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ABSTRACT 
Although much is heard from the Media of the Muslim `community' in Britain, 
the latter is in fact far from presenting a united front. There are divisions between 
generations and ethnic origins, and a diversity of religious practice and doctrine. 
There are many different religious groups at work that originate from the sub- 
continent, and reflect this wide range. Organisations like Young Muslims UK, 
Tabligh-i Jamaat, and schools of thought represented by the Deobandis and Barehvis, 
to name but four, play a vital role in the life of many Muslims. They both link them 
back to their roots in the subcontinent and influence the direction that Islam will take 
in Britain. 
The Muslim population in Britain is approaching two million. It is involved in a 
process of redefining itself as a minority in an alien culture. For the older generation 
the conflict has been cultural, their own ethnicity being under seige from the values 
of the receiving culture. Islam becomes an important ally of ethnic identity. For many 
Muslims born in Britain, however, the process is more complex. Their parents' values 
can seem as strange, or even stranger, than the values of the receiving culture. For 
this increasing percentage of the population, their religion can offer an identity. 
Stimulated by Islam's global revival and the West's reaction to it, some Muslims are 
attempting to discover a faith stripped of cultural accretions which are considered to 
be unlslamic. In the process they hope to find the universal Islam which can be prac- 
tised in any environment. They feel that this is the key to establishing a successful 
British Islamic community. 
The ideal of ammah has always been central in Islam, but now becomes an im- 
portant concept in the development of Islam in Britain. There are several questions to 
be considered: To what degree does an unmrah exist? What is its form? How is it 
likely to change? What effect will it have on the development of Muslims seeking a 
more localised identity in Britain? Within this context, what will be the effect of the 
various organisations and schools of thought at work amongst Muslims? To what 
degree will they shape the development of Islam in Britain? Are they free from 
'cultural accretion' or are they firmly rooted in idiosyncratic local expressions of the 
faith? Will Islam in Britain be moderate, or strongly revivalist in nature tinder their 
influence? Are they unifying or divisive forces? Can they hope to resolve traditional 
differences and work together in the new environment of Britain? 
In spite of the increasing interest in the Muslim presence in Britain, very few 
major works have looked at the influence of these various groups in the context of 
these questions. I know for myself that I could have used this kind of study when 
working for my M. A. in Religious Studies, and I know of many students in the same 
position. I feel that this study will therefore contribute not only to the study of Islam 
but also to the study of the various minority faiths found in Britain. 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
Aims and Objectives 
This thesis was written as a contribution to the Community Religions Project 
(CRP) as based in the Department of Theology and Religious Studies at the 
University of Leeds. The CRP studies contemporary minority faith communities in 
Britain and publishes a series of monographs and research papers. 1 I chose to do my 
M. A. in Religious Studies at the University of Leeds (1988) specifically because of 
the presence of the CRP. It was while researching an essay submitted in partial fulfil- 
ment for that degree, entitled `An attempt to isolate a uniquely religious dimension in 
the choices facing the Islamic minority as it comes to terms with living in Britain', 
that I first began to be interested in the themes explored in this thesis. 
My initial premise for that essay was that Muslim migrants of subcontinent origin 
would not necessarily follow the same pattern of development as the other minority 
faith communities originating from the same region. This is because Islam is neither a 
religion that began in the subcontinent nor is it centred in that region. It is a world re- 
ligion in the widest sense of the term, practised by many diverse ethnic groups and 
nationalities around the globe. Subcontinent Muslim; - migrants, although heavily in- 
fluenced by the culture of their original communities, also feel themselves to be a part 
of the worldwide Muslim ummah. Consequently, they. will be affected by changes and 
developments within Islam over a wide arena. 
It was in the context of exploring this idea that I became aware that some young 
British Muslims were asserting a religious identity as a self-conscious choice in order 
to cope with their situation in Britain. The majority of first generation migrants came 
from rural areas of the subcontinent. One of the problems involved in analysing the 
meaning of Islam in their lives is that it is very difficult, and sometimes impossible, 
to separate religion from ethnicity in the context of subcontinent village life. I agree 
with Eric Butterworth's comment in an early study that `life and belief are linked in 
an all-embracing way'2 in the traditional village background of many of the Muslim 
migrants. It is also undoubtedly true that many of the customs and beliefs of the sub- 
continent Muslim village have been imported into Britain, and are used to reinforce 
the ethnic distinctiveness of the various communities in reaction to an often hostile 
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receiving community. It is my contention, however, that despite the difficulties in 
separating religion from culture, it is precisely this process of separation that is be- 
ginning to take place. This is giving a uniquely religious dimension to the experience 
of many young British-born Muslims of subcontinent origin. This attempt to embrace 
Islam as a religious experience rather than as cultural heritage is providing increasing 
numbers of young Muslims with an alternative both to pressure to assimilate into the 
indigenous culture and to their parents' persuasion to conform to the various brands of 
imported ethnicity. 
This takes the thesis into an area of study of interest to some social scientists and, 
increasingly, scholars of Religious Studies, namely, the relationship between religion 
and ethnicity. Social scientists working in the field have tended to study religion as a 
constituent reinforcing ethnic identity3. Knott has stated that `there are times when re- 
ligion plays a more active role in the definition of an ethnic group's identity and be- 
haviour'. 4'The relevance of this statement is borne out when the role of Islam is ex- 
amined amongst Muslim migrants. The debate concerning the relationship between 
ethnicity and religion is not only of interest to social scientists and Religious Studies 
scholars, it is also an historically ongoing and emotionally charged issue within Islam 
itself. Throughout the Muslim world there have been attempts to rediscover the 
pristine faith of Islam by uprooting and destroying local cultural accretions which are 
deemed to be unislamic. This old debate within the faith has taken on new meaning 
for some British-born Muslims as they attempt to establish a community whose basis 
is faith rather than ethnic identity. Other Muslim migrants have sought to retain local 
expressions of their faith imported from the place of origin, and may well use their 
religious practices to reinforce their various ethnic identities. 
Various Islamic movements have been transferred from the subcontinent during 
the process of migration, and all of these groups have been historically engaged in the 
above debate. Membership of such groups will engage Muslim migrants not only in 
the historical debate within the context of the subcontinent but also in its new express- 
ion within the context of the development of Islam in Britain. It is my contention that 
this debate will become of increasing importance between British-born Muslims and 
first-generation migrants. The future of Islam in Britain obviously lies with the pre- 
sent and future British-born generations. They will need to resolve the problem of 
citizenship as negotiated between nationality, ethnicity, sectarian membership and 
identification with the worldwide Muslim untmah. This thesis seeks to clarify the 
above issue by assessing the probable impact of the key Islamic groups imported from 
the subcontinent upon Islam in Britain, with a particular emphasis on community. My 
contention is that the formation of a community seeking its identity in religion will be 
shaped by various other real and symbolic communities existing within the total popu- 
lation of Muslims in Britain. A community based on Islamic identity will need to 
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resolve issues generated from a complex relationship between the particular ideologies 
of various Islamic groups, the persistence of cultural/religious customs pertaining to 
ethnic identity, the identification with the historic umnah and its contemporary ex- 
pressions and, finally, expressions of identity arising out of other forms of social 
organisation created by the migration process, not necessarily unique to Muslims, 
which have been studied and defined by sociologists. 
Methodology: Research Strategies and Fieldwork 
This thesis utilises the Religious Studies approach to examine the processes 
through which subcontinent Muslims have transplanted Islam to Britain, and the con- 
sequent ongoing formation of Islam as a major minority faith community in this 
country. It acknowledges that many Muslims may seek ways of life extraneous to re- 
ligious commitment, but leaves this area of study to social scientists working in the 
field of migrant communities. As a Religious Studies scholar my concern is with the 
shape and form of the community developed by those to whom faith is central. 
It is essential that religion is studied both as an historical process and as a con- 
temporary mode of living which interacts with other areas of human concern. 5 In this 
context Knott observes that religion must be studied both diachronically and syn- 
chronically. 6 This is particularly important when studying the religions of ethnic mi- 
norities where there is a crucial interplay between historical developments in the 
country of origin and the new forms that the faith takes to express the often traumatic 
and dramatic process of settlement. To facilitate an understanding of these processes, 
Religious Studies utilises a multidiscipliary approach. This draws upon research un- 
dertaken in the fields of History, Islamic Studies, Sociology, Anthropology, Politics, 
Psychology, Theology, and Philosophy, to name only the main areas where I have 
searched for texts. The other important element of Religious Studies is that it is a 
non-confessional approach to the study of religion. In this respect it acknowledges the 
phenomenological ideal that the researcher should suspend judgement concerning the 
truth claims of the data under investigation. I agree with Philip Lewis that this is dif- 
ficult when some of the topics under scrutiny are highly emotive, both amongst Mus- 
lims themselves and within the wider community.? I have had to acknowledge my 
own deeply-held convictions on matters such as gender, colonialism, expressions of 
personal freedom, and religious belief. 
In order to achieve the above goals I have had to make a considerable study of the 
texts relating to the history of Islam in the subcontinent as well as those drawn from 
Islamic Studies. I have examined the substantial body of ethnographic material created 
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by anthropologists researching localised expressions of Islam both in the subcontinent 
and in Britain, and my own fieldwork draws heavily on this approach. 
There are many studies which examine Muslim communities within individual 
towns and cities throughout Britain and I acknowledge my debt to them. I decided, 
however, to seek a more overall British perspective. This was essential in order to 
determine if there was such an entity as the 'Muslim community', and if so, what 
forms it was taking. There are obviously as many dangers here as there are in gener- 
alising from local studies. I can more easily analyse national trends, but need to avoid 
overlooking the significance of local expressions of Islam. In order to establish both a 
national perspective and an awareness of the diversity of local expression I decided to 
spend periods (between two weeks and a month) undertaking fieldwork in key areas 
of Muslim settlement. I chose London, Leicester, Birmingham and the area around 
Leeds which includes large populations at Bradford, Batley and Dewsbury. My focus 
of attention was on members of the religious groups that I was investigating, but I 
also interviewed many Muslims who were not particularly affiliated with any groups 
plus members of other Islamic groups who are not studied here. This was done to as- 
certain the degree to which the concerns of the groups upon which I have focussed 
are of central significance to other Muslims outside of their membership. 
I chose Leicester and Birmingham as sites for in-depth participant observation 
study. Leicester has been a centre of activity for Jamaat-i Islami-inspired organisa- 
tions and is close to the Markfield conference centre which contains the Islamic Foun- 
dation and the national headquarters of Young Muslims UK. The concentrated 
presence of Muslims in the Alum Rock and Sparkbrook districts of Birmingham pro- 
vided a unique opportunity to observe the activities of all the groups I was interested 
in within a relatively small geographical space. I was especially interested in the vari- 
ous Sufi-inspired Bareht'i groups that were prominent in these two districts. Spark- 
brook also contained a Yemeni community living alongside the Muslims originating 
from the subcontinent. This provided the environment to examine the reality of claims 
for an Islamic identity which transcended ethnic origins put forward by activists of 
Young Muslims UK. In each of these locations I lived amongst Muslims, attending 
the mosques daily and spent considerable time enjoying the hospitality of my Muslim 
hosts in their own homes. I intentionally avoided the habits and contacts of my own 
lifestyle in order to experience the ambience of the Muslim communities. I believe 
that this was a successful strategy as the vast majority of contacts I made took me into 
their confidence and welcomed me. I thank them for this. Their hospitality was all the 
more remarkable as i took a deliberate decision not to make any advance arrange- 
ments for my arrival. I chose this spontaneous approach as a way of avoiding any 
animosity towards interrogative outsiders in the wake of the Rushdie affair. I felt con- 
fident that my familarity and affection with the culture of the subcontinent gained by 
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my considerable periods of time spent in Pakistan and India would be acknowledged 
and overcome any doubts concerning my motives. However, this strategy did not 
meet with success everywhere. Both in Britain and in the subcontinent, some 
organisations and institutions were deeply suspicious of my interest in them, notably 
those where there was a strong Deobandi/Tabligh-i Jamuat interconnection. 
I carried out many interviews both of a formal and informal nature. Although I 
prepared some necessary questions in advance, I allowed the interviews to be flexible, 
and was always prepared to explore unexpected avenues of interest. Many of the for- 
mal interviews were with leaders of the groups tinder study. I was aware that this 
could heavily bias my findings on two accounts: I was receiving the official view, 
and most of the leaders were first-generation migrants. I also needed to find out the 
views of the younger generation who were not usually in the position of leadership. I 
considered the idea of questionaires but dropped it for practical and methodological 
reasons. I decided, finally, to conduct a series of informal interviews with the 
younger generation and rank-and-file members. These interviews were undertaken 
after formal meetings with the leaders. They often took place over meals, in cafes, in 
homes, or sitting on the floor of the mosque. The discussions were lively and allowed 
me to check the information provided in formal meetings with community leaders. 
Before undertaking research in Britain I spent six weeks in Pakistan and India in 
order to observe those movements which I was studying, in their place of origin. I 
was particularly interested to discover changes that had taken place in transporting the 
movements to Britain. I spent time at Mansurah in Lahore, the national headquarters 
of Jainaat-i Island in Pakistan. I visited the tombs of several prominent Sufi saints, 
and also travelled to Mirpur, the place of origin of so many Muslims in Britain. I 
then moved on to India, and stayed in the Deoband dar al-Ulum before visiting the 
Barehvi dar al-Uluin in Bareilly, Nudwah in Lucknow, the national headquarters of 
Jainaat-i Island Hind and the world headquarters of Tahligh-i Janmat in Nizzamud- 
din, the last two of which are both situated in Delhi. In general, I observed the same 
methodological practices as described above for research undertaken in Britain. 
Like Barton, I am acutely aware of the problem of gender when undertaking 
research projects amongst subcontinent Muslim populations. 8 All male researchers are 
confronted by the restrictions imposed by the varying degrees of purdah existing in 
Muslim society. Wherever possible I have attempted to determine the position of 
women on the various issues under discussion. This was achieved by interviewing 
Muslim women themselves in such groups as Young Muslims UK or the equivalent 
youth organisations in India and Pakistan. I was also able to meet with some older 
women in Birmingham who were involved with education in the Central Mosque. I 
was aware that all these women were highly educated and middle class. They all 
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worked in professions such as teaching and medicine. It was impossible to gain access 
to the vast majority of Muslim women, especially those involved with the Deobandi 
or Bare/wi school of thought. In order to find out anything about their involvement in 
those groups I had to rely on the accounts of men, and the evidence of my own eyes. 
My other limitation was language. I am not a linguist or a scholar of Islamic 
Studies. Although I attempted to correct this by studying Arabic with first-year B. A. 
students in the Arabic department of the University of Leeds, my efforts were 
doomed to failure because of the demands created by the workload. My lack of 
knowledge of Arabic and my very limited knowledge of Urdu denied me access to 
considerable information. This was particularly true during my stay in the sub- 
continent. My interviews were either with those who spoke English or were limited to 
the vagaries of well-meaning translators. I am aware that this confined my investiga- 
tions to the more educated sections of the community. I was unable to gain informa- 
tion from the kind of informal conversations that were going on around me. Con- 
siderable data could also have been collected on the subject of ummalz and other cen- 
tral themes by listening to the Friday sermons of iznanns in the mosques of Britain. 
Transcription and Technical Terms 
I am not a linguist and therefore transliteration from Arabic and Urdu was prob- 
lematic. In arriving at the following solution I acknowledge my debt to Neil North at 
the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations and to the advice of 
one of my two supervisors, Dr. Neal Robinson. 9 
My first problem before even considering how to transliterate was when to use 
Arabic or Urdu variations for Islamic religious or cultural terms. In my textual-based 
study, most of the terms I needed to use were transliterated from Arabic but there was 
still considerable variety of spelling as utilised by different authors. Once I began my 
fieldwork I discovered that most of the Arabic terms had Urdu variations which were 
more often used by subcontinent Muslims. As Neil North has pointed out, 'Urdu has 
a special prestige as a language for religious affairs and is common in most mosques 
and madrasahs'. 10 The problem here is that there is no common transliteration system 
used for Urdu by Muslims in Britain. After considerable thought I decided to keep it 
as simple as possible. Essentially I use the transliteration of Arabic according to the 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, and maintain that spelling throughout the thesis unless I 
need to use an Urdu variation for proper names. Thus 'madrasa' remains 'ntadrasa' 
unless the Urdu variations of 'madrasah' or 'madrassah' are used in the names of ac- 
tual schools. The same applies to 'Dar al-Ulum'. I acknowledge the Urdu variations 
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of 'Ramadan' to 'Ramazan', 'Adhan' to 'Azun', 'Dhikr to Zikr', but choose to main- 
tain the Arabic transliteration throughout unless quoting from sources using the Urdu 
variation. There are some exceptions to this rule in deference to the main area of 
study in this thesis, and so, in a few cases, I follow the customary Urdu variation. I 
therefore prefer to use 'sheikh' rather 'sheikh', a 'q' for 'k', and a final 'h' for the 
Arabic 'ha' and 'te inarhuta'. Occasionally I have had to use Urdu terms spoken lo- 
cally which have no Arabic equivalent. Where this is the case, as in 'namuz' or 
'julus', I maintain the Urdu and do not provide an Arabic equivalent in the glossary. 
Generally, in order to respect the high regard of subcontinent Muslims for Urdu, the 
glossary of terms will contain both the Arabic and Urdu variation. The Urdu trans- 
literation will follow the Ferozson's Urdu English Dictionary. II 
In accordance with Neil North's advice, wherever possible I pluralise Islamic 
terms by adding an 's'. Where this is clumsy in pronounciation as in '/tadit/t' or 
'hafiz', the same form is used for both singular and plural. I do, however, distin- 
guish between the singular 'alim' and the plural 'ulema'. There are no changes to 
reflect Arabic grammatical constructions. Consequently, there are no subscript dots or 
diacritical marks and no superscripts to denote long and short vowels. The 'hamzah' 
and 'air' are indicated by apostrophes. This simplification should not cause undue dis- 
tress to Arabic readers who, I hope, will be tolerant of my lack of knowledge of the 
language and the difficulties involved with computer keyboards. 
Translations of the Qur'an follow Abdullah Yusef Alit' unless I have quoted from 
a source which utilises a different translation. In such cases, the endnote will indicate 
the source from which I have quoted rather than which version of the Qur'an was 
used. 
There are two terms used which are controversial to many Muslims and could 
cause offense. These are 'sectarian' and 'fundamentalism'. I acknowledge Muslim ob- 
jections to both terms. I have used 'sectarian influences' in my title to describe what 
Philip Lewis more accurately and diplomatically calls 'the development of distinct 
maslak, discrete schools of Islamic thought and practice'. 13 I am aware that this is a 
sensitive issue as there are Hudit/t in which the Prophet warns that the umnah will be 
divided by sects. Obviously, no Islamic organisation would define itself as a sect or 
wish to be defined as a sect. However, I maintain that there are tendencies in those 
schools of thought which are sectarian, even while I acknowledge that the nutslaks are 
not sects within Islam. This is argued throughout the thesis and is central to acknowl- 
edging the impact of these groups upon the ideal of umnah. It is not my intention to 
cause offense, but I cannot shy away from sensitive issues which are central to the 
question under scrutiny. 
I am even more sympathetic to the Muslim objection to the term 
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'fundamentalism', a term used frequently by the media to describe any attempt by 
devout Muslims to practice their faith that does not conform to the secular 
philosophy. This loose and derogatory use of the term could be applied to all the 
Muslims involved in the groups studied in this thesis since Islam occupied the central 
place in their world-view. This is obviously nonsense. After considerable thought I 
decided to keep the term. Where it occurs, it is used in a specialised sociological 
sense and therefore has to be defined. I have drawn upon the work of Hadden and 
Shupe14 and also that of Lawrence. 15 Hadden and Shupe define 'global fundamen- 
talism' as a 'pattern of many contemporary socio-political movements that share 
certain characteristics in their responses to a common globalisation process which may 
be described as secularisation'. 16 Secularisation is defined as the process whereby re- 
ligion is increasingly 'compartmentalised from other institutionalised splleres'. 17 Had- 
den and Shupe define the common characteristics of these groups as resistance to 
secularisation, a refutation of both the sacred and the secular spheres that have 
evolved with modernisation, and a coherent ideology which seeks to bring religion 
back to the centre stage in public as well as private life. In order to achieve this, the 
fundamentalist groups need to claim authority over a sacred tradition 'which is to be 
reinstated as the antidote for a society which has strayed from its cultural moor- 
ings'. 18 Lawrence adds an important contribution to this definition by stating that 
there is a 'peculiar tension' which exists in fundamentalist organisations. This tension 
is generated by the fact that they accept the benefits of modernity, particularly 
through the use of technology, whilst rejecting modernism as a ideological frame- 
work. Thus fundamentalism is a modern phenomenon which attacks the ideology of 
modernism. 19 
Title and Contents 
I have already defended the use of the term 'sectarian influences' in the title of 
the thesis. This term defines the impact of the maslaks transplanted from the sub- 
continent on the Muslim ummah as expressed in Britain. I have used 'Islam within 
Britain' rather than 'British Islam' although the latter term was often used by some of 
my interviewees; this is because other Muslims have pointed out that there can be no 
such thing as 'British Islam' as Islam is a universal faith. Finally, I have used both 
'uninah' and 'community' in my title because I believe that Muslim migrant express- 
ions of Islam will be influenced not only by concepts arising out of the ideal of 
ummah, but also by other types of community originating from their Muslim past, 
ethnic origin, and unique status as migrants. 
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This differentiation between 'rnnmah' and 'community' is acknowledged in the 
opening chapters. Chapter II attempts to analyse the origins of the term 'ummah' in 
the Qur'an and the historical development of the ummah as a cultural/symbolic 
phenomenon with obvious political overtones. Stresses and strains upon the ideal unity 
of the ummah are explored along with pragmatic Muslim solutions. Chapter III ex- 
plores some sociological ideas about community and also offers a sociological inter- 
pretation of ummah. This was necessary in order to demonstrate that Muslim migrants 
are not only members of the ummah but also belong to other types of community 
which have arisen through the migration process. I wanted to show that the formation 
of the Muslim community in Britain would be influenced by both the ideal of uunnah 
and the reality of other types of community as have been investigated by social 
scientists. Having provided this frame of reference, in Chapter IV I examine the 
situation of Muslims in Britain. I have tried to analyse the tensions existing in the 
transplantation of Islam from the subcontinent by setting up a series of dichotomies as 
observed within the Muslim community. The intention of this approach is that each of 
the groups studied may be examined to see whether or not they resolve these con- 
flicts. Thus their impact on the future of Islam in Britain may be ascertained. Chap- 
ters V to XI focus on the particular Islamic groups or movements under examination. 
Each group has a chapter which explores its origins in the subcontinent and another 
chapter which examines its development in Britain. Chapters V and VI look at the 
Barehvi strand of Islam. I begin with this movement as it can be argued that the type 
of Islam represented by the Barehvi tradition is the norm in the rural areas of the sub- 
continent (although I acknowledge that Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi organised the 
beliefs of this strand of Islam into a coherent movement responding to the success of 
the Deohandi critique). The various movements studied in the following chapters 
represent historical attempts to reform that tradition. Chapters VII and VIII examine 
the origins and development of the reform movement through to its institutional ex- 
pression in the nineteenth century tinder the name 'Deohandi'. Chapter IX focusses on 
the main expressions of Deobandi tradition in Britain. Finally Chapters X and XI 
study the twentieth century ideological expression of the reform ideal, the socio- 
political/religious group called Jamaat-i Island, in its subcontinent manifestation. 
Chapter XII concludes the thesis. 
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Chapter II 
UMMAH -- THE CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY IN ISLAM 
Nu'man Ibn Bashir said, `I heard the Messenger of God, may God bless him and give 
him peace, say "the Muslims in their mutual affection and mercy should be as a single 
body; if one member is affected, the other members suffer fever and sleeplessness"'. I 
Millions of Muslims and some prominent orientalists2 portray Islam as a transna- 
tional community that transcends ethnic, racial, linguistic and national identities. It is 
argued that membership of the Islamic ummah confers on the individual, be they male 
or female, rich or poor, black or white, a belonging which is based on the equality of 
all believers before Allah. To be a member of this community of faith, all that is 
necessary is a confession of the Shahadah. 3 The Islamic perspective of community, 
unlike that of many western sociologists, 4 does not have a spatial limitation; the 
ummah incorporates the totality of all Muslims regardless of where they live. A Mus- 
lim may be living in a non-Muslim state, but that does not nullify membership of the 
worldwide ummah. It is the only community to which a Muslim belongs simply by 
virtue of being a Muslim. For millions of human beings, membership of the ummah 
happened through the fact of being born. 
The ideal of the ummah, then, is that of a community bound together by its belief 
in one God, Allah, and in the message conveyed to mankind by His prophet Muham- 
mad. The purpose of the ummah is to act as a witness for Allah to mankind through 
the example of obedient worship and through the relation of its members to each 
other. The ummah is an indivisible organisation which is responsible for upholding 
the true faith and for instructing mankind in the revealed way of God as contained in 
the Qur'an and the Sunna of the Prophet. 
At the beginning of Islam's history, membership of the ummah supplanted the 
powerful communal tribal solidarity of the Arabs as the strongest identity of the indi- 
vidual in relation to society. 5 Once Islam was established, it carried out a major 
change in the area of law and order. Islamic law, which was based on the injunctions 
Qv (-a` e-' remodelled and often replaced customary tribal laws. 6 The ummah can 
0ý4. ýZ- I 
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be described as a community which grew out of the process of obedience to Islamic 
law. The ummah is ruled by Allah. His sovereignty is real and immediate. He con- 
trols the ummah through His commands as revealed to Muhammad and written in the 
Qur'an.? These commands are the Law and Constitution of the ummah. 8 Con- 
sequently, the concept of the ummah has had in the past and still maintains in the pre- 
sent a profound effect upon the political dimension of Islam. Guided by the word of 
God and the actions of His Prophet, the ummah has a moral mission to create a new 
social order based on faith and obedience. Muhammad and the early Muslim com- 
munity are seen as exemplifying this ideal, creating from the tribes of Mecca and 
Medina a socially just society that was free from exploitation. This ideal has supplied 
a rationale for political and moral activism. 9 It is reasonable to argue that it is the 
ideal of the solidarity of the ummah, or threats to its apparent unity, which have been 
Islam's major contribution to the political sphere. 
The uminah is held together not by any formal organisation but by a collective act 
of will, inspired by personal conviction and embodied in the ritual duty of daily 
prayer, the month-long fast of Ramadan and the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. Five 
times a day, millions of Muslims face Mecca, all at the same time, to observe the 
same ritual prayers. This core of shared ritual practices combined with observance of 
the Shari'ah is integral to Muslim life, and creates the bonds that tie together the 
ummah. 
Despite the ideal held by many Muslims of a single, divinely revealed and united 
Islam, there have been and continue to be diverse interpretations of Islam. It is an 
historical fact that the community was already torn by dissent and split into factions 
within the lifetime of the first generation of believers. The initial division occurred 
over the issue of the leadership of the ummah. 10 As will be seen, the Qur'an offers 
no single definition of ummah, and so other divisions were created concerning the na- 
ture and shape of the community itself. Major stress was also placed on the ummah 
by the spread of the Arab empire and its attendant rapid incorporation of older, more 
sophisticated cultures into the fold of Islam. 11 In recent history, Muslims have had to 
face the challenge of European culture and values. In particular, the ideologies of na- 
tionalism and secularism have provoked a strong reaction from many segments of the 
Muslim world. The ideal of the ummah as a united, indivisible, transnational com- 
munity has been developed by some modern Islamic thinkers to resist the pervasive 
influence of these two western concepts. In spite of the attempts of Muslim scholars 
and theologians to deal with these historical crises by claiming political and social 
unity of the ummah in Islam's history, 12 it is debatable whether the ummah ever ac- 
tually existed in this form after the Prophet's death except as a symbol of cohesion in. 
the psyche of the faithful. 
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The Qur'an 
It is necessary to begin the search for the Islamic concept of community in the 
Qur'an. It is not the intention here, however, to enter into an etymological analysis 
of the Arabic word `ummah' or to examine how it is used in the poetry of pre-Islamic 
Arab culture, but rather to demonstrate how the concept of uminah is developed in the 
Qur'an. Whatever the origins of the word, the term was taken up by Muhammad and 
acquired a specific Islamic meaning. The term `ummah' occurs sixty-four times in 
the Qur'an (see Appendix A), and its plural form `umam' is used thirteen times. 13 
The passages in the Qur'an where the terms `ummah' or its plural 'umain' actually 
occur are so varied that it is often difficult to define the precise meaning implied. 
Regardless of the variety of ways in which the term is used, however, it seems always 
to apply to an ethical or religious body of people with whom God works in history to 
fulfil the divine plan for salvation. 14 With three exceptions, 15 it always refers to a 
group of people who constitute a religious/moral community. 
The variety of ways in which the term `ummah' is used in the Qur'an would sug- 
gest that the revelations were addressed to those who were perplexed by the problem 
of religious disunity amongst mankind (Yunus 10: 19; Al-Anbiyaa 21: 92,93; Al- 
Muminun 23: 52,53), and developing towards the Islamic concept of community as 
Muhammad's mission proceeded through setbacks to success (Al-Imran 3.110). 
Frederick Denny16 argues that there is a progression from Mecca to Medina towards 
the full-blown concept of the ummah as representing the Muslim community. Fazlur 
Rahman17 agrees that the theological problem was not resolved until the Medinan pe- 
riod when the Muslim community was formally established as the ideal community, 
but argues that even in Mecca, the Prophet wished to unite the various communities 
of the AN al-Kitab into one single religious community which acknowledged his 
prophethood. It would appear that as Muhammad gradually came to understand the 
strength of the differences between the adherents of the earlier monotheistic faiths 
and the degree of their divisions into various sects, he realised that this would not 
occur. 
Initially in the period of Muhammad's preaching to the Meccans, the Qur'an does 
not mention separate or exclusive communities. 18 Al-An'am 6: 38, Al-A'raf 7.38 and 
Al-Ahgaf 46.18 suggest that all living creatures (even the jinn) constitute ummahs, 
but always there is an implication of salvation and judgement. Al-An'am 6: 108 and 
Al-A'raf 7: 34 state that every ummah is brought to judgement. 
More specifically, the term is used to describe a community to whom God has 
revealed his presence and purpose in order to guide them to the right path. Some 
members of that community will have obeyed and some will have disobeyed, but all 
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will be judged on the basis of their response to the revelation. In Al An'am 6: 42, 
Yunus 10: 47 and Ar-Ra'd 13: 30 the Qur'an warns of the fate awaiting those com- 
munities which do not heed the message. In these verses it is also possible to trace a 
connection that is being made between an ummah and a Messenger. An-Nahl 16: 36, 
16: 63 and Al- Muminun 23: 44 appear to define ummah as a people to whom a Mes- 
senger has been sent, and often rejected. 
In the above, 19 there is no suggestion that ummah means those who have ac- 
cepted Muhammad and embraced Islam. The term `ummah' is still being used to des- 
cribe complete communities or peoples who have been specially chosen to receive 
God's message. Within the ummah, some will choose to reject the message and some 
will choose to accept it (Fatir 35: 32). The Qur'an states that every community has 
received a Messenger to remind them of their obligation to God and to warn them of 
the consequences of forgetfulness and disobedience. Every community which ignored 
God's message and His Messenger, we are told, was replaced by a succeeding com- 
munity (An-Nahl 23: 44). The arrival of each new prophet then began a new ummah, 
and marked the end of the previous one. On the Day of Judgement, God will call His 
Messengers to be witnesses against those who denied the truth in their respective um- 
mahs (Al Muminun 23: 44). 
In this Sura the Qur'an indicates that some ummahs are sent a book as well as a 
prophet. Islamic theology differentiates between the Messengers of Allah on the basis 
of whether or not they are given a book to reveal. Those who were given a book are 
called rasul (messenger); those who were not are called nadhir (warner). The com- 
munities which received both a messenger and a book are seen as definitive com- 
munities; they are known as the AN al-Kitab (the people of the book). Primarily 
these are the Jews and the Christians. 
In Medina the term `ummah' seems to be used exclusively to describe the `people 
of the Book'. The Qur'an uses the term `ummah' in a modified sense when referring 
to these communities. Instead of calling the totality of the Jews and Christians an 
ummah, only the righteous and obedient amongst them are described as such. Here 
ummah is used to describe smaller groups within larger communities (AI-Imran 
3: 113, AI-Ma'idah 5: 66, Al-A'raf 7: 159). 
Just as God has sent a messenger to every community, so he has established a rite 
for each community as well. In the above passages the Jews and Christians who con- 
stitute an ummah are seen as those who follow their given rites. The ummah is more 
than religious identity; set forms of worship are the outward and visible expressions 
of submission and obedience. The rituals of prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage ensure 
that an ummah is kept upon the straight path. Thus a true ummah is one which stead- 
fastly and regularly, by day and by night, worships God through the required rites 
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(Al-Baqarah 2: 128, Al-Hajj 22: 67,22: 34, Al-Ma'idah 5: 48). The revelations of the 
Qur'an appear to be working their way towards developing the concept of the ummah 
as follows: a community of believers united in their common worship of God in the 
prescribed form as revealed through the Messenger, who in this case is Muhammad 
(At-Tauba 9: 71). 
Having used the term `ummah' to separate out the righteous amongst the AN al- 
kitab (AI-Imran 3: 113), the Qur'an accuses these communities of dividing themselves 
into sects and warns the Muslims to avoid the same error. It is clear that God does 
not tolerate the fragmentation of the ummah, and commands unity of cult and faith 
(Al-Muminun 23; 52,53). Here already the Muslims are being described as an ummah 
in their own right. 20 By the Medinan period, the Qur'an is using the term to describe 
the Muslims as the latest recipients of revelation (Al-Imran 3: 110). It is not until the 
late Meccan or early Medinan period that Muhammad begins to define the ummah as 
the Muslim community. It is probably not until Medina that the concept of ummah as 
a religious community reaches its most developed stage. In the Meccan suras the 
term `ummah' can be used to describe a people that rejected God's Messenger who 
was sent to them, but in Medina the term is used exclusively to describe the Muslims 
as `the ummah par excellence'. 21 Those who follow the message of the Qur'an, 
cacring out its commandments and worshipping according to its prescribed rites, living 
by its code of life and obeying the last and final Prophet, Muhammad, constitute a 
model ummah (Ummah Wusta). This Ummah Wusta or Ummah Muslimah is defined 
as a model for all mankind. It is a witness to mankind just as Muhammad is the wit- 
ness to the Muslims themselves of God's manifest will (Al-Baqarah 2: 143). This 
ummah replaces all the ummahs which preceded it. It is the recipient of the last and 
final revelation, the final form of ummah. 
This fully formed and Godly umnah, then, is a moral community which not only 
hears the Law but upholds and enforces it (Al-Imran 3: 110). A Godly ummah is 
obedient and faithful, and according to the Qur'an it is bound to be successful (Al- 
Imran 3: 179). The righteous ummah is the saved ummah. As far back as the early 
Meccan period, however, the Qur'an warns that even within the ummah of believers 
there will be varying reactions to the message. There will be those who will fall 
away; there will be those who are half-hearted (Fatir 35: 32). 
One verse of the Qur'an highlights this problem and appears to offer the solution 
to it when it uses `ummah' in a specialised sense. Although usually the term `umrnah' 
applies to the totality of the Muslims, it is also used to mean a righteous group of be- 
lievers who have been selected from the wider community and who are charged with 
the duty of inviting other Muslims to obedience. This righteous and faithful ummah 
within the wider ummah functions as a guide and arbiter (Al-Imran 3.104). This par- 
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ticular passage could be used as a justification for sectarianism in Islam. A self- 
defined righteous group within the wider community could draw upon this passage to 
make the claim that they were the true `ummah'. 22 
Mecca and Medina 
The above analysis of umrnah in the Qur'an demonstrates how the concept 
changed and developed throughout the Meccan and Medinan period. It would appear 
that in the beginning, Muhammad saw the ummah as a people to whom the prophet or 
messenger was sent. The Qur'an defines urnrnah as a community of believers, and 
the Meccan suras as recited before the Hijra already use the term in this way. This 
conception of the urnrnah developed at the foundation of Islam in Mecca, and was 
then fully developed in Medina. 
Muhammad's first followers in Mecca forsook kith and kin out of loyalty to Islam 
and its Prophet. This came about as their increasing faith in the oneness of God and 
the prophethood of Muhammad began to transcend their loyalty to tribe and clan 
when opposed by them. The transformation to a separate community was probably 
gradual, occurring slowly and organically as those who were attracted to Muham- 
mad's message and ideas began to join him in worship. Montgomery Watt suggests 
that in the early stages these people would not have been distinct from the rest of the 
Meccan population. As opposition developed against them, however, the first Mus- 
lims would have become increasingly isolated, and they would have been forced to 
fall back on each other's resources. 23 In this way a separate community identity 
grew, and a bond of unity was forged that was welded together by persecution, a 
common faith, and a shared moral outlook. The introduction of common ritual 
prayers would have cemented this union. The early converts thus came to see their 
companions in the faith as belonging to one family under the sovereignty of Allah, 
regardless of their worldly status. 
It is not surprising that the urnrnah took on a political dimension. The Arab tribes 
were a cohesive social unit, and there was a marked degree of communal solidarity 
based on tribal membership. Prior to the commencement of Muhammad's preaching, 
this solidarity was beginning to break up under the pressures of commercial 
prosperity. 24 The Meccan merchants were adopting a more individualistic mode of 
life based on personal wealth and competition. 25 Right from the beginning, Islam's 
message was relevant to the social and political organisation of the community; eco- 
nomic injustices and unethical commercial practices were strongly denounced. 26 
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Muhammad preached a redistribution of wealth as based on spending money for the 
communal good, explaining that this was a way to please Allah. 27 He stressed the 
need to feed the poor and to protect the weak in the community from oppression. 
Once the system of Zakat was introduced in Medina, it would have helped to rein- 
force fraternal feelings of mutual affection. 28 Thus Islam restored the feeling of 
communal solidarity that was beginning to break down in Mecca, but attached it to 
the growing community of believers rather than to the tribe. This momentum towards 
unity was reinforced by injunctions in the Qur'anic revelation. In this way did the 
ummah begin in Mecca. 
In Medina the uminah developed into a community which incorporated an 
organised political life; a society based on tribal loyalty, laws and customs was 
replaced by a religiously bonded community that was governed by God's law. In an 
extraordinary document named `The Constitution of Medina' (see Appendix B), the 
term `ummah' appears for the first time in Muslim history outside of the suras of the 
Qur'an. It begins: 
This is the writing of - 
Muhammad the Prophet between the 
believers and Muslims of the Quraysh and ' Yathrib, and those 
who follow them and are attached to them and crusade along with them. 
They are a single UMMAH distinct from other people. 29 
The document was drawn up to establish and confirm Muhammad's legal and 
political position in Medina; 30 Muhammad himself is unequivocally described as the 
Prophet. 31 It establishes the relationship between the Muslims and the tribes of the 
city, including the Jewish claims. 32 `Ummah' is used to describe a people sharing the 
same features and agreeing to the same conditions. These features are outlined and 
they define the membership of the ummah in terms of belief in Allah. 33 This shared 
attitude regulates their relationship with each other and to the rest of Medinan society. 
The Hijra had already fractured loyalty to blood ties as it removed the Muslims 
physically from their kinfolk. The most remarkable aspect of the Constitution is that 
it completely negates that sovereign concept of blood ties which lies so much at the 
root of all pre-Muslim Arabian values. It prepares the way for a theocratic, 
supratribal community which will become a universal community of believers and 
which will include non-Arabs in its ranks. 
The revolutionary aspect of the Constitution was its insistence that from hence- 
forth, faith should be the criteria for community membership. In Medina, Muham- 
mad was able to consolidate his position and to insist upon his dictum that Islam must 
take precedence over all other loyalties. Once Islam began to grow in strength, the 
-19- 
key division in society became that of believer and unbeliever rather than inter-tribal 
conflict. 34 The document demonstrates, however, that Muhammad did not attempt to 
abolish the old tribal constitutions, but rather that he expanded and reformed them in 
order to make them relevant to the larger community of Islam. 35 Ultimate authority 
was now no longer seen as resting with the tribal leaders and the collective voice of 
the people, but rather with Allah and Muhammad. 36 There was to be no division of 
church and state, and Muhammad was to be recognised as deriving his political 
and religious power from his office as Prophet of Allah. 37 
The period in Medina was the turning point in Muhammad's life. No longer the 
despised irritator of the Meccan merchants, he was now accepted as an honoured 
statesman and a Prophet of God. Islam developed from a religious belief amongst the 
Arab tribes into initially a community that governed all aspects of life, and finally 
into the state itself. The Medinan suras of the Qur'an are noticeable for their length 
and their emphasis on laws controlling the operation of society. There are religious 
laws regulating fasting, almsgiving, prayer and the pilgrimage to Mecca. 38 There are 
also social and political rules which deal with marriage, divorce, inheritance, rights of 
women, and the treatment of slaves and prisoners of war. 39 In Medina Muhammad 
finally broke with Judaism and Christianity, defining them as older ummahs which 
had already received their revelation but which had gone astray from it. 40 The Mus- 
lim ummah was now declared by Qur'anic revelation to be the recipient of the latest, 
best and final revelation from Allah. 41 It is in Medina that the uniquely Muslim reli- 
gious customs of setting aside Friday, fasting during the month of Ramadan, the 
Adhan, the Hajj, the Qibla, and the Salat are all established. 42 It is impossible to 
over-emphasise the importance of these customs in the cementing of the new com- 
munity, from the beginning right down to the present day. 
Out of the religious community of Medina grew the larger state of Islam. It was 
the first attempt in Arabian history to form a social organisation that was based upon 
religion. Everyone accepting Islam, regardless of their tribal affiliation, were now 
seen as brothers and sisters in the faith, at least in principle. This state of unity was 
doubtless true of the first converts of Mecca and Medina, but problems were to arise 
with Islam's rapid success. In the beginning individuals or even tribes embraced 
Islam out of genuine conviction, but success would have encouraged whole tribes to 
join for reasons of convenience or political expediency. As the Arab empire spread 
this problem became more acute, with conquered nations and civilisations having to 
be incorporated into the Islamic fold. Muhammad had succeeded, however, in creat- 
ing a community which would grip the imagination of generations of devout Muslims. 
It is said that even on his deathbed Muhammad's last concern was for the solidarity of 
the ummah. 43 
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The Umayyad and Abbasid Dynasties 
As far as is known, there was unity within the community during Muhammad's 
lifetime. If conflict occurred, Muhammad would have been able to use his authority 
and status to resolve it. After his death, however, tension was generated amongst the 
Muslims over the issue of leadership. Out of this issue arose the first and major split 
in the Islamic community: the Shia and Sunni division. Although the Shia were 
Islam's first sect, there will be no attempt to explore their development here. This 
analysis of ummah will remain with developments that took place in the main branch 
of Sunni Islam. It is sufficient to note that although most Muslims acknowledge the 
period of the rule of the four Caliphs that followed immediately after Muhammad's 
death as the continuation of his ideal Muslim community, major rifts did in fact occur 
over who had the right to lead the ummah. 44 From very early on we find the leaders 
of the Islamic state having to use force to repress sectarian tendencies and inter-tribal 
conflict. 45 The rulers of the Umwaw. yads relied on Islam for legitimacy, 46 and Islamic 
beliefs and values became the official code for personal and public life throughout the 
empire. The Umayyad caliphs appointed themselves defenders of the faith. 47 As the 
Umayyad empire expanded it underwent the process of centralisation and mili- 
tarisation; this process alienated many groups in Muslim society. 48 
Although in theory all Muslims were equal before God, Watt argues that until the 
end of the Umayyad d, ynasty the ummah was perceived as a federation of Arab 
tribes. 49 Goldziher this ideal: he suggests that the Umayyads' view of 
Islam was political in that `it had united the Arabs and led them to rule a world 
empire'. 50 In reality the empire was divided into four separate classes. The first two 
comprised the ummah. The social elite of the ummah were the Arabs, particularly 
those who had been companions of the Prophet. 51 After this came the non-Arab con- 
verts to Islam. Initially these were attached to an Arab tribe as clients (Mawali), and 
until the end of the Umayyad dynasty this seems to have been the only way in which 
they could be received as full citizens of the Islamic state. 52 They were apparently 
treated as second class members of the ummah, and were expected to continue paying 
taxes that were not levied on the Arab Muslims. 53 The last two classes were the 
dhimmi and the slaves. 54 The admission of increasing numbers of non-Arabs into the 
ummah created considerable tension; they objected to the preferential treatment 
received by the Arab Muslims and regarded their lesser status as a denial of their 
rights in Islam. 55 
The non-Arab Muslims were not the only discontented section of society. Many 
Arab nomadic tribes objected to the increasing bureaucratisation and centralisation of 
the Urnayyad dynasty. To the east of the empire, a distinctively Persian political 
structure had combined the culture of their ancient civilisation with Islamic doc- 
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trines. 56 To the west, the empire was expanding into Egypt and North Africa. These 
outer frontiers also began to object to tight central control. 57 Pious Muslims also 
viewed with deep suspicion the opulent and luxurious lifestyle of their rulers, seeing 
this as a grave departure from the Islamic way of life. 58 
Because of the religious basis of the Islamic community, any divisions have al- 
ways tended to be justified at the theological level, and the leaders of the community 
have looked to religious solutions to restore unity. Besides the major division between 
Sunni and Shia, the other important sectarian group of the time was the Kharijites. 59 
In common with the other major schools of thought, the Khari fites' central concern 
was with the make-up of the community. They had a radically different concept of 
the nature of the ummah. 60 Observing the un-Islamic lifestyle of the rulers, the 
Khari fites espoused a rigorous and committed asceticism that was lived in the spirit 
of egalitarianism. 61 They were pious believers who interpreted the Qur'an literally. 62' 
They believed in the principle of demonstrating faith with action, and they detested 
hypocrisy. 63 They decided that a Muslim's public actions must conform with Islamic 
principles if he is to be included in the ummah. 64 Sinners, i. e. those who are dis- 
obedient to the teachings of the Qur'an, should either repent or be regarded as 
apostates guilty of treason against the ummah. 65 This treason was punishable by 
death, 66 and all true believers were obliged to fight against these nominal or self- 
styled Muslims. 67 The Khari fites withdrew from the wider Muslim society and lived 
together in a community which was supposed to be modelled on the life of the 
Prophet and the first Muslims in Medina. 68 From these armed encampments they 
waged jihad against the jahiliyya of the Umayyads. 69 
The Murji'ites countered the Kharijite position. They argued that the decision as 
to whether a Muslim belonged to `the people of paradise' or `the people of hell' could 
only be made at the Day of Judgement by Allah himself. 70 Lawbreakers could be 
punished, but they could not be excluded from the ummah. 71 The Prophet would 
eventually intercede on behalf of even those Muslims who were in hell; they would 
eventually be forgiven and enter paradise. 72 All Muslims would in the end reach par- 
adise simply because they. were members of the Islamic ummah. 73 Although the 
Murji'ite conception of the ummah is the traditional one found in Islam to the present 
day, the Khari Fite ideal of the righteous minority that forms the true ummah is still 
influential amongst many Islamic reform and revivalist groups. 
The Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties represent a period of exciting developments 
in Islam that arose partly out of questions concerning the nature of the ummah and 
who should have control over it. Dabashi argues that this period marks the beginning 
of the process of institutionalisation of Muhammad's original charismatic lead- 
ership. 74 There was intensive analysis of the relationship between religion and 
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politics. Obviously control of the ummah was a political issue, but many different 
groups of the devout were not prepared to leave the moral and religious guidance of 
Muslims to the whims of often irreligious rulers. Sunni scholars were concerned to 
establish a theory of the Caliphate which clarified the relationship of the Caliph to the 
uminah. The Arab concept of the Sunna, which had become one of the central con- 
cepts of Islamic law, was under intense scholastic scrutiny towards the end of the 
Umayyad period. 75 The scholars were concerned to know whether or not the custom- 
ary laws conformed to the Qur'an. Many of these scholars were the same pious Mus- 
lims who objected to the lifestyle of the Umayyad rulers. 76 It was their interest in re- 
ligion that led them to define the law in such a way that the Islamic ideal could 
permeate all aspects of life. They subjected the existing law to a 4_k-rouýt% Islamic 
overhaul, injecting into it the ethics, mores and religious ideas derived from the 
Qur'an. 77 
Incorporated into the law was the body of duties to which every Muslim was 
bound. This foundation of the Shari'ah was to have profound effects upon the 
ummah. By the beginning of the Abbasid dynasty, the Hadith were collected and 
placed into a chain of transmission to determine authenticity. This was an attempt to 
remove all eccentric opinions, to reinforce the Shari'ah, and to give authority to the 
values and ideals accepted by the main body of the Sunni community and their 
ulema. 78 
By the time of the decline of the Abbasid Caliphs, the religious authorities were 
winning their struggle to make themselves independent of the domination of political 
rulers. 79 This separation of religion and politics, however, did not cause as much 
damage to the unity of the ummah as it could have done. The development of the 
Shari'ah ensured that the oneness of the faith was maintained throughout the turbulent 
times that were to come. By the thirteenth century, the Abbasid empire was a frag- 
mented, deteriorating commonwealth of self-governing states ruled by military com- 
manders. 80 Political unity existed only in theory, with this fictional unity of the 
ummah being embodied in the powerless Caliph in Baghdad. 81 The final end came 
with the invasion of the Mongols. The central Caliphate was abolished and replaced 
by independent Sultanates at the conclusion of the fifteenth century. 82 Muslim power 
peaked in the next century, only to decline under the threat of the advancing Euro- 
pean powers. Throughout these dramatic changes in circumstances and fortune, the 
Islamic faith provided an underlying unity, a source of identity and a direction to 
Muslims. In order to see how this came about in the Umayyad and Abbasid 
Dynasties it is necessary to explore the issue of the Caliphate and the development of 
the Shari `ah in more detail. 
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The Caliphate 
An examination of the historical debate on the theory of the Caliphate reveals a 
pragmatic attitude amongst the scholars and jurists of Islam. They are acutely aware 
of the political developments of their period, and they are above all determined to 
preserve the underlying unity of the people. This often manifests as a fear of anarchy 
and disorder in society. The original charismatic community of Islam had developed 
into a highly sophisticated civilisation spanning a large part of the world. Con- 
sequently, even the greatest religious scholars were more concerned with maintaining 
order in society than with reinforcing the traditional ideal relationship between Caliph 
and uminah with its basis in religion. 
For the Muslim, this life is a preparation for a fuller life after death. The ideal 
state is one that would provide the maximum means for all its citizens to perform 
their religious and ethical duties according to the ordinances of the Shari'ah, so that 
they would be best prepared for the life hereafter. The Caliphate would maintain 
society with the interest of the people uppermost both in this life and the next. It 
would prepare them to enter paradise. Muhammad had formed the `people of Para- 
dise' under Allah's guidance; it was the duty of the Caliph to protect the people from 
anything, whether outside or inside the community, that could threaten their position 
in this context. The Caliphs were considered the rightful successors to the Prophet, 
even though they did not have his prophetic authority. It is essential in a community 
governed by revealed law to bring the people into conformity with its regulations and 
dictates. This is the role of the Caliph; he is the defender of the faith. The Caliphs's 
task is to preserve the ummah, keeping it free from disunity, strife or heresy. The 
Caliph as the actual, and later symbolic, leader of all Muslims was the head of the 
community. He represented in his person the unity of the Dar AI-Islam, the Muslims 
ummah. Al Mawardi (d. 1058) expressed this very succinctly: 
There is no religion in which his power has disappeared without its institutions being 
changed... because with power is guardianship of religion and its defence..... it is 
incumbent to appoint an imam to be the sultan of his time and the leader of the 
umºnah, so that religion may be guarded by his power. 83 
Al Mawardi stresses the indivisible, universal and divine nature of the ummah by 
maintaining that the Caliphate was a canonical rather than rational requirement, and 
that therefore there could not be more than one Caliph at a time. 84 Individuals who 
ruled over sections of Islamic territory only had legitimate power if they accepted the 
overall authority of the Caliph. - 
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Both Sunni and Shia scholars were forced to compromise with this orthodox posi- 
tion and political reality as the Abbasid Caliphate went into decline and finally col- 
lapsed. They appealed to the principles of necessity and public interest in order to 
justify their accommodation. 85 To Sunni jurists like Al-Baghdadi (d. 1037) and even 
Al-Ghazali (d. 1111), the idea of political disintegration and its inevitable attendant 
anarchy was a horror to be resisted at all costs. 86 They compromised accordingly in 
order to maintain the myth of legal and political unity. It was essential that there 
should be a strong ruler to maintain law and order. Al-Ghazali quoted an Hadith to 
express this opinion: `Sovereignty endures even when there is unbelief, but will not 
endure where there is injustice'. 87 
Many considered that any kind of stable government was preferable to civil un- 
rest, even if the ruler had usurped his position by military force and had remained in 
power through tyranny. Ibn Hanbal, the great jurist and creator of one of Islam's 
four schools of law, legitimised this attitude: 
Whoever overruns the people by sword becomes Caliph, and is addressed as Amir al- 
Mu'minin, it is not permitted for anyone who believes in God and the hereafter to 
spend a night without recognising him as the Imam, whether he be pious or evil- 
doing. 88 
The above quotation indicates the degree to which the scholars of Islam were 
prepared to go in order to preserve the unity of all Muslims. 
Al-Mawardi attempted to redefine the role of the Caliph in his work The Or- 
dinances of Government. 89 He needed to compromise his traditional view on the 
Caliphate with the realities of the situation as the Abbasid dynasty declined. In- 
creasingly the empire was breaking up into separate kingdoms or sultanates that had 
been grabbed by military strength. He discussed the relationship between the We 
jure' authority of the Caliph in Baghdad and the We facto' rule of the sultans. He 
suggested that the Caliph should authorise the rule of the sultans by investing his au- 
thority in them. They would then rule as deputies, with the Caliph as their symbolic 
head. 90 The problem with this solution was that many of the sultans had taken their 
territories from the Caliphate by force. Al Mawardi suggested that the Caliph should 
accept the rule of the sultan on condition that the latter in turn acknowledged the 
status of the Caliph and gave him religious loyalty, 91and this in fact became the 
political reality as the empire declined. Since the Caliph had no power to enforce his 
will on the sultans, the Caliphate took on a symbolic role that expressed the unity of 
the ummah. Al-Ghazali acknowledged this change in the role of the Caliph arguing 
that `whosoever he may be to whom the holder of the military power professes his 
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allegiance, that person is the Caliph'. 92 
Ghazali's argument is that even if the Caliphate has lost its political functions, yet 
it still remains as the representative of the supremacy of the Shari`ah. As long as the 
sultans guaranteed to maintain the Shari`ah in their symbolic oath of allegiance to the 
Caliph, then the community was still living within the law of Islam. Ghazali suggests 
that the sultan would require a jurist to help him manage human affairs in accordance 
with the Shari`ah. 93 
Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) argues that there is no obligation on Muslims to ac- 
knowledge a single Caliphate. 94 The political leaders of the Umayyad and Abbasid 
dynasties were, according to him, only temporal rulers anyway; 95 their authority to 
be the Imam was given them by the ummah. The ummah was perceived to be `a 
spiritual unity of all Muslims though they might live in different places and have a 
number of difficult rulers'. 96 The function of the rulers was to cooperate with the 
ulema in order to ensure that the Shari'ah was correctly followed in the state, and to 
carry out their religious and political duties as the Shari'ah directed. The only re- 
quirement for membership of the ummah is the confession of the Shahadah. That re- 
quires complete obedience to Allah and His messenger, but does not limit the number 
of leaders who can rule of Shari'ah. It is the supreme authority, the divinely revealed 
law, the exclusive and complete guide of the ummah. 97 He acknowledges the prac- 
ticalities of obedience to temporal authority but ignores the issue of the Caliphate 
altogether. Ibn Taymiyya says simply that the head of state and his government 
should be ruled by the Qur'an and the Sunna, and that in religious matters he should 
rely upon consultation with the ulema. 
Despite the compromises of the scholars with political reality, the struggle con- 
firmed the victory of the ulema, or religious institution of Islam, over the Caliphate, 
or over for that matter any other political institution. This source of authority could 
not be controlled by governments, but was possessed by the ummah itself. The Sunni 
jurists and ulema had established that the ummah was to be based upon the Shari'ah. 
The historical development of the Shari`ah could not be at fault, for Muhammad him- 
self had said: `My ummah will never agree upon an error'. 98 
On these bases the community could not have strayed into sin, and therefore all its 
religious and judicial activities were valid. The Caliphate was ignored and the bond 
between the Shari'ah and the ummah was emphasised. The essential reality was that 
the vitality and unity of Islam depended upon a community that was held together by 
Shari'ah law. This had been facilitated by the work of Nizam al-Mulk (d. 1092), the 
vizier of the Seljuks who ruled over the Abbasid empire in the 11th century. He can 
be credited with developing a system which allowed for the preservation of the 
unified ummah even when political circumstances threatened to tear it apart. Nizam 
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al-Mulk established inadrasas throughout the lands of the Caliphate. 99 He even 
managed to open the famous college of Madrasa Nizamiya in Baghdad itself, the seat 
of the Caliph. In 1091, he appointed Al-Ghazali to the chair of Shafi`i Law in the 
college. 100 In these numerous small colleges, students were taught the four schools 
of jurisprudence. Some famous madrasas even taught all four as in the case of the 
Mustansiriyya Madrasa in Baghdad. 101 The teachers moved across the empire from 
one school to another. In this way, in spite of the fragmentation into various 
sultanates, a cohesive and unified theological outlook was maintained throughout the 
Caliphate. The colleges would have supplied Qadis for the legal system and clerks 
for the bureaucracy. It is perhaps even more important that they provided a 
uniformly trained ulema, which in turn helped to maintain a unified Islamic outlook 
as based on the Shari'ah while the empire collapsed. 
The Shari'ah provides the Muslims with a sense of continuity and tradition. The 
key position of the Shari'ah in the ummah, together with the degree of uniformity in 
its application through the development of a inadrasa-trained uleina, helped to ensure 
the unity of doctrine and belief. By virtue of its being an expression of God's will and 
by the common acceptance of its prescriptions by the majority of Muslims, it pro- 
vided the morality, authority and sanctions which ensure the survival of the ummah 
after the collapse of the Caliphate. The following quotation from Abu Abdullah 
Muhammad al-Shafi'i (d. 820) encapsulated that relationship of the Shari'ah to the 
ummah which has lasted to the present day and survived further massive crises as 
Islam's civilisation had to bow to the superior might of Europe. 
The Questioner asked, 'What is the meaning of the Prophet's command to cleave to 
the Collectivity? ' I said 'There is but one meaning to it. ' He said, 'How may it only 
have one meaning? ' I replied, 'When the Collectivity of Muslims was dispersed in 
various countries, one could not cleave to a Collectivity whose members were scat- 
tered, and besides, they were found together with Muslims and unbelievers, with 
pious men and profligates. Thus it could not mean a physical 'cleaving' because that 
was not possible, and because physical nearness would in itself effect nothing, so that 
there is no meaning in cleaving to the Collectivity except in agreeing with them in 
what they make lawful and forbidden, obedience in both these matters'. 102 
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Islah and Tajdid 
Under the Abbasids the ulema developed into a religious elite within Muslim 
society. Their authority was derived from their knowledge of the Qur'an, the Hadith 
and the Shari'ah. They became the theologians, jurists and teachers within Muslim 
society and the official protectors of orthodox interpretation of the law and the tradi- 
tions. 103 We have seen how they attempted to create cohesion by unifying the ex- 
panding empire via the Shari'ah; they were only partially successful in this. Not all 
rulers were prepared to follow the Shari'ah if it conflicted with their personal desires 
and ambitions. Amongst the educated minority there may have been a degree of in- 
tegration from the tenth and eleventh centuries onwards, but the gap between the 
ulema and the populace almost certainly widened. This can be seen in the success of 
the Sufi brotherhoods and in the degree of cultural and ethnic variation in the religion 
of the common people. 
Various individuals and religious groups attempted to counter this. They saw any 
political, military or economic decline of the ummah as caused by spiritual and moral 
decay, a wandering away from the straight path of Islam. The revitalisation of the 
ummah could only come about through a return to the original principles of Islam as 
embodied in the Qur'an and the Sunna of the Prophet. Once the Qur'an and Sunna 
became established canon it became possible to use them as a standard by which to 
judge contemporary Muslim society. Even when various dynasties were flourishing, 
there were those who were critical of the moral standards of the prevailing regime. 
Reformers could call for a change on the basis of scriptural interpretation. From the 
ninth century onwards, various individuals and groups had called for a return to the 
strict obedience of Qur'an and Sunna in order to renew the Muslim uºnmah and to 
bring it back to the pristine faith of the Prophet and his companions. 104 In the eight- 
eenth and nineteenth centuries there was a marked decline in the political fortunes of 
the Muslim world. This was caused by the internal collapse of Muslim empires and 
the increasing ascendancy of European power. This period is characterised by a reli- 
gious revival brought about by several revivalist groups from various parts of the 
Muslim world. 105 They all preached religious reform in order to combat political 
decline. 
The concepts of tajdid (renewal) and islah (reform) were central to these 
revivalists. 106 Islah called upon Muslims to realign their lives to the fundamental 
tenets of Islam. It is a term used in the Qur'an107 to describe the preaching of the 
prophets when they warned their respective communities of the need to return to 
God's ways by obedience to His law. 108 Voll states that `islah is the effort to in- 
crease the righteousness of the people'. 109 
-28- 
Esposito provides four central ideas that are implicit in the concept of tajdid: I10 
(a) The belief that the righteous community as established and guided by the 
Prophet at Medina represented the norm that should be sought by all Muslims, 
both individually and communally. 
(b) A purging from the community of all foreign or cultural accretions which were 
not Islamic. These were seen as `bida' or forbidden innovation. This included 
an attack on the Sufis, whose tariqas offered an alternative sense of community 
for the common people. 
(c) A criticism of the establishment, both rulers and ulema. 
(d) The belief that a renewer (mujaddid) of the faith will be sent at the beginning 
of each century to restore Islam and to regenerate a community which tends to 
drift from the straight path as laid down for it at the beginning of Islam's his- 
tory. This is based on a Hadith: `God will send to his ummah at the head of 
each century those will renew its faith for it'. 111 
Many of these groups viewed as unbelievers those Muslims who resisted their 
message. 112 There are obvious parallels here between this position and the beliefs of 
the Kharijites. Like them, these groups tended to establish their own integrated 
charismatic communities and then to divide into sects. Consequently, these attempts 
to unite the ummah often resulted in further fragmentation along theological lines. 
The Impact of Europe 
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the impact of European expan- 
sion began to be felt throughout most Islamic territory. Economic control in the 
eighteenth century gradually became political and military domination in the nine- 
teenth. 113 Muslims increasingly found themselves living under the dominion of 
Christian or even secular rulers whose customs and beliefs were alien to them. This 
had a profound effect upon the Muslim psyche. The ulema were inadequate to deal 
with the new situation. They were increasingly confronted by a superior European 
technology and military might that was founded upon economic power and the discov- 
eries of science. In addition to this, they had to deal with a radically different world 
view. This world view was based on a philosophical and political history that had 
given rise to ideas on statecraft which in turn had their roots in democracy, nation- 
alism, and secularism. 114 The ulema's inadequacy arose from the fact that the Euro- 
pean powers were consistently successful in taking over the territory of Islam. This 
provoked a crisis within the faith which the rigidly traditional uleina were not equip- 
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ped to resolve. Foreign domination by non-Muslims raised questions concerning the 
health of Islam and reasons for why divine guidance apparently no longer provided 
success to the ummah as it had in the past. 
The problem of inner decay had already been prominent in the minds of Muslim 
thinkers and reformers, but now they had to consider the possibility of Muslim 
civilisation being unable to survive this new external threat. 115 Most of them agreed 
upon the necessity of Islamic revival in order to restore the past glories of the Muslim 
ummah, but there was disagreement over how this could be achieved. Jamal al-Din 
al-Afghani (1838-1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and others attempted to 
show that Islam and modern western civilisation were not irreconcilable. They be- 
lieved that the Muslims could rediscover their power by rejuvenating the morality and 
ethics of Islam and learning from Europe the developments that had been made in 
science and technology. 116 The important thing was to know what was essential in 
the faith and what was not. Once the essentials were established, Muslims could 
safely go on to reform their legal, administrative and educational institutions and to 
compete with European nations. 117 This required an re-examination of ijtihad. 
The ulema believed the door of ijtihad to be closed, and that by the tenth century 
the codification of Islamic law was essentially complete. The majority of the ulema 
decided that independent interpretation of the law was no longer required. Muslims 
were simply to follow past precedent as elaborated by the early jurists; new problems 
were to be resolved by studying the established legal texts. This decision established 
the existing law as sacrosanct and made Muslim society very inflexible to changing =b n, 
situations. 118 Prominent revivalists like Ibn Taymiyya, Al-Ghazali, "Abd al-Wahhab 
and Shah Wali-allah had claimed the right to practice ijtihad themselves in order to 
revitalise Islam. They believed that Muslim scholars should go direct to the Qur'an 
and the Sunna to provide a renewed vision rather than studying the legal texts. In 
contrast to both these views, the modernist reformers of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries believed that i jtihad was open to all Muslims to discover the way to adapt 
Islam to the changing conditions of modern society. This allowed for legal and social 
reform. 119 The reformers criticised the ulema of holding back progress by being out 
of touch with the modern world. The ulema retaliated by accusing the reformers of 
introducing innovations (bida) from the Christian west which corrupt Islam. 120 
A new intellectual class of Muslims, educated to western standards, taking on the 
values of the conquerors and lacking the Islamic outlook of the reformers, gradually 
developed to challenge the authority of the traditional ulema. They stressed loyalty to 
the nation rather than to the ummah. Rifa'a Badawi Rafi al-Tahtawi (1801-1873) ap- 
pears to be the first of these to have introduced the idecsof fatherland (watan) and 
patriotism (wataniyyah) into Arabic. 121 He said that `the sons of the watan be united 
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always by their language, by their allegiance to one king and by their obedience to 
one divine law and political administration'. 122 In the collapsing Ottoman Empire, 
the sociologist Ziya Gokalp (1876-1924) propounded the theory of Turkism. He saw 
Islam as a source of ethics which could be adapted to the needs of the time, but reli- 
gion and nation had to be separated for the common good of both. He argued that it 
was possible to retain Islam's fundamental values and principles and to develop a 
modern Turkish national culture in which religious law would be replaced by secular 
law. Islam would function as a national religion to supplement Turkish culture. It 
could be used to develop connections with the wider Muslim world, but the interests 
of the Turkish nation must always be paramount. The nation was a natural integrated 
unit which through its language expressed a distinctive folk-culture. 123 This debate 
on the nature of the state and the question of loyalty took place throughout the Mus- 
lim world at this time. Each Muslim nation arrived at its own individual solution. In 
this respect the concept of the ummah took on a different symbolic meaning amongst 
Muslim minority communities than in the Arabic speaking heartlands. For the Arabic- 
speaking nations `ummah' was a term used in everyday language to denote various 
types of community. Where Arabic was not spoken as an everyday language `ummah' 
existed only as a very powerful cultural/religious symbol which could be drawn upon 
to promote Muslim identity against the majority population. 
The situation was further complicated by the success of the western-educated elites 
in seizing control of the newly emerging independent Muslim nation-states after the 
end of World War II. The new governments embraced the ideals of secularism and 
nationalism as learnt from their former rulers. Secularism, the separation of the 
spiritual from the temporal, affirms that an individual's religious life is a private mat- 
ter; this tended to divide the community's political life from its religious heritage. 
Both this ideal and the phenomenon of separate nation states was in opposition with 
the classical Islamic ideal of the united community of believers. Throughout the nine- 
teenth and twentieth centuries the Shari'ah has been modernised in most Muslim na- 
tions by the replacement of traditional Islamic codes with those derived from Euro- 
pean legal systems. Even family law, which was the heart of the Shari'ah and in- 
volved the laws of inheritance, divorce and marriage, laws which had remained intact 
as the major force to govern the lives of Muslims throughout the Islamic world, now 
began to be tampered with. An Islamic rationale was provided by governments wish- 
ing to reform their legal codes. They proclaimed their right to practice i jtihad. The 
ulema either cooperated with this process by working for the government or felt 
themselves powerless to stop the process even while they viewed it as profoundly un- 
Islamic. 
The new nation states have inherited all these divisions as generated by the rise of 
European power. So far, they have not been able to create a society which claims the 
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allegiance of all their people, nor have they established themselves as the primary 
locus of Muslim identity. The state sought to appropriate to itself those loyalties 
which Muslims traditionally gave to the universal community as established by 
Muhammad. This is further complicated by the rise of different ethnic identity 
awareness which existed within the frontiers of individual nations. The emergence of 
separate Muslim states, each one jealously protecting its independence, created serious 
divisions within the religious camp. 
Besides the conflict between the western-influenced ruling classes and the uleina, 
there was a third major division. The massive injection of European ideas gave im- 
petus to the revivalist groups whose central tenets included the idea of removing for- 
eign cultural accretions. New revivalist organisations appeared; the members of these 
tightly-knit groups did not belong to the ulema . Unlike the earlier revivalists, they 
were not formed around the teachings of a prominent madrasa-trained member of the 
ulema. 124 Instead, they rejected all forms of nationalism and the hidebound, ineffec- 
tive traditionalism of the uleina. They fought against the idea of loyalty to the nation- 
state by asserting that the only homeland for Muslims was the global community of 
Islam. 125 They declared that the only real choice lay between Islam and jahiliyya. 
The latter pervades the whole of mankind, including those societies which normally 
call themselves Muslim but in practice violate the Shari`ah. 126 The Shari`ah had 
maintained Islamic unity since the decline of the Caliphate, and was essential to the 
survival of the ummah. They demanded that Muslim nations establish themselves 
firmly on the Shari'ah and become Islamic states. 127 
Twentieth century revivalists insisted that the Shari'ah must be accepted in its 
entirety. 128 The revivalists were not prepared to be apologists for Islam; they con- 
demned the west and its values and asserted the self-sufficiency and superiority of 
Islam. 129 They did not condemn western technology and scientific knowledge, but 
encouraged Muslims to learn it and to integrate it into an Islamic life. They attacked 
both the ethos of personal piety and the rise of ethnic or national consciousness. 130 
Islam, they urged, had to be a comprehensive ideology for personal and public life. 
It had to be, the only foundation upon which Muslim society and state could be built. 
They combined their religious ideas with social and political activism; true believers 
were distinguished from their fellow Muslims and were to be totally committed to the 
struggle to transform society along Islamic lines. 131 
These groups developed into ideological structures with a well-knit, socio- 
religious organisation that is often divided up into a network of branches and cells. 
Their members are carefully selected, and trained to ensure an ideological conformity 
that is based on religious conviction and a personal moral code. 132 These jamaats, 
for example Jamaat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin and the Jamaat-i Islami, function as a 
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group of like-minded and totally committed Muslims whose aim is to transform their 
societies from within. 133 Maulana Mawdudi, the founder of Jamaat-i Islami, states 
that when the ummah is not functioning as it should, the Qur'an itself (Al-Imran 
3.104) insists that there must be one group within the wider community that takes 
upon itself the task of preserving Islam. 134 The work of these jamaats is backed up 
by a programme of religious instruction, youth work, schools, hospitals, religious 
publications, and social welfare projects. These groups reinterpreted Islamic history 
and tradition to enable their members to respond to the circumstances of the twentieth 
century. They insisted upon the union of religion and society, the relevance of Islam 
to every area of life, and the sovereignty of Allah over mankind as embodied in the 
all-comprehensive nature of the Shari'ah. They have presented a powerful challenge 
to the governments of many Islamic nations throughout the Muslim world. Their 
challenge to the established authorities is usually built around the conviction that an 
Islamic state is essential for the renaissance of the ummah and the true practice of the 
faith. 135 These tightly-knit organisations function independently of each other but 
recognise a common ideological allegiance which they refer to as the Islamic Move- 
ment. 
The revivalist movements are an attempt to recreate the ummah as based upon the 
integrated community of the Prophet in Medina, but there are huge difficulties in the 
way of transferring this vision to the entire Muslim world. The Muslim nations dif- 
fer on how their societies should be ruled; the ulema are divided into many different 
theological camps and the revivalists, despite common features, 136 are split into 
several movements each of which demand primary loyalty to their own community. 
Conclusion 
It can be argued that the integrated community of believers submissive to the will 
of Allah as proclaimed by the Qur'an has not existed since the death of the Prophet. 
Sectarian divisions over the question of authority split the community, and the various 
aspects of the Prophet's charismatic authority were passed on to several different in- 
stitutions. The ummah was maintained by the political institution of the Caliphate and 
by the ulema who codified and preserved correct doctrine. The Umayyads trans- 
formed the ummah into a Arab dynasty. Under the Abbasids the ulema and the 
Caliphate had separated from each other, and eventually the Caliphate itself had 
ceased to exist in all but name. Independent Muslims kingdoms came into being, but 
the ulema managed to hold the Muslim world together through the Shari`ah. 
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However, the uleina were split by differences of belief and were unable to maintain 
their hold under the challenge of European civilisation. 
Throughout their history, devout Muslims have been concerned with the question 
of what constitutes the true uinmah and how it should be maintained. A following 
Hadith demonstrates this concern: 
When the Prophet once said: 'The saved group among the religious group is one', the 
Companions asked, 'Oh, Messenger of God, which one? ' He said, 'The people of the 
Sunna and the followers of the community. ' They asked, 'Who are the people of the 
Suniut and the followers of the community? ' He said, 'Those who follow what I and 
my Companions abide by'. 137 
Exactly who constitutes this group has been a source of argument ever since the 
Prophet's death. This debate has been exacerbated by the conflict between the respec- 
tive values of Islam and the West. The result has been the division of the umnah into 
many factions, each justifying their position by various interpretations of the message 
of Islam. 
Gibb argues that `the first lesson learned by them was that the community must 
not be identified with or confused with political regimes. Political division in no way 
impaired the unity of the ummah'. 138 He argues that the doctrine of tawhid justifies 
Islamic totality and universalism. The aim has always been to establish a highly in- 
tegrated and united umnah. In fact, Islamic sectarianism has its roots in the political 
division of the ummah and in various attempts to restore unity. These factional dif- 
ferences in the community are in direct opposition to the ideal of universalism which 
they themselves preach to Muslims everywhere. An Hadith demonstrates that Mus- 
lims were aware of and gravely concerned with this tendency to divide into factions: 
Ibn Idris al-Khawtani said: 'I said to the Messenger of God, what do you order me to 
do if I shall live until the time of the troubles? ' He said, `Cleave to Collectivity of the 
Muslims and their Imam. ' I said 'And what if they have neither Collectivity nor 
leader? ' He said, 'Then withdraw from the factions altogether, even if you must gnaw 
the roots of trees until you die'. 139 
Despite all this, ordinary Muslims can look to the wider Islamic community and 
feel that they belong to it even though it is divided into various competing groups. In 
particular, there is a sense of belonging which is maintained through the unity of 
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Islam's ritual or cultic practices. The salat, Ha jj and Ramadan provide Muslims 
with a strong sense of religious communion. There are, however, powerful groups of 
Muslims who insist that this is not enough. They say that Islam has to be a fully 
comprehensive way of life taking its inspiration from the life of the Prophet and his 
companions. Their definition of the ummah is far more exclusive. 
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viduals are guilty of unbelief. They are no longer Muslim, but are 
atheists whose unbelief demands holy war. 
4) Opposition to legitimate governments extends to the official ulema, the re- 
ligious establishment, and state supported mosques and preachers who are 
considered to have been co-opted by the government. 
5) Jihad against unbelief and unbelievers is a religious duty. Therefore, all 
true believers are obliged to combat such governments and their sup- 
porters, whether individuals or foreign governments. Like the Kharijites 
in early Islam, radicals demand total commitment and obedience. One is 
either a true believer or an infidel, saved or damned, a friend or an enemy 
of God. The army of Allah is locked in holy war with the followers of 
Satan. 
6) Christians and Jews, are generally. regarded as unbelievers rather than 
`People of the Book' because of their connections with Western 
Christianity (colonialism) and Zionism. They are seen as partners in a 
Judeo-Christian conspiracy against Islam and the Muslim world. Thus, 
non-Muslim minorities are often subjected to persecution (ibid., pp. 170- 
172). 
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Chapter III 
A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF UMMAH 
Introduction. 
The previous Chapter has examined the Muslim concept of community which is 
rooted in revelations concerning `ummah' contained in the Qur'an and further 
developed by various Hadith. This approach to the ummah is not, however, sufficient 
in itself to fully understand developments in the Muslim' world. The following over- 
view of various sociological analyses provides alternative, ways of regarding develop- 
ments that have taken place in the ummah which have to be combined with the Mus- 
lim perspective to ascertain the possibilities that could occur in Britain. Before the 
following chapter focuses on the situation of Muslims in Britain it is necessary to 
balance the Muslim perspective of community with insights drawn from sociological 
studies. It is also important to realise that the Muslims in Britain are a minority 
migrant community and therefore form other kinds of community more amenable to 
analysis through sociological study than solely by reference to the Islamic concept of 
ummah. 
Sociological Analysis of Ummah 
McWilliams, in spite of his use of androcentric language, provides a concept 
which throws light on the situation of the Islamic world. I He speaks of `fraternity, ' 
which he defines as a relation of brotherhood or as an organisation based on fraternal 
relations between members. 2 The fraternity is a common bond based on aa common 
creator who has established the relationship of brotherhood amongst mankind. 3 
McWilliams states that the initiate brother is incorporated into a new community 
which breaks away or replaces an older community. In fact, membership is based 
upon accepting a set of values and beliefs which are considered higher than those of 
the older community. 4 This bond of companions linked by a common vision resem- 
bles but is superior to the community that is based on familial relations. McWilliams 
argues that the fraternity always contains the seed of its own destruction. 5 The 
ultimate conclusion of the fraternity's beliefs is to suggest that they should be in- 
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corporated into a universal community. All men should be united under the common 
creator. If this conviction is pursued with any degree of success, it creates a vast 
state in which the original fraternal relationship breaks down since the members can 
only know each other as abstractions. McWilliams' analysis can be usefully applied to 
the history of Islam and the concept of ummah. The rapid growth of the Muslim 
empire would have placed massive stress on the ideal of community as based on the 
close-knit companionship of the early followers of Islam. 
The usual Islamic conception of ummah is an historical one developed during the 
mediaeval period. The idea of the ummah as a theoretical construct is one thing, but 
its application within a dramatically changing world is quite another. Karl Mannheim 
argues that in a world in constant upheaval where new belief systems are constantly 
being introduced and old ones fundamentally challenged, the conflict of ideas will go 
so far as to attempt to destroy the actual foundations upon which the old beliefs and 
values rest. This collapse of intellectual unity comes about when the belief systems 
of different groups are diametrically opposed. 6 The Muslim nations contain such op- 
posing ideologies, and unless a solution can be found which satisfies all groups, any 
inherited unity based on Islam is in profound danger. The other solution is that one 
group becomes strong enough to impose its will on the others by force. Something of 
this has already been seen in Iran. 
Chapter II has demonstrated that there have been various creative responses to 
political and social change-in order to maintain the integrity of the urrunah. Arnold 
Toynbee suggests that civilisations break down when they are no longer able to 
respond creatively to new situations. He argues that this breakdown occurs not be- 
cause of any physical circumstances, but because of false attitudes leading to a failure 
of the inner spirit which embodies the civilisation's values. The civilisation tends to 
rest on its laurels, idolising either the whole society at the moment of success or else 
some special institution to which success was due. 7 Interestingly, Toynbee posits that 
this kind of breakdown occurs quite early in a civilisation's history. It is followed by 
a series of rallies and relapses, but once the initial breakdown has occurred, death is 
inevitable. 8 The Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties could be viewed as the loss of the 
original values of Muhammad's community. Since that time, the civilisation founded 
on Islam has sometimes rallied and sometimes relapsed. It has often been guilty of 
idolising a vision of community which it has not been able historically to maintain. 
Toynbee, however, suggests that if the community is a religious one, breakdown need 
not inevitably be followed by death; it can alternatively be followed by renewal. 9 If 
Toynbee is correct, the revivalist solution may well be the only one that can revitalise 
the charismatic community initially conceived by Muhammad. The problem here, 
though, is that the revivalist groups, like the early Khari fites, hold a more exclusive 
definition of ummah than that generally held by most Muslims who feel that simply to 
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be born a Muslim is sufficient qualification for membership. Consequently, the 
revivalists create elite groups within the wider ummah which often create division and 
conflict within Muslim societies. There are also many different groups based on 
ideological thinking. Toynbee argues that ideological thinking inflates the ego- 
consciousness: individuals exaggerate their own significance. A similar phenomenon 
takes place with groups; there is an inflation of group consciousness bound up with a 
strong awareness of separation from others based on a feeling of moral superiority. to 
This will make it difficult for the various Islamic groups to resolve their differences 
and recreate the Utopian united community they aspire to. 
The Rural and Urban Divide 
In addition to the above stresses on the Islamic ideal of ummah there is also a 
major divide caused by the diverse forms of religion which develop in the cities and 
the countryside respectively. Gellner has established two sets of characteristics which 
he claims distinguish urban Islam from that of rural areas. The characteristics of the 
former are strict monotheism; puritanism; stress on scriptural revelation and therefore 
on literacy; egalitarianism amongst the believers and consequently an absence of 
human mediation and its accompanying hierarchy; a minimisation of elaborate ritual 
or mysticism and a focus on sobriety and moderation instead; and finally a stress on 
the observance of rules rather than emotional states. The latter set is comprised of a 
tendency towards this-world and other-world hierarchies; a reliance on human inter- 
mediaries in this world and a hierarchy of spirits in the other; the development of per- 
ceptual symbols or images rather than the abstract word which leads to a multiplicity 
of ritual and mystical practices; and finally loyalty towards personalities rather than a 
formal set of rules. 11 
Gellner argues that the urban, literate, egalitarian Islam represented by the 
madrasa-trained ulema is to some degree identical throughout the Islamic world and 
can be defined as orthodox. 12 He goes on to suggest that the `hierarchical, less 
puritanical, emotionally and sensually indulgent Islam of the saints, holy men etc' is 
more fragmented. 13 It is `discontinuous in its organisation, which undergoes fairly 
frequent and fundamental transformations'. 14 
Gellner bases his observations on the argument that the rural Muslims whether 
from tribe or village require spiritual intermediaries between themselves and a remote 
deity because illiteracy renders the abstract reasoning of theologians and trained ulema 
and even the revealed voice of the deity itself beyond them. IS He suggests, however, 
that rural Muslims require the sacred for settling disputes and defining the norms of 
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village or tribal life. 16 For this reason hierarchical, charismatic religious personnel 
are essential. He concludes that the relationship of this religious elite with their fol- 
lowers is one of intense personal loyalty rather than obedience to a set of principles or 
rules and that this is liable to expose the villagers or tribesmen to accusations of 
heterodoxy. 17 On the other hand, the city-dweller is more likely to be literate and 
therefore the literate ulema can best function as mediators of scripture. 18 This 
manifests as a division between the orthodox ulema and the Sufi shaikhs or pirs. 
Gellner acknowledges that in the city both forms of Islam can be found but he 
suggests that the followers of a personal saint are recruited in a different way than in 
rural areas. He argues that in the city a saint's following is individual and elective, 
whereas in the villages and tribes it is by group and ascribed. 19 This urban/rural di- 
vide in the ummah may contain aspects of what is known as Gemeins- 
chaft/Gesellschaft relations. 20 Some urban Muslims, especially those that have 
migrated from villages may seek the closer ties and enhanced status of affiliation to 
revivalist groups or orthodoxy to replace the Gemeinschaft relations of the village or 
tribe which they may have lost in the more impersonal and individual life of the city- 
dweller. 
Muslim Minority Communities 
A further complicating factor occurs when a minority community of Muslims 
lives within a larger community of unbelievers, either as a result of conquest, migra- 
tion, or assimilation. Minority communities tend to organise themselves on an ethnic 
basis maintaining their original languages, very often living in close-knit inner-city 
enclaves to protect themselves from assimilation into or hostility from the majority 
culture. This creates a different kind of community formed around kin networks and 
place of origin which may use religion to reinforce ethnic identity. In the case of 
Muslims this may conflict with the religious definition of the ummah which insists 
upon universal Islamic identity being primary. This situation will prove a strong 
breeding ground in which revivalist groups can flourish. Divisions are likely to occur 
between religious and ethnic loyalties. This will be further complicated by pressures 
to assimilate into the mainstream culture. The receiving culture will insist that the 
new migrants obey the political authority and observe the laws of the country in 
which they find themselves. The dominant non-Muslim government, particularly in 
contemporary liberal secular societies, will try to distinguish the religious from the 
political by tolerating the former but curbing the latter. For many Muslims, it may 
not always be easy to distinguish between the two. It is inevitable that the non- 
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Muslim state will demand the political loyalty and allegiance of all its minorities. In 
the case of Muslims, where the Shari'ah bridges the divisions between politics and re- 
ligion, this could create conflict. The various Muslim responses to this. situation will 
create further divisions within their community. The Muslims will have no choice 
but to uphold their position in order to protect themselves. It is, however, almost im- 
possible to ascertain whether this would lead to unity or to factions along the lines of 
divisions already historically existing within the community in their countries of 
origin. In the case of Muslim migrants who originate from the subcontinent, the im- 
pact of western colonialism and the consequent introduction of secular values has al- 
ready led to a crisis of identity in the countries of origin which has affected the sur- 
vival of the community, the self-awareness of Muslims, and their relationship to non- 
Muslims. 
Sociological Analysis of Community 
It is essential, then, to balance the Islamic ideal of the ummah as the universal 
brotherhood of believers, with some sociological definitions of community. This is 
especially so in the context of Muslim migrant minority communities. Generally 
sociologists make the distinction between a social system and a community on the 
basis of space. A social system is a set of inter-related social institutions covering all 
aspects of social life, familial, religious, judicial, etc., and the associated belief 
systems belonging. to each. A community is usually defined as a local social system 
where such a set. of inter-relations exists in a geographically defined area. 21 On the 
basis of this type of definition, the area of the globe covered by Islam is far too 
diverse to be described as a community. It could, however, certainly be viewed as a 
social system containing many different kinds of communities. 
Colin Bell and Howard Newby argue that the study of community should be un- 
dertaken by `locality' studies; in other words, it should be the study of the inter- 
relationship of social institutions within a territorially-defined area. 22 A limited 
geographical space combined with some elements of Tonnies's Gemeinschaft seems 
to be the common denominator of most modern sociological definitions. 23 Stein's 
definition is typical: a community is `an organised system standing in a determinate 
relation to its environment which has a local basis but not necessarily a rigid bound- 
ary'. 24 So many human groups have been studied by sociologists that it is an im- 
possible task to pin down a single definition of a community. Poplin attempts to 
clarify this . by dividing the sociological use of the term into three categories : 
(a) As a synonym for religious organisations, prisons, mental hospitals, and minor- 
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ity groups. 
(b) As 
, 
moral or spiritual phenomena where community is seen as some kind of 
ideal in the post-industrial revolution world. This is particularly expressed in 
phrases like `a sense of community'. 
(c) As units of social and territorial organisation such as hamlets, villages, towns, 
or districts of cities; that is to say, places where people maintain their homes, 
earn their livings, rear their children, carry on life's activities. Here there are 
three common factors: a geographic area, social interaction and a common tie 
or ties. 25 
Amongst studies based on the latter definition there are many of migrant com- 
munities in inner city `ghettos' or urban villages. These fit comfortably into most 
definitions that sociologists have arrived at, and may be termed `par excellence com- 
munities'. 26 In this respect community is referred to as a condition in which human 
beings find themselves enmeshed in a right-knit web of meaningful relationships with 
their fellow human beings. 27 This kind of community has been of particular interest 
to sociologists engaged in the urban. studies. In an early study of urban life, Louis 
Wirth defined the city as `a relatively large, dense and permanent settlement of so- 
cially heterogeneous individuals'. 28 He perceived the city-dweller to be `anonymous, 
isolated, secular, relativistic, rational and sophisticated'. 29 Wirth concludes that the 
social system of the city is similar to Tonnies's Gesellschaft. 30 Wirth's study was un- 
dertaken in 1938 prior to suburbanisation. Gans argues that Wirth's analysis is now 
possibly only valid in the inner-city whose populations are typically heterogeneous 
and transient. 31 The presence of migrant communities in the inner-city challenge 
Wirth's analysis. They demonstrate that a significant proportion of the inhabitants live 
within social structures and cultural patterns which they brought with them from else- 
where and develop to fit the new situation. 32 These populations, which include large 
numbers of Muslims, form relatively homogeneous groupings protected from the at- 
tributes of city life as defined by Wirth. Rex and Josephides suggest `it is still true 
that the springs of Gemeinschaft are far more evident amongst ethnic minority im- 
migrants in industrial society than they are in the host community'. 33 These migrant 
communities are likely to use religion as one of several means to reinforce their eth- 
nic identity as a wall against the perceived threat of the Gesellschaft aspects of the 
alien city which they have to establish as their new home. 
Maclver makes the distinction between community and association. 34 He argues 
that a community is merely a `common living of human beings', whereas `an associa- 
tion is an organisation of social life, definitely established for the pursuit of one or 
more common interest'. 35 The association is. a consciously formed group of people 
who come together to attain a specific goal. which is easier to obtain when all unite to 
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achieve it. Within a community there may be many associations. Rex argues that the 
distinction between community and association needs to be made more subtle to fit the 
reality of migrant communities within inner cities. This is based upon his own 
research in Sparkbrook, Birmingham. 36 He draws a distinction between " `primary 
communities' and associations. He states: 
In primary communities men reveal more of themselves. They turn to their fellow- 
members in times of emergency. They tell secrets about themselves. They share ex- 
citements and joys. They feel able to relax and `to let their hair down'. In ordinary 
life outside they measure themselves against what they think other members of the 
primary community might think is proper behaviour. 
37 
Most individuals find their primary community amidst their immediate family. 
This would certainly apply amongst the Muslim minority in Britain especially once 
the South Asian migrants moved out of the all-male stage of community development. 
Rex argues that the membership of a primary community is not sufficient to fulfil all 
the interests that people have in a complex economic and social urban environment. 38 
He suggests that structured interaction begins to take place in the form of associa- 
tions. The membership of an association presupposes a shared world-view. 39 In the 
case of migrants, Rex argues that the associations they form will be concerned with 
the morality of the younger generation; the maintenance of food taboos'and religious 
observance, and keeping contact with the culture of origin. He suggests that the'con- 
cern with religion will be bound up with the problem of conserving culture in the new 
environment. 40 
Faced. with the welter of conflicting cultural meanings of the city, the immigrant, at 
least, until he knows his way round, needs a cultural retreat, where he knows the 
rules, and knows that other people accept the rules. For a while, therefore, he must 
live `in a colony'. The colony may grow around a church or mosque. 
41. 
Rex argues that migrant associations will not only be concerned with spiritual 
well-being but also the practical problems and difficulties' of immigrants. They will 
be called upon to deal with employment problems, passport difficulties, legal con- 
cerns, housing, and all the other problematic 'areas which arise in dealing with living 
in an unfamiliar environment. He suggests that individual immigrants need . to 
know 
that there is one of their own kind, sharing their own world-view, who can assist 
them through the maze of problems and concerns. 42 
Many of the religious groups in Islam, especially those formed in the twentieth 
century, could fit into Maciver's definition of association. All the mosques in Britain, 
however, are affiliated to a particular strand of Islam, the majority having loyalty ei- 
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ther to the Barelwi or Deobandi groups whose origins are further back in subcontinent 
history. Each mosque functions as a centre to reinforce a particular world-view and 
finds itself not merely a place of worship but an association which fulfils the needs 
put forward by Rex. Joly points out that the earlier Muslim associations in Britain 
were concerned with immigration issues and return to Pakistan, 43 and that they were 
rarely British-wide or international organisations. 44 She goes on to demonstrate that 
later associations are more concerned with the maintenance and reproduction of the 
community in Britain. In this context the central concern has become the preservation 
of Islam and the promotion of Islamic identity, particularly in regard to the British- 
born generations. 45 These groups are more likely to be associated with international 
Islamic movements. In Britain they are national organisations established around a 
particular programme or ideology. Joly argues that they all `share the firm intention 
of securing a place for Muslims and Islam in Britain, outside the Dar al Islam'. 46 
There are two other conceptual types of community which can be useful to un- 
derstand this latter development of Muslim associations in Britain identified by Joly. 
These are the `moral community' and the `intentional community'. Poplin defines the 
moral community as having the following qualities: the members have a deep sense of 
belonging to a significant meaningful group in which they have a sense of pursuing 
common goals and feel a oneness with other community members; they are sub- 
merged in various groups and feel a compelling need to participate in these groups 
where they are regarded as whole persons who are of intrinsic significance and 
worth. 47 
The intentional community overlaps with the moral community. Shenkar defines 
the intentional community as one which is founded as a conscious and purposive act 
and where membership is voluntary and also. based on a. conscious act (even if the 
member is born in the community). He goes on to say that the group sees itself as 
separate from and different to its environment and relates as a group to its environ- 
ment. This includes withdrawal from the environment. This means that the com- 
munity is relatively self-contained and most of its members can potentially live their 
entire lives in it. Sharing is part of the community's ideology and it has collective 
goals and needs and expects members to work towards their satisfaction. The ideology 
expounded claims that the goals of the community, even if orientated to the benefit of 
the individual, can only be obtained in a collective framework as it is not the individ- 
ual that constitutes the source of authority, but the community or people appointed by 
the community. The general way of life of the community is considered to be in- 
herently good, i. e. it is seen as an end in itself over and above its instrumental value 
and the community's existence has a moral value and purpose which transcends the 
time-span of individual membership. 48 
-56- 
Muhammad's original wnmah in Mecca and Medina, so often the inspiration of Is- 
lamic: revivalist groups, could be defined as both a moral and an intentional com- 
munity. The present-day ummah, based as it is simply on being born a Muslim, is far 
too large and diverse to be defined as this kind of community. Within it there exist 
groups of Muslims who have formed organisations with specific Islamic goals to 
recreate the conditions of Muhammad's original ummah. These too are both moral 
and intentional communities. These groups have been imported into Britain through 
the process of migration and will have a profound impact in their interaction with 
other forms of community, organisation which exist amongst the Muslim migrants. 
Conclusion 
This overview of various sociological analyses provides alternative ways of 
regarding developments that have taken place in the ummah which have to be com- 
bined with the Muslim perspective to ascertain the possibilities that could occur in 
Britain. The urban village comprised of a migrant community living within its own 
socially, linguistically and ethnically defined borders, and interacting in a selective 
way with the broader non-Muslim society around it may either function with the ideal 
of the ummah to reinforce Muslim identity or it may conflict with the Islamic vision 
of a universal, egalitarian society based on the revelation of the Qur'an and the sunna 
of the Prophet. Various Islamic groups operating in Britain utilising a revivalist ideol- 
ogy received from the wider Islamic world which incorporates the ideal of the ummah 
may find themselves in open opposition to the ethnic-based urban village community. 
Before going on to examine some of the most important of these groups which have 
established themselves in Britain, it is essential to look in more detail at some of the 
issues facing the Muslims in Britain as they attempt to establish themselves with a vi- 
able communal identity based on Islam. 
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Chapter N 
ISLAM IN BRITAIN 
Introduction 
Any attempt at research in the mosques, which are still growing in number in 
many British cities, will reveal that nearly all of them are aligned to various move- 
ments originating in the subcontinent. Although their relative influence will vary con- 
siderably from city to city, there can be no doubt of the importance of these groups 
imported from the subcontinent ý in the struggle for the hearts and minds of British 
Muslims. Both the historical relationship between these groups and their various 
strategies developed to deal with the decline of Muslim power in India have been 
transported via the migration process to Britain, and will influence the development of. 
Islam. in this country. 
Before proceeding to focus on the four prominent strands of Islam represented by 
the Barelwis, theDeobandis, Tabligh-i Jamaat and Jamaat-i Islami, it is essential to 
look more generally at the situation of Muslims in Britain and to pinpoint some of the 
dilemmas and challenges which they face. Only' then is it possible to say something 
about the role of the above religious movements in shaping the community as it at- 
tempts to respond to these problems. Although the major issues have been isolated 
and looked at as dichotomies, it is necessary to remember that this is an academic ex- 
ercise. In reality, these isolated dilemmas are intertwined and interconnected in a 
very complex manner to form a single whole: The tensions between these dichotomies 
will' function as the dynamics to determine the direction of change in the Muslim 
community. Muslims living in Britain, particularly those-born and educated here, con- 
front. these dilemmas as their unique inheritance, and finding a solution to them is 
crucial in the process of carving out their own identity both as individuals and as a 
community. . 
It is not the intention'to'dwell on the origins and the early development of the 
Muslim community in Britain. This has been covered thoroughly by others in several 
comprehensive studies. I 'This' chapter will only draw on material from this' well- 
ploughed ground insofar as it is relevant to the analysis of certain problems discussed 
herein. 
Since'the 1950s Britain has received tens of thousands of Muslim immigrants from 
-62- 
the subcontinent. They came in response to the host nation's demand for cheap 
labour and to join with their family members already here. They risked leaving their 
countries of origin to find work with higher wages, often intending to return home 
eventually. Most, however, have remained in Britain and formed themselves into 
communities established around their religion, places of origin and kin networks. 
John Rex succinctly sums up this process: 
The presence of major Islamic communities in the British Isles in the 1980s is to a 
large extent the result of a late imperial process, common to all of Western Europe - 
the migration of people into Britain seeking work from former British colonies? 
As- with the other migrant communities, the first notable Pakistani presence ap- 
peared in the 1951 census. With the arrival of dependants beginning in the 1960s, the 
population of subcontinent. Muslim migrants substantially increased. 3 It is difficult to 
determine exactly how many Muslims there are in Britain today as the Census does 
not have a category to distinguish people by religion. Even should one take the 
trouble to sift arduously through the categories of ethnic origin in the 1991 census in 
search of Muslim surnames, the results are likely to be highly inaccurate. 4 Many will 
refuse to identify themselves by ethnic origin as they strongly identify themselves 
with a common Islamic identity. Others may not reveal their presence on the Census 
as they are in Britain illegally. The significant figure, however, is not, so much the 
total estimate but the ever-increasing proportion of Muslims born and educated in 
Britain as compared to the proportion of migrants born in. the subcontinent. 5 If the 
immigration laws continue to make it increasingly difficult for subcontinent. migrants 
to enter. the country, this figure. will increase to almost 100% within the duration of 
one generation's lifespan as first-generation migrants die. 
The other significant statistic amongst those who were born in the subcontinent is 
the diversity of , regional place of origin. 6. Although often defined by the receiving 
culture as an homogenous minority (Pakistani), the self-definition of the immigrants 
has tended to revolve around the customs and. beliefs inherited from localised ex- 
tended family groupings confined to small areas of rural Pakistan, Bangladesh and, to 
a lesser extent, India. It is becoming increasingly difficult to pass on the values and 
traditions of these villages of origin to a generation born and educated in Britain who 
identify 
, 
themselves as British.. This cultural clash of values that manifests itself 
across the generations is central to the various dichotomies that Muslims in Britain 
need to resolve in order to form a communal self-identity within which, individual 
self-esteem can be enhanced. 
Striking examples of common unity and fellowship arising from membership of 
the Muslim ummah can be found within this diversity of ethnic groupings, where 
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regional and tribal divisions can still further divide a single national grouping. The 
salat, Ramadan, the Hajj, and the respect and status given to the Qur'an still provide 
powerful reinforcement to the awareness of shared identity. The principle of tawhid, 
the unity and uniqueness of God, binds Muslims together in a common faith which 
can be the basis of unity. This strong shared faith enables the individuals concerned to 
cope with the difficult experience of living as a minority, in Britain despite the loss of 
living under Shari`ah law. It. could be argued that these symbols of Islam become 
even more powerful in what is perceived to be a hostile environment by many of the 
Muslim population. 
Ethnicity, 7 which embraces all the symbols of religion in order to affirm itself, 
becomes an important factor for minority groups. There is no doubt that the Muslim 
migrants passed through a stage of extreme entrenchment in which ethnic identity 
was reinforced. 8 Niels, 2n states that the growth of. mosques in Britain is linked to the 
immigration process. 9 The arrival of wives and families brought a dramatic increase 
in religious practices, and a new awareness of religious life which is reflected in the 
increase in the number of mosques. The mosques function, however, not only as 
places of worship, but also as centres to maintain and reinforce shared memories, 
values and goals located in the place of origin. Barton noted in his study of Bengalis 
in Bradford that the mosque is used as a refuge from British society, and as a `focal 
point for the recollection of a personal and corporate identity that is rooted in Syl- 
het'. 10 This process of ethnic consolidation helped to establish the boundaries of the 
communities. 1 t 
In some ways this appeared to be a religious revival as symbols of religion were 
utilised to reinforce group identity, but is more likely that the phenomena of religion 
manifested to reinforce ethnic identity. 12 Certainly it can be observed that this 
gathering around Islamic symbols which was used by the first generation migrants to 
sanctify the customs. of their cultures of origin, 13 does not sit easy with the younger 
generation of British-born Muslims. Many of them have utilised religion to attack the 
ethnic customs of their parents as unlslamic. 14 They often seek a different kind of 
Islam, an Islam freed from South Asian cultural accretion. Regardless, however, of 
the. divisions, and the fact that the majority of the Muslim migrants are British 
citizens, there is no doubt that membership of a universal community - the Muslim 
ummah - is an important aspect of self-awareness and understanding. The ummäh has 
always drawn its membership from a variety of, ethnic, national, and linguistic 
groups; ideally it should override them. Religious identity should be the first loyalty 
and common fealty of the Muslim. The ummah transcends these boundaries, and 
helps to unite Muslims by providing a shared world view based on common belief, 
values and norms. 
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In fact, while they have much in common, Muslims in Britain do not form an 
entirely homogenous community. Peter Clarke sums up the situation: 
The encounter for the first time with different cultural and religious forms and even 
with different Muslim traditions, as well as British society, and the emergence of sec- 
ond generation of British born and British educated Muslims has made the creation of 
an Islamic community that is not seen to be too closely linked to any particular 
cultural tradition a top priority. 15 
Central to the problems of the Muslim is the distinction between the ideals and 
values of Islam on the one hand and the cultural mores of a particular time-space 
milieu on the other. Muhammad. Mushaq Ibn Ally argues that the emergence of an 
Islamic community that is integrated in British society depends upon Muslims sepa- 
rating out the universals of Islam as revealed in the Qur'an from the accretions added 
by culture, custom, and history. He states: 
One important need of the Islamic ummah in Britain and every sub-group within it, is 
to distinguish that which is essential to the faith, and that which is transitory, 
cultural, historical, or national expression. There needs to be a turning away from 
the customs of the ancestors. Muslims must be prepared to be permanently rooted 
both psychologically and spiritually in Britain. 16 
For most Muslims in Britain, this is not a simple transformation. It is extremely 
hard for them to find, in the midst of ethnic differences, a religious/cultural con- 
sensus which is simultaneously based on Islamic principles and capable of encompass- 
ing full participation in the cultural resources of the receiving culture. It is 'a balanc- 
ing act which, if not successful, can divide the community on religious as well as eth- 
nic grounds. Failure can lead either to extreme fundamentalism with the community 
alienated from both the indigenous and the migrant cultures; or else to assimilation 
into Britain's secular society, thus reducing Islamic belief and practice to the private 
sphere. This latter possibility is problematic. John Rex points out that in principle 
Islam is not able to accept the distinction which our society has made between the 
public and the private sphere. It is a central tenet of Muslim belief to maintain that 
Islam is a whole way of life. Consequently, it affects attitudes not only in private 
moral and cultural matters, but also in the social, political, and the economic 
sphere. 17 It is debatable whether Islam could in fact lose this dimension without 
losing something fundamental to its identity as a faith. 
Despite the problems involved in dealing not only with major ethnic and 
geographical divisions but also with important regional, linguistic, social, and politi- 
cal differences within the major groupings, there are signs that Islam is becoming the 
-65- 
mark of identity for Muslim minorities all over Europe. Three important strands can 
be distinguished which contribute to this phenomenon: 
(a) Various studies have shown that when Muslims from rural areas migrate to the 
cities, a transformation takes place in their religious life. In the village, the 
beliefs and practices of Islam are part of an inherited total way of life rein- 
forced by the close-knit nature of a small community. The move to the more 
impersonal, individualistic, urban culture leads to a questioning of the village 
values, and'a'conscious redefinition of Islamic identity. 18 The move from the 
villages of the subcontinent to the major urban/industrial centres of Western 
Europe is an extreme version of this phenomenon. It is resulting in a shift of 
focus of religious identity from the subcontinent to the inner cities of Britain. It 
can be argued that this is counteracted by the immediate and personal experience 
of stress caused by the movement of the migrant from one social world to an- 
other. Verity Saifullah Khan argues that the traditional institutions of village 
life re-emerge in modified form to help the migrants cope. She suggests that 
there is an idealisation of the village life-world. 19 
(b) Most Muslim migrants find themselves 'to be a minority. However, in the- case 
of subcontinent Muslims they are psychologically and sociologically used to 
being part of a minority through their long history in India even though they 
may have migrated from the Muslim nations of Pakistan and Bangladesh. For 
these Muslim minority groups the ideal of the ummah can become even more 
important than the place of origin as a marker of identity. ' 
(c) Interconnected with the previous two strands is the world-wide resurgence of 
Islam. Priorities being 'decided at an international level become' hard to ignore. 
Choices and perspectives being developed at this level may have little bearing 
on the Muslims' experience in their new host cultures. 
Badr Dahya suggests that Pakistanis in Britain are feeling alienated not only from 
the receiving culture but also from their culture of origin. This is particularly acute 
for the younger generation born in Britain, but at least they are more able to identify 
with the receiving culture which is their land of birth. He argues that first-generation 
Pakistani migrants are starting to reject the traditional expectation on the part of kin- 
folk and fellow villagers back home that they should distribute expensive gifts when 
they revisit. They are also alienated by the treatment given to them by custom offi- 
cials, taxi drivers, hoteliers, and shop keepers. Supposedly returning home, they are 
received with rudeness and dishonesty and exploited as foreign tourists. He suggests 
that the alienation felt from both cultures is leading to a change of image. `Such 
changes suggest that the migrants are now discovering the ethical and moral values of 
Islam, or rather reinterpreting their conception of what Islam is about'. 20 
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Certainly all of this indicates that religious identity in the Muslim community is 
becoming the sharpest focus for establishing a sense of selfhood. The framework 
transferred from the Muslim majority societies is no longer relevant. The early 
migrants experienced a sense of loss, but the second generation feels a sense of. denial 
of self. Its members need to discover, or at least to redefine, both a spiritual. and a 
social self. Alienated, disorganised and floating, many young Muslims in Britain 
have begun to refuse the classification of `black' or `Asian'. They have found a 
strategy for self-rehabilitation by claiming their identity as . 
`Muslim'. Clifford 
Longley succinctly sums up this social. phenomenon stating that it has the potential `to 
fuse into something extraordinary - British Islam'. 21 
In contrast to this, it must be remembered that no single view of Islam is held by 
all members of the community. The process of organising the Muslim community on 
a national basis is as old as its presence in Britain. The pattern of chain migration re- 
inforced by biradari networks22 has significantly strengthened ties to extended 
families that originated in small locales of Pakistan and Bangladesh. This is reflected 
in the way the communities have been organised in Britain.. Pnina Werbner has ob- 
served that, by now, virtually all the religious divisions prominent in Pakistan have 
their local institutional expression in Britain. 23 Mosques and welfare organisations 
proliferated throughout the 1970s and 1980s, each representing small sub-groups 
within the community. 24. Any attempts to create umbrella organisations to represent 
the community on a national level were relatively unsuccessful. 25 There area large 
number of Muslim organisations in Britain. In 1986 it was estimated that there were 
over four thousand, mostly concerned with local welfare. 26 Tensions between the 
universal and the particular. are ever-present. Any move towards establishing the kind 
of national organisation based on the universals of Islam which would represent the 
whole community is likely to be seen as a critique of those values and traditions 
which many Muslim immigrants still hold dear. 
Very. of ten the ideal of the ummah is seen to be betrayed by any degree of integra- 
tion with the host community. Many Muslims go as far as. to question whether a truly 
Islamic life is even possible in the West where Muslims are in a minority. 27 Up until 
now the mosques have not responded positively to the challenge of modernity. This 
has resulted in the mosques' inability to, attract young people and a neglect of a public 
participation of women in religious activities. It is amongst these two groups that the 
search for common identity is most acute. 
In regard to the minority question, it must be remembered that prior to the crea- 
tion of Pakistan in 1947, Muslims had always been a minority in the subcontinent. 
Muslims in India long regarded. themselves as separate and distinct from other reli- 
gious and social groupings. They developed strategies. to deal with living alongside a 
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Hindu majority, and later to deal with being ruled by the British. - Essential to these 
strategies was the message of return to the basics of Islam in order to revitalise, the 
community, which had found itself in danger of being. relegated to a minor position. 
In the 19th and early 20th century several. theological/political groups emerged in the 
subcontinent in response to the decline of the. Muslim -community and the successful 
spread of European culture. 28 The central tenet of - their message was a return to the 
fundamentals of Islam based on the Qur'an and Sunna, and a . stripping away of any- 
thing that was seen to be cultural accretion. The influence of some groups has in- 
creased recently as a result of the general resurgence of Islam throughout the Muslim 
world. 
It is not surprising that these theological /political movements have become much 
more influential in Britain than have the locally organised welfare organisations. The 
apparent emphasis on the universals of Islam, the history of Islamic revival, and the 
fact that many first-generation Muslims would have existing loyalties to one or the 
other of them transferred from the subcontinent has enabled them to flourish in 
Britain. The twentieth century ideological movements are more likely to be attractive 
to young Muslims and Muslim women born in Britain. Perhaps even more attractive 
is the fact that these groups were formed partly in opposition to British colonialism 
and Western values. Muhammad Anwar points out that the relationship between 
Muslims and the indigenous population can best be understood against the background 
of the colonial encounter, and the unequal economic and political power relationships 
generated by colonialism both in British India and now in Britain. 29 If this is true, 
then the success of these groups must be attributed to the fact they have developed 
historical strategies to cope with* Muslims being a minority ruled over by the British. 
The confrontation with British colonialism and Western values has been transplanted 
to Britain from the subcontinent by the economic processes of capitalism. The Mus- 
lim minority of the subcontinent, once ruled by a British colonial minority, now finds 
a part of itself to be an economically and socially deprived minority in the land of its 
old rulers. The major difference here in the new situation is that the old rulers are 
now the majority population. 
It has tobe ascertained whether these revivalist organisations30 can really fulfil the 
expectations of British-born Muslims. One has to examine critically their proclama- 
tions of a culturally-free emphasis on the universals of Islam. This may have been 
true at the time, within. the context of their creation but they may now be too caught 
up in the history of subcontinent Muslim sectarian conflict to be of any use in helping 
to create a unified British Muslim community. A. history of mutual recrimination and 
even excommunication has characterised their relationship with each, other in the sub- 
continent, and is seen to have spilled over into Britain. 31 This has resulted in divid- 
ing some small communities and has led to power struggles for control of some 
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mosques. The different groups are intensely suspicious of each other and do very. 
little to integrate amongst themselves. They all retain strong. links with their parent 
organisations Sin the subcontinent. There is the strong possibility that they are in 
danger of imparting divisions which developed in the history of subcontinent Islam 
which could seriously undermine any efforts they might make towards developing a 
truly native version of Islam in Britain. 
A number of major dilemmas, which I will look at as dichotomies; need to be 
resolved by Muslims in Britain before a community can be established that exhibitsa 
minimum basic degree of unity. It is essential to examine these closely in order to 
appreciate the difficulties involved. This exercise will also facilitate a deeper un- 
derstanding of the role of sectarian movements in the formation and shaping of the 
community in Britain: 
First generation migrants Y. Later British-born generations 
The third generation which are now coming up are calling themselves Muslims, not 
Pakistanis or Asians. They are speaking English, their culture is British, and they are 
Muslims. What it means, of course, is that we have decided to stay here in Britain. 
We have to be able to discuss the common issues facing the whole British Muslim. 
community. Now people have no intention of returning to Pakistan. 32 
The greater divisions will not be between Britain and the Muslims, but between the 
two factions within the faith. This will not be entirely generation-defined, yet it will 
be the younger people who will decide. They see their parents besieged. They are 
more rigid in their religion than they would have been even in their old homeland, 
and they see that they cling to the conservatism from comfort, from fear. 
33 
In the above quotation Sher Azam has pointed out a crucial change of self-identity 
amongst the British-born descendants of the original settlers. He is right when he' sug- 
gests that they have no intention of returning to Pakistan, but he does not mention that 
this indicates a serious split in attitude between generations. -The first generation 
migrants had used `the Myth of Return' to legitimise continued adherence to the 
values of the homeland, and to condemn any assimilation of British cultural values as 
irrelevant and destructive. Most of the parents come from rural areas in the sub- 
continent and were not educated. They have tried to maintain a world outlook which 
is foreign to the values of the receiving culture. Very often this has resulted in a 
conservatism that even in the original homeland many would find rigid and old- 
fashioned. The countries of origin have undergone considerable changes since the 
departure of the original migrants to Britain, but they often continue an emotive at- 
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tachment to the way things were at that time. This can become idealised and mytho- 
logised; the values brought over are not to be challenged. Many migrants find it dif- 
ficult to understand their children who were brought up and educated in Britain. 
Sometimes attempts to question or break away from the parents' values is seen as cor- 
ruption. by the host . nation's unlslamic values and as a move 
towards godlessness and. 
the disintegration of the community. The children can find it equally difficult to un-. 
derstand the beliefs and lifestyle of their parents. 
Despite their greater contact with the values of the indigenous culture through the 
medium of. education, the family still remains tremendously important to the majority 
of young Muslims. Muhammad Anwar. found that 94% of those whom he inter- 
viewed claimed they would not be prepared to do anything that would damage the 
prestige of their family. 34 The concept of izzat acts as a powerful agent of reinforce- 
ment for the passing' down and maintenance within the family of the. rules and 
customs of the community. ' There are powerful emotive inhibitions against disgracing 
the family or letting down the family honour. The most important -part of the 
Shari'ah is Muslim family law, which insists that religious duty governs personal 
relations. Consequently, izzat. is maintained and sanctified by a complicated pattern 
of behaviour evolved from Islam and the time-honoured customs of the family's place. 
of origin and social status. To the older generation who find themselves-struggling to 
maintain their ethnic/religious identity as a minority group, izzat becomes of great 
significance. Very often the particular and the universal have equal importance. 
Their Islam is not based on the study of Qur'an and Hadith, but has been formed by 
the rites and ceremonies of family and village life. Religion is indistinguishable from 
their way of life, and these traditions are zealously guarded in the alien and often 
hostile environment of Britain. 
When Zaki Badawi speaks of `two factions within the faith', ' he is accurately pin- 
pointing a major ideological split over what constitutes Islam. He is`right to suggest 
that this has a strong'generational element. Muhammad Anwar suggests that the first 
generation are seen to be more committed to religious observance and therefore ap- 
pear to be more orthodox in response to `Western' values. 35 Dr. Farhan Nizami, ' the 
Director ofr'the' Oxford Centre of Islamic Studies, appears to' contradict Muhammad 
Anwar's view. He argues that studies have shown that second generation followers of- 
Islam are often more strict in their observance than their parents. Even those exposed 
to a modern Western education often feel a need to return to their Muslim roots. 36 
This apparent contradiction of Muhammad Anwar's findings is reinforced by two 
comments from a newspaper cutting. Hannana Siddiqi observes, `Over the years my 
parents have become less orthodox, but my brothers have become more religious'. 
Prajna Patel reinforces this, stating, 'the'younger generation have been won by funda- 
mentalists. They are often poor and unemployed with no prospects. They are saying 
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"We are Muslims"'. 37 
This paradox is resolved when it is realised that young Muslims in Britain are in- 
creasingly rejecting both assimilation into the mainstream indigenous culture and the 
ethnocentricity of their parents. Both generations are affirming the values of religion. 
The earlier migrants use Islam to affirm their cultural inheritance and allegiance to 
life in the subcontinent. Old customs and traditions are reinforced by sanctifying 
them as prescribed by religion. The mosques function not only as places of worship, 
but also as centres to maintain and reinforce shared memories, values, and goals lo- 
cated in the country of origin. Congregations tend to consist of a distinctive regional- 
ethnic origin. Increasingly, however, there are signs that the later generations are 
developing a religious awareness which has little to. do with ethnic solidarity. There 
is an attempt taking place to discover Islamic identity that is based on the universals 
of the faith. It is not enough to be born a Muslim. Religion has to be more than an 
accident at birth, subservient to culture. It has to be founded on knowledge and expe- 
rience. Many young Muslims in Britain are confounding their parents by their at- 
tempts to separate the essentials of the faith from cultural. or historical additions. 
Values cherished by parents as part of their cultural and religious identity are now 
coming under attack, not from the expected directions of the indigenous culture, but 
from their children who declare them to be unlslamic. : 
Women v. patriarchal structures of Asian culture 
Many Muslim women in Britain, although not desiring to achieve the apparent 
freedoms won by English women, are. questioning traditional images of Muslim 
womanhood. These include gender roles, purdah, dress-customs, the issue of work 
outside the home, and certain kinds of arranged marriage which are seen as typical to 
South Asian culture. 
Initially, the arrival of Muslim women in Britain led to a consolidation of ethnic 
identity. Ironically, this resulted in the women themselves facing stricter rules on 
dress, purdah and employment than any other group of Asian migrant women. The 
fragmentation of the traditional family, the isolation created by fear of moral con- 
tamination from the receiving culture, the prestige given to purdah as a mark of 
middle-class status, and finally the climate of Britain, all had severe consequences for 
women. Purdah was not only retained but strengthened in response to, insecurity and 
the threat. perceived from `immoral' Britain. 38 In the process, purdah increasingly 
lost its function as protection and became a prison. 39 Many women have not learnt to 
speak English, and it is not uncommon to see them using their children as interpreters 
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when out shopping. Unlike their husbands, who come in contact with the indigenous 
culture through employment, or their children (both male and female) through school, 
many older Asian Muslim women have minimal contact with a world outside their im- 
mediate family and close relatives. 
There has been a lack of encouragement for women to organise and participate 
fully in public religious life in Britain. In many Muslim communities there has been 
outright rejection of South Asian. female participation in public.. worship and. many 
mosques still have no facilities for women. They often find themselves. the. victims of 
South Asian' gender attitudes which are rigidly disguised as the strictures of Islam. 
Sharif states that many young women do not know much about the teachings of 
Islam. As with the boys, although taught to recite the Qur'an in mosque schools they 
do not understand the Arabic. They believe that everything that their parents say is ac- 
cording to-Islamic prescriptions. 40 The girls are brought up to be submissive and not 
to confront their parents or elders. In many homes even dialogue and discussion by. 
girls is discouraged as unIslamic behaviour. 41 Rashid argues that there is `no clear cut 
distinction in the minds of either parents or teenage girls between religion and 
customs and so "religion" encompasses a vast area of social practice'. 42 Thus any at- 
tempt by women to challenge cultural norms concerning employment,: dress, educa- 
tion, or marriage patterns is often attacked on the grounds that these are unalterable 
tenets of Islam. 
Many women, particularly the later generations born in Britain, are acquiring the 
same weapons that were mentioned in the previous sections. South Asian men may 
well be afraid of, the impact of western culture on their wives and daughters, and can 
to some degree isolate them from contact with it. They cannot, however, isolate 
them from Islam. Knott and Khokher have observed that recent studies are showing 
that more young Muslim women are distinguishing between cultural traditions and the 
central tenets of Islam. 43 Many parents and husbands have found that their religion 
itself is being used as an effective weapon against certain forms of ethnic oppression, 
as some women begin to redefine themselves and their role in society by studying the 
fundamentals of Islam. In Mirza's study all the women interviewed argued that it was 
men, and not Islam, that had put them in a subordinate position. 44 This new aware- 
ness has come about not only because -of the need for Muslim women to redefine 
themselves' in Britain but also because of an increased awareness of religion brought 
about by the resurgence of Islam worldwide. 45 Many daughters and wives are arguing 
that there is no incompatibility between being British citizens and Muslim women. 46 
Dress does not have to be Asian to be in conformity with the prescriptions of the 
Qur'an. Shaw sums up this process arguing that `they justify the pursuit of education 
and careers by reference to religious ideology, arguing that their critics' understand- 
ing of Islam is' outdated and narrow'. 47 It. is inappropriate not only in Britain but 
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even in Pakistan, where today many women attend university and have careers. Many 
of the arguments over the role of women are going on in the subcontinent. Knott and 
Khokher point out that many of the religious groups engaged in discussion on. the role 
of women are established in Britain and that their various perspectives are reproduced 
here. 48 
As devout Muslims, more and more young British-born women are looking to. 
the Qur'an and the Sunna of the Prophet for the answer to all questions. Often they 
find that the teachings of Islam directly contradict hallowed customs and traditions 
regarding the status and place of women in society. They defend both Islam and 
themselves from the abuses of a rigidly patriarchal society by arguing that the. poor 
standing of women- that is often associated with Islamic prescription is a cultural ac- 
cretion having no basis in the Qur'an itself. 49 On the contrary, they can claim that 
true Islam is pledged to equality of the sexes, albeit respecting the essential, dif- 
ferences between them. This approach which Knott and Khokher describe as the 
`self-conscious exploitation of religion'50 emphasises the differences between the gen- 
erations rather than conflict between life at school and life at home. The more con- 
scious, analytical study of Islam does, however, owe something to the techniques. of 
textual analysis, command of English, and the influence of speculative thought learnt 
at school. 51 Rashida, a biology teacher, is typical of this trend in the Muslim com- 
munity. She states that she struggled against a repressive Asian culture until she dis- 
covered the true Islam. 
I confused Islam and Asian: they are not the same: I feel as if .1 have to fight all the 
way; people said to me, "sit back, you're a girl", and my parents told me not to go to 
school. If I hadn't discovered Islam, I would have become westernised. 52 
Many are discovering that the emancipation of women was. apparently a matter of 
importance to the Prophet. They refer to his wives, particularly Khadijah who was a 
successful businesswoman, and Aisha who became a stateswoman in the early years 
of Islam's development. They claim that 1400 years ago women were liberated by 
the establishment of Islam. They were given inheritance rights, the right to keep their 
earnings, the right to divorce, and the right to maintain their own surnames. Sub- 
sequently, they argue, various cultures have superimposed their own. variation of gen- 
der inequality onto Islam as it spread through Asia. Many claim that this is particu- 
larly the case in South Asia. 
The whole issue of the rights of Muslim women born in Britain is beginning to 
centre upon the challenge Islam is posing to both ethnicity and westernisation. The 
opposition to uncritical acceptance of western values is central to the ideology of Is- 
lamic resurgency throughout the world. By incorporating this into their view of 
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British life, many young Muslim women are able to feel both solidarity with the Is- 
lamic movement globally and to develop a critique towards the dominant culture's at- 
titude towards them. At the same time they can utilise the revivalists' stance against 
cultural accretion entering into Islam to defend themselves against attitudes which 
often belong more to the subcontinent village than the teachings of the Qur'an. Knott 
and Khokher point out that this stategy enables young Muslim women born and edu- 
cated in Britain to neither feel torn between two cultures or to switch back and forth 
between two opposed worlds, but to find'a way forward utilising their. religion. 53 
Secular education v. religious education 
Having looked briefly at young people and women, it becomes apparent that the 
issue. of education is, very important amongst Muslims here in Britain. Moeen Yaseen 
of the Islamic Schools Trust has defined education as `the major instrument of 
cultural engineering'. 54 Many Muslims feel uneasy about the presence of their chil- 
dren in British state schools. Dr. Haleh Afshar of the University of York has de- 
scribed this dilemma as a conflict between home and school, which she further 
elaborates as `school at school' versus `school at home'; the former is reinforced by 
television. 55 School is the place where Muslim society and British society most deeply 
interact. It is this interaction between values that leads Muhammad Anwar to state 
that young Muslims are `caught between two cultures'. This argument is challenged 
by research which suggests that British-born Muslims are having `the best of both 
worlds'. 56 The popular perceptions and sentiments expressed by Muslims themselves 
of all generations, however, agree with Anwar. Most of the young Muslims inter- 
viewed for this study were deeply involved with 'practising their faith. Many of them 
were active members of Islamic organisations. All expressed a feeling of identity 
crisis of the type identified by Anwar. They felt that only their allegiance to Islam 
could resolve this. It may well be that young Muslims who feel that they have `the 
best of both worlds' are adopting a secular alternative and come from homes whose 
attitude to the British way of life and practice of Islam is more tolerant. 
If education is viewed as a means of cultural engineering, then it will sometimes 
clash with an equally powerful form of socialisation that takes place within the fam- 
ily. Parents themselves are often torn between their loyalty to traditional value 
systems incorporating religious and social authority on the one hand, And a desire to 
see their children succeed in the educational system on the other. Distrustful of a 
Western secular society which is popularly viewed as corrupt and blatantly sexually 
promiscuous, they attempt to counteract this influence of school by nurturing their 
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children into the overarching belief system of Islam. This last will include views of 
European culture, perceptions of education, the right behaviour between the sexes and 
between the generations, and codes of moral behaviour and appearance. All of these. 
will be reinforced by the code of izzat. This is likely to be imposed more on the girls 
than the boys. Mirza argues that the girls are victims of double standards of morality 
in which actions deemed improper for a woman are accepted when performed by 
men. 57 She states that women are put under stricter surveillance after the onset of 
puberty as it is considered that too much freedom will ruin a. girl's reputation. 58 Even 
British teaching methods based on enquiry and the development of freedom of 
thought could be highly suspect. 
The Qur'an or mosque school is used to support this framework of the family and 
its values. Several nights a week the children will 'attend two-hour sessions. They 
will be taught by rote the Arabic of the Qur'an, basic religious instruction, and some- 
times the mother-tongue of their parents. Usually the instruction is by the imam. 
Often he will be suspicious not only of the influence of British secular education on 
the children but also of the influence of their parents, whose knowledge of " Islam he 
may not trust. 
The main purpose of the mosque school is to inculcate into the children the aware- 
ness that they belong to a Muslim community. Stephen Barton points out that when 
the children are asked, `Who are you? ' the correct answer expected is, `A Muslim'. 
He compares this with the beginning of the Anglican catechism59 and concludes that 
the Muslim child's sense of identity in relation to itself and its faith lies not in indi- 
vidual identity nor even in relationships to family but membership of the household of 
Islam. In fact, the child's education at mosque school will ultimately depend on the 
calibre of the imam and the brand of Islam that he himself follows. Much of the 
teaching is very basic, simplistic and taught in what must be seen as a boring way. 
This deficiency is inherent in that system of part-time religious schools run alongside 
the English system of education which became the pattern under the British adminis- 
tration in colonial India. At the time it considerably disadvantaged Muslim youth, 
and it will continue to do so. At best it gives a very elementary knowledge of the 
faith; at worst it defeats its own object by turning the children against their own reli- 
gion. The extra studying hours placed upon small children could well be to the detri- 
ment of their education at school. It could also create a clash of values. 
Some Muslims believe the solution to be the establishment of Islamic schools 
which teach academic subjects alongside religious instruction in Islam. The major re- 
ligious movements are increasingly establishing dar al-ulums which provide full-time 
religious education combined with a few core subjects from the British curriculum. 
Essentially these schools are based on the subcontinent Islamic curriculum which was 
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established to train the ulema. The demand for places in the dar al-ulums is growing 
rapidly . especially 
amongst Muslim parents with Deobandi, sympathies.. The major 
problem here is that there is hardly any agreement on which `Islam' should be taught. 
An article in Link . International 
identifies two dimensions here. First, it notes, the 
divisions along. sectarian lines that prevail in the community. Muslims . with 
loyalties 
to Deobandi, Barehvi, Tabligh-i, and Jamaat-i Islami brands of Islam each want to 
teach. their children according to their own ideology, and consequently consolidate 
divisions within the community. Second, the article comments on `Sufistic' inter- 
pretations of Islam incorporating all sorts of practices brought from home villages in 
the subcontinent, which can only be described as syncretistic. These reinforce the 
inward-looking maintenance of ethnic values. 60 
Sharif suggests that girls are more likely to be aware of the disparity between the 
values of home and and the values of school. 61 Many Muslims in Britain originate 
from the rural areas of the subcontinent and received little informal education them- 
selves. The education of girls was not considered important as marriage is considered 
to be their destiny. Training in running a home is felt to be more important than for- 
mal education. 62 As a consequence the parents expect girls to concentrate. on 
housework, cooking and looking after children, rather than schoolwork. 63 Sharif 
found that boys were given more encouragement with homework and that television 
was often censored for the: girls. 64. Mirza argues that educated women were perceived 
as a threat by. men who considered them too assertive. She also suggests that in-laws 
expect their sons' wives to be servile. 65 Many of the girls are sent to single sex 
schools to protect them from the perceived sexual promiscuity of British culture. 
Teachers are often asked to keep them closely supervised. Parents and brothers often 
chaperone them to and from school, 66 Despite this difference in attitude and closer 
control of girls, many find that school provides them with opportunities to be more 
critical in their thinking, and to develop the ability to differ with. their. parents. 67 
Many parents are not able to sympathise or even be aware of the ethos of individual 
fulfilment and development offered to both sexes in school as it is not a part. of their 
cultural background. ' This conflict of values has led many parents in Britain. to be- 
come more repressive. 68 Higher. education by. girls is rarely achieved without strug- 
gle69 and many religious parents see that the solution is to provide girls with a dar a! - 
ulum education only; Yasmin Ali sums this up: 
The education of Muslim girls has less to do with schooling than with the exercise of 
control by Muslim men over the lives of women in the family and wider community. 
Generally, control is maintained by monitoring the level and amount of interaction 
with male relatives and the local community. But in the area of schooling, Muslim 
parents feel that their grip on their daughters' lives is weaker. Single sex education is 
preferred by, Muslim parents, and nearly always for their daughters. 
70 
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In the meantime there is considerable evidence that Muslim children of sub- 
continent origin are not doing as well in school as they should be. 71 Young 
Pakistanis have a much higher unemployment rate than either the indigenous popula- 
tion, or indeed any other minority group. 72 Monica Taylor states that `the schooling 
of a minority is dependent on how powerful they are'. 73 It is only since the Rushdie 
protest in 1989 that Muslims in Britain are beginning to realise that organised unity is 
powerful, and that their common Islamic identity is the banner behind which they 
need to unite. 
Integration v Assimilation 
A great deal of sociological analyses of migrant communities, including Muslim 
communities, has focused on the alternative choices of either assimilation into the 
British `way of life', or an assertive embracing of distinctive ethnic cultures based on 
the lifestyle, religion and customs of the place of origin. 
Muhammad Anwar defines the concept of `pluralistic integration' as that `whereby 
a group maintains itself as a unit on its own, but is nevertheless accepted by the ma- 
jority itself as part of the wider society'. 74 In this model the minority group main- 
tains such distinguishing features as religion, family structures and language. The in- 
crease in the numbers of migrant Muslims has made this possible. Economic, social 
and emotive needs can be found amongst family,. friends and ethnic services. Con- 
sequently, there is a decrease in the opportunities for contact with the indigenous pop- 
ulation. As the contact lessens, so the acquisition of skills required for full participa- 
tion in the advantages of the majority society are proportionately hindered. This in- 
dependence and isolation from the indigenous population is reinforced by a fear of its 
`corrupting' influence. The idea of assimilation is seen as betrayal; a loss of religion 
and cultural norms from the place of origin that results in the family losing face in the 
minority 'community. The burden of maintaining this ethnic purity falls on the 
younger generation, their opportunity for contact with the culture of the receiving 
society is perceived as considerably greater than the first generation migrants. This is 
often viewed with suspicion, and the family itself then becomes the place of inter- 
generational tensions as signs of assimilation are. looked for. 
Verity Saifullah Khan confirms this view. She argues that `the climate of ethnic 
"cultural resistance" is thus as much an outcome of internal hegemonic struggles as it 
is a response to outside domination'. 75 Various religious organisations imported from 
the subcontinent help to maintain and preserve the cherished ethnic identity with a 
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proselytising zeal. The mosque becomes the symbolic centre for this religio-cultural 
awareness, and very often the imam himself will come from the place of origin. He 
is still in touch with home village gossip and politics. He will preach in the local lan- 
guage, and sometimes will be unable to speak English. Isolated from British culture,, 
he comes to represent uncontaminated ethnic identity. His religious function con- 
firms the perceived bond between Islam and home culture. . 
Very often the community leaders who make up the mosque committees employ-ing 
the imam are ethnic entrepreneurs. It is in their financial interest to further tradi- 
tional values and perpetuate and defend ethnicity. Assimilation into the indigenous 
culture would not assist their own business enterprises. Ironically, this sub-section of: 
the Muslim community often involves those individuals with the most contact with the 
majority society. 76 There have been instances where the imam has been dismissed by 
the mosque committee because of his religious views. Where this has taken place, the 
imam has usually been preaching a revivalist form of religion which . places 
its 
emphasis on the universals of Islam and attacks cultural accretion as a corruption of 
the faith. 
So far, there are no real indications that Muslims in Britain are following that path 
towards complete assimilation that has already been trodden by the majority of 
Britain's Catholics and to a lesser extent the Jews. Many young Muslims claim that 
assimilation is not a genuine choice. in. that. the indigenous white culture would always 
discriminate against them on the grounds of colour. Integration is criticised by many 
in the receiving' culture. Remaining separate is seen as a critique of the British `way 
of life', and very often it is. Migrants in. general are often attacked for not assimilat- 
ing. Some young Muslims see three choices being presented to them by the receiving 
culture . 
(i) Develop individuality and avoid group identity. This would leave them 
even more isolated than- they are now. (ii) Take on the cultural norms of the in- 
digenous culture. (iii) Be more subservient and obedient -a form of internal 
colonialism. 77 Equally, for reasons already discussed, they are ill at ease with the 
ethnic isolationism of their parents and grandparents. Embracing Islam as a religious 
experience rather than a cultural heritage is providing increasing numbers of young 
Muslims with an alternative to pressure to assimilate into British culture on the one 
hand, and on the other to respond to parental persuasion to conform to various strands 
of imported ethnic culture. Thus it can be seen that the situation is not a straight 
choice between assimilation and integration. The indigenous culture will have to 
come to terms with two major groups demanding the right to integrate: one on eth- 
nic/racial grounds; the other on purely religious grounds. This can create considerable 
confusion. Both will call on Islam to support their case, and it will not always be easy 
for the receiving culture to distinguish between the two. It is likely that the latter 
group will become increasingly larger and more vocal. 
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Sufism v. Reform Islam 
The religious and ethnic situation is further complicated by the history of Islam in 
the subcontinent. Sufism has always been'a major influence in that part of the world, 
and Sufi pirs were a major factor in the propagation of Islam amongst the Hindu pop- 
ulation. Many were converted under the inspiration of these charismatic figures. 78 
Their attitude to tawhid was often far more flexible than the orthodox; they focussed 
on inner union with the immanent rather than on the uniqueness of the transcendent 
Allah. 79 Hindus would have been far more sympathetic to this outlook. The Sufis in 
turn were often not so strict on the externals of Islam and consequently there 
developed a, highly syncretistic version of the religion, especially in rural areas. This 
version of Islam has been under constant attack from reformers who have criticised 
the Hindu influences in its style of worship. The reformers have focussed their atten- 
tion on the universals of the faith as based on the Qur'an and the Hadith. 80 
The arrival of subcontinent Muslims in Britain has transplanted into this country 
all the divisions and controversies which have historically split the community in India 
and Pakistan. The major Sufi orders, Nagshbandiya, Qadriya and Chisi, f are all in- 
fluential at a local level in Britain. The pirs have always been the bearers of regional 
culture and language. They have taught in the vernacular, and carried the message of 
Islam deep into the hearts and minds of rural people who are often illiterate. This 
custom-laden version of Islam emphasises popular. devotion, the intercession of saints, 
barak., shrines, tombs of holy men, peculiar powers and miracles, singing and 
dancing and, above all, the importance of the pirlmurid relationship. Asian food, 
candles, incense, rosewater offerings, holy water and amulets are all used in religious 
worship. These may be used to cure the sick, to secure the birth of a male child, or 
even to protect the worshipper from magical forces such as evil jinn. 
Obviously this form of Islam, unique as it is to the villages' of the subcontinent, 
evokes very powerfully for many migrants' the feeling of never-forgotten places of 
origin. It is debatable whether this strand of the faith can survive beyond the gener- 
ation of migrants that was actually born in the subcontinent. Its powerful link with the 
villages of the migrants' past will have no association for British-born Muslims, and 
they may well ally themselves with the reformist critique of the Sufi tradition. Their 
need to distance themselves from their parents' Asian origin and to assert their British 
identity will leave them disenchanted with this folk form of Islam. 
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Status within migrant community v. Class position in British society 
Any analysis of class in the Muslim community must take place on two levels. 
There is the social structure operating within the Muslim community itself which may 
be influenced by the stratification of society in the country of origin; and there is also 
the class position of the Muslim migrants within the receiving society. Pnina Werbner 
suggests that migrant men are likely to have dual status. 81 
In the wider society they are likely to be perceived as working-class or even as an 
underclass. The economic position of the Muslims in Britain has changed very little in 
the last thirty years; the majority are still concentrated in the semi-skilled and un- 
skilled sectors of industry. They suffer disproportionately from unemployment due to 
their concentration in manufacturing industries82 and the continuation of racist atti- 
tudes in job allocations. They are likely to be in low-paid, menial work that is un- 
attractive to the indigenous population. In 1984 Muhammad Anwar and Roger 
Garaudy argued that the typical Muslim worker was likely. to be young and male. 
They found that the overwhelming majority were employees in relatively few in- 
dustries notably textiles and engineering. Large numbers were often found making up 
the workforce of a particular factory or mill. They calculated that 11 % of the Mus- 
lim community were of professional class. 83 
The most noticeable change is in the growing number of self-employed Muslims. 
This may reflect a shift away from focussing on the country of origin and an ac- 
knowledgement that the future is in Britain. Money that was once sent home to rela- 
tives in the subcontinent may have been used to establish small businesses. Essen- 
tially these enterprises were set up to serve the requirements of the growing com- 
munities., This was facilitated by the way in which various migrant groups gathered 
together in relatively small areas of particular towns and cities. These entrepreneurs 
concentrated on providing goods and services that reinforced the ethnic identity of 
their customers. This has resulted in a further closing of ranks amongst the migrant 
populations. As the Muslim community becomes more autonomous, Muslim men and 
women can define their status within their own group thus the class position thrust 
upon them by the host community becomes largely irrelevant in terms of self-esteem. 
Amongst fellow-Muslims class status can be derived from several sources. Com- 
munity leaders are given considerable prestige based on their education, their eco- 
nomic status, the length of time their family has been. in Britain (original settlers are 
well respected as community elders), the status of their family in the country of 
origin, Islamic scholarship, and membership of voluntary organisations such as wel- 
fare organisations and mosque committees. The membership of the latter is likely to 
be dominated by. those with high status in the community. Pnina Werbner. confirmed 
that most Pakistani cultural, religious or political associations are run by educated 
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members of the community; intellectuals of middle-class background. 84 
Pnina Werbner goes on to suggest that the mosque has become `the highest locus 
of communal involvement'. 85 It is not only the centre of religious worship and learn- 
ing but also the source of very high status within the community. The committee 
which runs each mosque in Britain is usually controlled by businessmen and the 
professional middle-class. Very often these are also early settlers in the area. Pnina 
Werbner argues that the mosque is `the ideological, regional, denominational, eco- 
nomic and social "core" or centre of the community. 86 
This control of the mosque will have important consequences for the development 
of Islam in Britain. The firm grip of the older-generation early migrants is often 
resented by the generation born in Britain, the latter feel that the issues which are im- 
portant to the old-timers are not relevant to them. Previously, it was explained that it 
is often in the interest of local Muslim entrepreneurs to maintain ethnic identity and 
that this has sometimes resulted in conflict with the imam. This conflict, however, 
can also happen in reverse. Sometimes the imam will be entrenched in a more 
tradition-based form of Islam that is influenced by Sufi beliefs and village practices. 
This may not please all the members of the mosque committee. It has been noted by 
Pnina Werbner that ritual and religiosity become vehicles for the display of social dif- 
ferences within the ethnic group, even as they continue to uphold the distinctiveness 
of the group as a whole. 87 This link between religion and class goes back to eco- 
nomic and social changes in the country of origin. 
Village society is characterised by rigid adherence to traditional norms and values. 
Social control is maintained by everyday life in a close-knit community. Illiterate vil- 
lagers are largely dependent upon the ceremonial aspects of religions and daily rites 
for their apprehension of Islam. Landless labourers in Pakistan are increasingly 
migrating to the cities, Werner Schiffauer argues that a quantum change occurs in the 
religion of migrants moving from the countryside to the city. In his study of Turkish 
peasants in their home villages in Anatolia and Germany, he notes what he calls 
`Islamicisation of the Self' amongst urban immigrants and migrants to Europe. Schif- 
fauer notes that religious thought in the villages takes `the form of collective self- 
certainty', in which the legal norms, the do's and do not's of Islam are central. 88 He 
argues that `in sacred times the village turns into a religious community', but that in 
the city one leaves the society and enters a religious community. This often becomes 
`a counterweight to secular society, as well as a place of retreat, a haven where, in 
contrast to the outside society, one is treated with respect and esteem'. 89 
The move of the family from the village to the city may well result in better 
education for the children and more lucrative employment for the parents. For the 
first time the family will have access to the Qur'an and Hadith for themselves, and 
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urban imams are likely to be better. educated in the principles of Islam. Village prac- 
tices and traditions may well be denigrated by `sophisticated' urban dwellers. In 
Pakistan, the move to the city may well lead the migrant to identify with the values of 
ashraf culture to improve status. This includes a knowledge of classical Islam and a 
critique of village practices. All of these factors link. the. change in class status in- 
volved in the move from village to city to a change in. religious identity. Revivalist 
and `fundamentalist' groups flourish in the cities. of the subcontinent. Badr Dahya 
estimates that 95% of Pakistani migrants to Britain were of rural origin. 90 Virtually 
all that move to Britain live in urban areas. The impact of this change will be con- 
siderably more than the move, to. a city in Pakistan. The bulk of the migrants were 
small landholders in their, place of origin, people who considered themselves a class 
above landless labourers. In. migrating to Britain they have not hesitated to take on 
work as labourers in mills, factories and foundries. Despite this apparent loss of 
status and their low position vis-a-vis the receiving culture, it can be argued that all 
migrants improve their class position by. the actual process of migration to cities. 
This, in turn, has a radical effect on the kind of Islam they practice, as religion can 
be used to improve standing in the Muslim community. Thus Muslim migrant com- 
munities are likely to be in considerable flux in regard to their religious position. 
These changes will be uneven in different parts of the community, and thus generate 
considerable tension and inter-communal, rivalry. 
Regional Languages v. English 
Language is able to express beliefs which are widespread in particular social 
groups. It is also the main means of transmitting culture from one generation to an- 
other. Particular usage of language can reinforce the values and goals of a particular 
section of society, as opposed to the values of the mainstream culture. In India dur- 
ing the nineteenth century, Urdu became the pre-eminent symbol of Muslim identity. 
Islamic revival was fuelled by the publications of the reform ulema in Urdu, and the 
translations of scripture from Arabic and Persian. 
Breton has observed that the range and variety of ethnic institutions constitute an 
'index of institutional completeness' in the migrant community. 91 Language must be 
included in this category of 'completeness'. The Muslims in Britain speak a variety 
of tongues, both national and regional. These local dialects will help to maintain the 
values and norms of the place of origin. They will also, however,. restrict any at- 
tempt to create a unified ummah in Britain by circumscribing the community at the 
level of place of origin. This process is reinforced at the mosque where preaching is 
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usually done in the local dialect of the congregation. 
This influence of the vernacular language is counteracted by some Arabic phrases 
and by the increasing use of English. Certain expressions in Arabic that are derived 
from the Qur'an are used all over the Muslim world. They are well-known to all 
Muslims. Phrases like `Allahu Akbar', `Inshallah' and `Bismillah' become symbols 
of the universal ummah. Their usage by all Muslims reminds them that they are 
united in the membership of their common faith. Thus these phrases in Arabic help 
to counteract the divisive tendency of ethnic languages. 
The transmission of vernacular languages to a generation born and educated in 
Britain is problematic. The latter are much more likely to be fluent in English, and 
quite often this English is the working=class dialect of the region where they have 
grown up. This familiarity with a particular English idiom will also make for an 
ease with local indigenous cultures in Britain such as their parents will never achieve 
as long as their main communication is in a language from the subcontinent. The 
older generation's control of the mosques has established a link between religion and 
the vernacular language from the place of ethnic origin. Many children are still 
taught Urdu, Bengali and Punjabi in the relevant mosque schools by the imam. 
British-born Muslims are, however, fluent in English. Unlike the first generation of 
migrants, English is their tongue. There are growing indications that these 
British-born Muslims will insist on English becoming the language in which Islamic 
beliefs and practices are taught and communicated. 92 A unified community in Britain 
can only be seen as a possibility when Arabic (the lingua franca of the ummah) and 
English become the sole linguistic modes of inter-generational transmission of Islam. 
Majority v. Minority (Racism) 
The Muslim psyche does not find it easy to come to terms with being a 'minority 
in a non-Muslim society. The Shari'ah makes no provision for Muslims living as a 
minority except to suggest that they should migrate to the nearest Muslim state. Al- 
though there is advice concerning obedience to legitimate rulers even if the latter do 
not practice Islam, Muslims are inherently uncomfortable as a religious minority 
under a non-Muslim government. The idea of `manifest success'93 has programmed 
Muslims (with the exception of the Shia minority) for victory.. The initial rapid suc- 
cess of Islam led to the development of a theology of power which sits uneasily in the 
minds and hearts of Muslims experiencing powerlessness. 
The South Asian Muslim community, however, was nurtured in the antagonistic 
environment of the subcontinent. Always a minority, it has had to face major chal- 
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lenges from Hinduism, Sikhism, Christianity and British colonialism. The loss of 
power to the British led to an increase in the feeling of insecurity; there was a con- 
stant threat that Muslims would lose their Islamic identity. The community developed 
a sense of distinctiveness based on an embattled or siege mentality. It thrives on con- 
flict and persecution: 
Despite the recent experience of Pakistan, this minority in the subcontinent has 
become a minority in Britain. Inevitably, these people brought with them to Britain 
the strategies which they had developed in the subcontinent in order to cope with their 
position there as a' historical minority. The experience of Britain was, however, 
bound to increase the feeling of uncertainty. Familiar points of reference, cultural 
certainties, and South Asian moral codes were no longer there. The need to hold on 
to a consistent idea of selfhood became imperative. The ethnic institutions in the area 
of settlement serve as an anchorage for the migrant Community; they were also used 
as a means of making explicit to outsiders the Muslims' refusal to adopt local norms 
or to surrender their religious and cultural identity. 
One aspect of British identity has always been based 'on skin colour. The arrival 
of large numbers of non-white immigrants has created racial tension, and British cul- 
ture is now believed by many to be under threat. Politicians and journalists have 
begun to speak of `the British way of life' which must be preserved. There is a con- 
stant affirmation of a British identity which is felt to be threatened by the immigrants' 
culture. Although assimilation is presented as the ideal, many in truth know that it is 
not likely. 
Muslims are beginning to function as a focal point in'this racial conflict in Britain 
and Western Europe. Right-wing political activity is overtly directed at the presence 
of Islam in Europe. In France this campaign is based on an attack on what is termed 
the `Islamicisation of the nation'. There have been demands to make the right to 
French nationality dependent on blood. In Germany racial attacks are on the increase 
since unification, and the Muslim migrants have been the major target. 94 The 
polemic of racism describes Muslims as dangerous, as a dark, sinister force in our 
midst. They are seen as barbarians, scroungers, a challenge to the indigenous culture, 
and a possible shelter for terrorists. During the Gulf War Muslims in Britain were 
sometimes regarded with suspicion as a fifth column. During the war, Charles Moore 
wrote in The Spectator that a large family of Muslims were living next door. Their 
prayers heard through the wall alarmed him. He did not feel that dark-skinned alien, 
non-Christian people should be allowed to settle here. 95 
Throughout the European Union, immigration laws are becoming tougher. This 
idea of a `Fortress Europe' is formed at least in part as a response to the perceived 
threat from Islam. Paul Gordon suggests that Islam is becoming Europe's Other. 96 
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Edward Said in his illuminating book Orientalism97 argues that European identity is 
always seen as superior to other cultures. The Orient is perceived as opposed to both 
Christianity and rational thought. The West is seen as rational and culturally supe- 
rior, the Orient as undeveloped, irrational and culturally inferior, as something to be 
feared and to be controlled by pacification. Paul Gordon argues that immigration 
laws have to be. understood in the. -context of Orientalism.. Firstly,. he explains that 
immigration policies are not based on rational criteria. There is a perceived need to 
control people who are regarded as undesirable. The criteria for `undesirable' is non- 
European. Secondly, he makes tha point that immigration discourse is not about those 
coming in but. about those already here. An example of this. is that in 1988 new Im- 
migration laws were passed in Britain forbidding entry of, more than one wife per 
man. Only an average of twenty cases per year were in. this category, yet the passing 
of this law signalled to the white population that alien Islamic familial practices would 
not be permitted in Britain. Thus immigration controls are, justified on cultural 
grounds. 98 It is significant that more immigration controls in Western Europe are 
using Muslims as an example. .. 
For years Muslims have told themselves that Islam and the West are two, mutually 
exclusive hostile systems. This is reinforced by conspiracy, theories based on the 
`West' being hell-bent on destroying Islam. These fears are simply confirmed by the 
rising polemic of racism in Britain and Western Europe that is being directed towards 
Muslim migrant minorities. Islam is perceived to be under attack, and consequently 
the Muslim religion becomes the most powerful banner under which the minorities 
can be united. This has given added urgency to the need to identify those universals 
of faith with which all Muslims can agree. The West can therefore be seen as having 
undoubtedly contributed to Islamic revival. 
Dar al-Islam v. Dar al-Harb 
Traditionally the awareness of an overriding Muslim ummah has been reinforced 
by the idea. of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb. The former constituted all the 
geographical territory that was ruled by Muslim rulers and under the 
jurisdiction of 
Islamic law. The latter was the world outside Islamic control, territory which could 
be conquered and converted. The idea of Dar al-Harb as the world of unbelievers 
has been reinforced by the concept of jahiliyya. Originally Muhammad had used this 
term to describe the condition of pre-Islamic Mecca; it denoted a s}-,. Y, ýL' o c4\. cous 
ruled over by the pursuit of individual wealth and pleasure. The concept of Jahiliyya 
is a powerful precedent for viewing or identifying secularised British culture. Mus- 
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lim revivalists use the term in much the same way, and with. the same connotations, as 
Rastafarians draw on the concept of `Babylon'. 
Muslim minorities have to be careful about declaring as Dar al-Harb those non- 
Muslim: nations that they have migrated to voluntarily for their own economic better- 
ment. This is particularly poignant for British-born Muslims whose national loyalty is 
to their place of birth.: There is no doubt that many of the relatives in the sub- 
continent and some of *the migrants themselves considered that life in Britain was full 
of risk to moral health;, it was seen as exerting a potentially corrupting influence on 
the newcomers. Britain is thus considered to be a land where people are too lax in 
their moral standards. This is particularly the case with 'sexual standards. The in- 
digenous population, especially the women, are perceived as promiscuous. 
The first-generation migrants used the concept of jahiliyya defensively; it was 
used to justify a `ghetto' mentality. Once wives and children began to arrive, the 
newly-formed communities consolidated around a flurry of ethnic activity in well- 
defined areas of Britain's manufacturing and industrial centres. When the ethnic 
group begins to feel, as did the Muslims in Britain, that their way of life is threatened 
by acculturation, it can react with a conscious organised effort to preserve its religion 
and culture. Ralph Linton describes this organised reaction as `a perpetuative-rational 
nativistic movement'. 99 He argues that to make such a movement successful, the 
group needs to use a 
, 
number of `boundary maintaining mechanisms'. These 
mechanisms can be both psychological and physical. An example of the latter is the 
organisation of both formal and informal provisions for welfare within the com- 
munity. Those who needed assistance could go to fellow-migrants or members of a 
welfare association rather than to outsiders. Barth has argued that ethnic groups can 
only survive by maintaining distinctive cultural traits. He suggests that where people 
of diverse cultural backgrounds interact, it would be expected that these differences 
would breakdown. He concludes that the persistence of ethnic groups indicates that 
`there is a structuring of interaction which allows for the persistence of cultural dif- 
ferences'. 100 The idea that Britain was jahiliyya' operated as a powerful religious 
deterrent against assimilation. These boundary-maintaining mechanisms that were 
pursued by Muslim organisations and leadership in Britain were operated at the local 
level. They reinforced and created rivalry between religious and ethnic factions. 
They therefore also worked against the development of a national organisation and a 
shared Islamic identity. 
Many young Muslims involved in establishing their Islamic identity use the con- 
cept of jahiliyya in a quite different way. Their Islam is militant and unapologetic. 
The portrayal of Western society as meaningless and aimless, as plagued by delin- 
quency, crime, psychiatric disorder, immorality and the collapse of the family, can be 
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used to establish Islam as an alternative lifestyle in Europe. They are given a sense of 
purpose by the feeling of being involved in an ideological movement which confronts 
the secular capitalism of the West. The strong. moral precepts of the Qur'an; the em- 
phasis on family values and collective responsibility in Islam, can be viewed as the 
cure for the ills of corrupt Western cultures. For many Muslims born in Britain the 
whole issue of jahiliyya cannot be ignored.. The perceived atheistic and corrupt cul- 
ture of Britain is not to be hidden from. It gives a raison d'etre. A tremendous sense 
of individual and group identity can be found by emulating the first Muslims who 
rallied round the Prophet and destroyed the jahiliyya that was Mecca, turning it into 
the first city of Islam. This `Jihad' must begin by liberating their fellow Muslims 
who have either fallen prey to its corrupting influences, or ignorantly allowed them- 
selves to pollute Islam with the cultural accretions of South Asia. 
Ethnicity v. Islam 
This dichotomy is in some ways at the heart, of everything that has been looked at 
so far. It is a central issue, not only for Muslims in Britain seeking to establish self- 
identity in a new land, but also in that it links what is developing here to the struggle 
taking place in Islamic communities throughout the world. Historically, Islamic 
revival has always involved a search for the fundamentals of the faith -a purification 
based on rooting out cultural additions to the teachings of Qur'an and Sunna. Usually 
this search for a `pure' Islam sets up as an ideal the Muslim community in Medina at 
the time of the Prophet and continuing during the reign of the four rightly guided 
Caliphs. 
It can be argued that the British Muslim population has so far undergone two 
major religious revivals.. The first was not unique to Islam; it was part of a process 
apparently common to all the migrant communities. Roger and Catherine Ballard iso- 
lated four chronological stages. of development in the South Asian settlements in 
Britain. 101 The third stage involved a general consolidation of ethnic settlements fol- 
lowing the large-scale entry of wives and children throughout the 1960's and 1970's. 
The reuniting of families was accompanied by a strong ethnic awareness, and the 
organisation of religious practices on a communal basis. Festivals, holidays and life- 
cycle rituals began to be celebrated here in Britain. These were all inextricably bound 
up with the religions of the various communities. Maintaining religious and ethnic 
customs provided status to the migrants amongst their peers. Gradually communities 
were formed, based on shared memories, values and goals that were all located in the 
area of origin. In the case of Muslims, Islam has always been the main basis of 
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group cohesiveness. At this point the major symbols of Muslim communities began 
to appear in Britain: 
Verity Saifullah Khan has argued that ethnicity is not a manifestation of the tradi- 
tional but is' something quite new. She suggests: that it is a reaction to an unacceptable 
external definition, a perceived restriction of choice. 
. The new minority demands. resources inaccessible to, and distinct from the majority 
Traditional mechanisms and resources are adapted to reorganise disrupted relation- 
ships and institutions within the minority - traditional symbols, ideologies, forms, of 
behaviour, became strategies for articulating a distinctive self, a distinctive group- 
Ing. 102 
If this is true, then the phenomena associated with the Ballards' third stage of de- 
velopment should be seen not as a religious revival amongst the migrants, but rather 
as the use of religious symbols and institutions to ensure that the cultural traditions of 
the old country are transmitted to. children. Thus, the separate identity of the com- 
munities concerned is maintained. 
The Muslim communities in Britain are still very. localised. They are formed 
along local as well as national lines. They are often structured around a handful of 
families who have all migrated from the same small. group of neighbouring, villages. 
This is particularly true of the Pakistani migrants. Akram in a study of Muslims in 
Huddersfield found that the majority of families were from villages in the Lyallpur 
district of Pakistan. 103 The majority of original Pakistani settlers relate to their village 
kin, home area and culture of origin. Although labelled Pakistanis by the indigenous 
population, in their own day-to-day activities they are neither reminded or involved 
with a wider notion of the Pakistani population. It is kinfolk, the village and the 
biradari network which command their attention. The notable exceptions to this were 
the perceived attack on Islam made in Salman Rushdie's novel The Satanic Verses, and 
any international conflicts involving Pakistan or to a lesser degree other Muslim na- 
tions. 
The above characteristics of the Muslim population in Britain have resulted in the 
presence and proliferation of a diverse range of ethnic concerns. These have kept the 
communities relatively closed since the migrants do not have to go outside their 
boundaries to satisfy everyday needs. 
There are, however forces which counteract this tendency. The diverse nature of 
the Muslim population has resulted in. their encountering other modes of Islamic 
cultural expression which have equally strong claims to validity as their own. This 
creates questions concerning the `true' form of Islam.. The majority of Muslims be- 
lieve in the. fundamental tenet of the faith that Allah is sovereign. This sovereignty 
-88- 
does not reside in a human being or a territory. In Islam, religion is held to be the es- 
sence of culture. There is a widespread belief in a universal Muslim. culture and life- 
style; the very, search for an Islamic lifestyle in Britain brings this. into focus. Many 
Muslims are seeking to define their faith in terms of the universals of the religion. 
This links up with the concept of the world-wide ummah, and also with the interna- 
tional phenomenon of revivalism. This has led to British-born and educated Muslim 
children questioning their parents' values. Muhammad Mushaq Ibn Ally argues that 
Muslims' perceptions of self-understanding. must take into account that they consider 
themselves to be members of a universal community taking its membership from 
several diverse national, racial and linguistic groups. 104 Muslims from India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh cannot help but be aware of tensions between this joint 
membership of the ummah which is the ideal in Islam, and the actuality of different 
ethnic groups. Stephen Barton discovered in his research undertaken in Bradford that 
when Muslims face tension and conflict, they take shelter in the communities in 
which they were born and raised. 105 To be a Muslim in Britain is to be a Bengali, or 
a Punjabi, a Sylheti, or a Mirpuri. He states: `Bengalis in Bradford seek the company 
not of fellow Muslims, members of the world-wide ummah but of other Bengalis'. 106 
Contacts with developments in the heartlands of Islam however, are inevitable. 
Pakistanis have brought with them a history of conflict between tribal and regional 
divisions. The attempt to forge a nation state in Pakistan has revolved around this 
question. Islam was the single element which provided a basis for the foundation of 
Pakistan in 1947. The attempts to establish and'preserve Pakistani identity have 
centred upon Islam. The Constitution of Pakistan begins with the declaration that: 
Sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to God Almighty alone and the authority 
which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people, for being ex- 
ercised within the limits prescribed by Him, is a sacred trust. 107 
Clause 3 states that the Constitution must be based on: 
The right of Muslims to order their lives, in the individual and collective spheres, in 
accord with the teachings and requirements of Islam, as set out in the Holy Qur'an 
and the Sunna. 
108 
This has resulted in considerable. and still unresolved controversy in Pakistan. 
Several powerful religious groups are struggling for the establishment of an Islamic 
state based on Shari'äh law. This debate has taken on a new significance in Britain 
amongst Muslims who are seeking an Islamic identity over and above ethnic dif- 
ferences: It is significant that the same religious/political groups have been imported 
-89- 
to Britain, and are competing for the loyalties of the Muslim population here. 
Dr. Zaki Badawi has said: 
Our adjustment is inevitable. The first sacrifice we shall make is the individual cul- 
tures within the faith. Nigerians, Egyptians, Pakistanis all carrying bits of their cul- 
ture around their necks like a dead weight, slowing down progress. That will be shed, 
allowing a return to the basics of our religion. 109 
This is not as straightforward as Dr. Zaki Badawi claims it to be. He himself is a 
qualified member of the ulema who was trained in A1-Azhar, Egypt. His definition of 
the fundamentals will be debated strongly by various other factions in Britain. 
Individual, v. Community 
Much has already been said about the pressures to conform to the norms and 
values of the group. as experienced by Muslims in Britain. As already ascertained, 
these pressures can arise simultaneously from the local ethnic group and from the 
sanctified beliefs and practices of the world-wide Islamic ummah. The relationship 
between these two is complex, and the latter can often be used to reinforce the former 
or even vice versa. Conformity to group values is also reinforced within the family 
group. At this level the concept of izzat functions as a powerful agent to maintain 
conformity. The various obligatory aspects of Islamic worship (salat, Ramadan, 
Hajj) also function to maintain a very strong awareness of communal religious 
identity as opposed to a more individual relationship with the Divine. 
In an early study Eric Butterworth has questioned the degree to which Muslims are 
a community. He argues that even through the lives of many are circumscribed 
within relatively narrow group tenets, this certainly does not apply to all of them. He 
emphasises that there are definite differences between the generation that arrived here 
as adults and those born and being brought up here. 110 Young Muslims will find 
themselves coming into daily contact with the core values of secular Britain through 
their education. 
A change in the family structure has resulted from the geographical fragmentation 
of the extended family and the relatively young composition of the Muslim migrant 
population. Badr Dahya has observed that the village kin groups as a residential unit 
have gradually begun to transform into nuclear households. 111 Large numbers of 
Muslims in Britain are adopting the nuclear family as their own choice of ideal life- 
style. Although many still adhere to the system of arranged marriages, both Muslim 
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boys and girls are demanding the right to refuse their parents' choice. Many would 
ideally marry a partner born in Britain rather than someone brought over from the 
country of origin. These changes in family structure will eventually lead to a less- 
ening of those controls and strictures which are maintained through the extended fam- 
ily network. This process will be reinforced by the move away from the inner city 
migrant zones to the suburbs, a move which the Ballards identified as the fourth stage 
of migrant development. 112 
Muslims brought up in Britain are likely to find themselves being brought into 
contact with a culture which sanctifies the rights of the individual. At a Day Seminar 
on Islam in Britain at the Department of Peace Studies, Bradford University113 the 
conclusion was that there were problems arising out of the conflict between mainte- 
nance of community values and identity and acceptance within the wider society. 
This has manifested in some Muslim girls running away from home, and a high in- 
cidence of attempted suicide amongst young people. The Salman Rushdie controversy 
highlighted the conflict between these opposing ideologies. Muslims as a community 
felt that they had been insulted by The Satanic Verses and its apparent attack on 
Islam. No less fervent was the reaction from various Western writers and creative 
artists. The latter attacked the Muslim critics by vigorously defending the rights of 
the individual to free expression. Very often the ideology being expressed by these 
Western critics of Islamic values was that contained in the term `modernism'. This is 
defined as the search for 
individual autonomy driven by a set of socially encoded values emphasising change 
over continuity, quantity over quality, efficient production, power and profit over 
sympathy for traditional values. 114 
This lessening of the strength of traditional community structures does not neces- 
sarily mean an embracing of the values of the receiving society. The development 
towards increasing individualism may well lead to a change in the understanding of 
Islam. Muhammad Anwar sums up this process from his own experience of studying 
the Qur'an for himself: 
Contrary to what I may have expected, I find it very logical and very, very beautiful. 
That came as a surprise because of the Islam I had learnt from my father. He relied 
merely on habit. What I could work out for myself was much more exciting'. 
115 
-91- 
Tradition V. Modernity 
Bruce Lawrence defines `modernity' as: 
the emergence of a new index of human life shaped, above all by increasing 
bureaucratisation and rationalisation as well as technical capacities and global ex- 
change unthinkable in the pre-modem era. 116 
Modernity is accompanied by the* ideology of modernism which the Oxford 
English Dictionary defines as: `modem view(s) or method(s), especially a tendency in 
matters of religious belief to subordinate tradition to harmony with modern 
thought,. 117 Ahmed states that `the drive towards industrialisation and reliance upon 
the physical created an ideology which emphasised materialism as a way of life'. 118 It 
is often assumed that as modernisation sweeps across the world, traditional religion 
would lose its grip on culture. Ahmed is concerned with the question of how a reli- 
gion like Islam which is based upon a revealed code of behaviour, and which 
zealously guards the uncorrupted and final revelation in the Qur'an can come to terms 
with an ethos which `puts aside the past and exults in diversity'. 119 
This clash of values is further reinforced by the fact that western imperialism is 
associated with the ideology of modernism. In the early twentieth century many Mus- 
lim leaders attempted to come to terms with the success of European colonialism by 
adopting a modernist stance. Most Muslim nations attained their independence led by 
movements whose leaders had embraced secularism, democracy, socialism, and a 
desire to model the newly-formed nations on a European model. They wished to 
transform their societies by introducing western education, technology, and legal 
codes. 120 This was resisted by religious leaders who asserted the values of traditional 
Islam over the influence of the west. 
Ahmed discusses the relationship between postmodernism and Islam. Although he 
acknowledges that postmodernism incorporates a loss of faith in the ideological 
certainties of modernism, it retains the scepticism of traditional orthodoxy. 121 It is 
doubtful whether many devout Muslims would be able to make the distinction be- 
tween modernism and postmodernism. The Islamic reform organisations like the 
Deobandis founded in the subcontinent in the nineteenth and early twentieth century 
are still engaged in a critique of modernism. Akhtar maintains that the orthodox will 
never be able to come to terms with `the impulse to uncertainty so characteristic of 
modern pluralistic culture'. 122 Their response is often chauvinism and a retreat into 
isolation. 123 
Ahmed argues that the fundamentalist movements characteristic of the second half 
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of the twentieth century are a response to the world of doubt which is a characteristic 
of postmodernism. 124 Sahgal and Yuval-Davis agree that the rise of fundamentalist 
movements is connected to the crisis of modernity. They argue that disillusionment 
with both capitalism and socialism has resulted in a feeling of despair which has 
resulted in some turning to religion as a source of solace. 125 They acknowledge that 
fundamentalist ideology has made a concerted attack on the ideology of 
secularism. 126 Many contemporary social scientists who maintain that western 
society has become secularised argue that any hold that religion might continue to 
have over individuals would be transformed into forms of privatised belief where reli- 
gious belief became only a matter of individual consciousness rather than remaining a 
collective force, with potential for social change. According to this argument, the 
contact of traditional South Asian Muslim culture with secularised Britain should 
result in the process of Islam becoming more a matter of individual private conscious- 
ness. The comment of Muhammad Anwar at the end of the last section may be inter- 
preted in this light. In. fact, it may. be an example of a very different reaction to con- 
tact with western culture. As modernity becomes a global phenomenon, its ideology 
of modernism is meeting stubborn resistance from religion in the form. of fundamen- 
talism. 
Fundamentalism v. Secularisation 
Karel Dobbelaere has summed up the secularisation thesis as: 
the higher the degree of functional differentiation the more advanced secularism will 
be, and the less impact religious organisations will be able to exert on the culture. 
Functional differentiation produces social sub-systems in polity, economy, education, 
family etc. They are increasingly autonomous and specialised. Religion is reduced to 
a sub-system of society rather than an overarching system of values and beliefs. 
Secular values replace religious ones. 
127 
This viewpoint assumes that at some point in the past religion and the world were 
once one, but that now religion and modernity are in basic contradiction. The 
secularisation theorists tend to be opposed to religious ideology, but fail to realise that 
secularism is. in itself ideological. The concept is value-laden rather than value-free. 
The ideas of the secularisation theorists generally reveal the view that the so-called 
`factual knowledge' of modern societies will obliterate the religious superstitions of 
traditional cultures. 128 
It cannot be denied that totally secular economic, scientific, governmental and 
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educational institutions have developed in the West. These are often linked by 
sociologists to the transition of social life from. Gemeinschaft to Geselischaft. 
Secularisation is perceived as Gesellschaft rationality dissolving the customs and 
sentiments. of religion. Hadden and Shupe contend that secularisation is apart of a 
`globalisation' process in which there is increasing homogeneity with respect to modes 
of production, institutions and structures and patterns of social relationships. 129 This 
has come about from the increasing economic interdependency between nations and 
the success of technology. Alex Inkeles argues that this. means that as `human life ex- 
perience becomes more alike; attitudes, values, and basic disposition will also become 
alike'. 130 He goes on to suggest that `distinctive cultural traditions'. and `historically 
determined institutional arrangements' deriving from : the precontemporaryera will 
operate as the main-brakes on this process. 131 If this is true, then the culture of the 
Muslim migrants in Britain is. considerably at risk. If their original culture is being 
undermined by the spread of western values, then they. have put their heads into the 
lion's mouth by , 
immigrating to the very Western . European nations 
from which the 
global culture originated. 
Hadden and Shupe also pose the possibility that fundamentalism is a global 
phenomenon in response to secularisation. They. note the world-wide appearance of 
religious/political movements which base their claim to legitimacy on the fundamen- 
tals of a religious tradition. They all seek to direct social changes by claims based on 
scriptural authority. 132 Bruce Lawrence points out that fundamentalism is a modern 
phenomenon. 133 , Although fundamentalists try to reclaim what is authentic in their 
pasts as there must be a clear discernible continuity between them and the faith tradi- 
tion their movements claim to. restore, they also accept implicitly that the modern 
movement is. the credible guardian of the past, but in order to combat secularisation 
they are prepared to use modern technology to the full. Lawrence suggests that they 
are `moderns but not modernists'. 134 They reject modernism as an ideological frame- 
work, asserting instead a religious authority expressed through the collective demand 
that specific credal or ethical imperatives derived from scriptures be publicly recog- 
nised and legally enforced. They reject the modernist apostasy that change is absolute 
and in some way always beneficial. 
Muslim fundamentalists have attacked the values of Western Europe and the USA. 
They condemn Western culture as morally decadent and argue that colonialism has not 
ended. They link themselves to ideologies that attack third' world exploitation by the 
West, and contend that even after independence Western ideology still rules the Is- 
lamic world under a so-called Muslim mask. Islamic fundamentalism must be seen as 
a protest movement promulgating an ideology which evokes a response from those 
groups which are the most acutely aware of the tensions presented by the con- 
temporary world. Many Muslim fundamentalist groups are comprised of young 
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people who have had some contact with Western values through education. They are 
educated enough to understand the possibilities denied to them by the inequalities of 
the world system. Trained and educated, often in science and technology, law and 
accountancy, they still face unemployment. or underemployment on low wages. 
It is not surprising that many young Muslims in Britain are attracted to the funda- 
mentalist message as a solution to the problems that they face. The Muslim funda- 
mentalist groups are addressing many of the dilemmas discussed above. Although 
British, many Muslims still feel exploited by Western colonialism. They also face un- 
equal opportunities even though promised success if they achieve the academic goals 
of education. Many of them feel let down by both the culture of their birth and-the 
culture of their parents. The latter they perceive as riddled by traditional attitudes and 
beliefs that-have no bearing on their own situation. Fundamentalism attracts them be- 
cause it is quintessentially modern; that is to say, it constitutes a response to events 
and conditions in the present. The problem of Muslim minorities in Britain encapsu- 
lates many of the problems facing the majority communities in the heartlands of 
Islam. It is not surprising that they seek similar solutions. In Britain, the values of 
modernity call for increasing assimilation into the cultural mainstream of the society 
into which the migrants have settled. At the same time, opportunities to do this on an 
equal footing are denied. On the other hand, the emergence of migrant communities 
which preserve group solidarity by defining identity ethnically cannot offer very 
much to young Muslims who firmly know themselves to be British.. Fundamentalism, 
in its affirmation of religious authority as absolute and holistic, offers a solution to 
this dilemma. Although the establishment of an Islamic state is clearly an unrealistic 
goal in a British inner city where Muslims are a small minority, it should be apparent 
why it still remains the ideal for some. Religion is not just an individual commitment 
entailing personal piety nor a group loyalty which requires the formal ecclesiastical 
membership implicit in the arguments of secularisation theorists. The phenomenon of 
fundamentalism indicates that religion can be the corporate public. action of reli- 
giously motivated individuals to change the social system on behalf of what they per- 
ceive to be their deepest spiritual loyalties. Thus for many Muslims in Britain and 
elsewhere, the concept of the ummah becomes of central importance in their religious 
ideology. In Britain, it links many British-born Muslims to an identity which trans- 
cends both their allegiance to nationality and the culture of their parents. The concept 
of the ummah can also be used as a challenge to that overriding secular view of the 
world they find in the indigenous culture which is so often unaccepting of their 
presence. . 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has looked in some depth at the dilemmas facing the Muslim popula- 
tion in Britain. Before a clear direction for a uniquely British Muslim community can 
be ascertained, it will be necessary to resolve the dichotomies which have been the 
subject of examination. The form that the community takes will be forged out of the 
process of resolving these difficult problems. 
Islam is, in one form or another, the heritage of all Muslims who have come to 
live in Britain. Initially the society they joined was virtually devoid of all symbols of 
Islam. Many of these symbols have now appeared in Britain. Muslims can observe 
the familiar outlines of 'mosques complete with dome and minarets on the skylines of 
British industrial cities. Islam is here to stay. Along with the symbols have come the 
controversies. The Islamic world is involved in the process of rediscovering what it 
means to be Muslim; this too is the focus for British Muslims. They must be 
prepared to be rooted in Britain. This will make it imperative to evolve and generate 
a new pattern of life which is in harmony with the values and norms of Islam but 
which, in the context of life chances, is based firmly here in Britain. Many have al- 
ready discovered that minorities need distinctive or alternative systems of resources to 
give them a greater degree of resistance. They are finding this is their common Is- 
lamic identity. 
This will involve a continuous process of bargaining and negotiating between (a) 
the British social, economic and cultural environment, (b) the ideals and expectations 
of various components of countries of origin, and (c) the ideational forces of 
orthodox Islam in its several forms. 13: 5 There is clearly no one group or grouping 
which on its own has the strength to impress itself on the majority of the Muslim pop- 
ulation. All the main theological/political organisations will need to be examined in 
the context of the issues raised in this chapter. Jamaat-i Islami, Deobandis, Tabligh- 
i Jamaat and Barelwis will each have an influence on the shape of the community in 
Britain. They all have a definite ideological programme and a specific Islamic world 
outlook. Each one challenges the dominant secular ideology in Britain, albeit to dif- 
fering degrees. They oppose the corruption and decadence of a materialist society 
which they perceive to have lost its moral values. It is important to establish whether 
their ideological programmes clearly perceive the need to find a place for Islam in 
Britain in the context of Britain as a non-Muslim society in which the historical con- 
troversies and solution of the subcontinent simply cannot work. 
For this reason, as Islam becomes a rallying flag around which the various Mus- 
lim ethnic and national groups in Britain can rally, it is important to be aware of the 
religious background inherited from the subcontinent. It is especially noticeable that 
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out of the main groups currently at work in Britain (Deobandis, Barelwis, AN 
Hadith, Tabligh-i Jamaat, Jamaat-i Islami), only the last two were formed in the 
twentieth century. The nineteenth century groups were all part of. the phenomenon of 
Islamic reform in India, even: the Barelwis, who need to be seen as an organised reac- 
tion to the reformers. 136 The twentieth century Tabligh-i Jamaat is a continuation of 
the reform trend, and even the fundamentalist Jamaat-i Islami incorporates many fea- 
tures of the earlier reform movement. 137 Therefore it is necessary to examine the 
origins of these movements within the wider context of the unique development of 
Islam in the subcontinent in order to discover the reasons why various strands of Mus- 
lim belief that arose there should be so important to Muslim migrants in Britain. The 
organisations which represent these strands will continue to have. considerable impact 
on the direction that the Muslim community takes in the future. 
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Chapter :V 
BARELWIS IN THE SUBCONTINENT 
Introduction 
In Chapter III there is a section on Gellner's analysis of the division between rural 
and urban forms of Islam. Geliner points out that in rural areas, the kind of Islam 
practised is likely to rely on a multiplicity of ritual and mystical practices, devotion to 
charismatic personalities, and finally, a tendency towards this-world and other-world 
hierarchies. The subcontinent is particularly rich in this version of Islam and it 
manifests in countless varieties from region to region, village to village. The 
predominance of this strand of Islam in the subcontinent arises from two causes: the 
powerful influence of Sufism in the area and syncretic developments arising out of 
the meeting of Islam with Hinduism. It would have been also reinforced by the work 
of Maulana Ahmad Riza Khan (1856-1921) to defend the beliefs and traditions of this 
strand of Islam against the vehement attacks of the reform groups. Raza Khan's ac- 
tivities established a common identity known as Barelwi to this wide-ranging diversity 
of belief and practice. Since the majority of the first-generation Muslim migrants ar- 
rived from rural areas of the subcontinent, it is inevitable that they would. have 
brought with them religious beliefs and practices steeped in local customs legitimised 
by precedent. 
Obviously the impact of practices derived from Hinduism would be less apparent 
in the Muslim nations of Pakistan and Bangladesh but in both these countries the 
tradition of Sufism has been, and still is, very powerful. Historically, many Sufis had 
been far more tolerant of Hinduism than the ulema, and some of them had not been 
very strict concerning the externals of Islam. This had assisted the development of 
syncretistic varieties of Islam and a trained eye familiar with both religions may still 
observe the Hindu origin of various practices even in Pakistan and Bangladesh. 
Sufis and Shrines 
Although the invasion of parts of India by Muslim forces would have resulted in 
forced conversion, the majority of Indians converted to Islam through contact with 
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wandering faqirs and Sufis. I These charismatic figures would have easily gained the 
respect and veneration of Hindu villagers familiar with wandering yogis and sadhus. 
It is arguable that they did not always differentiate between them. This is still the 
case today in Indian villages where there are many examples of sadhus and faqirs 
being welcomed by both Muslims and Hindus alike. Village shrines of holy men are 
attended by adherents of both faiths regardless of the original faith of the tomb's oc- 
cupier. Indian temples and sacred places were taken over by Muslims and continued 
to be visited by the local unconverted population. 2 If the place had become a centre. 
of teaching by a Sufi some of the Hindu population would have been converted, pos- 
sibly feeling more at ease with Sufism's spiritual interpretation of Islamic precepts. 
Others would have incorporated the Islamic cult based around the Sufi. into their own 
system of beliefs by identifying the Muslim saint with Hindu mystics or even with 
one of the Hindu deities. 3 
One of the central tenets of Hinduism is reverence for the spiritual guide or guru. 
Disciples have gathered in large numbers around some of the more charismatic of 
these figures, and after their death many cults have developed. The holy man is a 
venerated figure, often being perceived as a link to the divine or as even participating 
in divinity himself. At the same time, traditional Sufi doctrine insisted upon the need 
for a spiritual guide and encouraged reverence and devotion towards him. It is not 
surprising that the Sufi shaikhs or pirs collected disciples from both communities. 
The Hindu reverence for holy men did not end with their deaths; it was believed that 
their link with divinity ensured that their power survived the demise of the body. 
Shrine centres focussed the attention of devotees who hoped that the saint could inter- 
cede with or propitiate the divinity on their behalf. The institution of shrines was al- 
ready prevalent amongst Hindus before the arrival of Islam, and played an important 
part in local religious tradition. 4Pilgrimage to these shrine centres was regarded as a 
sacred act. 
Sufism, too, has stressed the master/disciple relationship. A pir is expected to un- 
dertake responsibility for his murids' spiritual development. A formal oath of al- 
legiance or bai'at is made by the murid to the pir. Once taken the murid is taken into 
the spiritual protection of the pir and his old sins are forgiven. 5 The pir/murid rela- 
tionship is prevalent in the Muslim villages of the subcontinent. Usually children will 
follow the pir of their parents. The Urdu adjective `be-pir' (without pir) which means 
pitiless, vicious or cruel, indicates the importance of the pir in traditional Muslim 
society. 6 
A Sufi was expected to have karamat, supernatural power which enabled him to 
perform miracles. This power, it was believed, was not lost at death, but was 
retained and later attributed to his tomb in the dargah or khanqah. 7 Relics, such as 
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the personal belongings-of the saint are maintained in the khanqah and believed by the 
pilgrims to be endowed with baraka; the power to bless. 8 The saints were also at- 
tributed with the power to intercede and answer prayers on behalf of murids or 
visitors to the tomb. The deaths of Muslim holy men thus created a new network of 
local shrines, and sometimes in the case of prominent Suf is, national centres of pil- 
grimage. 9 Imtiaz Ahmad argues that these shrines created local cults which `involved 
what may be called the localisation of Muslim spiritual geography to correspond 
broadly with the confines of their region with some extension to the great all-India 
shrines'. 10 
Many Sufis wandered as itinerant holy men but as the great Sufi orders developed, 
the advantages of remaining in one place and working with a particular community 
became apparent. The khangah or dargah was established, as a teaching institution 
usually by those Sufis who belonged to one of the orders, this ensured that the orders 
would survive the lives of founders and individual inmates. 11 After the saint's death 
it was essential for his successors (pirzade) to legitimise their claimed closeness as 
soon as possible. This, is usually done by stressing blood-ties to the saint himself or 
to his immediate successor (khalif a) if he had nominated one. 12 The main duties of 
the successors, is to cherish the memory of the dead saint, to observe the proper rites 
at the tomb and to guide the pilgrims and visitors to the tomb so that they may receive 
the blessings, of the dead saint via the mediation of his successors. The sanctity of the 
khanqah increases with. proximity to the tomb. Generally women are not allowed into 
the tomb itself but perform prayers, light incense and make offerings outside the 
walls of the inner sanctum. Very often. the shrine consists of several tombs contain- 
ing the bodies of the saint's wives and children. 13 Sometimes these become special 
places of worship for women denied entry to the tomb of the saint. 14 In general, 
however, women form an important constituent of the shrine cults. Although mosque 
attendance for women is generally disapproved of in the subcontinent, shrine at- 
tendance is not. Many pirs accept women as murids and some shrines are specifically 
to women saints. 15 
Depending on the fame of the pir, the number of visitors to the shrine can range 
from a handful to. hundred each day. This number increases dramatically during urs, 
the annual celebration of the of the saint, when thousands can gather at the fair 
which is held at that 'time. The annual urs functions as a social event for the sur- 
rounding population who are entertained by music, games, and food. Pilgrims can at- 
tend the shrine to receive the saint's blessing and intercession on all manners of ills. 
The sick can pray for a cure and couples who are childless may bring a red thread 
which is tied to the wall of the tomb. Those in debt seek the blessings of the pir. 
The poor, the destitute and those who find the social well-being of their families 
threatened may stay in the khanqah' for a short period. Some khanqahs maintain pub- 
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lic kitchens which distribute free food to the poor and to travellers. This is known as 
the langar. 16 The langar is also an essential feature of the urs celebrations. Depend- 
ing upon the Sufi order to which the saint belonged, many of the khanqahs provide 
qawwali singing; this usually occurs on a Thursday night. The musicians sing of the 
life and death of the pir together with popular songs of the Sufi tradition. There is 
also worship and prayers in the attached mosque, and generally dhikr would be held 
here: ordinarily once a week, but also on special occasions like urs and Milad Nabi. 
Most visitors donate to the khanaah, often on the tomb of the saint. This money is 
collected by the mujawars or pirzade, the descendants of the shrine and to assist the 
local poor. 
In the saint's lifetime people would have come for blessings and for the cure of 
ailments. This was done by the issuing of ta`widhs, amulets each containing a verse 
of the Qur'an written on a small piece of paper. At the larger khanqahs the 
mujawars continue this function at the shrine by mediating the power of the pir. On 
arriving at the shrine the visitor is met by the mujawars who offer their services. 
They guide the visitors to the tomb, assist their offerings and prayers and issue bless- 
ings on written ta'widhs. 
Despite the processes of urbanisation and the sharp attacks of the critical reform 
movements, folk-sufism based around the shrine cults and the figure of the pir 
remains popular throughout the subcontinent. It is difficult to envisage its decline in 
the region. In Pakistan and Bangladesh some pins have considerable political in- 
fluence, and since the work of Ahmad Raza Khan established the Barelwi tradition, 
this popular strand of Islam has been represented by powerful bodies of ulema. 
Local customs 
Besides the Sufi tradition which has developed into folk-religion based around the 
pirs and their tombs there is also widespread practice of customs and rituals which 
some Muslims, particularly those from the reform organisations, would argue were 
unIslamic and a product of incomplete or faulty conversion. These customs usually 
predominate in rural areas and concern religious activities involved with rites of pas- 
sage. In contrast to the reform argument, however, many Muslims claim that it is 
completely acceptable within Islam to follow both local custom and. the universally 
prescribed laws of the Shari'ah as long as there is no compromise with the central 
tenets of Islam. This debate over the legitimacy of local custom is central to the an- 
tagonism between the Barelwis and the reform movements. The reform movements 
criticise many local customs as bida, innovation deriving from contact with 
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Hinduism. This syncretic influence is likely to be stronger in India and Bangladesh 
than in Pakistan. The following examples demonstrate the kind of customs shared by 
both Muslims and Hindus in the villages of the subcontinent. 
Several studies have examined this aspect of Muslim culture in the subcontinent. 
17 
Fruzzetti explores birth. rituals in Bengal and finds striking similarities between those 
observed by both Hindu and Muslim women. 18She notes that in the fifth month of 
pregnancy a black thread containing a ta`widh is tied around the mother's neck and a 
red thread is tied around her waist. The purpose of thetkeads is to protect the mother 
and the child against bhutas (spirits) which can take life. Both Hindu and Muslim 
women bury the placenta as it is regarded as vulnerable to attack by the bhutas, who 
it is believed can harm the child. 19 Various rituals of protection for the new-born 
child are identical for both Muslims and Hindus, and both groups believe that the 
child must be protected by these for the first twenty-one days after birth. After 
twenty-one days it is believed the child is partially protected by Sasthi, Hindu deity of 
children. Amongst the spirits which can harm a child the most feared is the Hindu 
godling Chutti. 20 Amongst Hindus and Muslims alike the mother and child must be 
kept in seclusion as both are believed capable of polluting people who come in contact 
with them. Fruzzetti concludes that a dual system of thought operates among these 
rural Bengali Muslims: they clearly state that they belong to the universal Islamic 
ummah, but the rites and practices which bind them to this ummah are by no means 
their only concern. In everyday life they share in a `Bengali culture' which is com- 
mon to both them and Hindus-. 21 In an earlier piece of research Fruzzetti concludes 
that these customs and practices which belong to Bengali culture combined with the 
universal prescriptions and practices of Islam to form a `folk religion of Islam unique 
to Bengal'. 22 . 
Saiyid, A. R. has examined the phenomenon of celebrating Moharram amongst 
some Sunni communities in India. 23 He discovered that in several cases the festival 
involved the entire community regardless of religious affiliation. He noted that this 
was not the case with the universal Islamic festivals of Eid and Ramadan, which were 
only observed by Muslims. 24 At some Moharram festivals he observed that on the 
final day the custom of possi was maintained. In the morning groups of Muslims 
banging drums collected donations from all the houses in the village, both Muslim 
and Hindu. The collection was later spent on alcohol which was drunk that night 
while dancing. The drinks were served to the dancing men by the village womenfolk. 
It was discovered that this custom was also followed at the Hindu festivals of Dus- 
sehra and Diwali when the roles were reversed. The Hindus collected the donations 
and the Muslims contributed and joined in the celebrations. 25 It is possible that these 
Sunni communities regarded the Moharram festivities as part of local culture as it is 
traditionally a Shia festival. This allowed them to participate in the festival with the 
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Hindu neighbours. By contrast Eid and Ramadan are considered to be part of their 
belonging to the universal ummah, and therefore purely Muslim occasions. 
The above examples are only a few selected at random from detailed research 
carried out in the subcontinent. Undoubtedly in every region in India where Muslims 
live similar examples can be found. When combined with the tradition arising out öf 
Sufism they form a varied, regional folk-Islam that is vigorously practised throughout 
the subcontinent. Even the Muslim nations, Pakistan and Bangladesh, have not lost 
these traditional folk customs amongst rural Muslims, though in this case the Sufi va- 
riety is stronger than syncretic influences arising out of contact with Hinduism. As 
mentioned previously, one of the main devisions between the Deobandis and the 
Barelwis concerns the permissibility in Islam of these local customs arising as they do 
either out of contact with Hinduism or from a bedrock of popular Sufism. 
The Barelwis 
The Barelwis are the only major nineteenth century Islamic movement in the sub- 
continent whose teachings were not derived from the ideas of Shah Wali-allah. Ra- 
ther than emerging out of a desire to change standards of religious practice, they ad- 
here to the custom-laden style of Sufism and closely allied themselves to the teach- 
ings of the mediaeval pirs. They gave less importance to individual, responsibility, 
and believed in the intercession of the pirs and their ulema. Their leader Maulana 
Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi defended vigorously any custom that elevated the stature 
of the prophet and the saints, He emphasised the pre-eminence of Muhammad and 
often spoke of the Sufi doctrine of Noor-i Muhammad. This doctrine regarded the 
Prophet as an emanation of God's light, and saw the Prophet as pre-existing the be- 
ginning of creation. The world was seen as having been created specifically to 
demonstrate the Prophet's glory, and his true form was believed to be self-existent 
light. He was human, but his humanity was different from other men. He possessed 
a unique knowledge of the unknown, and complete awareness of all spiritual matters. 
Consequently, he could be called upon to intercede with God on behalf of the be- 
liever. The saints were at once part of and aware of the light of Muhammad, and 
after death they were believed to be able to intercede with God on behalf of ordinary 
believers just as the Prophet himself could. Ahmad Riza Khan elaborated on Ibn 
Arabi's belief that there was a secret hierarchy of saints whose presence in every age 
sustained the universe itself. 
The Barelwis can be seen as a conscious reaction to the Deobandi reformers. Ob- 
viously every Muslim from the subcontinent who does not follow the strictures of the 
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revivalist message can be described as Barelwi, but Ahmad Riza Khan and. the 
Barelwi ulema . used their status and. 
legal scholarship consciously to justify a 
mediatory, custom-laden Islam that was closely linked to the intercession of shrine- 
based pins. Unlike the Deobandis, there was no attempt to blame the colonial rulers 
for the threat they made to Muslim culture, but the Barelwis under the leadership of 
Ahmad Riza Khan worked hard to inspire Muslims to devote themselves. to Islam. 
The aim was to revive and maintain the Islamic status quo as it existed currently. Its 
present state was seen as an organic and hence valid development from the past. The 
reformers of Deoband were accused of practising an idealised Islam that was based on 
texts and historical past and was not properly aligned to the present. More sig- 
nificantly, they were accused of lack of respect for Allah's prophets. It is not surpris- 
ing that the Barelwi message appealed to the rural population and the uneducated. It 
supported and justified the faith that they were already practising. Especially sig- 
nificant is the fact that it made far less demand for individual responsibility in its fol- 
lowers than did the reform movements. 
Ahmad Riza Khan did agree with the reformers in one respect: he sought to make 
religion play an intensely vital part in daily life. Unlike the reformers, he and his 
movement initially placed little value on the establishment of schools and institutions. 
The success of Deoband, however, caused the Barelwis to found a number of 'schools 
of el., ýrown in order to train 
4rulema. The most famous of these is Ahmad Riza 
Khan's dar al-Ulum in Bareilly. Like Deoband the college has attracted students from 
abroad, but these -have been generally the sons of prominent Barelwis who have 
migrated from the subcontinent. One distinctive difference between the two colleges 
is their respective treatment of the graves of their founders. The original Deobandi 
ulema are buried in the college graveyard. These graves are marked by simple head- 
stones. Sometimes students will enter the graveyard and stand quietly with closed 
eyes by the grave of a famous 4\, m In Bareilly, Ahmad Riza Khan is buried in a 
splendid tomb in the mosque hung, with fabric and surrounded by carpets. His im- 
mediate family have tombs around him and are venerated equally. Any day a number 
of people may be seen at the shrine as at any of the other famous shrines of saints and 
Sufis in the subcontinent. Ahmad Raza Khan's Urs is celebrated at the college which 
functions as a shrine as well as a dar a1Ulum. 
It is difficult to assess the degree to which the beliefs of Ahmad Raza Khan were 
followed by the nineteenth century Indian ulema. Many of the ulema were untouched 
by the reformist position, and already practised the type of religion advocated by the 
Barelwis. Today there are many ulema and pirs that would describe themselves as 
Barelwis merely because they practice a certain type of Islam. This certainly indicates 
the success of Ahmad Raza Khan in establishing a unified identity for a strand of 
Islam which is by nature disparate and lacking central organisation. On the other 
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hand, many adherents more closely identify themselves with their individual pir or 
tariqa than a wider Barelwi consciousness. Organisation still takes place around the 
former although there are groups of ulema trained in Barelwi dar al-ulums who con- 
sciously represent the latter. There is no doubt that Ahmad Raza Khan enabled Mus- 
lims who practised the type of Islam condemned by the reform groups'to feel a com- 
mon identity and to fight back against the success of the criticism made against them. 
It is not the actual type of religion practised by the Barelwis that made them an inde- 
pendent sect, but rather the conscious use of it as an oppositional stance to the 
reformers. 
Conclusion 
Fruzzetti's conclusion that Muslims in Bengal feel. that they belong both to the 
universal Muslim ummah and to a Bengali culture which is common to them and 
Hindus is important. It demonstrates that Muslims who follow this tradition will have 
no opposition between ethnicity and Islam. The Barelwi tradition is strongly 
represented in Britain and is often used to reinforce identification and loyalty to ethnic 
origins. As mentioned in Chapter IV, the folk-Sufi strand of Islam, which is followed 
throughout the Muslim villages of the subcontinent, powerfully evokes memories. and 
feelings of never-forgotten places of origin for the first-generation migrants. Al- 
though the. influence of Hinduism is nowhere near so apparent as in the villages of 
India and Bengal, many Muslims associate the lifestyle and beliefs of those who prac- 
tise this kind of Sufi-inspired Islam with Hindu influence. While researching in 
Leeds, a prominent local businessman and chairman of a Barelwi mosque committee, 
was described to me as `a devout Muslim who lived a Hindu lifestyle'. In reality, it is 
a strand of Islam which is inextricably interwoven with the customs pertaining to eth- 
nic origin. Consequently, it is difficult to foresee the form that this tradition will take 
in Britain as British-born Muslims may have little sympathy with this highly idiosyn- 
cratic form of Islam unique to the subcontinent. The following chapter hopes to throw 
some light on the development of the Barelwi tradition. in Britain. 
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Chapter VI 
THE BARELWIS IN BRITAIN 
Introduction 
Most of the original migrants from the subcontinent came from a few very 
defined areas of the region. Large numbers of Pakistanis came from the poorer rural 
communities of Mirpur district in southern Kashmir and the Campbellpuri districts of 
north-eastern Punjab. Many of the Bangladeshis originated from Sylhet district. 
These are all places where Sufism has been traditionally very strong. Although the 
evidence suggests that religion was not a major factor to the first-generation migrants 
when they first arrived, it was soon to become so once wives and children began to 
settle. 
This apparent religious revival very strongly featured the reinforcement of ethnic 
identity and awareness. In order to achieve this, the focus of religious activity and 
customs centred upon the way of life that was followed in the villages of origin. 
When mosques were established in Britain's industrial cities, the imams were often 
employed from the area of origin. The imams themselves very rarely challenged the 
kind of Islam practised, being indeed selected to reinforce it. Problems did emerge, 
however, when the wishes of the often better educated mosque committee diverged 
from the wishes of the congregation. This could result in the appointment of an imam 
who preached the teachings of the reformers when by contrast the congregation 
hankered for the folk-Sufism and more syncretistic oral traditions of the faith associ- 
ated with their home villages. The problem was compounded by the fact that the 
reform groups such as the Deobandis, Ahl-Hadith, and Tabligh-i Jamaat were 
quicker to organise themselves in the context of Britain (see Chapter IX). They were 
aided by the fact that they were already tight-knit organisations created for the express 
purpose of reforming Islam in the subcontinent. They were all committed to dawah 
activity amongst Muslims. Definite dilemmas were created when many Muslims 
from rural backgrounds arrived in the economically and socially advanced industrial 
cities of Britain; the reformers were quick to use these dilemmas to their own ad- 
vantage. Despite the activity of the reformers, however, the majority of first- 
generation subcontinent Muslims in Britain who continued to practise their faith 
retained their loyalty to the traditions they had received back in their villages. 
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It is this geographical and social background of the migrants that gives credence to 
the suggestion made by Maulana Shahid Raza Khan, imam at the Leicester Islamic 
Centre and Executive Secretary of the Shari`ah Council of Britain, that most of the 
Muslims in Britain are Barelwi. 1 Shahid Raza Khan's statement is accurate to the 
degree that the majority of practising Muslims who migrated from the subcontinent 
are happy with the traditional version of Islam that they brought with them from their 
places of origin. This, however, does not mean that they consciously identify them- 
selves with being Barehvi. Even in mosques that I visited which were associated with 
the teachings of a particular pir, many of the congregation said that they prayed there 
because it was the nearest mosque to their home. Only in cases where a Muslim was 
consciously active in a reform movement, or was, equally, the murid of a pir did I 
find that they went to a mosque that was further away than the local one. It is this 
majority of first-generation Muslims and their offspring, people who do not con- 
sciously identify themselves as Barelwi yet practice the kind of Islam that the 
Barelwis assertively defend, that has become the target of dawah activities from the 
activists amongst both the reform groups and Barelwi organisations. 
The fact that this kind of Islam is practised by rural people throughout the sub- 
continent, involving as it does a wide range of local customs established by oral tradi- 
tion or kept to a particular locale through being focussed around a Sufi shrine, makes 
it difficult for its adherents to organise themselves on a national basis in Britain. 
Barton in his study of Bradford states that at the shrines in Sylhet, 
the Muslim is not only made aware of the centuries of tradition that link him to his 
ancestors, but is able to engage in a form of devotion that is significantly different 
from the performance of the formal prayer-rite. 
2 
He argues that it is unlikely that the shrines can be replicated in Bradford, and in- 
deed that it is not necessary so long as the migrants focus their attention on Sylhet 
through remittances and journeys home. 3 The very nature of this kind of Islam has 
meant that its adherents have not usually engaged themselves in a debate concerning 
unification through using the universal symbols of Islam. There is instead an aware- 
ness of belonging to the wider Muslim ummah, but in everyday life we find rites and 
rituals legitimised by custom functioning to strengthen kinship ties and localised 
identity within the country of origin. Maulana Shahid Raza Khan indicates that this a 
problem confronted by Barelwis trying to organise themselves in Britain: 
That is why sometimes for an outsider, or for a person who is just having a quick 
view of the community he or she (can) think that they are not a major group; they 
may be a minor group (based) here or there. The Barelwis in this country are (also) 
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divided into several groups. You will find mosques of Barelwi Muslims who have 
come from Bangladesh who are working among their own people. They have no 
strong links with Muslims from other countries. (But) I think that the Pakistani 
Barehvis have got the dominant hand here in this country in the Muslim community 
but they are divided on the basis of their regional background. Again they have their 
own Sufi orders. There are Qadiris, Chishtis, (and) Nagshbamlis 4 
Within the major Sufi tariqas the prime loyalty is not to the tariqa itself but to the 
individual pir. Although those amongst the Barelwis who follow a pir acknowledge 
his tariqa, they do not organise themselves around their identity as Naqshbandis, 
Chishtis, or Qadiris. Each group of murids following a particular pir creates its own 
organisation in which membership is restricted to the inurids and the pir. This frag- 
mentation of the community is maintained in many of the Barelwi mosques which are 
not affiliated with a Sufi tariqa. The mosque will often serve a community which 
lives in the streets surrounding it. Through the process of chain migration, very often 
this community will consist of Muslims who have all come from the same small area 
of the subcontinent and the imam will have been recruited from the district of origin. 
In this way the mosque provides a sense of security in an alien world by continuing 
the familiar customs of the original migrants' place of birth. The imam may well not 
speak English but his presence becomes a focal point for legitimising and reinforcing 
those customs from a particular rural locale in the subcontinent that have been 
transported to a few terraced streets in a British industrial city. Here the mosque 
functions more strongly as a means of reinforcing kinship and ethnic ties than as a 
means of intensifying the sense of belonging to the wider ummah whether in Britain 
or the Islamic world. This kind of mosque will demonstrate the symbols of being 
Barelwi without necessarily identifying with any larger attempt to establish a Barehvi 
consciousness throughout the country. 
Maulana Shahid Raza Khan suggests that there are further reasons for the Barelwis 
not being unified. He argues that there are divisions between some of the Barelwi 
ulema and some of the pirs. These divisions are based on a number of factors. He 
suggests that though the ulema believe in the tariqas, all is not well within those in- 
stitutions: 
There are so many wrong things that have cut into these institutions, and the existing 
pirs who come here frequently from Pakistan or other parts, certainly their ancestors 
they (were) real Sufis and pirs, but they themselves do not hold those moral and 
spiritual values up to their standard? 
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He goes on to suggest that in many cases the pirs who visit from the subcontinent 
have suspect motives. He claims that: 
most of them come here for their material objectives; they come here to raise funds to 
build a school, or a spiritual centre, and because the people are simple, most of them 
have come from villages, they have no education, or they are not well-educated, so 
they respond very warmly. 
6 
Furthermore, he says, the pirs coming from the subcontinent to Britain have 
brought with them long-standing differences between themselves. These imported 
historical differences have yet further fragmented the community to which the pirs 
come.? He also criticises some of the pirs for their lack of knowledge of Islam. He 
states that: 
a number of pirs and Sufis who are coming to this country from the subcontinent 
(they) are not qualified ulema. They have no degrees from a dar at ulum or a 
madrasa at all. They are just here on the basis of their family heritage, family name. 
`Look I am the grandson of that big pir. ' 'I am the great-grandson of that great, great 
Sufi. ' So they have got that sort of link in their mind and they think that is the 
greatest qualification that they are holding. 8 
It is difficult to substantiate these criticisms of the motives of visiting pirs by 
prominent members of the Barelwi ulema, but two important points emerge that will 
have repercussions for the development of the community here in Britain. Firstly, 
there are obviously divisions amongst the leaders of the Barelwi communities which 
will further set back any attempts towards creating a unified Barelwi front in Britain. 
Secondly, whatever the motives may be of some visiting pirs, as long as they direct 
the focus of the community towards projects in the subcontinent, they will undermine 
the development of a Muslim community centred upon Britain. 
The Barelwi ulema in Britain are also divided along political lines. These lines 
reflect historical disputes over authority which originate in Pakistan and India. The 
founding of the Jami'at al-Ulema-i Hind and its equivalent organisation, the Jami'at 
al-Ulema-i Islam, in Pakistan brought the Deobandi ulema into the field of politics. 
The Barelwi ulema were quick to realise that there would be a significant loss of 
status and power if they did not similarly organise themselves. Subsequently these 
bodies which represent the ulema were established in Britain. The first Barelwi 
organisation established here was the World Islamic Mission, which runs several 
mosques. The World Islamic Mission has branches in a number of Western European 
countries, in the Middle East and in Africa. Although its headquarters is in Britain, 
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the prominent figure is the Chairman, Maulana Murani, who is an important 
politician in Pakistan. The World Islamic Mission is active in publishing books and 
magazines. A second Barelwi organisation, the Jamaat-i al Sunnat was created here 
in Britain echoing divisions between the ulema in Pakistan. This organisation is not 
involved in publishing but it is active in organising annual conferences. These con- 
ferences bring together ulema and scholars from the subcontinent to discuss various 
theological and political issues with the Barelwi ulema here. Recently there has been 
a breakaway from the World Islamic Mission which has resulted in the founding of a 
third Barelwi organisation, the International Muslim Organisation; this was founded 
by Pir Abdul Wahhab Siddiqi from Coventry who died in 1994. Despite a strong 
local following in Coventry, Pir Abdul Wahhab Siddiqi did not appear to have much 
support throughout the country. He was, however, very active in Holland, Canada, 
the U. S. A., and parts of Central America. The most important development in the 
context of Britain is that Pir Abdul Wahhab Siddiqi had allied himself with the newly 
established Muslim Parliament. 
Despite these various factors which create tensions and further fragmentation 
amongst the Barelwis here in Britain, there are other forces which have pulled them 
towards a common consciousness and a degree of unity. The Barelwi ulema's reas- 
sert or.,. of the more popular expressions of the Sufi traditions has resulted in strong 
criticism from the reform groups, particularly the Deobandis and the Ahl-i Hadith. 
As a result of this, a common Barelwi identity has developed as a defence mechanism 
against the attacks of the better organised, often tightly-knit, reform groups. Ahmad 
Riza Khan (1856-1921) has been the focus for this organisation of Barelwi practices 
and beliefs into a recognisable and coherent group in the subcontinent. His followers 
have presented themselves as Ahl-i-Sunnat wa jamaat rather than as Barelwis. This 
has allowed them to identify themselves as the true Sunni Muslims who follow prac- 
tices legitimised throughout the Islamic world by popular usage. In this way they can 
transcend being labelled a regional sect within Islam. Maulana Shahid Raza Khan 
says on this subject that: 
there is a group of Barelwi ulema and imams who say 'look there is a great danger 
that the real name, "the Sunni", the word "Sunni" will be highjacked by others, and 
then we will be introduced all over the world as "Barelwi", and the word "Barelivi" 
is not known all over the Middle-East at all'. (Because) "Barelwi" is not a legal or 
recognised term in Islamic history. There is a danger they (will) think we are only in 
Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, (but) what we do is done by Muslims all over the 
world. So they (the ulema) say, the Barelwis of the subcontinent (that we) are a part 
of that Muslim community who are all over the world. 9 
Identifying themselves as the true Sunni community has allowed the Barelwis to 
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counter the reform groups' central criticism that their Islam is impure and full of in- 
novations and cultural accretions. In response, they reply that the Islam they practise 
is legitimised by being followed by the wider Sunni community throughout the world. 
They accuse the reform groups of being Wahhabis. The ulema of the Bareilly dar al- 
Ulum founded by Ahmad Riza Khan have issued falwas which declare that Wah- 
habisin is outside the fold of Islam. This counterattack by the Barelwis against the 
reform movements has resulted in several struggles for control of mosques in British 
cities. Usually these incidents have been between Barelwis and Deobandis, the tradi- 
tional antagonists with a history of conflict going back to their roots in the sub- 
continent. Maulana Shahid Raza Khan, although a prominent Barelwi alim, has been 
active in trying to resolve these conflicts in his role as the Executive Secretary of the 
Shari'ah Council. He suggests that, although these conflicts between the Barelwis 
and the Deobandis still happen, they are on the decrease. He is confident that 
dialogue and negotiations will begin between these traditional enemies in Britain. 
They will be brought together by crises in the community that demand a unified Mus- 
lim response. 
I am sure that the first positive thing to begin in this country among various sects of 
the Muslim community will be dialogue among these groups. We are experiencing it 
now and then on common issues. (Like) during the Rushdie affair it happened for a 
short while. And again at the moment regarding the Babri Mosque issue. I can see 
that AN Hadith and Bareiwis and Deobandis are attending meetings with each 
other. Having dialogue and talking to each other sincerely. 
10 
He is more concerned that many of the conflicts that he is now called upon to con- 
ciliate are between various Barelwi groups fighting amongst themselves for control. 
It has happened in so many places. This type of thing has happened in the past in 
High Wycombe, in some of the mosques in Birmingham, in Bradford, in Manchester. 
So there is internal rivalry going on between ulema or imams and pirs. Though both 
are Barelºvis, both have got (the) same apida but it has become a matter of their au- 
thority in this country and that is why such things are happening in this country at the 
moment. Il 
Ahmad Riza Khan definitely established the Barelwis as a self-aware tradition 
within subcontinent Islam. Nielsen suggests that there are three elements which 
identify this tradition. First is the centrality of the Prophet. 12 This is so strong that 
the Reform groups have accused the Barelwis of shirk. Maulana Shahid Raza Khan 
says that the Barelwis have distinctive beliefs concerning the Prophet. 
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They believe that the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, has been given by God 
the knowledge of the Unseen. Similarly the Barelwis believe that Prophet Muham- 
mad, peace be upon him, is going to intercede on the Day of Judgement for the 
ummah, for the believers. They also believe that he has been given by God such a 
power (in) which he can hear whatever we say in our address to him. They believe 
that he is alive as he was alive in this world and whatever we are saying for him here, 
he is listening. 13 
According to Nielsen, the second distinctive feature is that religious authority is 
mediated through the descendants of the Prophet and the descendants of the saints and 
pirs. Finally, this piety towards the Prophet and the saints has resulted in a succes- 
sion of popular holidays celebrating them (urs), the most important of which is the 
birthday of the Prophet himself. 14 The other holidays celebrating the U---s of Sufis 
and saints are usually held locally at the respective shrine. Maulana Shahid Raza 
Khan adds to the above several unique customs which also distinguish and unite all 
the Barelwi factions. Barelwi mosques are usually decorated with fairy lights and 
coloured tinsel; above the minbar `Ya Allah' is written on the right-hand side and `Ya 
Rasul Allah' is written on the left-hand side. When the Barelwis gather for congrega- 
tional prayers they include a number of additional practices such as Du'a (prayers of 
petition and intercession usually addressed to the Prophet); dhikr (formula for the 
constant remembrance of God usually consisting of repetition of Allah's ninety-nine 
names or the first part of the kalima `la ilaha illa Allah'); and a na`t (song) sung in 
Urdu by the congregation gathered around the imam, in which the Prophet is praised 
and his blessings called for (see Appendix Q. At the end of the prayers the con- 
gregation will often form a line to greet and kiss the hand of the imam or any de- 
scendants of pirs that may be present. 15 These features have given the Barelwis a 
distinct identity and have helped them towards forming a cohesive group. 
In Britain three other factors have worked together to overcome the usually dis- 
parate nature of the Barelwi tradition. The Barelwis' veneration for the Prophet 
meant that they reacted much more strongly to the publishing of Salman Rushdie's 
book, The Satanic Verses. Nielsen reports that their communities were `collectively 
more prepared to register the insult contained in the book'. 16 Maulana Shahid Raza 
Khan supports this view: 
In the campaign against Rushdie the support of the masses was on the basis of 
Barelwi support. Barelwis were the major group who were attending rallies, 
demonstrations and giving the campaign a boost everywhere. They were in the fore- 
front but unfortunately as the majority of the imams amongst the Barelwis cannot 
speak English; they are not organised; (and) they do not know how to approach the 
press, so the leaders on the forefront were other people, but the real support to this 
campaign was given by the Barelwis in this country. 
17 
-126- 
This experience not only helped to unite the Barelwi factions but also provided 
openings for their leaders to work with the leaders of other non-Barelwi groups on is- 
sues which affected the Muslim community in Britain as a whole. Undoubtedly the 
various Muslim factions were impressed by the value of unity on this occasion, but it 
is still unclear just how this realisation will manifest in the future. 
Another factor which is bringing the Barelwis together is their shared fears for the 
future of the younger generation. This fear exists not only in the context of children 
growing up in a non-Muslim environment, but in the anxiety that these children will 
be attracted towards the message of the better organised and more vocal reform 
organisations. When I asked Maulana Shahid Raza whether it was not more impor- 
tant that the younger Muslims in the community became strong in their faith than that 
they belong to particular factions, he personally agreed but stressed that, 
they (the Muslims) wish to identify themselves in terms of their own group title. 
They think for their children that it is essential to be a Barelwi or a Deobandi or a 
Tablighi or something like that. These differences are very, very deep and serious, 
and those devoted Barelwis or Deobandis or Tablighis (they) think that if my child 
goes into another group he almost loses his faith. He is not a Muslim. 18 
He insists that the Barelwis are particularly afraid because the reform groups, 
especially Jamaat-i Islami and Tabligh-i Jamaat, are exceedingly well-organised. He 
states that, 
These are well-organised organisations having good leadership, and working in a 
dynamic way in this country, (and) they might affect their future, and many of our 
children might fall in the trap of these groups. That is the general feeling of the 
Barelwis at the moment. And they are very keen on doing something in order to 
neutralise the effect of other well-organised and well-financed groups. A lot of meet- 
ings are going on. 
19 
A third element has amplified the above factors in terms of pointing the Barelwis 
towards greater cohesion: the arrival in Britain of resident charismatic pirs who are 
forming powerful groups of Barelwis amongst Britain's Muslims. 
In order to highlight the various changes which are taking place within the Barelwi 
community it has been essential to acknowledge the disparate nature of the Barelwi 
tradition. To render analysis possible three case studies have been chosen to represent 
the Barelwi scene in Britain. All are in the Sparkbrook area of Birmingham. The first 
is a Barelwi mosque with no association with a pir or Sufi tariga. The mosque func- 
tions as the focus for a Mirpuri community living in the streets which surround it. 
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The other two examples examined are connected with Sufi tariqas. One is grouped 
around the example and charisma of a living pir based in Britain; the other is a tradi- 
tional Sufi structure centred around the descendants of a thirteenth century Sufi whose 
shrine is in Pakistan. 
1. The Bareiwi Imam 
Noor ul Uloom Mosque, 51 Somerville Road, Birmingham 
The mosque is situated on the other side of the Moseley Road from Sparkbrook, at 
the edge of the Mirpuri-dominated Alum Rock area. It is in a new building on the 
site of a former house mosque in a quiet street made up of Victorian terraces and 
larger detached houses of the same period. Inside, the only indications that you are in 
a Barelwi mosque are the many multi-coloured strands of tinsel that crisscross the 
ceiling, the fairy lights that decorate the relatively simple minbar, and `Ya Allah' and 
`Ya Rasul Allah' in Arabic on either side of the minbar. 
My visits were made during the last ten days of Ramadan, and the mosque was al- 
ways packed for prayers. This was probably considerably more than the usual at- 
tendance, but the Friday juma namaz was obviously always packed as there had been 
a history of complaints from the non-Muslim residents of the area concerning lack of 
parking facilities. The congregation is essentially Mirpuris living in the streets which 
surround the mosque. There is, however, a small minority which consists of Muslims 
originating from around Peshawar, Lahore and Bengal. As usual in a Barelwi 
mosque, the customary na't in praise of the Prophet is sung by the congregation at the 
end of the prayers but a considerable proportion of the congregation leave before this 
event. This and the composition of the mosque congregation suggests that the mosque 
is filled with Muslims who attend because they live locally rather than for ideological 
reasons. For those Muslims in the area that are either Deobandi or Jamaat-i Islami 
there are mosques nearby that belong specifically to those groups. 
Despite the fact that the dominackgroup is made up of Mirpuris, the imam is not 
from that region and neither does he preach the weekly Friday sermon and the Sunday 
Qur'an interpretation in their dialect. He speaks to them in a very fine educated 
Urdu. The imam reflects the fact that the mosque committee is composed of some 
very prominent local businessmen whose allegiance to the Barelwi tradition is more 
consciously ideological than merely a matter of imported customs from a cluster of 
villages of origin. This is particularly demonstrated in the way that the imam was 
chosen. He comes from Bihar state in India, and was educated first in a madrasa in 
Faisalabad and then, finally, in Bareilly dar ul Ulum itself. After completing his 
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education he was invited to teach children in Bareilly, and he remained in this post for 
two-and-a-half years. At this point an invitation arrived from the mosque in Birming- 
ham. The imam explains: 
So I taught there for two-and-a-half years, and then someone wrote a letter from here 
to Bareilly asking that we need a preacher. And then the manager of the school chose 
four names and sent their speeches here with a cassette. 
20 
After being chosen the imam arrived from India. Initially he intended to stay for 
only three months, but the congregation of the mosque was reluctant to let him leave. 
I gave admission to the manager of the mosque and to the madrasa in Bareilly that I 
wanted leave for three months to preach. A call to preaching. And they were agreed. 
But here people stopped me (from returning). We couldn't move back there. 21 
The training which the imam has received in the centre of Barelwi theological 
thought means that he is very consciously Barelwi, but in a way that is markedly dif- 
ferent from the type of imam who is chosen because he lives in the region from which 
the mosque congregation originates. Imam Razwi, in common with many in the con- 
gregation, arrived in Britain unable to speak any English, but he was also unable to 
communicate in their dominant language. He has, however, managed to learn a con- 
siderable amount of both English and Punjabi since his arrival. He is very conscious 
that the language used in the mosque should incorporate more English, especially if 
the younger generation are to be kept interested. 
The younger generation of Muslims understand English well. So the ulerna must also 
learn English. This is the necessity of this country. So we try, in some schools, and 
some mosques, to appoint a teacher or imam who will learn English, like in the big 
mosques, the central mosque. It is very necessary. 
22 
His attempts to achieve this, however, have been limited in scope and marked with 
little success. As in other mosques, the imam runs traditional classes for the children 
every evening from 5pm to 7pm. Between eight to ten assistants help him in this 
teaching. Each teacher has a class of about twenty children. Although there are a 
large number of children attending these classes, the lessons are only in memorising 
the Qur'an and learning Urdu. The imam is proud that the lessons have succeeded in 
creating ten hafiz, but his attempts to incorporate English into the syllabus so far 
have been limited only to facilitating the students' ability to learn Urdu. 
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When I teach Urdu, I explain the difficult, the new words in English. Yes. And then 
they write the word easily. And if I explain the new word in Urdu they feel many 
difficulties. The children feel more difficulties. If I say it in English they un- 
derstand quickly. And sometimes I say some sentences in English, and they become 
active and they have more interest. 
23 
Attempts by the Mosque committee to find someone who could teach the children 
Arabic, Urdu, and English through the medium of English have failed. Although 
there has been little actual success in this direction, it is notable that the imam and the 
committee are both aware of the need to correct this situation. 
The imam is also keen that the Barelwi tradition should not be linked to specific 
practices or beliefs which pertain only to the subcontinent. He suggests that the word 
`Barelwi' was invented by the Deobandis in order to create the perception that the 
Barelwis were a sect in Islam. The imam, however, believes that the Barelwi tradi- 
tion follows the beliefs of the majority of Sunni Muslims since the time of the 
Prophet. 24 As a consequence of this belief, he attempts to legitimise the Barelwi 
tradition by removing it away from the locale of the subcontinent out to the wider Is- 
lamic world. In common with many other active Barelwis interviewed he recounts 
the same hagiographical event from the life of Ahmad Riza Khan in order to achieve 
this. 
Some Deobandi ulema wrote in their books wrong things. And then one person 
called Maulana Ahmad Riza Khan took action against them and wrote a book which 
said that this was a lie, is wrong against Islam, and he wrote like a judge. He went 
direct to the Arabs on the occasion of the Pilgrimage. And he showed the thing (his 
book) to the Arab ulema, and the Arab ulema agreed with him, and said 'indeed these 
things are wrong'. And they wrote and supported him. They supported Maulana 
Raza Khan and said that the persons who had written these things were wrong accord- 
ing to the Qur'anic verses and Islamic traditions. 
2S 
In order that the Barelwis in Britain should not be considered a sect of sub- 
continent Islam, the imam believes that not only should the ulema be trained in this 
country but that they should also be sent outside to the Muslim world to complete 
their training. He is very pleased that a Barelwi mosque in Milton Keynes is sending 
children to complete their education in al-Azhar, Cairo. 
Although it is difficult to ascertain all the beliefs held by the Mosque congrega- 
tion, it is clear that the imam and the mosque committee are holding to a theologically 
conservative version of the Barelwi tradition as followed by the qualified ulema from 
Bareilly and associated dar al Ulums. There is no dhikr in the mosque, and the only 
urs celebrated are the birthday of the Prophet and the night of Miraj. There have 
been attempts to introduce Naqshbandi dhikr into the mosque by one of the congrega- 
tion who is a son of a pir in Pakistan, but the imam has refused permission. He has, 
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however, allowed him and his sympathisers to eat and to read from the Qur'an in the 
mosque on certain festive occasions. The imam does not believe that real pirs inherit 
their position, but rather that they earn the title through their spiritual practice. He 
asserts that the great Sufis of the past combined spiritual experience with study of the 
Qur'an and the Hadith. 
Pir is not an inheritance. It depends on knowledge and especially knowledge of God. 
If there is a good or a real pir I will respect him because in Islam there were a lot of 
pirs who were educated and were good leaders but nowadays, I think, as I know here, 
a lot of pirs are uneducated. They cannot explain to people the Qur'an and Hadith, 
and if any person asks them to please explain anything, they will say, `go to a maulvi 
to understand. I am a pir'. In the past history of Islam all pirs, faqirs and Sufis 
were well-educated. These pirs are only (pirs) in appearance. 26 
There are no social welfare activities taking place from the mosque, but the imam 
feels that it is a good thing when a mosque is able to organise this kind of activity. 
He blames the lack of these activities on the size of the mosque and its lack of facili- 
ties. He praises Sufi Abdullah for organising social welfare activities at his centre in 
Birmingham and has attended meetings there. These are meetings to which all the 
ulema and prominent Muslims in Birmingham are invited regardless of sectarian af- 
filiation. Imam Razwi admits, however, that generally only the Barelwi ulema at- 
tend. The imam expressed sentiments of unity to me, an expression of his feelings 
that the divisions between Muslims of the subcontinent should not be continued here 
in Britain. He attempted to confirm this belief in unity by citing the mosque's mem- 
bership of the Sunni Configuration of Mosques Midlands. This is an umbrella 
organisation founded in 1984 to which fifty-two mosques belong. All of the 
mosques, however, are Barelwi, and so far their activities have been limited to such 
activities as fixing the timetables of prayers and establishing the beginning and end of 
Ramadan. Birmingham council has now made the Eid at the end of Ramadan an of- 
ficial public holiday for Muslim employees. Through the efforts of the Sunni Con- 
figuration of Mosques, the majority of Muslims celebrated Eid on the same day in 
Birmingham in 1993. This was the first time such a majority agreement had been 
reached. The imam felt that this was a great step forward in achieving a common 
identity for the Muslim community in Britain. He emphasised, however, that each 
mosque still maintained its independence. 
It is apparent that this mosque is not the typical small house mosque serving a 
group of Muslims united by their place of origin in the subcontinent which employs 
an imam from the same area, even though it does provide facilities for a 
predominantly Mirpuri population living nearby. The Mosque committee and its 
choice of imam has ensured that the traditions of the mosque belong to the more self- 
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conscious Barelwi school as linked with Ahmad Raza Khan and the Bareilly dar al 
Ulum rather than with the religion of local customs or folk-Sufism as originating in 
specific areas of the subcontinent. 
2. The Living Pir 
Dar ul Uloom Islamia, Golden Hillock Road, Birmingham 
The Dar ul Uloom Islamia buildings occupy two blocks on either side of a stretch 
of the Golden Hillock Road between two roundabouts. On one side of the road a 
very large mosque is under construction; it will dominate the area's skyline. The 
mosque will offer facilities for several thousand Muslims to congregate and pray, and 
there is also a large car park and buildings which will be used as a supplementary 
maktab for the children. 
On the other side of the road, various buildings are contained within a courtyard 
which is entered through arched gates constructed in traditional Islamic style. The 
buildings which front the street are all obviously a part of the complex as their 
windows are designed to match _ the arch of the entrance. Fairy lights cover the ar- 
ches. Inside the complex there is a mosque decorated with gold tinsel. The minbar is 
particularly ornate; it is a painted wooden structure which is itself a small mosque 
complete with two minarets. This model of a mosque is illuminated with coloured 
fairy lights. There is also a large meeting hall which is used as a langar and a place 
of prayer for women; a small dar al Ulum in which a few older male students come 
from other parts of Britain to study; an Islamic bookshop and printing press; and two 
Asian job clubs, one for males and the other for females. Once the buildings are 
completed in the new mosque complex, there are plans to extend the school facilities 
so that they become a large dar al Ulum and hostel. The overall intention is to create 
an Islamic village or, to be more specific, a model Sufi community in the centre of 
Birmingham; this is envisaged as taking place over the next five to ten years. The en- 
ergy and the vision manifesting in this once run-down part of inner city Birmingham 
is the product of the inspiration of one man, Sufi Abdullah Khan. 
Like the imam of the Noor ul Uloom mosque many of Sufi Abdullah's murids 
argued that the term `Barelwi', although acknowledged, created a false picture of 
their lineage. They did not wish to be confined to a sectarian conflict that was limited 
to the subcontinent, but wanted rather to be identified with a much larger tradition as 
found throughout the Islamic world. 27 Ahmed Riza Khan's work is acknowledged 
and highly respected for challenging the claimed false ideas of Deoband, Ahl-i 
Hadith, and the Shi'as. He is perceived as a mujaddid, a purifier of Islam, and a 
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Sufi saint of the Qadiriyya order. Here at the Dar ul Uloom Islamia too, they told in 
great detail and with many embellishments the story of Ahmed Riza Khan's defence 
of his beliefs in Mecca before the Arabian ulema. The Deobandis were accused of 
creating a major schism in Sufism by adopting and spreading the ideas of Muhammad 
Ibn `Abd -Lk(-- Q -' c-1 
At this centre, however, as opposed to the Noor ul Uloom mosque, the stress is on 
Sufism and the role of the great Sufi teachers in Islam. 
The great Sufi shaikhs have done great work in accordance with the way of the 
Prophet to put people on to the right knowledge, the right guidance, and they 
propagated Islam from that point, and they fought against whatever was not Islamic. 
And a Sufi's rank can go as far as where prophethood begins, but it does not super- 
sede or become the rank of a prophet. 
28 
The major focus of respect is the person of Sufi Abdullah himself and his pir, 
Hazrat Shah, who is usually referred to as Zindapir; Zindapir means `the living pir'. 
The followers of these exemplary or charismatic living Sufis are to some degree criti- 
cal of the sajjada nashin, those descendants of famous Sufis who usually function 
today as guardians of the shrines based around their illustrious ancestor's tomb. The 
followers of the charismatic living Sufis described above still acknowledge and 
respect the sa j jada nashin, but see the latter's charisma as merely derivatory. They 
are not regarded as `real' saints as the original Sufi was, or, indeed, as Zindapir and 
Sufi Abdullah are today. As the Chairman of Dar ul Uloom Islamia explained: 
Our religion is not coming from inheritance. A pir is a pir, we respect them because 
their fathers did a good thing, but in the meantime he or she has to earn that thing. 
Sufi Abdullah is not the son of a pir; he is not the relative of Pir Sahib but at the mo- 
ment we are witness that he is near to Pir Sahib. He has got a very, very, very big 
place in front of our Zindapir. He has earned this seat. 
29 
The history of the Tariqa 
The Naqshbandi silsilah of the followers of Zindapir and Sufi Abdullah begins 
with Abu Bakr. Several famous subcontinent Suf is are contained within this spiritual 
genealogy, amongst them Bayazid and Naqshband (see Appendix D). The teacher of 
Zindapir was Muhammad Qasim Mori, a Kashmiri; his shrine named Mohara Sharif 
is in the Muree hills, to the north of Islamabad. He had established his khanqah there 
in the late 19th century. Muhammad Qasim died in 1947. Zindapir, a sayyid, al- 
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though from a family of Qadiriyya Sufis himself, had travelled from his home in 
Kohat on the North-West Frontier in search of a teacher. The story of this meeting, 
told in the words of Abid Hussein, demonstrates the hagiographical accounts of Sufis' 
lives that are constantly being recounted by their followers. 
When he went there at that time Baba Ji (Muhammad Qasim) had finished with the 
world, he had gone into total devotion and seclusion. He had passed permission to 
his son to see to the murids, the people, the khalifas. And he went into seclusion to 
see no-one, to initiate no-one, to meet no-one. When a Sufi master reaches a certain 
rank, and that rank is very high, when that stage takes place then he begins to lose his 
shadow. When you develop the great Noor, the great light of Allah, and you are to- 
tally merged into the Prophet, into Allah, and then your physical form is there but it 
doesn't have a shadow. It has developed as pure light. So that was the position with 
Baba Ji. When Zindapir arrived his intention was to meet Baba Ji but everyone was 
going towards his son, Sheikh Nazir Ahmed. Whoever wanted initiation to join the 
tariqa, they were asked to go to Nazir Ahmed. But Zindapir heard a voice. I heard 
this direct from Zindapir. He said that he heard a voice in his ear which said `your 
initiation is with Baba Ji'. Three times the voice said the same thing to him. So he 
requested one of the grandsons of Baba Ji, who was the doorman, who took food in, 
washed Baba Ji's hair, did everything, looked after him, and that grandson's son is 
here with us. So Zindapir spoke to him, and all he did was to go into Baba Ji and 
stand before him. He didn't say a word. And Baba Ji said, 'Go and call him in'. 
Baba Ji was expecting him. So when Zindapir went in they spent a long time to- 
gether. What they exchanged together, what took place, only those two people 
know, only Allah knows. So he was given initiation and he was given the juba from 
Baba Ji and then Baba Ji walked out with him and told all the people 'this is my 
khalifa'. 30 
It is of interest to note here that the congregation of the Harounia Mosque in 
Alum Rock, Birmingham are followers of the pir, Haroun Rashid, the son of Nazir 
Ahmed; Haroun Rashid visits this country periodically from Pakistan. This group 
considers itself to be in a direct line of descent from Muhammad Qasim. Although 
the group respects the efforts of Sufi Abdullah in Birmingham, it only acknowledges 
Zindapir as one of the khalifas of Muhammad Qasim. 
After initiation, Zindapir joined the army, married and had four children. In the 
army he worked as a tailor, but also he began to teach, to organise dhikrs and to in- 
itiate followers. It was here in 1948 that he was met by Sufi Abdullah, an instructor 
in the Signals section. In 1951, Zindapir left for the mountains around Kohat and 
went into retreat within a cave. He claims that this was under the direction of the 
Prophet who appeared to him in a vision. He has remained there ever since. Abid 
Hussein describes this with great piety and respect: 
He is just called Zindapir which is a title but his own name he has forgotten because 
he has totally annihilated himself, finished himself and this is the spiritual name 
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which means the living pir. The place where he lives is called Gamkol Sharif in 
Kohat. It is about six kilometres from Kohat City in the mountains. I have only been 
there once. It is situated in such a place that before the shaikh sat there in 1951 there 
was no life there. Huge mountains. All around mountains. And caves there. And in 
1951 he sat there in a cave in that mountain. There wasn't any vegetation, or any 
green, or any tree, or any water, or any animal. 31 
From 1951 to 1971 he did not leave the area at all, but since 1971 he has made the 
Hajj annually in the company of many of his followers from all over the world. 
Since 1951 the efforts of Zindapir's followers have transformed Ghamkol Sharif. 
Pnina Werbner visited the centre in 1989 and describes the khanqah: 
It is a lovely, prosperous, tranquil scene. The orchards bear apples, oranges, lemons. 
Tomatoes, cucumbers, cabbages, and chillies grow in well tended vegetable beds. A 
fifty strong cattle and buffalo herd grazes in the valley. Chicken and geese honk in 
the coop. A herd of goats bleat in the hills. Wild honey bees have made a hive in 
one of the trees of the orchard groves. The courtyards of the houses and hospices are 
surrounded by green lawns and bordered with flower beds and shady trees. The 
beautiful mosque, elaborately decorated in white, green and dark red, its three domes 
and delicate minarets set against the blue sky and the hills beyond, is a scene of per- 
fection... All is quiet apart from the sound of dhikr echoing in the mountains and the 
splashing of water fountains. Gharnkol Sharif is, perhaps, as close to paradise as a 
Muslim can get on this earth. 32 
Sufi Abdullah had accompanied Zindapir to Ghamkol Sharif and remained there 
with him until 1962. In that year his shaikh made him a khali fa and sent him to 
Britain. Pnina Werbner records that Zindapir told her that he had sent Sufi Abdullah 
to Britain because the Pakistani migrants had forgotten Islam. They no longer 
prayed, celebrated Eid, maintained Ramadan, or performed dhikr. He felt that they 
needed a guide to direct them back to the path of Allah. 33 Sufi Abdullah's followers 
in Birmingham compare his journey to the West with Zindapir's retreat to Kohat. 
Both have raised the flag of Islam in a desolate, God-deserted wilderness. This is the 
mark of the true Sufi. Pnina Werbner states that it is the hardship of the saint's jour- 
ney, whether to the land of infidels or to the wilderness, which constitutes the ordeal 
that makes him who he is. 34 The Sufi saint literally sanctifies the godless ground 
where he takes up residence. In Sufi Abdullah's case, the ordeal was to include 
twenty-four years of manual work in the iron foundries of the Midlands. At the same 
time, he was beginning his spiritual work. Initially, he taught Qur'an classes to a 
handful of children and only two people joined him for dhikr. Slowly his work pro- 
gressed and then gathered pace. He purchased a house in Warwick Road and con- 
verted it into a mosque. Originally he knocked out the downstairs walls but as more 
and more people joined him in prayer and dhikr he enclosed the complete back garden 
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to form an extension. In 1983 Sufi Abdullah expanded his work by instructing his 
followers to purchase the present site in Golden Hillock Road. He continues to live 
with his family in the Warwick Road Mosque, however. 
Personal Impressions of Sufi Abdullah 
Sufi Abdullah spends most of his time living in extreme simplicity in a small room 
downstairs. I was told that often he spends many days there fasting and in retreat. 
This room has become the equivalent of Zindapir's cave. The shaikh keeps to the 
rules of fasting, required of all Muslims during Ramadan, all the year round. The 
same room is also used to meet people. A darban (doorkeeper) controls the visitors 
and ensures that Sufi Abdullah is not disturbed unnecessarily. Women visitors are 
taken upstairs to the family quarters, and from time to time he goes up to see them. 
During the time that I spent sitting with Sufi Abdullah he dealt with many problems; 
these ranged from advice on illnesses and family matters to simply giving his bless- 
ing. He had just returned from keeping itikaf in the Prophet's mosque in Medina and 
hundreds of followers wished to see him and to receive the enhanced blessings that 
such an action could provide. Sufi Abdullah had brought water from the spring in 
Medina, and this was given to all the visitors to drink along with raisins and nuts 
from the same area. 
There is no doubt of Sufi Abdullah's charisma. My first meeting with him was at 
Heathrow Airport on his return from Medina. I travelled with a coachload of murids 
from Birmingham who were going to meet him there and bring him back to the city. 
The excitement was immense. Many of them told me of the blessings I would receive 
in seeing the shaikh when he was himself in such a state of holiness. On the journey 
the followers continuously performed dhikr, chanting `la illa'llah illallahu' 
melodiously. Many of them told me stories of miraculous events either in their own 
lives or in the lives of Sufi Abdullah and Zindapir. These events usually involved 
some kind ofsynchronicity. At Heathrow many other followers from different parts 
of Britain had gathered to meet Sufi Abdullah. Altogether there were about four hun- 
dred people, many of them carrying welcoming garlands. Just prior to the shaikh's 
arrival everyone formed a double line and began to perform dhikr. I was not 
prepared for Sufi Abdullah's physical appearance. He is a giant of a man, probably 
close to seven feet tall in his turban. He was dressed that day in white robes with the 
juba given to him by Zindapir thrown over the top. His grey beard is long and full, 
and his eyes are still, fixed and penetrating. Sufi Abdullah passed down the double 
line of joyful followers, and they all garlanded him. At the end of the line the murids 
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encircled him, continuously performing dhikr, while he removed the garlands and 
placed them over their heads. After this, before beginning our journey back to 
Birmingham, Sufi Abdullah led the evening prayers in Terminal 4 of Heathrow Air- 
port. Carpets were produced from the bags of various followers and the Airport be- 
came a masjid for a short while. The prayers also marked the end of the Ramadan 
fast for the day, so on the coach back everybody celebrated with a meal eaten with 
their Shaikh. Before arriving in Birmingham, the coach stopped in the carpark of a 
motorway service station to allow everyone to perform the final prayer of the day. 
Observing the followers of Sufi Abdullah with their shaikh demonstrated that they are 
clearly inspired by the example of his piety and devotion. Muhammad Saleem Akhtar 
expresses this exemplary role of Sufi Abdullah and his shaikh Zindapir in the follow- 
ing words: 
Our shaikh is doing it. And those followers who have seen it, can see in him the 
shape of the Prophet. They can see in him the teachings of the Prophet. They can see 
in him the deeds and the character of the Prophet. And they love it. 35 
Although I was to meet Sufi Abdullah several times, he usually directed me to one 
of his followers to answer my questions. He was concerned only with my spiritual 
state, not my academic research and constantly reminded me to prepare myself for the 
Day of Judgement. 
The Special Features of Worship (Adab) in the Dar ul Uloom Islamia 
The Naqshbandi order of Suf is can be found throughout most of the Muslim 
world, but it is not a unitary organisation. There will be variations unique to each in- 
dividual group within the order, all of which are recognised as a means towards final 
unification with the Prophet and God. Very often these variations will be based upon 
the lifestyle, dress, habits and spiritual practices of the shaikh that founded the group. 
His followers will base their own spiritual disciplines on attempting to emulate him. 
This is known as adab. The followers of Zindapir form a distinct regional cult within 
the Naqshbandi order as centred upon the Pir and Ghamkol Sharif. Sufi Abdullah 
has extended the borders into Britain. All Sufis taught that the heart can be purified 
through dhikr but the form of the dhikr will change from group to group. The fol- 
lowers of Zindapir practice both the silent dhikr of the Naqshbandis and the spoken 
dhikr of the Qadiriyya Sufis. This is because Muhammad Qasim's father was a 
Shaikh of the Qadiriyya but he received bai'at from the Naqshbandi, shaikh 
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Nisamuddin. In the silent dhikr the practitioner internally remembers the sound 
`Allah' as he inhales, and the sound `hu' as he exhales. The loud or spoken dhikr 
consists of a series of short phrases from the Qur'an constantly chanted over and 
over. These phrases are usually connected with the ninety-nine names of God. 
Amongst these are the phrases `Allahu 's samad'; `la ilaha illa 'llah'; `la ilaha 'llahu 
ill 'llah'; and `Allah hu'. The male followers of Sufi Abdullah, including some 
young boys, gather in the mosque late each Saturday night to perform communal 
dhikr around their shaikh. The dhikr goes on for about two hours. Each one of the 
above chants is repeated; they begin slowly and pick up speed until the sounds seem 
to run into each other. The dhikr always finishes on the silent repetition of Allah's 
name in the breath. This is an intense, powerful religious experience. 
Although gathered around the shaikh in a circle, the practitioners cannot see each 
other. The mosque is kept in darkness so that whatever experiences of ecstasy they 
may have, no-one else can see what must be kept private between the worshipper and 
Allah. In the dark I could only perceive silhouettes rocking back and forth rhythmi- 
cally to the ever-increasing speed of the beat of the dhikr. After completion of the 
dhikr Sufi Abdullah asks the young men and children to recite passages from the 
Qur'an. During this recital bottles of water were brought in to be blessed by the 
sanctity of the dhikr. First Sufi Abdullah blew into the top of the bottle, and then it 
was passed around for each participant to do likewise. I was told that this water was 
distributed to the sick in the community. After this, the participants eat and drink tea 
together. The dhikr ends with the followers of Sufi Abdullah lining up to embrace 
the shaikh and then to kiss his hand. Individual disciples practice dhikr in their own 
time whenever they can. The aim is that the name of Allah should be remembered 
constantly and automatically in all their activities. 
Sufi Abdullah and his followers celebrate two urs. The first is the Milad e Nabi, 
or the celebration of the Prophet's birthday in August. This is celebrated, of course, 
in common with all the Barelwis. The other urs, held since 1962 with the permission 
of Zindapir, is the urs of Baba Muhammad Qasim. This is held after the Hajj in 
July. Sufi Abdullah has made both these celebrations unique events in Birmingham 
by having a procession, or julus, pass through the city from Small Heath Park oppo- 
site the Dar ul Uloom Islamia to the Central Mosque. The followers of Sufi Abdul- 
lah come from centres in Manchester, Derby, Slough, Burton, Watford, High 
Wycombe, and Maidenhead to join with thousands of Barelwis in Birmingham who 
either watch or join the procession. Sufi Abdullah leads the procession himself, fol- 
lowed by a group of seven or eight khalif as. Each khalif a wears a black juba over 
new white cotton robes. Behind come the followers wearing white shalwar kamis and 
green caps; they carry banners inscribed with the kalima. A group of highly 
decorated cars leads the way, one of these is fitted with a loudspeaker to lead the 
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procession in dhikr. The celebration ends late at night in the mosque when Sufi Ab- 
dullah recites the final du'a. It is believed that at this last du'a all the living souls of 
past Sufis attend along with the congregation. 
Sufi Abdullah visits Mecca and Medina twice a year. Since 1971 he has attended 
the Hajj with Zindapir. In 1980 he obtained permission to do `Umra, the lesser pil- 
grimage which may be performed at any time of the year, during the last ten days of 
Ramadan. He keeps itikaf in the Prophet's mosque in Medina. The Ha jj provides 
an opportunity for any of Zindapir's followers to spend time with him. Both men are 
accompanied by as many of their followers as can attend; between one hundred and 
four hundred murids usually attend the Hajj with their pir. 
The langar is an important institution to Zindapir, and he insists that everyone 
who comes to visit him in Ghamkol Sharif is fed before their audience with him. In 
Mecca, Zindapir provides free food to all needy pilgrims. It is the duty of Sufi Ab- 
dullah to organise the langar on the Ha j j. There is a langar in the centre in 
Birmingham too, and Sufi Abdullah follows in his shaikh's footsteps by organising a 
langar during the two urs. The food is distributed freely at the end of the procession. 
The food is tobarrak, blessed, and the cooks perform dhikr as they prepare it. 
The spiritual world of the followers of Sufi Abdullah in Britain is a contained 
universe of specific communities linked together in veneration of one man and his re- 
ligious life. The centre of this universe is the space sacralised by Zindapir's presence 
in Ghamkol Sharif . Sufi Abdullah's piety and commitment to the work of 
his shaikh 
has made the Dar ul Uloom Islamia an important centre in its own right. By follow- 
ing Sufi Abdullah, the murids are linked to Zindapir in Ghamkol Sharif. 
It is true that the pir is in Pakistan but his representative is with us here. So that fills 
the gap. When people wish to see the pir there is Ha j j, and also in Pakistan they visit 
him. They get the full flower of the knowledge from Sufi Abdullah. 36 
It should be noted that the murids in Britain are comprised of those who received 
bai'at from Zindapir in Pakistan, and the majority who have received it from Sufi 
Abdullah in Birmingham. The relationship of these two groups of murids towards 
Sufi Abdullah is different. Both groups respect him and follow his leadership but 
those who received bai'at from Zindapir regard Sufi Abdullah as a fellow disciple or 
pirbhai, albeit a very respected one as he is a khalifa with the right to appoint 
khalifas of his own. The majority regard Sufi Abdullah as their pir but retain im- 
mense respect for Zindapir as the pir of Sufi Abdullah. 
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Other Features of the Dar ul Uloom Islamia 
Obviously this is a community of Muslims which focuses its attention upon the 
charismatic figure of Sufi Abdullah. The shaikh leads the dhikr, and at the juma 
namaz on Friday he says the du'a supplicatory prayers on behalf of the congregation 
and the wider Muslim community. A living saint is a wali, a friend of God and his 
ability to intercede on behalf of the worshipper is firmly believed in. This central 
role of the shaikh is indicated by the number of supplicants who come to him with 
various problems and ailments. The shaikh's role is not theological or scholarly. 
Questions concerning to f sir, fiqh, or the Shari'ah are resolved by the imam; the lat- 
ter appointed by the shaikh from amongst the ulema who follow Zindapir. 
The mosque congregation does not consist solely of Sufi Abdullah's followers. 
This mosque is not situated in the Alum Rock Mirpuri community. Around Small 
Heath there are Punjabi communities and Campbellpuris from the North-West Fron- 
tier, and Sufi Abdullah is himself a Pathan. Several of Sufi Abdullah's followers are 
from these communities, and the mosque provides a place of worship where the other 
members of these ethnic communities can gather together. Although not members of 
the tariqa, they are, nonetheless, pleased at the external signs of success in this centre 
as it enhances the status of their community, and of Islam in Birmingham. As in the 
other Barelwi mosques which I visited, a large percentage of the congregation left the 
Friday prayers before the final du'as and na'ts. Some young Muslims I met, mem- 
bers of various reform groups, told me that they once prayed in the Dar ul Uloom Is- 
lamia but that they now refused to go there. They were scathing of the BarelwilSufi 
practices and compared them to witchcraft. 
The charisma of Sufi Abdullah and the piety of his followers has attracted con- 
verts to Islam; there are several young white and West Indian males who attend the 
mosque. Their knowledge of Islam is very basic, and in my discussions with them, I 
found that many did not seem to be aware that they were involved with a Sufi group. 
They did not realise the distinctiveness of the various different elements within Islam, 
and in the case of the white converts, they did not seem to realise that the Islam they 
had adopted had many practices which belonged to the subcontinent. Most of them 
were dressed in shalwar kamis and had adopted beard styles that were copied from 
the tariqa's elders. When I challenged them on the question of why they had taken 
on a style of appearance which belonged to a subcontinent ethnic minority rather than 
to Islam, they were surprised. In the main they had never thought about such issues. 
The converts, on the whole, were far less analytical of this kind of issue than were 
the young British Asians of such reform groups as Young Muslims UK; to these Mus- 
lims such questions are crucial. 
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The people I interviewed were aware that it was important to ensure that the prac- 
tice of Islam remained strong in the younger, British-born generation. They did not, 
however, critically analyse what was required to achieve this beyond ensuring the 
continued practice of those time-honoured customs which for generations had been 
used in the education of subcontinental Muslims. Muhammad Saleem Akhtar be- 
lieved that the problem of the young could be resolved by training new members of 
the ulema who were well-educated and skilled in the medium of English. He ac- 
cepted that the original migrants were generally uneducated and made no attempt to 
integrate themselves into the receiving culture. 
As a result the first generation managed, it was needed, to bring with them a piece of 
their original country. They came with the culture of their town. They were not 
equipped with English. With the passage of time we have realised that this is a gap 
that we have to fill up. 
37 
The solution, however, has been to send ten boys to a dar al Ulum in Lahore 
where the Islamic education is completed through the medium of English. Muham- 
mad Saleem Akhtar also acknowledges that the general feeling in the institution has 
been to emphasise reading the Qur'an in Arabic because that bestows more blessings 
on the reader. He agrees that it does not answer the requirements of the present gen- 
eration of young Muslims. 
Today's need is not that. Today's need is to understand it. And to understand it the 
teachers must speak your language. If I speak in my own language I cannot make any 
communication. That is missing. We are not getting the results as we ought to be 
having. 38 
I saw very little attempt to use the medium of English in the mosque or the sup- 
plementary school at Warwick Road. The latter was very traditional in its methods of 
education. The children sat on the floor in lines and were taught by rote to recite the 
Qur'an; when they failed the teacher verbally bullied them and sometimes beat them. 
A much more progressive attempt to work with young people is the provision of 
space on the premises for an Asian Job Club. Abid Hussein suggests that this was the 
brainchild of Sufi Abdullah: 
He says that Islam and Sufism, and being a good 
Muslim is your personal thing, but 
you have other needs, recreational and social, and educational needs which Islam em- 
phasises. Encourages. So he is very much in favour of that. 
39 
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There are two Job Clubs, one for women and the other for men. They are staffed 
both by followers of Sufi Abdullah and by professional career advisors. They not 
only help to find jobs but also provide training and educational programmes for 
young Asians in the city, regardless of their faith. 
The followers of Sufi Abdullah do express the need for greater unity amongst the 
Muslims in Britain. In order to further this unity of the ummah they have been in- 
strumental in forming the Configuration of Sunni Mosques Midlands. This 
organisation was created to link together all the Barelwi mosques and institutions. 
Muhammad Saleem Akhtar, a murid of Zindapir and the Chairman of Dar ul Uloom 
Islamia, is a founder member of the Configuration. He is the chairman of the Con- 
figuration's executive committee, which consists of each individual mosque's 
chairman and secretary. Obviously this organisation provides a strong show of unity 
when dealing with local officials. Muhammad Saleem Akhtar admits that it was not 
easy to get all the mosques to work with each other: 
When people got together and they came to know the written constitution and that 
they were not going to lose their own religious identity then I think it became popular 
because our intention was for there to be a unity among the Muslims. 40 
So far the Configuration has been successful in achieving agreement on the times 
of prayers and the dates of the beginning and ending of Ramadan, but it has not at- 
tempted to resolve the ideological and religious differences that divide the com- 
munity. The members of the Configuration are very proud that these times and dates 
are now agreed upon by most mosques in the Midlands, and feel that unifying these 
externals of the faith is the way forward to unify the community. This search for 
unity extends outside the Barelwi groups but only in very limited forms. The Dar ul 
Uloom Islamia holds meetings which are attended by many prominent members from 
all the Muslim denominations. These meetings can be on specific topics, for example 
a lecture on Malcolm X held while I was there, or on the occasion of a Muslim 
holiday celebrated by all the community. There is a deliberate policy at these meet- 
ings not to discuss issues which divide the members of the various groups that attend. 
At one such meeting that I attended during Ramadan, the guest speaker was Dr. Surti 
of the Muslim-Christian Relations Institute at Selly Oak. The theme of the lecture 
was Ramadan in the Qur'an. The unusual feature was that the lecturer admitted that 
he was a member of AN Hadith, and identified himself with the Salafis, ar\ 
tslG c_reform group Saudi n. Arabia. These special occasions hosted by the Dar ul 
Uloom Islamia should not be regarded as being necessarily an indication of closer 
links or co-operation between traditional rivals. In Birmingham, the leaders of the 
Muslim community have always demonstrated considerable unity on key issues con- 
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cerning all Muslims without giving up internecine conflicts. 41 As a consequence of 
working together on such issues as education, the Rushdie affair, and the provision of 
halal food, the Muslim community leaders know each other well. It is a sign of the 
prestige of Sufi Abdullah that his institution can organise and host these social events. 
3. Sa j jada Nashin 
Sultan Bahu Trust, 17 Ombersley Road, Birmingham 
The Sultan Bahu Trust mosque is to be found in a maze of Victorian terraced 
streets in what was once obviously an industrial area full of factories. Just before the 
railway bridge over Ombersley Road there are two large double gates that lead into a 
cobbled courtyard. On the left-hand side there is an old Victorian factory about four 
to five stor. ejs high. On the right-hand side there are buildings which were once the 
offices of the factory management. There is nothing about these buildings which 
would suggest to a casual passer-by that here is one of the biggest Barelwi centres in 
Birmingham. A more observant person might notice the sign on the gates in Urdu 
and English; this indicates that what we have here is not an old Victorian industrial 
site but a centre of Islamic worship. 
Directly in front of the viewer, at the end of the courtyard, stands the recently 
constructed building which is the new mosque. Until recently the factory had been 
used for prayers, and one of the floors is still maintained for that purpose. Thou- 
sands could gather here in these huge Victorian galleries. At the present time this 
area is used by the women for Friday prayers and for the supplementary classes for 
boys and girls. The offices opposite contain the rooms used by the mosque adminis- 
tration; these are also used as a hostel for the dar al Ulum which the Sultan Bahu 
Trust is trying to establish. In August 1994 there were thirty-five students. 
The mosque is a large hall which could accommodate several hundred Muslims at 
prayer. I first visited it during the last ten days of Ramadan, and observed an area of 
the mosque had been closed off with white sheets to form a separate compound. This 
area was being used by several old men who were maintaining itikaf. The mosque is 
relatively simple by Barelwi standards; it is not decorated with tinsel, and the minbar 
is a very basic structure. There is, however, the usual `Ya Allah' and `Ya Rasul 
Allah' on the wall on either side of the minbar. The same na`t is sung at the end of 
namaz as is sung by Barelwis everywhere in Britain and the subcontinent. As in the 
other mosques that I visited, a large proportion of the congregation left the mosque 
immediately after completing their prayers and before the na't began. This mosque, 
like the others I studied, is used by the community which lives around it regardless of 
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whether they are followers of Sultan Bahu or even consciously Barelwi. The mosque 
serves both the local community as a place of prayer and the committed followers of 
Sultan Bahu's tariqa as their centre of activity in Birmingham. 
Despite the relative lack of decoration, this is not only a Barelwi mosque but also 
a centre of Naqshbandi Sufism committed to the teachings of Hazrat Sultan ul 
Ahrafeen Sultan Bahu. The latter was an seventeenth century mystic, and his shrine, 
Durbar Sultan Bahu, is in Jhung near Multan in Pakistan. The tariqa and the shrine 
of Sultan Bahu have been maintained by his descendants to this day. 
Biography of Sultan Bahu 
Although well-known in Pakistan, there is a Sultan Bahu Chair in the Punjab 
University, 42 very little material is available on the saint's life and teachings in 
English at the present time. Hazrat Sultan Bahu's family were wealthy landowners of 
the Awan clan who ruled in the South Punjab. It is said that originally the Awan clan 
migrated to Pakistan from Medina. 43 His father, Sultan Muhammad Bazid was one of 
the leaders of the Awan and his mother, Rasti was also known as a Sufi. According to 
the hagiography of Sultan Bahu, it was his mother who was responsible for the saint 
moving to Shorkot in the Jhung District where he settled and established his khanqah. 
Although Hazrat Sultan Bahu travelled extensively in search of a pir, he claims 
that his attempts to find one who could satisfy him were unsuccessful. In his most 
famous book, Risala Rouhi, he writes that he received bai'at directly from the hands 
of the Prophet. He claims that he received no formal education and that he was 
directly educated by the Prophet himself. These accounts of Hazrat Sultan Bahu's 
spiritual experiences also state that Abdul Qadir Gilani was present in the gathering of 
saints around the Prophet. As a result of this the original tariqa of Sultan Bahu is 
known as Qadiri/Sarwariyah. Succeeding pirs took bai'at at the hands of Naqshbandi 
shaikhs. 44 thus linking themselves to the Naqshbandi tariqa. Although Hazrat Sultan 
Bahu acknowledges only the Prophet as his pir, there is no doubt of his own convic- 
tion to teach through the path of direct personal experience. In Risala Rouhi he writes 
that if you are in search of Allah, then come to me, I will make the connection in one 
moment. 45 Despite his denial of any formal education Hazrat Sultan Bahu was, 
however, a prolific author, writing over one hundred works on the Qur'an, Hadith, 
and fiqh in either Arabic, Punjabi or Persian. 46 
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The Sultan Bahu Trust in Birmingham 
There are several descendants (sa j jada nashin) of the saint who lay claim to the 
title of pir as based on direct family lineage traced back to him. In Pakistan these 
men manage the shrine at Jhung, preach, and maintain the centres of the Sultan Bahu 
Trust around the country. In 1980 one of them, Sultan Fiaz ul Hasan Bahu, visited 
Britain and set up the Sultan Bahu Trust in Birmingham. He stayed here and was 
joined by his two brothers, Niaz and Riaz. The efforts of the three brothers have 
resulted in the establishment of mosques dedicated to Sultan Bahu in Bradford, 
Leicester and London. There are also groups of followers in Leeds, Newcastle and 
Glasgow. Fiaz ul Hasan Bahu is regarded as the present pir of the Sultan Bahu Trust, 
and his brother Sultan Riaz ul Hasan Bahu is the chairman of the centre in Birming- 
ham. The President of the Sultan Bahu Trust in Birmingham is Yousef Kamaur, a 
very prominent community leader and the Director of the Asian Advisory Centre in 
the city. Yousef Kamaur is also a member of the Muslim Liaison Committee, an um- 
brella organisation which attempts to represent all Muslims in Britain. Yousef 
Kamaur informed me that the Sultan Bahu Trust had recently spent £350,000 on 
developing the centre at Ombersley Road. This money was used on the new mosque 
and the dar al Ulum. 47 
The imam of the Sultan Bahu mosque discussed with me the Trust's intentions 
concerning the dar a! Ulum. Imam Pirzade is aware that it is necessary to provide a 
thorough Islamic education for young Muslims born in Britain. He feels that imams 
brought to Britain from the subcontinent should be trained in modern teaching meth- 
ods by attending courses here, and that English should become as soon as possible the 
medium for the transmission of Islam to the British-born generation. 
In the mosque there should be two languages: Arabic and English. Of course the lan- 
guage of Islam should be Arabic. You should know Arabic and English because it is 
the language of this country. Punjabi and Urdu are the other languages (spoken); 
they should be personal not the language of the mosque. The imams which are com- 
ing from Pakistan are mostly educated in Urdu medium or Punjabi medium so they 
do not know English. I have often said that some of our Muslim scholars have very 
orthodox thinking. If you want to make your ideas progressive then you must learn 
English. 48 
In order to provide for the needs of young Barelwi Muslims from around Britain, 
the Sultan Bahu trustees want to provide hostel accommodation and educational facili- 
ties. There will be two courses: one for children starting at the age of eleven and 
lasting for three years; and the other will be a six year course for boys aged sixteen or 
above. The courses will begin by providing a basic introduction to Islam; English, 
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Arabic and Urdu will also be taught. The students will go on to study the Qur'an, 
Hadith, fiqh and tafsir. While the children are still at school or college they will 
stay at the hostel and study their Islamic curriculum every evening. The intention is 
to provide qualified teachers who can assist the children in the subjects they are learn- 
ing at school. As a result it is hoped that the students will become knowledgeable in 
both the culture they live in and the religion they belong to. 
The appointment of Imam Pirzade at the Sultan Bahu Trust reflects the ambitions 
and the religious orientation of this institution. The imam himself is from a long line 
of Naqshbandi Sufis. His grandfather was a pir and a graduate of Bareilly dar al 
Ulum, and Imam Pirzade. had studied Islam with him. He told me how his father had 
taught him the use of specific ta'widhs to achieve various ends. He knew different 
ta`widhs to make people fall in love with each other, to prevent toothache, to cure the 
bite of a mad dog, and to protect people from the evil eye. These amulets contain 
verses from the Qur'an written in Arabic, Urdu, Persian, or even in local dialects and 
they are worn on the hand, the throat, or the shoulders. For example, Imam Pirzade 
explains how the ta'widhs can be used to cure rabies: 
If a mad dog bites someone, then write this ta'widh, and say to the person that he 
must bring some clay, and mix the ta'widh in the clay, and then rinse it on his body. 
The hair of the dog who has bitten the person, this hair will come out through the 
skin, and the effect of the madness will disappear. 49 
The imam told me that the pirs, or anyone to whom they have given permission, 
can give ta'widhs to people. He himself distributes them, and he informed me that the 
practice is widespread amongst Barelwi Muslims in Birmingham. On the other hand, 
Imam Pirzade is very educated compared to many imams in this country. He com- 
pleted his M. A. in English in Pakistan and taught as a lecturer there. His ambition 
was to open his own school. In order to achieve this he came to Britain to study the 
education system here. He has now enrolled for a part-time M. Phil. at the Institute 
for the Study of Islam and Christian/Muslim Relations in Selly Oak. He chose to 
study in Britain because he knew people here who were his pirbhai. He was per- 
suaded by them to remain here as the imam of the mosque on the grounds that he was 
educated, knew the English language, and could establish the school for Islamic 
studies. He admits that his background is Sufi but that his education has been 
secular. 50 
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The Religious Practices (adab) Unique to Sultan Bahu 
The religious practices in the Sultan Bahu Trust mosque are an example of the 
wide range of minor variations that can exist within the Barelwi tradition whilst 
remaining recognisably Barelwi. As mentioned before, the customary nath is sung 
after prayers. Here, however, the nath is preceded by a poem written by the original 
Sultan Bahu, and followed by the silsilah of Sultan Bahu chanted in Urdu. As in the 
other mosques that I visited, the tariqa is Naqshbandi, and the dhikr is a variation of 
the essential Naqshbandi dhikr. There are no qawwalis sung in the mosque, although 
they are not disapproved of if listened to or participated in by any Muslims else- 
where. The dhikr is held every alternate Friday and Sunday evening. It begins with 
the chant `La ilaha illallah', then the `la ilaha' is dropped and only `illallah' is 
repeated; then only `Allah' is chanted repeatedly; finally `Allah hu' is repeated with 
the breath. It is claimed that this variation of the Naqshbandi dhikr can be traced 
back to Abdul Qadir Gilani of Baghdad who is held in very high regard by all the 
Barelwis. I found a qualitative difference between the dhikr as practised by the Sultan 
Bahu followers on the one hand and that of Sufi Abdullah on the other. The Sultan 
Bahu dhikr is much shorter in duration and less intense. It is a part of a formal reli- 
gious ritual in which are included other set prayers and the repetition of the silsilah. 
The dhikr with Sufi Abdullah, however, is an intense shared emotional experience in 
the company of the shaikh, whose purpose is to induce ecstasy. Often the sajjada 
nashin of Sultan Bahu are present in the mosque during juma nainaz. At the comple- 
tion of the prayers the remaining congregation will line up to greet them and the 
Sultan Bahu elders. I felt that I was witnessing a time-honoured Barelwi tradition but 
it lacked the electricity which was always present when Sufi Abdullah was with his 
followers. 
The dhikr is also chanted at the urs. There are four urs celebrated at the Sultan 
Bahu Trust. There is the MiladeNabi and the annual urs of Sultan Bahu but the fol- 
lowers also celebrate the birthday of the Prophet every Monday night after isha 
prayers. This occasion consists of recitation from the Qur'an, a sermon in which 
stories from the Prophet's life are told, several naths, the dhikr, the silsilah, and 
prayers of intercession on behalf of the sick and needy. Finally, there is Giarvin 
Sharif, a monthly celebration of the teachings of the Sufis. The Giarvin Sharif is 
also held quarterly and annually in a more elaborate form. The women also observe 
these celebrations, gather for juma namaz, and study Islam. The Sultan Bahu Trust 
has a formally organised women's section which uses the prayer hall in the former 
factory. The young girls are taught by a qualified primary school teacher. Sometimes 
the imain teaches the women and the girls if there is something that cannot be ex- 
plained by the usual teachers. 
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The Sultan Bahu Trust has both informal and formal relations with the Dar ul 
Uloom Islamia, with Harounia Mosque in Alum Rock, and with several other Barehvi 
centres in Birmingham. At the Eid prayers on the completion of Ramadan I noticed 
the presence of several prominent members of other mosque organisations in the 
Sultan Bahu mosque. This interchange was made possible by having four sessions of 
Eid prayers between Sam and 10.30am. Imam Pirzade confirmed that, although the 
Barehvi mosques were independent, there was interchange between them, and that 
members of the different groups do visit each other on special occasions. He at- 
tributed much of this to the work of Sufi Abdullah and the Configuration of Sunni 
Mosques Midlands to which the Sultan Bahu Trust belongs, as do most Barehvi 
mosques in Birmingham. 
Conclusion 
The claim that the Barelwis form around 90% of the subcontinent Muslims in 
Britain has to be viewed critically. It is true that the great majority of Muslims do not 
belong to the various reform movements. Most of the first-generation migrants were 
uneducated villagers, and the religion in which they practice and believe has been 
passed on to them from generation to generation. There has been little reason to 
analyse or challenge that which they have received. They have attempted to reproduce 
their faith in Britain, but not without criticism from their children. Both the Barelwi 
ulema and the Sufis who are beginning to step up their missionary activities amongst 
the Muslims in Britain claim that this majority are their supporters. In fact, this pop- 
ulation of Muslims is the target of both the activists of the reform groups and the con- 
sciously aware Barelivis led by the inspiration of Sufi pirs. The Barelwi leaders ac- 
knowledge that the Deobandis began to organise themselves in Britain far earlier than 
they did: 
In 1973 there were only two pirs resident in this country. Pir Marouf of Bradford and 
Sufi Abdullah Khan in Birmingham. These were the only two personalities in the 
whole of the country who were actually resident. Other used to come in those days, 
make a visit and go back. They still come. Obviously the Deobandis had been here a 
long time before. And they settled. They had their mosques. 51 
The conflicts that took place over the control of mosques throughout the 1970s 
and '80s point to an attempt by the Barehvi leaders to organise their followers into a 
self-conscious Barelwi movement in Britain which would offset the start which the 
Deobandis and the other reform groups had over them. Despite the work of Ahmed 
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Riza Khan, the Barelwis were, however, still not a unified religious movement. There 
was remarkable disparity and diversity amongst them based on place of origin, lan- 
guage, degree of organisation, religious practice, education, and involvement or non- 
involvement in varous Sufi tariqas. Pir Noor ul-Aqtab Siddiqi states that the Barelwi 
mosques are `connected with people, personalities' rather than organisations. 52 This 
has worked against any attempt to create unity of purpose amongst the Barelwis. The 
recent change in pattern of mosque conflict from Barelwi versus Deobandi to Barelwi 
versus Barehvi indicates that important changes could be taking place amongst them- 
selves. The conflict with the Deobandis and other reform groups helped to define a 
common Barelwi identity. The in-fighting amongst Barelwi groups suggests a lead- 
ership struggle as various factions attempt to make themselves more influential. I 
would suggest that this is an aspect of the changes that are taking place amongst the 
Barelwis. I would argue that the conflict is an indication of a shift towards greater 
Barelwi awareness of common identity and a need to organise themselves around this 
identity despite the prevalence of disparity. The conflicts are a power struggle 
amongst Barelwi personalities out of which the most dominant could emerge vic- 
torious as leaders of the community. This search for unity and common identity is 
further demonstrated by organisations like the Configuration of Sunni Mosques Mid- 
lands which respect the autonomy of each individual mosque but promote the aware- 
ness of the benefits of working together. 
None of the mosques that I visited conformed to the traditional scenario of a 
Barelwi mosque that is comprised of a congregation which originates from a small 
group of villages somewhere in the subcontinent and an imam imported from the 
same region. This picture seems to be rapidly changing. There are obviously still 
mosques of this type to be found throughout Britain, but the demands of the younger 
generation that was born and educated here are making themselves felt. The mosque 
committees are often led by men like Yousef Kaumar who runs the Asian Advisory 
Centre in Birmingham, and Muhammad Saleem Akhtar, who is a successful account- 
ant. These men are in touch with wider British society and the problems of young 
British Muslims. Although staunch Barelwis and Sufis, they are aware of the need for 
a wider unity which must include all Muslims in Britain if Islam is to prosper here. 
These successful and educated community leaders are appointing imams whose view- 
point is wider than the rural imam imported from the subcontinent. It is essential that 
their viewpoint includes the younger generation of both sexes. Certainly, one spur of 
this new emphasis on young people is the success of some of the reform groups in 
this area. Noor ul-Aqtab Siddiqi confirms this: 
Slowly there is a movement growing up that we have to do something about our 
younger generation. The reason why at this particular moment in time even the 
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Barelwis have to accept that they (the reform groups) are working harder is because 
of the fact that they have more resources. 
53 
As a result of this concern for the younger generation, the more organised Barelwi 
groups have begun to establish dar al Ulums. In 1982 Pir Abdul Wahhab Siddiqi set 
up the Islamic Study Centre in Coventry to help create a British Barehvi ulema. At 
the moment the college has facilities for fifty pupils, but the International Muslim 
Organisation founded by the pir is buying a school from Coventry City Council 
which can take three hundred students. The pir's long-term ambition was that the 
school will grow to become Britain's first Islamic university. Noor ul-Aqtab Siddiqi 
claims that his father' school was the first Barehvi dar al Ulum in Britain. 54 and that 
it was inspired by his father's ideas concerning the future of Islam in this country. 
He said that we need those ulema who are going to be successful in western society. 
Those ulema who are familiar with western ideas, western concepts, and have gone 
through the western system of education, and also they have that ability, they have 
the knowledge of the din, the knowledge of Islam. 55 
Pir Abdul Wahhab Siddiqi also believed that the next generation of imams has to 
be chosen from amongst the educated in the community. He believed they should also 
be `doctors, lawyers, and engineers'. He felt that the most important aspect of the 
imam's work is preaching rather than leading the prayers. 56 There are now two dar al 
Ulums in Bradford belonging, respectively, to Pir Marouf and Habib Rahman Shah. 
In Birmingham, there are the dar al Ulums of Sufi Abdullah and the Sultan Bahu 
Trust. So far, all these establishments are very new. Despite the awareness of the 
needs of young people and of women that is developing amongst the foremost 
Barelwi leaders, I saw little happening in practice. The dar al Ulums may now be es- 
tablished in Britain but so far they have offered little beyond the traditional Islamic 
education as prevalent in the subcontinent. 
One problem is that the teachers know only the system of education which they 
themselves were taught when they were students in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. 
The other problem is the innate conservatism of most of the first-generation migrants. 
They are suspicious of any kind of innovation in terms of religion which they in- 
herited from their ancestors. In my visits to Barelwi mosques I did not find one that 
was using English either in the mosque or in the mosque schools. The prevalent feel- 
ing amongst the members of the mosque congregation was that these changes would 
take place organically as the older generation died. The mosques which are organised 
around the Sufi tariqas in Birmingham were at least providing separate prayer facili- 
ties for women but this was not happening in other Barelwi mosques. 
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There is no doubt that the arrival of resident Sufi pirs is inspiring the Barelwis in 
Britain. The teachings of the Sufis pervade Barelwi thought and practice. The lives of 
the saints are a focus for the piety and devotion of the majority of ordinary sub- 
continent Muslims. The arrival of living charismatic pirs based on British soil does 
much to redirect the focus of Barelwis away from their place of origin in the sub- 
continent to the community here. The respect which the Barelwis have given to the 
Sufis has focussed the attention of Barelwi worship upon the shrines that have grown 
up around the tombs of the saints. These shrines cannot be imported to Britain, but 
living Sufis can. Sufi Abdullah, for example, through his activities and obvious piety, 
has done much to extend the focus of his followers in Britain from Ghamkol Sharif in 
Pakistan to an inner city block in Birmingham. Pnina Werbner asserts that the 
`spirituality of a Sufi pir is embodied in the space that he has sacralised. His divine 
blessing purifies his spatial dominion and endows it with sanctity'. 57 The presence of 
living pirs resident in Britain is sacralising buildings, parks, city blocks, and proces- 
sion routes. Parts of inner city Britain are becoming as sacred as shrines in the sub- 
continent. It is tempting to speculate that the death of pirs that have lived their lives 
in Britain, as in the case of Pir Abdul Wahhab Siddiqi who has been buried in 
Coventry, could produce future shrine locations here in this country. 
Pnina Werbner also points out that there is a constant historical process of `wax- 
ing' and `waning' amongst the local cults within the broad encompassing tariqa. She 
suggests that new cults appear, `energised through the emergence of a charismatic 
saint', which revitalises the tariga. 58 She argues that the shrines of departed saints 
cannot function in this way. 
Although shrines of illustrious saints, once established, remain points of personal pil- 
grimage and seasonal ritual celebrations, such shrines no longer extend as organisa- 
tions far beyond a relatively localised area, and cannot continue to control, as the 
cult founder did, a series of sub-centres, and sub-sub-centres over a vast region. 59 
The situation in Birmingham indicates the complexity of the full picture of the 
relationship between charismatic living pirs on the one hand, and on the other, de- 
scendents of past Sufi saints, the sajjada nashin, who usually maintain and lead the 
activities of a cult based upon a shrine. The sa j jada nashin have been visiting Britain 
for some time; ever since, in fact, they became aware that followers of their localised 
cults had migrated here. They have created centres in Britain that are based on the 
original cult but the needs of the community, however, are different here than in the 
country of origin. In the subcontinent the sajjada nashin find themselves acting prin- 
cipally as custodians of the shrine but here they are involved in the propagation of 
Islam. Due to the need to ensure the survival of Islam on foreign territory, these Sufi 
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cults have spread to form sub-branches in other British cities. The Sultan Bahu Trust 
is an example of this kind of organisation. What is most interesting, however, is the 
relationship between the Sufi groups organised around the efforts of the sajjada 
nashin and the groups growing up under the leadership of living charismatic pirs. 
If Pnina Werbner is correct, the former should be declining or static whilst the lat- 
ter flourish. I do not disagree with Pnina Werbner that this is the usual cyclical pat- 
tern of development amongst Sufis cults in the subcontinent or elsewhere in the Mus- 
lim world. What appears to be happening in Birmingham, however, is that the 
presence of charismatic pirs like Sufi Abdullah, together with the activity which their 
presence inspires, is reawakening the old cults led by the sajjada nashin. This is 
given impulse by the need of Muslims to protect their religion in an alien environ- 
ment. Groups like the Sultan Bahu Trust are old in the subcontinent but new in 
Britain. It is difficult for them to lie dormant when half-a-mile down the road so 
much inspired activity is taking place. This is especially so when it is the followers of 
Sufi Abdullah who are taking the lead in promoting Barelwi unity and who have per- 
suaded them to join the Configuration of Sunni Mosques Midlands. The timing of 
the increase in the activities of the Sufi groups would suggest that they have been ac- 
celerated by the publishing of The Satanic Verses by Salman Rushdie. As previously 
noted the Bareiwis were particularly upset by the novel because of their great venera- 
tion for the Prophet. They were foremost in public expressions of anger but lacked 
the leadership to organise. This role of organising the Muslims' reaction fell to the 
better educated and structured reform groups. The Barelwi masses, however, experi- 
enced for the first time the results of organised protest and the power of unity. It is 
not surprising then that the growth of the groups led by the pirs has occurred since 
the late-1980s even though the pirs themselves have been here longer. The diverse na- 
ture of the tradition is still the dominant feature amongst Barelwis in Britain as it is in 
the subcontinent. There are indications, however, that a stronger sense of unity and 
identity is growing amongst them as they tackle the problem of being part of a Mus- 
lim minority in Britain. The roles of Sufism and, above all, of charismatic pirs will 
be crucial in this process. 
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Chapter VII 
THE RISE OF THE ISLAMIC REFORM MOVEMENTS IN INDIA AND 
THEIR ROLE FOR MUSLIMS IN BRITAIN 
Introduction 
The conditions which paved the way for the essential message of the reformers 
can be traced right back to the introduction of Islam into India. Chapter V has estab- 
lished that right from the beginning there were various compromises with Hinduism 
particularly amongst the Sufis. This example of tolerance towards the Hindus became 
the normal policy of the state although the more orthodox ulema were often opposed 
to this. I This pragmatic approach made it easier for a minority to rule, but it also fa- 
cilitated the gradual encroachment of Hindu ideas and customs. Several of India's 
Muslim rulers and courtiers, together with many noblemen, married Hindus. Titus 
suggests that the influence of these wives would sometimes affect their husbands' 
views towards Hindus and their religion, to say nothing of the influence of the 
mothers on children. 2 
Besides the influence of their high-caste Hindu wives on the Muslim ruling 
class, there was also the fact that the greater part of the Muslim population was con- 
verted en masse from Hindu low castes and outcaste groups. Regardless of whether 
the conversion had come about as a product of conquest or to improve status by join- 
ing the faith of the new rulers, or, even by religious persuasion, complete Islamicisa- 
tion of the converts had not been accomplished thoroughly. Often, hastily converted 
people were left behind by the conquering forces, and for many of these there would 
have been little follow-up when it took place. Very often the original conversion 
would have been at the hands of 
itinerant Sufis following in the footsteps of the mili- 
tary forces. Besides the formative 
influence of the Sufis and the impact of Hindu 
ideas and customs, there were also powerful 
Shia elements which led to the creation 
of many diverse religious movements which were eclectic and syncretistic in their 
message. 3 
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The Origins of the Reform Movement: Akbar and Sirhindi 
The syncretistic tendency was to reach its zenith during the reign of the Mughal 
emperor Akbar (1556-1605). 4 Akbar's abandonment of Shar'iah law and the estab- 
lishment of his new religion which placed him above the law was anathema in Islam, 
and appalled the orthodox. 5 Akbar came to be viewed as an apostate by the orthodox 
ulema, as a symbol of the corruption and decline of Islam and the pollution created 
through its contact with Hinduism. This situation brought to a head the idea that 
Islam was in danger of being engulfed in an all-embracing sea of Hinduism. Shaikh 
Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1625) of the Naqshbandi Sufi order6 was to lead the reaction 
against Akbar and the cultural impurities that he perceived to be entering Islam. Sir- 
hindi's ideas of reform became the basis of the later reform movements, which really 
began with Shah Wali-allah and his descendants (see Appendix E). Sirhindi was 
determined to unite the ummah under the rule of the shari'ah, 7 to destroy the innova- 
tions (bida) which he saw creeping into Islamic belief and practice, and to persuade 
Muslims to shun religious contact with the Hindu population. 8 This attempt by 
orthodox Islam to reassert itself became the seed of that Muslim separatism which 
continued to develop, culminating in the establishment of the separate Muslim state of 
Pakistan in 1947. 
Despite his own Sufi affiliation, Sirhindi asserted the prominence of the shari'ah 
over the tariqa, insisting that Suf is themselves should be exemplary in their obedience 
to the law. 9 Simple conformity to the shari'ah would base the Muslims' faith firmly 
on revelation rather than on the mystic's intuitional awareness of unity. The heart of 
Sirhindi's attack on the heterodox forms of Sufism was its openness to pantheistic and 
monistic ideas, which in turn led to alliances with Hinduism. He considered that 
education in theology and law should take precedence over Sufi teaching, and that the 
Prophet and his companions were superior to all the saints of Sufism. A core idea in 
Sirhindi's plan for revival, central to all the later reform movements, was the return 
of Muslims to perceived standards of the Islam of the Prophet and the Rashidun (the 
first four rightly guided caliphs). Sirhindi's voice of protest against syncretistic 
movements and liberal trends was an attempt to protect both Sufism and the Muslim 
masses from the ideas and morals of Hinduism's pantheistic views. Essentially, Sir- 
hindi saw Hindus as infidels not entitled to their dhimmi status; the revival of Islam 
thus meant the reimposition of shari'ah and the removal of cultural accretions and in- 
novations arising out of Sufism, Shi'a and, in particular, Hinduism. 10 True Islam 
must rest on the Qur'an and the Sunna of the Prophet. The correct Sunna was estab- 
lished in approved Hadith. Sirhindi's deep awareness of the need for reform, com- 
bined with his intense suspicion of innovation and his distrust of any contact with the 
non-Muslim world, made him the pioneer of Muslim isolationism. Consequently, his 
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restoration of orthodoxy led inevitably to a widening gulf between the Hindu and 
Muslim communities. 
Shah Wali-allah (1702-1763) 
Shah Wali-allah, often described as the greatest Islamic scholar India ever pro- 
duced, tt picked up the major strands of Sirhindi's ideas and developed them into a 
coherent ideology that was to form the basis of Islamic revival in the subcontinent 
right through to the present day. Very few Muslim thinkers from the region have not 
been influenced by him. Appendix C indicates graphically the extent of his influence 
on modern Islamic history in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. He himself lived in an 
age that saw the rapid decline of Mughal power, but the Battle of Plassey, which 
placed the East India Company in effective control of Bengal, occurred four years 
after his death. It was left to his sons and successors to develop his ideas into a 
coherent movement dealing with the transfer of power of Islamic rule to the British. 
The decay, however, had begun to set in long before the East India Company estab- 
lished its dominion over Bengal; it had begun with the death of Aurangzeb in 1707. 
Since his demise there had been a decline which led to the disintegration of Muslim 
political power and culture. 12 Feudal lords were no longer prepared to act as vassals, 
and now established their own kingdoms. 13 There were rebellions by Marathas, 
Sikhs and Rajputs, and, in 1739, Nadir Shah of Persia sacked Delhi. 14 There was no 
longer any strong central government or leadership. 
India had never been a theocracy, but matters of religion had always been seen as 
a function of the Muslim state. The need to maintain Muslim rule in India was very 
rarely disassociated from the necessity to establish the religion of Islam. During the 
era of Muslim domination the unity of the faithful was expected to be maintained by 
the ruler, who was seen as the defender of the faith and the custodian of the law. 15 
A truly Islamic temporal order was that in which the shari`ah as understood by the 
consensus of scholars was enforced by a righteous Muslim ruler. The anarchy and 
degeneration of the eighteenth century, and the loss of Mughal territory to the Hindu 
Marathas and the Sikhs, helped to create a desire for the renewal or purification of 
Islam. The Qur'an states that God has confided the world to His righteous servants; 16 
for many Muslim thinkers, the decline in temporal power was an indication that they 
were no longer to be counted amongst the righteous. 
As so often in Islam's history, the pattern of decline in temporal power was ac- 
companied by a religious revival. Ikram states, `that the political disintegration of the 
eighteenth century in the subcontinent was not partnered by religious collapse is 
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largely due to the work and inspiration of Shah Wali-allah'. 17 Through his inspira- 
tion, the religious leadership came to believe that political leaders could no longer 
hold onto the empire without the motivating force of religion. In fact, Shah Wali- 
allah throughout his life never ceased from turning to various Muslim potentates in an 
attempt to restore the glory of the Muslim way of life. None of these rulers, 
however, responded to his call. It. was difficult for him to conceive of any solution 
other than the discovery of an enlightened ruler who was strong enough to re-establish 
the rule of the shari'ah. 18 This failure, however, did not stop him from communicat- 
ing his message of renewal. 
Like Sirhindi before him, Shah Wali-allah reiterated that the lack of moral 
standards which led to the decline of Muslim fortunes was due to contact with Hindus 
and badly converted Muslims. 19 He accused the Muslims of India of becoming In- 
dians rather than identifying with the larger worldwide ummah. 20 He was especially 
afraid that Islam, the only religion that had not been corrupted by innovation, was it- 
self in danger of losing its pristine and final revelation. 21 This he felt to be coming 
about as a result of Hindu contacts that encouraged the admittance into Islam of non- 
Islamic practices. He insisted that Indian Muslims should see themselves as an in- 
tegral part of the larger Muslim world. 22 He saw the intolerable political situation as 
proof that Indian Muslims had failed to fulfil the requirements of the shari'ah. It was 
incomprehensible to him that Islam itself could be at fault. Recommitment was re- 
quired, and no true Muslim should accept the contemporary decline. He was con- 
vinced that a regenerated Islam could again be strong enough to counteract the effects 
of internal decay and external domination. 
Although Shah Wali-allah's call for revival had a strong Sufi influence, 23 he at- 
tacked many Sufi practices of his time as corrupt and as aberrations of true Islam. He 
rejected the local popular style of Islam in favour of scripturalist emphasis on the 
original practice of the faith. He criticised both the attribution of divine powers to 
saints and the habit of worship at their tombs. It is, however, possible to find various 
aspects of Sufism, for example, the pir/murid relationship, dhikr, and silent medita- 
tion being practised in the nineteenth century reform groups like Deoband. Essential 
Islam was contained in the revelation to the Prophet, and the exemplary inspiration 
was the life of Muhammad himself. Shah Wali-allah's belief in revelation made it 
impossible for him to question the shari`ah. 24 This final perfection of the shari'ah, 
which he was to champion with great energy, enabled him and succeeding generations 
to rally around the banner of a system that could not be improved upon and therefore 
should not be changed. The renewal of the reformers was a return to what they con- 
sidered to be the pure Islam of the founder. Shah Wali-allah's emphasis on the ex- 
emplary role of the Prophet led him to stress the importance of a renewed study of 
Hadith. 25 He urged Muslim scholars to study the Qur'an and the Hadith directly, ra- 
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ther than studying the interpretations made by the four schools of law. 
If the Muslims could not be united by being citizens in Dar al-Islam, Shah Wali- 
allah believed that there must be an integrated Muslim brotherhood which could reach 
out to bring everyone into a united religious social grouping: a kind of umnah within 
the ummah. In his attempt to create unity out of discord, Shah Wali-allah presented a 
comprehensive statement of Islamic belief and practice in which all Sunni scholars 
could find guidance and inspiration. Ikram suggests that Shah Wali-allah's translation 
of the Qur'an into Persian connected him with a broad-based movement to carry the 
knowledge of the Qur'an to `the average literate Indian Muslim'. 26 Although he was 
to have little effect in his own lifetime, his habit of training students in the different 
branches of Islamic knowledge and entrusting them with the teachings of others, thus 
allowing him to be free to write, was to achieve great success as the model for the 
reform movement developed by his successors. Ikram argues that `by working out a 
system of thought upon which most extremes of view could agree, he helped to 
supply a religious base for later national cohesion'. 27 He was not, however, able to 
reconcile the basic divisions in Indian Islam, despite the fact that all the various 
movements that emerged, including the Barelwis, acknowledged him as a scholar, 
reformer and mystic. 
The Issuing of H'atwas 
In 1803 Lord Lane occupied Delhi. 28 Around the same period Ranjit Singh was 
consolidating Sikh power in the Punjab, and Western India was experiencing an up- 
surge of Hindu revivalism inspired by the success of the Marathas. By the opening of 
the nineteenth century, real power over the heartlands of the old Mughal empire had 
passed into non-Muslim hands. Although a Mughal remained as titular king in Delhi 
until after the uprising in 1857, from now on the Muslims would have to come to 
terms not only with being a minority in Hindu India but also with being relatively 
powerless under British rule. The first decades of British rule were to worry pious 
Muslims. No longer able to control a whole range of issues relating to the organisa- 
tion of the law, there was a proliferation of the direct issuing of fatwas from the 
ulema to believers. 29 Common penal laws and separate judicial courts meant that 
they were mainly concerned with the small detailed concerns of everyday life, and al- 
though they had no coercive power, they were essential to Muslims searching for a 
way to preserve a true expression of their faith under foreign domination. 
30 The is- 
suing of fatwas indicated a move towards creating self-contained communities in 
matters of religion and everyday behaviour. 31 The thousands of fatwas issued by 
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various ulema were to help maintain the boundaries of the various movements that ap- 
peared throughout the nineteenth century. Fatwas were issued to condemn the beliefs 
and practices of other groups and to give authority to one's own. The fatwas func- 
tioned to form group identity and they also allowed for some control over keeping 
Muslim life within the bounds of the shari'ah when there was no Muslim state to en- 
force the law. The detailed restrictions on daily activity also functioned as a bound- 
ary which isolated those Muslims who observed these practices from both Hindu and 
British India. Furthermore the issuing of fatwas confirmed that India was no longer 
dar al-Islam; it was now dar al-Harb. The fatwas functioned as a recognition that 
organisation of the state was no longer in Muslim hands. 
Many of the fatwas were issued by the descendants of Shah Wali-allah. The 
nineteenth century saw his ideas organised into energetic socio-political religious 
movements. Mujeeb states that Shah Wali-allah's sons, Shah Abdul Aziz (1746- 
1824), Shah Rafi'uddin (1748-1817) and Shah Abdul Qadir (1753-1827), `turned to 
the study of the Qur'an, the popularisation of religious knowledge, and the creation of 
a new aspiration to study, to understand and live by the shari'ah'. 32 As part of their 
aim of popularising the correct interpretation and practice of Islam, two of the 
brothers made translations of the Qur'an into Urdu, 33 which was rapidly taking over 
from Persian as the language of educated Indian Muslims. 34 The reformers were to 
encourage the use of Urdu as the basis of communication amongst the religious elite. 
In time Urdu was to become one of the most important symbols of Muslim identity in 
India. Shah Abdul Aziz took over from his father as spiritual leader in Delhi, and be- 
came the central figure in an important circle of reformist teaching. 35 He was a 
prolific issuer of fatwas in an attempt to ensure thereby that instruction in a shari'ah 
should spread beyond his circle of followers and students. 36 In continuation of his 
father's message, many of his fatwas were explicit commands to follow the Sunna of 
the Prophet by continuous reference to Hadith. 37 When the British entered Delhi, 
Shah Abdul Aziz issued his famous fatwa which declared India to be outside Dar-al 
Islam and inside the world of Dar al-Harb. 38 The declaration that India was Dar al- 
Harb opened up the possibility of jihad as an activist alternative to the more scholarly 
issuing of fatwas. 39 
Sayyid Ahmad of Rae Bareilly 
The charismatic Sayyid Ahmad of Rae Bareilly (1782-1831) established a small 
kingdom in the North-West Frontier from which he waged jihad against the Sikhs of 
the Punjab. 40 He defeated the Sikhs at Akora Khattak in November 1826, and began 
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to establish the rule of shari`ah in the area he had carved out for' himself and his fol- 
lowers. Despite the opposition of local tribes to his reforms, he had established him- 
self in Peshawar by 1830. In 1831 he was trapped at Balakot by the Sikhs, and he 
and six hundred of his mujahiddin were killed. 41 
Sayyid Ahmad was closely connected to the family of Shah Wali-allah. As- a 
young man (1806-1811) he had studied with Abdul Qadir in Delhi. Abdul Aziz's 
son-in-law Abdul Hayy (d. 1828) and Shah Wali-allah's grandson Muhammad Ishmail 
(1781-1831) were both to become followers of Sayyid Ahmad after he returned to 
Delhi in 1818. Both took an oath of allegiance to him as their Shaikh. 42 They as- 
sisted him in writing his two influential works, the Siratu'l - Mustagim (The Straight 
Path) and the Taqwiyattu'l - Imam (The Strengthening of the Faith), in which he 
stressed the centrality of tawhid and condemned all practices and beliefs that in any 
way compromised the essential teachings of Islam. 43 Metcalf suggests that his com- 
mitment to the reform of custom and practice was even stronger than- that of his 
teachers from the family of Shah Wali-allah. They had interpreted the renewal and 
purification of Islam in a more intellectual form. 44 Despite Shah Wali-allah's in- 
sistence that his successors forsake cultural accretions, some refused to abandon the 
practices involved. Even Shah Abdul Aziz distributed food after reading the faiihah 
at his father's grave. The younger members of the family quietly left when such 
practices were carried out. 45 Sayyid Ahmad's more radical reformist approach was 
consequently more attractive to the younger generation of reformers. 
In'the years prior to his jihad, Sayyid Ahmad established the method of spreading 
the reform message that was to last throughout the nineteenth century, long after his 
military operations had failed. Particularly in the period after returning from his 
Hajj, he began to orchestrate his followers into the type of organisation that was to 
become the model for the future jamaats (a well-knit group of workers, preachers 
and reformers). He established a network of centres through word-of-mouth preach- 
ing in villages and the distribution of tracts. Leaders of prayer were appointed to 
mosques to teach the basic beliefs of reform Islam, subscriptions were collected, and 
Islamic courts were set up to administer the shari'ah amongst Muslims. The fol- 
lowers of Sayyid Ahmad, like those of the later nineteenth century reform move- 
ments, felt themselves to be a part of a special community with access to the true 
teachings of the faith. They had a sense of being unique, of exclusiveness. Metcalf 
suggests that this gave meaning to people whose lives appeared to be beyond their 
own control. 46 Sayyid Ahmad used the Delhi nucleus of reformers centred on the de- 
scendants of Shah Wali-allah to give him contacts with a network of ulema and stu- 
dents from the most important religious families of the Doab. 47 Also, inspired by the 
methods of the Christian missionaries, the reformers made considerable use of the 
printing press, publishing both tracts and books in Urdu. Many of the reformers un- 
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dertook extensive preaching tours, and Sayyid Ahmad's tours were especially 
renowned. 48 
Sayyid Ahmad's death finished the possibility of re-establishing Islam through the 
means of jihad, although some of his followers regrouped in Sittana where they kept 
alive the idea of jihad until the 1860's, when the British backlash to the 1857 uprising 
finally destroyed their hopes. 49 Sayyid Ahmad, however, left behind him two impor- 
tant ideals: the possibility of an Islamic society made actual, and a means of revitalis- 
ing Islam through reform-movement jamaats. After his death the reformers focussed 
their attention an the latter. 
Strategies towards the British 
In 1824, Shah Abdul Aziz died and was succeeded by his grandsons Muhammad 
Ishaq (1778-1846) and Yaqub. Although Abdul Aziz and the Bengali reformer 
Shari'atullah (1781-1840) established the trend of the reform movement to co-operate 
with the British, maintaining the ideal of renewal rather than jihad, the ulema hated 
not only the British but everything to do with British culture - the British way of life, 
British dress and British-style education. In all these areas, the reformers encouraged 
Muslims to assert their own unique identity. Shah Abdul Aziz insisted that it was im- 
proper for Muslims to learn English in order to secure jobs in the administration or to 
promote better relations with the British. 50 Mujeeb states that several sensational 
murders were committed by Muslim servants who became aware that is was sinful to 
serve British masters. 51 Before 1857 Indian Muslims were far more concerned with 
purifying their own religion than imitating a culture which in their eyes was barely 
worth the name. After 1857, that culture would have to be taken seriously, not for its 
own worth but in view of its material success. In their efforts to keep Muslim society 
distinct from the British invaders and the taint of Christianity, the reformers began to 
construct a wall of isolation that was cemented together by religion. 
Although both Abdul Aziz's grandsons emigrated to Mecca in 1841, they had con- 
tinued the work of spreading Shah Wali-allah's vision of reform. They left behind 
them a committed nucleus of students52 who in turn were dramatically to influence 
the direction of Islam in the subcontinent (see Appendix E). Their call to reform, re- 
jecting mediaeval Indian Islam in favour of classical Islam, attempted to demonstrate 
that such a message had the possibility of uniting Indian Muslims who were otherwise 
divided by class, education, language and regional culture, 
As the nineteenth century progressed, the British consolidated their power in 
India. The Muslims were far from being in one mind in regard to British rule. The 
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activist option of jihad was to decline in importance as the hold of the British 
tightened. After 1857, very few Muslims believed that the British could be removed 
by force. The ideal of a separate Muslim state governed by shari'ah and led by a 
righteous Muslim leader, however, lived on. Some came to accept that as the British 
did not interfere with the practice of Islam, it followed that India was still Dar al- 
Islam. The British government was an established, legitimate regime, and therefore it 
would be breaking the law to rebel or create disaffection against it. 53. Increasingly, 
the reformers understood the necessity of using their zeal and enthusiasm to establish 
their vision of an Islam that could be capable of existing in the absence of an Islamic 
state. There is no doubt that they succeeded in this, but the price paid was an 
isolationism which they justified by perceiving the culture of the British as jahiliyya, 
to be avoided. The other problem was that the jamaats that had been formed by vari- 
ous reformers suffered from the members' sense of exclusiveness. Islam was rescued 
in a time of extreme crisis and then renewed, but the reformers did not succeed in 
uniting Indian Muslims, as can be seen by the fact that the various movements began 
to develop sectarian tendencies. This was especially pronounced in the conflict be- 
tween Deobandis and Barelwis, but even the reform movement itself experienced 
problems between the various jamaats; a good example of this is the conflict between 
Deoband and the Ahl-i Hadith. 
It is debatable whether the Indian Muslims could ever have been defined as a sepa- 
rate nation, even before losing power to the British. There was no common race, 
little common history, and a proliferation of conflicting interests. Some Indian Mus- 
lims were descended from converts, others from Arabs, Turks, Persians, Afghans and 
Central Asians. Some spoke Urdu while others communicated in a wide variety of 
dialects. Some had been in India for as long as a thousand years, others had been 
converted for no more than a hundred. Many of these people had more in common 
with the local Hindu population than with their fellow-Muslims. Being Muslim did 
not make them a nation, but being Muslim under British rule did provide them with a 
common experience upon which to draw. They all had to deal with the problems 
created by the increasingly secular culture of the imperial power, which was itself 
undergoing a huge transformation through the processes of modernisation and indus- 
trialisation. The reformers' main strategy was to devote their energies to the Muslim 
community, preaching a renewal of Islam which they felt could resolve the historical 
diversity of Indian Muslims and bring about a unified ummah. 
Mediaeval Islam, had not thought of itself as a nation. It was at best held together 
by a few common rituals and by the aspirations of its scholars. The nineteenth 
century reformers helped to create a unique national identity for Indian Muslims 
based on faith. 54 They came to hold a special position that was defined by 
monotheism, a unique revelation, and a remembrance of the days when they had 
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reigned supreme in India. By the time of Partition in 1947, a very large number of 
Muslims in British India felt themselves to be part of a special community. All the 
reform movements that were formed in the previous hundred years contributed to the 
substantial religious self-consciousness of the period, demonstrating and encouraging 
as they did the growing awareness that the Muslims of British India were all linked 
together by the practice of their faith. Despite the internecine squabbles that resulted 
from the conflicts between the various reform movements, the very existence of these 
different movements led to substantial Muslim homogeneity. It was crucial for Mus- 
lims to define themselves as just Muslims; those united in conflict shared a powerful 
sense of belonging. The overall result was a proliferation of mosques in cities and 
villages alike; new schools everywhere; literacy and elementary religious knowledge 
for girls; printing and publishing houses for religious books and tracts; and ever- 
increasing numbers of pilgrims doing the Hajj. Religion became a badge of pride, 
and the reformers who were committed to the ideal of return to classical Islam be- 
lieved themselves to be in the exalted company of the great Muslims of the past. The 
reformers felt great strength in the fact that they were engaged in a renewal of the 
Prophet's teachings. There was a sense of continuity with the past together with a 
sense of community in the present, plus an enhanced awareness of meaning and direc- 
tion in the life of the individual. 
The Relevance of the Reformers in Britain 
It is not really surprising to find that the same organisations are preaching the 
same message in British cities in the second half of the twentieth century. This is be- 
cause the Muslim presence in Britain continues the colonial relationship between the 
two cultures. The British Muslims still find themselves a relatively powerless minor- 
ity in the midst of a non-Muslim majority. In their homeland, the indigenous British 
occupy twin roles: they are both the rulers and the majority faith. Muslims living in 
Britain experience themselves as a community under threat, socially underprivileged 
and isolated from their home culture. Once again it is appropriate for them to rally 
around Shah Wali-allah's old familiar cry of `Islam in danger! ', S5 and just as it once 
attempted to unite all the disparate Muslim strands in India, so now the reform mes- 
sage can hope to bring together the many ethnic divisions amongst the Muslims in 
Britain. The reform message can serve to unite a Muslim minority community from 
the subcontinent to a wider world-wide movement of Islamic revival. 
The reform movements offer guidance in changed circumstances. Although they 
have not yet taken to issuing fatwas on the scale of their Indian forbears, they are ex- 
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cellent vehicles for the dissemination of detailed information on religious matters, 
especially those applying to everyday life. In the absence of an Islamic state, it is 
once more essential that a Muslim minority seeks methods to preserve an authentic re- 
ligious expression and to maintain its identity. The nineteenth century movements 
have stockpiled two hundred years of experience in performance of this task. 
Mattison Mines notes that the reformist tradition provides a common cultural 
identity amongst Muslims. In particular, Muslims uprooted from their local societies 
have been influenced by reform beliefs and values. In his study56 he observes the be- 
haviour of a group of Muslims who travel to the city to find employment. He 
demonstrates the importance to them of identification with the `high tradition' of 
Islam for securing a place in their new community. In the city they explicitly 
identified themselves as Muslims in dress, religious activity and patterns of associa- 
tion, something which they had not done in their villages. Adherence to the `classical 
tradition' of Islam can also be a mark of being `Ashraf, well-born Muslims claiming 
Arab or foreign ancestry. 57 Those who wish to improve their status but are unable to 
change their economic position can acquire signs of Ashraf behaviour such as refined 
language or a degree of religious learning. In some way, the knowledge gleaned 
from reform Islam can still bestow a sense of cultural worth. This process of social 
mobility provides a means of obtaining status and respect within the migrant com- 
munity that is independent of the receiving community's attitude, which may be 
hostile or disinterested. 
The Indian reformers of the nineteenth century had already established the 
psychological ploy of improving their self-esteem by defining their morality and 
beliefs favourably against those of outsiders. They had given this ploy the sanctity of 
legitimacy. British culture in India had already been labelled as sinful, corrupt, 
materialistic and godless. The followers of the reform movements operating in 
Britain can draw upon this already developed theme, and label the receiving culture as 
jahiliyya. In this way, they can feel themselves linked with the difficulties experi- 
enced by the Prophet himself in Mecca. Muhammad was the first to use the term 
`jahiliyya'; he used it to describe the condition of the materialistic Meccan merchants. 
The migration to Britain can be seen in terms of `Hijrah', a journey which furthers 
the cause of Islam as did the original flight of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina. 
This provides a religious sanction to the situation of being an embattled minority. By 
living an exemplary Islamic life it may be possible to return a godless society to the 
true path. It also justifies the community in turning inwards upon itself, even though 
the receiving community would allow it little opportunity to do otherwise should it 
wish to do so. 
The rivalry for power and leadership amongst the various reform factions provides 
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an opportunity for the ambitious in the community to consolidate their position and 
gain prestige as defenders of the faith. Sandra Freitag suggests that this type of con- 
flict is actually positive in that it satisfies the needs of those involved. It endows 
them with a sense of uniqueness, of being misunderstood, of being wronged by 
society, but it also allows them to relish the fact that they are morally superior. 58 
Where self-esteem is shaken by change in general, and by the racism inherent in both 
direct and economic colonialism in particular, sectarian membership and its rivalries 
can provide a sense of value. 
Economically, the reform movements have already learned the lesson of being 
self-supporting. Experienced in being without the support of a state apparatus, they 
succeeded in raising all the significant symbols of Islam during alien rule. In Britain, 
custom-built mosques and Muslim schools become equally important symbols of Is- 
lamic presence. The various communities can feel a great sense of achievement and 
pride if they utilise the experience of the reform groups in the subcontinent and 
manage to fund their enterprises without endowments or assistance from outside. In 
Britain, however, many of the reform groups have been accused by their critics of 
receiving large endowments from oil-rich Muslim states. 
Conclusion 
Life in a modern Britain can provide several parallels with the experience of the 
nineteenth century Indian Muslims. There are economic factors at work just as there 
were then. 59 The reform message can be used to support and unite an un- 
derprivileged class, and the added legitimacy of the heritage of Shah Wali-allah can 
be as powerful an agent of identity for the Muslims in Britain now as it was for their 
ancestors in British India. The `internal conversion' to the scripturalist tradition, as 
found for example in Tabligh-i Jainaat, is, in Weberian terms, part of the process 
towards rationalising religion. It leads to a religion which is more self-conscious, 
systematic, and based upon abstract principles. Consequently it is a faith that travels 
well, since it has the potential to escape the confines of ceremonies and rituals that 
bind the believer to a particular site, such as the tombs of saints or festivals that need 
to be at a definite location. Shah Wali-allah's warning that the endangered Muslim 
minority in India must identify themselves with the world-wide ummah through 
determining and then practising the universals of Islam is also valid for the Muslims 
in Britain. 
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Chapter VIII 
NINETEENTH CENTURY REFORM MOVEMENTS 
Deoband and Tabligh-i Jamaat 
Introduction 
The previous chapter has explored the history of Islam in the Subcontinent in 
order to demonstrate the conditions which paved the way for the message of the 
reformers in the nineteenth century. It is clear that the various necessary com- 
promises with Hinduism, the incomplete Islamicisation of coverts, and the promi- 
nence of Sufis in the propagation of the faith resulted in powerful syncretistic devel- 
opments within Islam in India. The tradition of reform grew from various attempts to 
purify Islam from these accretions and to establish what was perceived to be, in the 
ideals of the reformers, a pristine faith identical to that practised by the Prophet and 
his companions. These two strands of the faith have divided the the religious tradi- 
tion of the Muslims in India into two distinct elements: one proximate and local, vali- 
dated by custom; the other ultimate and formal, derived from Islamic texts. 
Islam in India had never been able to function as an organic unity. It had been 
unable to develop the kind of organisation required in order that all the diverse 
strands of the community could act as one in religious matters. In order to achieve 
this aim, effective control would have to have been maintained by acknowledged rep- 
resentatives and a formal hierarchy. However, this did not exist. It had been a 
powerful but unrealised dream since the very beginning of Islam, this vision of an in- 
tegrated Muslim brotherhood which would include all the faithful in one united social 
grouping. This dream of an united uminah has always existed in the religious con- 
sciousness of Muslims. Its power has been unaffected by the fact that the unity of 
Islam was shattered within a few years of the Prophet's death, when Muslims were al- 
ready fighting fellow-Muslims. This fact of disunity, however, strengthened the ideal 
of unity rather than weakening it. Again and again, reformers of the faith were to 
preach that unity and success would be restored to the uminah by returning to the 
basics of the faith as based upon the message in the Qur'an and reinforced by the 
Sunna of the Prophet. 
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Developments in the Subcontinent Reform Movement 
Prior to the Establishment of Deoband 
Confronted with British rule, Muslim loss of power and the threat of Hindu ma- 
jority, undergoing its own revival, the nineteenth century Muslim reformers looked 
aghast at the fragmented condition of Islam in India. They, like their predecessors, 
were to draw heavily on the ideal of a brotherhood united together by a pristine 
Islam. They confronted the fact of Islam's reduced condition with a firm belief that 
the way to salvation and renewal was through strict adherence to the Shari'ah in its 
purest form. They were convinced that it was only by a renewal of their faith and by 
living an exemplary pious life that Muslims could regain their former glory. After 
1857, the reform movements retreated from political activism to religious quietism. 
Sayyid Ahmad's militant methods were dropped, but not forgotten. His more peaceful 
methods of dissemination were retained and developed. The result was a forceful and 
active propagation of scripturalist legal norms in all aspects of social and religious 
life. Although preaching and distribution of religious tracts became a dominant 
method of spreading the reform message, a new and very important thrust of dis- 
semination was to develop. To counteract the establishment of schools in India by 
Christian missionaries and the British government, the reform uleina turned their 
energies towards education. Suspicious of British education, either because of its 
secular or its Christian element, the reformers decided to establish institutions that 
would educate young Muslims in the classical traditions of their faith. The graduates 
of these colleges would spread the message of reform throughout the subcontinent. 
Delhi College 
During the first half of the nineteenth century the most important Muslim educa- 
tional institution was Delhi College, founded in 1825 and closed down after the 1857 
uprising. The college had been established by the government to educate middle-class 
Indian youths to occupy positions in the administration. Taking over the buildings of 
the Madrasa-e Ghazi al-Din, the college had a British principal and was expanded by 
endowments from the Nawab of Oudh in 1828.1 The curriculum combined Western 
and Oriental subjects including English language and literature, sciences, Arabic, Per- 
sian, Sanskrit, Geography, History and Mathematics. 
Barbara Metcalf argues that the success of the school was due to the use of Urdu 
as the primary means of instruction. 2 The school certainly encouraged the use of 
Urdu, and its Muslim intake comprised between one-third and one-half of its pupils. 
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Many of these Muslim pupils were attracted by the presence of Mamluk Ali, the 
school's head of Arabic. Mamluk Ali had close connections with the family of Shah 
Wali-allah (see Appendix E). He had come to Delhi in 1842 with the express purpose 
of studying under the descendants of Wali-allah. The first head of Arabic at Delhi 
College had been Maulana Rashiduddin Khan. 3 Mamluk Ali studied under him and 
later succeeded him. Rashiduddin Khan had been the disciple of Shah Rafiuddin, the 
youngest son of Shah Wali-allah. He had also studied under Shah Wali-allah's other 
two sons, Shah Abd al-Aziz and Abdul al-Qadir. 4 Mamluk Ali's involvement with 
the Delhi reformers is further demonstrated by the fact that he went on the Hajj with 
Muhammad Ishaq and Yaqub (see Appendix E) in 1842. 
There were mixed feelings concerning their contact with the government amongst 
these members of the reform movement associated with Delhi College. Barbara 
Metcalf suggests that the students of Muhammad Ishaq and Yaqub shared a common 
experience created by their commitment to reform and their exposure to Western in- 
stitutions. The latter influence was created by the missionary societies and the educa- 
tional institutions of the British. 5 She argues that it was the varying balance between 
their two formative influences that determined the different directions in which their 
followers were to develop their ideology throughout the remainder of the nineteenth 
century and into the twentieth. 6 Some, despite their fears of contact with the mis- 
sionaries and the government, went on to prestigious positions either in government 
schools or in the administration. Through Mamluk Ali they achieved not only a firm 
commitment to Islam but also access to government service so it is not surprising that 
among Mamluk Ali's pupils were the founders of the Aligarh movement (see Appen- 
dix E). Others were to go in a different direction. Heirs to the early nineteenth 
century programme of reform, they turned their attention to the establishment of 
educational institutions which could train men to give guidance in their faith to Mus- 
lims of all backgrounds. They were suspicious of Western education, and were only 
interested in reviving religious education along the lines of the traditional Arabic 
madrasas. They were primarily concerned with the Islamic quality of individual lives 
and they were sceptical of the ulema who served the British. Amongst this group can 
be found the originators and first teachers of Deoband, Muhammad Qasim 
Nainautawi, Maulana Rashid Ahmed Gangohi, Maulana Zulfiqar Ali, and Maulana 
Fazl al-Rahman Usmani who studied with Mamluk Ali. Of the six founders of the 
Dar al-Ulum, four had studied with Mamluk Ali at Delhi College.? 
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Deoband 
The founders of Deoband were also connected with the descendants of Shah Wali- 
allah through their association with Shah Muhammad Ishaq, the leader of the Delhi 
reformers and the grandson of Shah Wali-allah (see Appendix E). Maulana Muham- 
mad Qasim Nanautawi, Maulana Rashid Gangohi, Maulana Muhammad Muzhar 
Nanautawi, and Maulana Muhammad Munir Nanautawi had all fought against the 
British in 1857.8 This fact links the founders of Deoband back to the militant Jihad 
movement of Sayyid Ahmad of Rae Bareilly. After the defeat of 1857, however, this 
group of ulema eliminated any further thought of political activity from their 
programme. They did not want any more direct confrontation with the British so they 
chose to protect Islam from both the British conquerors and the Hindu majority by 
eliminating all apparent cultural accretions from the faith. 9 In order to achieve this 
they focussed their attention on the Muslim community. They left Delhi and estab- 
lished themselves in Deoband, Saharanpur, Khowlah, Gangoha and Bareilly, all in the 
North-East corner of Uttar Pradesh. These were places with large established Muslim 
communities. There had been Muslims in Deoband since the thirteenth century. 10 
The British presence was less noticeable than in Delhi and the cities of North India, 
and it was here that they made their centres for preserving classical Muslim culture 
and religious life along the lines taught by Shah Wali-allah. They made the madrasa 
the institutional centre of their activity. It was felt that the establishment of a reli- 
gious academic institution was necessary in order to keep the Muslim religious con- 
sciousness awake and to organise on a national scale. 't 
Deoband dar al-Ulum was founded in 1867 on a site ninety miles north-east of 
Delhi, and the school was to become the pattern for all the other madrasas which 
were established throughout the subcontinent by so many of the Deoband graduates. 
The school was conceived in discussions which took place in the old Chhatta Mosque 
in Deoband between Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi, Maulana Zulfigar Ali, 
Maulana Fazl al-Rahman and Hajji Muhammad Abid. 12 The first classes took place in 
the same mosque, and apparently began with only one student and one teacher. 13 The 
rapid expansion of the classes resulted in the school moving, first from the Chhatta 
Mosque to the Qazi Masjid and then to the Deoband Jaina Masjid where cells and 
courtyards were constructed in the style of the old madrasas. By 1869, when this too 
proved inadequate, land was purchased near the Chhatta mosque on which the original 
school was built. This is still the site for the college, although several buildings have 
been added to the original as growth continues. 14 
It is possible that the founders, influenced by their time in Delhi, had been im- 
pressed by the British bureaucratic style of educational institution as opposed to the 
old informal teaching style of the madrasas. Although the growth of the academy 
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was organic, it would appear that the founders always thought that it would be more 
than a class held in the corner of a mosque or at the home of a Muslim teacher. 
Within the first year of its existence it had acquired a library and classrooms; profes- 
sional teachers were appointed; the students were admitted for fixed course of study 
and required to take annual examinations, and a majlis-e shura (council) was ap- 
pointed for administrative purposes and to function as a board of governors. 15 
The curriculum developed as the college expanded and it took some time to evolve 
to the state it is in today (see Appendix F). In 1956 an official publication issued by 
the government of India stated that the college taught Tafsir, Hadith, Islamic law, 
philosophy of law, principles, astronomy, Unani medicine, and mathematics, but with 
the greatest emphasis being on Tafsir and Hadith. 16 The original curriculum was 
basically that devised by Farangi Mahal in Lucknow in the eighteenth century. This 
curriculum was known as the Dars-i Nizami. It was divided into two parts: the Man- 
qulat, which consisted of study of the Qur'an and Hadith, and the Ma'qulat, which 
was the study of law, logic and philosophy17. The Deobandi uleina were opposed to 
the emphasis on Ma'qulat which existed at Farangi Mahal and had become the norm 
in most of the old-style Arabic madrasas before the arrival of the British; they accor- 
dingly reversed this trend. More emphasis was given by them to the traditional 
sciences of Tafsir, Fiqh and Hadith as opposed to the rational sciences. In particular 
the six authorised collections of Hadith were studied as they were regarded by them 
as the basis of correct belief and practice, The curriculum was certainly not innova- 
tive, but the focus on Hadith gave the graduates knowledgeable access to popular 
material for teaching the Muslim masses. 
The aim of the school was to train well-educated ulema who would be committed 
to the cause of reform Islam as taught by Shah Wali-allah and his successors. The 
Dar al-Ulum at Deoband has never considered itself to be only an educational institu- 
tion. The staff and students have always regarded themselves as an independent 
school of thought, and as an effective and active movement within Islam. 18 The 
main aim of this movement is to protect and revive Islam by continuing Shah Wali- 
allah's efforts to purify the faith. Rizvi in The History of the Dar al-Ulum Deoband 
quotes from Shah Wali-allah's work, R isala al-Juz al-Lati f: 
I have been gifted with the expertise whereby I can distinguish between what is the 
original teachings of religion brought by the Holy Prophet and what are those things 
that are accretions or later additions as the result of interpolation of certain schismatic 
sects. 19 
Rizvi himself writes: 
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This movement cleansing the Muslims' beliefs and actions of all the rubbish and 
trashery, acquainted them with pure and unalloyed Islam, liberated them from 
polytheism and superstitions, and, removing fear and awe from their hearts, capa- 
citated them politically to raise the prestige of the Muslims as a community. 20 
The ulema were seen to have a central role in this rejuvenation of Muslim society. 
The school set out to provide the structure for a religious leadership of India's Mus- 
lims without the support of the state. In order to achieve this, Maulana Muhammad 
Qasim Nanautawi insisted that the school and the students' education should be fi- 
nanced by donations from well-wishers. By means of private donations he hoped that 
it would remain independent of the government and feudal landlords. 21 In the early 
years people donated books, food for the students and furniture for the premises as 
well as cash. The network of donors both provided financial support and helped to 
disseminate the reform message. 22 It also engendered the development amongst Mus- 
lims who were not students or staff of a genuine consciousness of being part of a 
movement. This special bond was reinforced amongst the staff and the ulema as 
many of them belonged to reform Sufi orders; in particular, many were murids of 
Imadadullah (see Appendix E) who was known as the shaikh of the ulema. 23 As 
many as five hundred alim of North India were reputed to have taken Bai'at from 
him. 24 Barbara Metcalf suggests that marriage was also used to strengthen links be- 
tween the reformers of Deoband. 25 The combination of these factors reinforced the 
unity already existing through commitment to reform and together they defined a 
separate sense of community within the wider ummah. Increasingly Deoband came to 
represent a distinct style, a maslak, of Islam in India. 
Within six months of the founding of the Deoband school, another madrasa run 
on the same lines was opened in Saharanpur. This college, named Madrasa Mazahir- 
i Mum, is regarded as being second only to Deoband. By 1880 there were over a 
dozen schools identified as Deoband and this number had tripled by the end of the 
century with schools existing as far away as Madras, Peshawar and Chittagong. By 
the time of Deoband's centenary celebration in 1967 they claimed that there were 
8,934 Deobandi schools in the subcontinent. 26 Many of the graduates from the dar 
al-Ulums went on to establish schools themselves, and so the system became self- 
perpetuating. In 1971 a census in Pakistan of 915 inadrasas found that 458 were 
Deobandi. The remainder belonged to Shi'as, Ahl-i Hadith and Barelwi groups. 27 
As well as opening new inadrasas, many of the existing ones affiliated themselves 
with Deoband and were provided with the same structure in regard to syllabus and ex- 
aminations. All the schools exchanged staff and the personnel were linked by family, 
common experience and cooperation. The combination of this network of schools 
and the dominance of Deobandi graduates in the Jami'at-i Ulema-i Hind, the most in- 
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fluential organisation of the ulema in India and its equivalent organisation in Pakistan, 
the Jami'at-i Ulema-i Islam, has resulted in Deoband having a status in the sub- 
continent that goes far beyond the numerical strength of the reformers. 
The success of Deoband was partly achieved by the synthesis of the two main 
streams of Islamic tradition: intellectual learning and spiritual experience. The 
Deobandi ulema actualised Shah Wali-allah's theorising on the unity of the Shari'at 
and tariqat; both were placed firmly within the fold of Islamic orthodoxy. The 
Deobandi ulema were not totally opposed to Sufism. Many of them received Bai'at 
from Naqshbandi Sufis such as Imadadullah, and the pir/murid relationship ce- 
mented the teacher/student relationship in the colleges. The ulema were often them- 
selves shaikhs and this combined the two disciplines. The Deobandis were totally op- 
posed to the kind of Sufism that arose around the tombs and shrines, condemning the 
celebrations of urs and most of the practices associated with `popular' or `folk 
Sufism' and refusing to believe in the intercessionary role of the shaikh. In contrast 
to the pirs of the shrines, the Deobandis emphasised that the most important activity 
of the disciple was obedience to the Shari'ah. In common with most Sufis, however, 
the Deobandi Sufis did practice dhikr and tasawuf but obedience to the Shari'ah was 
nonetheless always centra1.28 
Soon it was not only Indian Muslims who began to be attracted by this successful 
mixture of Shari'at and tarigat. The combination of this and the Deobandi's empha- 
sis on conduct was successfully promoted by high profile visits of the ulema to other 
Muslim nations. Thus its success in propagating the message of reform was furthered 
by the college's ability to attract students from outside the subcontinent. Even in the 
first few years of its existence the Deoband dar al-Ulum received students from 
Afghanistan and from South India. From its founding in 1867 to its centenary in 
1967 the college had produced graduates form Afghanistan, Burma, China, Malaysia, 
Iraq, Iran, South Africa, Siam, Russia, Indonesia, Kuwait, Ceylon, Saudi Arabia and 
the Yemen, although obviously the vast majority were from India and Pakistan. 29 
Foreign students still come to Deoband, but I was told, not in the same numbers as 
before. The students themselves claimed that this was both because of the difficulties 
of obtaining visas from the Indian government and because many students from the 
Islamic world now find it easier to go to Pakistan. Most of the foreign students pre- 
sently at Deoband are the children of either Indian and Pakistani migrants to other 
parts of the world or of Malaysians. Some of the teachers complained that the for- 
eign students were corrupted by Western values and were not as compliant to dis- 
cipline as were the Indian students. Some of the Malaysian students complained that 
they were pressured to attend the dar al-Ulum because their parents were afraid that 
they would become tainted by contact with Western culture in Malaysia. This was 
compensated for, however, by some foreign students' ideological commitment to 
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reforming Islam in their home nations, this being particularly the case with those stu- 
dents from Britain, Trinidad and South Africa. The present Shaikh al-Hadith, 
Niyamatullah, commented that it had become a custom amongst some Indian Muslims 
to send the least bright of their children to receive the very economical dar al-Ulum 
education whilst sending the brighter children to state universities. He was concerned 
that this would effect the quality of the future ulema30. Despite these problems, 
however, the foreign students have helped to spread the Deobandi message of reform 
outside the subcontinent and have helped to link it to the wider world of Islam. 
Deoband used several methods of spreading the reform message. For this purpose 
they made great use of fatwas. Within ten years of the college's foundation, istafta 
(legal queries) began to arrive in increasing numbers. 31 Muhammad Qasim 
Nanautawi had taught that false custom led to shirk, certainty was required to avoid 
this danger, particularly in periods of fitnah (disorder). To ensure that this certainty 
was provided Deoband produced f atwas in great numbers. From 1911 a register was 
kept of f atwas. In the first century of the college's existence 269,215 fatwas were 
issued, most of which focused on belief and ritual. 32 The ulema closely examined 
customs and beliefs associated with Sufism to see if they contained bida or innova- 
tion. They attacked anything which sought to elevate the status of the saints. In addi- 
tion to fatwas the Deobandis took part in preaching and religious debates. This ac- 
tivity was often directed against Christianity and militant Hindu organisations like the 
Arya Samaj, but much of the debating was between groups within Islam on points of 
custom and law. These debates helped to establish the boundaries between different 
Muslim points of view, and assisted the growth of diverse reform movements such as 
Ahl-i Hadith and AN Qur'an. 
The Deobandi emphasis on custom and Shari'ah means that they are deeply con- 
servative; the proliferation of fatwas reinforced this conservatism. They had decided 
that the dar al-Ulums would teach only a traditional religious curriculum and would 
not incorporate any of the syllabus of Western education. Muhammad Qasim 
Nanautawi had stated that this was so because the tremendous increase of government 
schools throughout the nineteenth century made it a futile exercise to attempt these 
Western-style subjects, and it was much more important to concentrate on the reli- 
gious sciences. 33 He suggested that Deoband graduates could continue in secular 
education after leaving the college. In practise, however, this is difficult, because the 
full term of study at the dar al-Ulum takes eight years. The question of the cur- 
riculum has been a source of considerable debate and criticism within the subcontinent 
to the present day. It is argued that this puts the Deobandi graduates and ulema com- 
pletely out of touch with the modern world and the problems faced by ordinary Mus- 
lims living in it. Some of the contemporary students at the college explained that they 
felt that they only qualified to become members of the ulema or teachers in religious 
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institutions, that they felt inadequate to deal with the problems of the modern world. 
The Hindustan Times has criticised the institution of Deoband for being socially and 
academically backward, and has stated that it needed to `moderate its methods of 
work in accordance with present circumstances'. 34 
I attended Hadith classes with Shaikh Niyamatullah. The only concessions to the 
modern world were electric lighting and the Shaikh's microphone. The students were 
seated on the floor before the Shaikh who himself sat on a raised wooden platform. 
He would command a student to read from the relevant Hadith. When the Shaikh 
wished the student to stop reciting, he raised his arm. The Shaikh then commented in 
Urdu on the passage. When he had ceased his commentary, he again raised his arm 
and the student continued. Both the Shaikh and his students were proud of the fact 
that this traditional style of teaching Hadith was still maintained. 
This conservatism further manifests in the Deohandi attitude towards ijtihad. 
Cantwell Smith states that `the door of ijtihad is closed tight'. 35 This accusation is 
also critically made by the members of Jamaat-i Islami against the ulema of 
Deoband; the Deobandis defend themselves against the accusation by arguing that the 
door of i jtihad remains open but that great caution has to be exercised. Shaikh 
Niyamatullah argued that: 
if you give permission to do i jtihad to every person then there will be a lot of 
opinions and differences which will cause chaos in the community. You will find a 
tnujaddid in every corner. And who is going to follow who. So now we have ij- 
tihad for those things which are not being presented in the old books, which have not 
been dealt with. When we have a new problem to solve, it can be done in a group - 
i jma - the system of ijina can be done here, and if all the uletna get together and 
want to do i jtihad then it is proper. 36 
It is new problems arising out of the modern world that seem to worry the 
Deobandi uleºna. The Vice-Chancellor of Deoband told a meeting of the ulema at 
Cairo in 1963 that i jtihad must not be used to establish new views in support of 
something arising out of present-day Western civilisation that had impressed Muslims. 
He said, `we must not be anxious to bring them within the limits of legitimacy 
(jawaz) by searching (for) supporting evidence in the Qur'an and the Hadith'. 37 The 
Deobandi conservatism is further reinforced by their emphasis on correct religious 
practice. This has been reinforced by a lessening of the Sufi influence with its focus 
on inner experience throughout the twentieth century. When I asked Shaikh 
Niyamatullah who has been a student and a teacher in Deoband since 1945 what 
changes he had seen in that time, he replied that: 
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before they not only studied, they also meditated, what we call tasawuf. They were 
master in both........ so what I am trying to say is that we also have to have master- 
teachers not just ordinary teachers who just come to learn for the sake of learning, or 
just to teach for the sake of teaching, or just to learn for the sake of knowledge; 
there must also be some meditation and inner experience. 
38 
This conservatism is joined to the Deobandis' belief that they have a special un- 
derstanding of the reality of God. This belief gives than a feeling of specialness, a 
sense of being unique. All the reform movements created a sense of conviction 
amongst their followers that they alone conformed to the Sunna. This conviction is 
central to Deobandi belief and self-perception. Their self-definition is that they are 
the true Sunni Muslims, whereas others are deluded or confused by following cultural 
additions which jeopardise their Islam. Although there is empathy with other reform 
groups similar to themselves, the Deobandis have difficulties with most of the new 
`Islamic Movement' organisations such as Jainaat-i Islami as they are often critical 
towards the ulema or even actively opposed to them. 
Throughout the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries the 
Deobandis, though increasingly conscious of their differences from other com- 
munities, defined themselves in opposition to the ruling non-Muslims. In the face of 
British power, scientific knowledge and material 'mastery, the Deobandis asserted 
moral superiority. They urged their followers not to wear British dress or to buy 
British goods. Many of the fatwas encouraged this attitude of moral and spiritual 
self-confidence. The emphasis on correct religious practice provided a means for 
people to express their own value in a situation where they were powerless in other 
areas. There was satisfaction to be gleaned from identifying themselves as morally 
correct, and in separating themselves from others whom they judged to be wrong. 
A sense of pride and self-esteem also resulted from the rejection of local Sufi- 
based practices in favour of the emulation of regulations demonstrated to be from an 
authentic text or identification with an idealised historical period in Islam's past. The 
pir-based style of religion of the Sufis made the follower dependent on others for 
spiritual development. The pir mediated between his followers and God, and his posi- 
tion often rested on descent rather than accomplishment. The Deobandis taught that 
the believers were responsible for their own practice. This shift in emphasis put 
much more weight on individual initiative. Furthermore, the adherence to the high 
tradition of Islam provided the means for identification with Muslims throughout the 
world rather than merely with the followers of a local Indian variety of the faith. 
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Tabligh-i Jamaat 
Tabligh-i Jamaat was founded in the late 1920s by Muhammad Ilyas. 39 Ilyas had 
studied Hadith in Deoband in 1908, and continued as an instructor at Mazahir-i Ulum 
in Saharanpur until 1910.40 After the death of his brother in 1916 he returned from 
Hajj to teach in his father's madrasa in Nizzamuddin, South Delhi. 41 The mosque 
and madrasa in Nizzamuddin is now the headquarters of Tabligh-i Jamaat activity in 
India and worldwide. In 1926 Ilyas again visited Mecca, and returned with the burn- 
ing conviction that he should take on the task of teaching Islam to the Muslim masses. 
To achieve this he went on extensive preaching tours. 42 He began his work in 
Mewat, a district south of Delhi among the Mewatis. The population was only 
nominally Muslim, and Hindu customs and traditions were prevalent amongst them. 
Holi and Diwali were celebrated along with Moharrum and Eid. 43 
Unlike the members of Deoband, Ilyas did not feel that it was necessary to be a 
member of the professional ulema in order to reform Islam. He believed that every 
Muslim had a responsibility to generate an awareness of Islam to others. He was not 
interested in reaching out to non-Muslims, but wanted to create a grassroots move- 
ment amongst Muslims to inspire religious renewal. The organisation created to 
achieve this had no central administrative structure, but Ilyas felt that there was a 
need for a central leader to co-ordinate the voluntary activities of a network of 
preaching teams. 
The organisation of these preaching teams remains basically unchanged to the pre- 
sent day. They consist of an Amir or leader, a Mutakallim or speaker, and a Rahbar 
or guide, The size of the team can range from a minimum of three people to a maxi- 
mum of ten. The Amir co-ordinates, selects the speakers and checks the content of 
the preaching. The Mutakallim's task is to inspire the audience into faith and right 
conduct. The main emphasis is on performance of prayers and instruction in the 
Qur'an. The Rahbar takes care of practical arrangements such as travel, food, 
laundry and accommodation. Meetings are held with both prominent Muslims in the 
neighbourhood and with the common people, both singly and in groups. Large 
gatherings are then organised in halls and mosques. Each member of the preaching 
team has to pay for his travel and board, and private hospitality is avoided. The 
teams sleep in the madrasa or mosques. There is a strong emphasis on humility and 
piety, and the overall aim is the self-reform of the members of the teams themselves; 
others are to be encouraged by example. As the teams progress, those that have been 
inspired by them are formed in turn into new preaching teams and sent out. In this 
way the circle of preachers is constantly extended. 
Ilyas taught that Muslims should make religious effort a part of their daily lives. 
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When he was teaching in Mewat he insisted that volunteers should preach weekly on 
basic religious principles in their own locality, and form a group that would tour the 
neighbourhood. For three days out of every month they should go to nearby villages 
to hold meetings and to persuade other people to undertake similar tours. In addition 
to this, they should spend at least four months out of every year away from their 
homes, visiting centres of religious learning and studying there. Ilyas maintained that 
the natural way to learn Islam was to follow the Prophet's method of creating a group 
which, through travel and personal effort, would effectively transmit the religious call 
to all sections of the community. 44 So as to meet these demands, he felt that Mus- 
lims needed to spend time away from their home and vocation in order to concentrate 
on their faith. 
If the preaching team was operating in an urban environment, the group members 
would preach in a city mosque. After sunset prayers they should go from door-to- 
door inviting people to come to the mosque where, after prayers, they could listen to 
the message. If the preaching was taking place in a rural area, however, schools for 
the poor were to be established at the roadside. The shade of a tree was sought, a 
sackcloth spread, and water and a hookah provided for the sake of hospitality. 45 
Like the Deobandis, Ilyas was tolerant of Sufism so long as it was concerned to 
maintain the Shari'ah. Like Deoband and Ahl-i Hadith, he considered himself to be 
true successor of Shah Wali-allah. In common with Shah Wali-allah, Ilyas believed 
that the Muslims of his time were ignorant of their faith. 46 He regarded true Mus- 
lims to be those who led a life of true faith, observing the Law as revealed by God to 
His Messenger. He based the aims of the Tabligh-i Jamaat on two verses from the 
Qur'an: 
You are the best community sent forth to mankind, you command that which is 
reputable, and you prevent that which is disreputable and you believe in Allah. 
And let there he of you a community calling others to do good, commanding that 
which is reputable and prohibiting that which is disreputable 47 
Ilyas believed that the British were the main opponents of Islam in India at the 
time, but he never allowed himself to be drawn into political activity. He was unique 
in his belief that religion and politics should be kept strictly separate. Haq states that 
Ilyas believed the religious quest to be the sole reason for the emergence of the Mus- 
lim ummah. 48 In this respect Tablighi-i Jamaat differ radically from the views of 
Maulana Mawdudi and Jarnaat-i Islami (see Chapter X). Ilyas stated that `never can 
a government or any kind of political authority be the objective of Muslims'. 49 
Purely as individuals, volunteers were free to hold any individual political view they 
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wished, and there was no objection to their participating in political activities so long 
as they did not bring their politics into religious affairs. Political discussion was for- 
bidden in the preaching groups. Haq suggests that Ilyas was attempting to adapt the 
teachings of Islam to the policies of a secular state. 50 
Ilyas's work was primarily directed towards people who were totally ignorant of 
the basic principles of Islam; he aimed to acquaint them with at least the minimum 
correct religious observances. He emphasised the fundamentals of the Shari`ah and 
acknowledged the influence on him of Shah Wali-allah, Ahmad Sirhind and the 
reform Naqshbandiyya Sufis. 51 Nielsen describes Tabligh-i Jainaat as `the active 
pietism of the Deobandi movement'. 52 
During Ilyas's lifetime the Tabligh-i Jamaat spread out from Mewat to U. P. and 
the Punjab. After Partition it was carried to Bombay, Gujarat, Maharashtra, 
Hyderabad and Madras. In 1950 the Tabligh-i Jainaat began in Pakistan. Ilyas was 
succeeded in 1944 by his son Muhammad Yusef who expanded the work 
phenomenally, both in the subcontinent and abroad. Preaching began in Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Britain, Holland. France, Malaysia, Indonesia, Algeria, 
Japan and the U. S. A. Of all the subcontinent reform groups, the Tabligh-i Jainaat 
has been the most successful at transforming itself into a worldwide organisation 
transcending local ethnic and geographical divisions. 
Conclusion 
Through its network of dar al-ulums, Deoband was able to formalise the ideas and 
activities of the reformers into a coherent body of knowledge and practice that could 
be transferred from generation to generation through education. Wherever they were 
in the world, the Deobandi-trained uletna would preach the same basic message to 
Muslims. Education enabled the reform tradition to be passed on in places where 
Muslims no longer held political power. The emphasis was on strict obedience of the 
Shari'ah and study of the Qur'an and Hadith. The reform message of an unsullied 
Islam required the Deobandis to avoid the influence of Shia, Hinduism, and the 
British. 53 The resulting isolation combined with the organising of reform doctrine 
into an institutionalised education system caused the Deobandis to develop into a dis- 
tinct group within subcontinent Islam. This led to fervent discussion between the 
reformers over aspects of belief and practice, resulting in various other reform groups 
appearing each with a distinct group identity. The debates and arguments over right 
practice which went on between the groups helped to reinforce the boundaries be- 
tween them, and membership thus became an important factor in defining self- 
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identity. Although a Muslim's faith and knowledge of Islam was enhanced by mem- 
bership and a sense of identity was provided by being a committed member of the 
uminah, on the other hand, sometimes violent antagonism could be felt towards Mus- 
lims belonging to other groups. 
Francis Robinson surmises that if the `Deobandis in Britain are true to their 
original purposes, they will form a bastion of conservative Sunni orthodoxy in the 
Hanafi mould' which will be concerned to continue proselytising through education a 
`particular religious personality'. 54 Robinson also indicates that Tabligh-i Jamaat is 
probably the most successful reform movement in the Muslim world. 55 He argues 
that the missionary activity of Tablighi Jamaat carries the energy and orientation of 
the nineteenth century reformers and Deoband into the twentieth century, and enables 
the message to reach the Muslim masses. 56 The next chapter will explore the two 
movements and the relationship between them in the context of Britain. 
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Chapter IX 
THE REFORM MOVEMENT IN BRITAIN 
Deoband and Tablighi Jamaat 
Deobandis in Britain 
In 1971 the Vice-Chancellor of Deoband dar al Ulum visited Britain. He stayed 
for a few months and spoke in most of cities in which South Asian Muslims have 
settled. After leaving Britain, he visited France and Germany. After returning to 
India he expressed his opinion that: 
Such preachers and ulema are urgently required there who, having full command over 
the English language, may explain the basic principles of Islamic sciences with insight 
and discrimination to the people of those places and may also live for some time 
amongst them with financial independence. I 
The Deobandis, however, were established in Britain well before 1971. An ex- 
amination of the major South Asian Muslim communities in Britain shows that the 
first mosque to be established often became a Deobandi one. Research in Birming- 
ham, Leeds and Bradford reveals a similar pattern of development in each. 2 There 
first mosques were established in the late 1950s-early 1960s, and according to the 
people interviewed had no obvious affiliation to any particular school of thought 
within Islam. Sher Azam describes the early days in Bradford: 
What happened is that when we came to Britain, the people who were praying in the 
mosque, I remember, we were praying together. There were no Deobandis, no 
Barehvi. s, no AN Hadith, nobody. We were glad to have a mosque and to be able 
to pray. Whoever established it usually was going to do it his own way, in his own 
tradition, but we were glad to see him whether Deobandi or Barelwi. We didn't mind 
what it was as long as Islam was practised. I remember that Pir Marouf Husain Shah 
who was a Barelwi used to pray at Howard Street. 
3 
A similar pattern occurs in the Jinnah mosque, the first to be established in 
Leeds. 4 The Howard Street mosque, the Jinnah Mosque and the Walford Road 
mosque in Birmingham are all now firmly within the Deobandi tradition. The key to 
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what happened lies in Sher Azam's statement that `whoever established it usually was 
going to do it his own way, in his own tradition'. The founders of the earliest 
mosques were usually the better-educated migrants who had come from the cities of 
the subcontinent. They were more confident to organise in a strange environment and 
were the natural leaders of the community. Initially they founded mosques in various 
cities wherein all members of the small but growing communities could pray. There 
are, however, two reasons why the founders of the first mosques would have been 
sympathetic to the reform tradition of Islam. Firstly, it is generally true to say that 
the Deobandi/Barelwi division is along an urban/rural divide. Sher Azam acknowl- 
edges this: 
I think it is fair to say that a large number of people who have the Barelwi tradition 
happen to be from the rural areas, while the situation from the Deobandi tradition is 
almost the reverse, they are from the cities and towns. Educated urban migrants were 
therefore statistically more likely to be sympathetic to the Islam of the reform tradi- 
tion. Secondly, if a mosque was to be founded in which all the community could 
pray, it would be necessary to include only the very basics of Islam within the style 
of worship and the mosque architecture. This was a stripped-down, supposedly 
culturally-unadulturated, basic style of Islam that was practised to find the common 
denominator amongst mosque attenders, so that there would be no disagreements 
within the congregation. Significantly, this also coincided with the basic ethos of the 
Deobandis. The Barelwis and other groups were happy to go along with this until the 
community grew big enough to sustain another mosque. When this happened, the 
prominent leaders of the other communities founded their own places of worship. 
This left the original mosque free to declare openly its Deobandi sympathies. 
S 
The establishment of Deobandi mosques did not happen without controversy. 
Tariq Modood notes that South Asian Muslim migrants in Britain are `only one gener- 
ation from rural peasantry'. 6 Many of them originated from Azad Kashmir, one of 
the poorest and most backward areas in Pakistan. The majority of Britain's original 
Muslim migrants were from rural areas of the subcontinent that were more familiar 
with the traditional folk-Sufism of the Barelwis than with the more orthodox message 
of the nineteenth century reformers. Many of the Bengali population came from Syl- 
het, an area famous for its Sufi traditions. 7 
Initially, when all the community attended one mosque, there were almost no 
members of the ulema in the community. The congregation often prayed behind an 
imam who was chosen from amongst their number on the basis of age, education and 
background. Very often the imam would have been selected from the members of the 
mosque committee, the small group of educated urban, middle-class Muslims who 
had founded the mosque. With the arrival of families from the subcontinent and the 
subsequent growth of the community, these mosque committees organised for 
qualified ulema to be sent from the subcontinent as imams for the mosques. These 
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imams reflected the beliefs of the mosque committee and were often graduates of 
Deobandi dar al Ulums throughout the subcontinent. This created tensions between 
the imam and the mosque committee on the one hand, and the predominantly Barelwi- 
orientated congregation on the other. Even the more moderate mosque committees, 
more aware of the very different circumstances in Britain, were not always happy 
with the fervour of some of the Deobandi ulema. Sher Azam graphically describes 
this situation: 
I think that conflict is... what happens is we have sometimes teachers, alirns, who are 
very orthodox, rigid believers in one tradition. They come to speak and they natu- 
rally speak in favour of one and they combat the other. And the people who are from 
other traditions don't like this or have problems... And because of this the Council of 
Mosques and other institutions have discouraged it in the last few years. And they 
have also asked the Pakistan government to help us in that, so that they do not send us 
the identified troublemakers. 8 
This kind of pragmatic realism was arrived at only after several years of painful 
experience. Often the imam would preach against the time-honoured customs still be- 
lieved in by the congregation, and conflict would break out. Once the Barelwis 
managed to organise themselves behind their own leaders, several very bitter conflicts 
broke out for control of mosques. 9 
In the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, the Muslims set about recreating in 
Britain as many of the institutions of Islam as they could. Religious life was used to 
reinforce an intense awareness of ethnicity. Amongst the South Asian Muslims this 
process is reflected in the increase in the number of mosques in Britain. At the end 
of the 1960s there were only nine, but by 1974 there were 81 registered mosques. 
Between 1975 and 1980 twenty mosques were registered each year. By 1983 it was 
estimated that there were 450 mosques in Britain. 10 This number is thought to have 
increased to around 900 in 1993. 
This rapid expansion in the number of mosques resulted in a dramatic increase in 
the number of imams employed from the subcontinent. The imams of the first 
mosques were chosen from the community to lead the prayers (imam ratib). Some 
basic instruction was also given to children. Daniele Joly in her research in Birming- 
ham noted a disapproval in the better organised mosques towards those mosques that 
only had an imam ratib. She suggests that the `revitalisation of Islam' required an 
imam khatib who was able to preach and instruct the congregation in Islam. 11 She 
noted that the imam khatib was usually a qualified alim trained in Islamic theology. 12 
Many of these members of the professional ulema as employed from the sub- 
continent were trained in Deobandi dar al Ulums. Deoband education provided its 
graduates with a thorough training and a unified, consistent curriculum. It also had 
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the reputation in the subcontinent of being the most famous Islamic university after Al 
Azhar in Egypt. To the middle-class Muslims dominating the mosque committees in 
Britain, Deoband's reputation for scholarship and religious orthodoxy appeared to 
provide the essential qualities necessary for strengthening Islamic values amongst the 
migrants. The Deobandi style of Islam had two main aims: to purify the faith from 
superstitions and folk-belief and to rediscover the pristine faith of the Prophet and his 
companions through direct study of the Qur'an and the Hadith. This suited the new 
status of the Muslim migrants. 
I agree with Werner Schiffauer that the migration of workers has to be seen as a 
process of urbanisation. 13 Changes in religious consciousness arising from the migra- 
tion from rural areas to the cities of the subcontinent will inevitably be accentuated by 
migration to the inner cities of Britain. Schiffauer claims that `the development of 
specifically urban (and modern) structures of consciousness can be more clearly ob- 
served than in the native country'. 14 Philip Lewis points out that those involved in the 
transmission of Islam are faced with the dilemma of a culture that is in the process of 
transformation from orality to literacy. 15 Lewis shows that three traditional features 
of the transmission of Islamic knowledge are being challenged. He identifies these as 
`the essential orality of the Qur'an, a highly personalised transfer of knowledge 
through accredited teachers and the popularity of sama', a state of ecstasy achieved 
through music and dance. 16 He argues that the introduction of printing to nineteenth 
century India, so successfully utilised by the Deobandis, not only assisted the process 
of the shift from oral to written culture but also made possible a diminution in de- 
pendence on rote learning. Increasing literacy brought a new emphasis on un- 
derstanding. '7 Schiffauer explains that, in the village, little emphasis was placed on 
inner conviction. He demonstrates that when Muslims migrate to the city, religious 
practices are no longer an obligation but become part of a process of `Islamicisation 
of the self' 18. He suggests that in the new environment the individual no longer 
belongs automatically to a given community but can choose a religious group and a 
leader on the basis of how convincingly Islam is represented. 19 
In this context, the Deobandis were initially in a better position to supply the reli- 
gious demands of the migrants in the context of their radically altered situation in 
Britain. Although the migrants were economically and socially at the bottom of the 
overall British class structure, within their own framework they had risen a class. 
They had moved from a rural location to an urban one. They were better off finan- 
cially than they had been in the subcontinent, and they could demonstrate this new- 
found wealth by sending money and gifts back to relatives in the place of origin. 
Many were able to build new homes in the villages they had come from and to im- 
prove the economies of those areas. In Chapter IV I have argued that identification 
with the classical tradition of Islam demonstrates improved social status. The 
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Deobandi tradition provided the migrants with a means of showing both their new 
status within their own culture as well as a more rational approach to religion as 
founded on self-knowledge through a study of the Qur'an and Hadith. 
Despite the Deobandis' claim that the Islam to which they are committed is freed 
from the accretions of South Asian culture, that it is a universal Islam which unites 
the ummah in the central tenets of orthodoxy, they are in fact linked to various class 
and ethnic groups of the subcontinent. The South Asian background to this has been 
discussed in detail in the previous Chapter. This is manifested in Britain by the 
predominance of Muslims committed to Deoband and originating from India, either 
via East Africa or as muhajirs, Indian Muslims who migrated to Pakistan in 1947.20 
John King and Philip Lewis point out that the Gujarati community plays a significant 
role in Deobandi leadership, a role that is disproportionate to its numerical strength in 
Britain. 21 The Gujarati migrants are traditionally self-employed, merchants who have 
spread throughout the world. They are familiar with the processes of migration, and 
compared with other ethnic groups they are highly urbanised. The Urdu-speaking 
inuha f irs came from the heartlands of the old Mughal empire where Suf ism had never 
been as prominent as orthodoxy. As they are not native Pakistanis, they have raised 
the slogan of Islam to fight for their position in Pakistani society. This position is in- 
creasingly involved in a power struggle between ethnic and regional groups. 22 For 
other Muslims in Britain, status may be enhanced by being connected to these two 
better-educated or materially successful groups through religious affiliation. 
The Deobandi ethos also coincided with the consolidation of the community 
around religious/ethnic identity in the third stage of migrant development. The em- 
phasis of the Deobandi ulema had always been on the minutiae of correct religious 
custom and behaviour derived from the Hadith rather than on the legalistic interpreta- 
tion of fiqh. This was so in spite of their allegiance to the Hana fi school of juris- 
prudence. As a consequence of this the Deobandis stressed correct dress, length and 
style of beards and correct Islamic manners, all these dictates being derived from the 
Sunna of the Prophet. Essentially, this attitude arose out of the colonial situation in 
nineteenth century India, in which the Muslims were a powerless minority. In order 
to protect the community, they set out to construct a fence of correct ritual and prac- 
tice which defined the parameters of Muslim life. Maulana Muhammad Raza ex- 
plained that when Deobandi students first went to study at Al Azhar, they were sur- 
prised to find that Egyptian Muslim scholars were not at all concerned with such is- 
sues as the length of beard permissible in Islam. 23 This obsession to copy the details 
of the Prophet's lifestyle and appearance was not paramount in a Muslim majority 
state. Such an obsession was a defence mechanism against inundation by the ways of 
a stronger, more powerful non-Muslim ruling group. Metcalf points out that threaded 
through all these issues was the essential underlying concept of community. The 
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Deobandis needed to define the limits for a group of Muslims where unity was ob- 
tained by this kind of shared correct perspective on all issues. 24 
The Muslim migrants in Britain underwent the same process after the arrival of 
wives and children from the subcontinent. They felt the need to protect themselves as 
a viable separate religious and cultural community. They were also concerned to pro- 
tect their womenfolk from the perceived immorality which they saw as innate in the 
Western liberal ethos of freedom, and to pass on their culture and faith to the younger 
generation. The Deobandis already had a respected tradition of strategies by which to 
define and protect the community from outsiders. It is not surprising, then, that they 
were initially successful amongst Muslims in the new environment. The statistics 
support this. Maulana Muhammad Raza suggests that 90% of Muslims who came to 
Britain were from a rural background, and that although they were not self- 
consciously Barelwi, in general they believed in the kind of traditional rural Islam as 
defended by the Barelwi ulema and pirs. He admits, however, that although there are 
no official figures of the ratio of Barelwi/Deobandi control of mosques nationwide, it 
is something like 60: 40.25 This ratio is surprising considering the rural backgrounds 
of the majority of first-generation Muslim migrants and indicates both the Deobandis' 
organisational abilities and the success of the reform message in the new environment 
of urban Britain. 
By 1967 the Deobandi ulema had founded the Majlis Ulema UK, an organisa- 
tion designed to coordinate their activities in Britain. The ulerna needed to come to- 
gether to organise conferences, to plan tours of visiting preachers, to print calendars 
and posters, to establish the correct times for prayers and the beginning and end of 
Ramadan, to coordinate their activities against Qadianis and Ahmadiyyas in Britain26, 
to discuss what was bida in the British context, and to issue fatwas to ensure correct 
practice by Muslims in Britain, and to operate politically in the campaign for separate 
Muslim schools for girls, the provision of Halal food, and the acceptance of Muslim 
family law by Parliament. 27 
In spite of the Deobandi emphasis on a uniquely religious community as one 
bound together by observing the essentials of Islam stripped of South Asian cultural 
accretions, members were not able to override the considerable strength of original 
national and ethnic identity. In 1974, the Majlis Ulema UK divided into the Jami'at 
Ulema Britannia and the Markazi Jami'at Ulema Britannia. In 1980, the Jami'at 
Ulema Britannia divided again, and the Hizbul'ulema was established for 
predominantly Gujarati ulema who have always been influential amongst the 
Deobandis. 28 The Jami'at Ulema Britannia has recently divided again, both 
organisations keeping the same name. Besides these organisations, there are smaller 
national groupings of ulema that are organised from London, Nottingham and Man- 
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chester. 29 There is also the International Mosque and Muslims Defence Council, 
which focuses on welfare activities. It is extremely difficult for an outsider to obtain 
the precise information on why there are so many splinter groups among the 
Deobandi ulema. Certainly ethnic origin will have an important role to play, since all 
the organisations involve themselves in the politics of the various subcontinent na- 
tions. Nonetheless division has also arisen over arguments on sighting the new moon 
in order to establish the beginning of Ramadan and the dating of Eid. Various new 
organisations have arisen or split off from existing ones when the management have 
divided amongst themselves. I was not able to establish the details of this internal 
politics amongst the Deobandi ulema, but Sher Azam admits that ethnic background is 
significant. 
What seems to be happening is that there are people who have come from different 
areas, and (that) although they have the same tradition, they have come from different 
countries or different areas; and therefore sometimes it is a language problem, or 
cultural problems. 30 
The Deobandi tradition of issuing fatwas has continued in Britain but on nowhere 
near the scale reached by the dar al Ulum in India. The Jami'at Ulema Britannia has 
established a sub-committee to function as a Shari'at Council. 31 The members of this 
committee answer the questions of individual Muslims who approach them on matters 
of the law. Most of the questions are on matters of births, marriages, deaths, wills 
and mortgages. The collection of Deobandi fatwas issued in Pakistan and India is 
referred to but new fatwas are being issued here in Britain. New situations are creat- 
ing questions unique to the community's presence in Britain. Typical of these con- 
cerns are questions about artificial insemination or the method of slaughtering 
animals. The Council meets every month and liaises with solicitors and barristers 
who advise them on British law. 
Deobandi dar al Ulums in Britain 
Although the Deobandis have successfully created a network of mosques in 
Britain and established various organisations of their ulema, the most important devel- 
opment is the foundation of dar al Ulums in this country. Deoband came into being 
originally as a college which was a separate institution from the mosque. The 
Deobandi influence on the community came through their graduates becoming imams 
in the mosques and establishing further colleges. Up to the present time, Deobandi 
ulema have been invited from the subcontinent to become imams of the mosques. 
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There has been no central organisation to co-ordinate this, and each mosque com- 
mittee has made its own arrangements in the subcontinent. As a result, the imams 
reflect the regional background of the congregation. During my travels around the 
various communities I found very few Deobandi imams who were able to converse in 
English. This fact has been noted by a number of prominent Deobandis, both lay and 
ulema, who are increasingly concerned for the future of the younger generation. Al- 
though they voice their concern in regard for the continuation of Islam, like all the 
groups studied they believe that theirs is the genuine expression of the faith. In prac- 
tice, therefore, the well-being of Islam really means the perpetuation of their own 
tradition. 
In order to solve this problem, the Deobandis have opened several dar al Ulums 
designed to train qualified ulema who are familiar with the problems of life in 
Britain. These ulema also have to be conversant with English, and able to carry the 
tradition forward to the next generation. I have been able to identify Deobandi dar al 
Ulums in Bury, Dewsbury32, Birmingham, Bolton, and the girl's college in Bradford, 
but Sher Azam states that there are seven in the country. 33 Of these, the most in- 
fluential are in Bury (founded in 1975) and Dewsbury (founded in 1982). The dar al 
Ulums provide the means to liberate the Deobandi mosques from their dependence 
upon the subcontinent. They also function to forge links between the mosques, as so 
many of the latter have sent students to the dar al Ulums. 34 This is especially true of 
Bury and Dewsbury, which cater for about six hundred students between them. 35 
Over the last few years, the leaders of the community have agreed to modify the 
original Dars i Nizami curriculum of Deoband so that it may be more suited to Mus- 
lim requirements in Britain. 36 The main addition is a secular timetable in the 
. that 
is taught in English. This section of the curriculum is known as 
Duniawi. This addition of a secular curriculum is something which Deoband in India 
fiercely refuses to do37. At Bury and Dewsbury these subjects are chosen from 
amongst Science, Computer Studies, Mathematics, English Language, Geography, 
Social Studies, History, Urdu and Arabic and taught up to GCSE level. It is unlikely 
that the students will study all of these. Some Bury students informed me that it de- 
pended upon the availability of staff and the demands of the timetable. 
In the afternoons the sole priority is Hifz, the traditional method of learning to 
recite the Qur'an in Arabic without understanding the meaning. 38 At the age of six- 
teen the students can enter the full seven year course to study to become ulema. It is 
not until the third year of this course that they can begin to study the Qur'an in order 
to understand its meaning. 39 In this second period the students will study not only the 
Qur'an but also the Hadith, Arabic, Urdu, Persian and Hana fi fiqh. The main text 
for this is the twelfth century Central Asian work the Hidayah, written by Burhanu'd- 
Din Abu'l-Hasan `Ali Marghinani. This text consists of fifty-seven volumes covering 
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such topics as basic religious duties, purification and cleanliness, apostasy, criminal 
offences, peace and war, the status of non-Muslims, commercial transactions, and the 
administration of government. Each chapter contains the opinions of several jurists 
and scholars. 40 Persian and Urdu have to be learnt because most of the books which 
are studied are in those languages. The Deobandis were influential in making Urdu 
the language of Islam in the subcontinent. The language is immensely important to 
them and has become sacralised second only to Arabic. For three years the students 
have to learn tajwid, the proper pronunciation of Urdu. The language is still the me- 
dium of instruction both in the morning classes of the younger boys and in the senior 
college. When the Qur'an is studied to ascertain its meaning, it is the Urdu transla- 
tion which is used, not English. 41 
The students still learn in the traditional method of the dar-al Ulums in the sub- 
continent. They sit on the floor and wear traditional South Asian Muslim dress. 
Television, radio and videos are forbidden. 42 Philip Lewis notes that the method of 
learning is to master a series of set texts from the Hadith. These are read aloud in 
Arabic and translated into Urdu by the student. The teacher then provides a com- 
mentary on the text in which he offers various interpretations of the meaning as of- 
fered by different scholars. There is no speculation or individual interpretation of the 
text by the students. The successful student is able to memorise the text and 
reproduce the official interpretations. 43 This is exactly the same process that I ob- 
served when I sat in on Hadith classes in Deoband itself. After completing their 
studies, the brighter students go on to further studies in Al Azhar or Medina 
University. Sher Azam told me that the first batch of Bury graduates completing 
their studies at those universities are due back in Britain next year. He feels that this 
will correct the situation whereby the present ulema have an inadequate command of 
the English language. 
The main problem is that we have a shortage of teachers, a shortage of alims who are 
as you have quite rightly said that they do not have enough command of English as 
well as the religion. So we need to fill that gap. 
44 
He admits that there is a reluctance on the part of the mosque committees and 
other Deobandi institutions to switch from Urdu to English in the mosque and at 
meetings. 45 
Sher Azam estimates that there are about 1500 students in the dar al Ulums, in- 
cluding the girls' college in Bradford. He suggests that the present number of col- 
leges does not accommodate the demand from Muslim parents for their children to at- 
tend. He states that this demand is growing, and that more dar al Ulu= will need to 
be opened. He admits that this is one reason for the secular curriculum. 
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If we just prepare them for imaºns then there are not enough mosques in Britain. It is 
a lifetime work and unless the person dies there is a tradition that he carries on46. 
He believes that the dar a! Mums have to equip the students to live in Britain, car- 
rying out other professions. 47 He is also concerned that the ulema should not become 
a priesthood. 
It is one of the religions that does not confine you to a life which says that you must 
not do any other worldly thing. Therefore we have to demonstrate that Islam, being a 
Muslim, or being an alim, or imam, you are not forbidden to be taking part in any- 
thing else. You can be an imam and you can be a barrister, you can be shopkeeper. 
48 
There are two problems with this approach. The course already takes seven years, 
which means that the students graduate at the age of twenty-three if they completes 
the full course. If the dar al Ulum teaches an `A' level curriculum it will add another 
two years. If the students then goes on to a Western university they will be close to 
thirty before completing their education. Sher Azam admits that very few students 
would be sufficiently committed for such a long duration of study. 49 He concedes 
that the emphasis on correct Urdu is very demanding for young British Muslims who 
are more fluent in English. The demands of learning Urdu prevent the dar al Ulums 
running `A' level courses along with the Islamic curriculum. 50 The problem here is 
that the texts are written in Urdu, and the Deobandi ulema are reluctant to abandon a 
teaching medium with which they are so emotively involved. Sher Azam acknowl- 
edges that the problem has been identified, and says that discussions have taken place 
as to how Urdu may be phased out. 51 
The Problem of Deobandi Isolationism 
Previous chapters have explored the history of the development of Deoband in the 
context of the British conquest of India and the decline of Muslim power. The 
Deobandis responded to the social and political changes brought about by colonialism 
by creating a self-conscious ideology and constructing a fence around themselves in 
which the primary focus was group loyalty. This loyalty was expressed as loyalty to 
the pristine faith of Islam. Barbara Metcalf states that the `colonial appropriation of 
public and civic institutions encouraged a kind of retreat to domestic and religious 
space as sites where cultural values could be reworked and renewed'. 52 In order to 
ensure that the correct cultural values were maintained within the walls of the 
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threatened community, the Deobandi uleina issued fatwas on the minutiae of every- 
day life. 
The Deobandi ulema kept their distance from the British, suspecting their motives, 
condemning their lifestyles, and ignoring their secular educational reforms. The 
ulema and their supporters despite their isolation, were vigorously anti-colonial. 53 
Their campaign to purify Islam was dynamic and, notwithstanding their traditional 
orthodoxy, revolutionary and modern in four major areas. Firstly, they defined the 
world of religion as a private domain that was separate from the public arena of 
politics and government. This is explicit in Maulana Hasan Ahmad Madani's state- 
ment that: 
(1) faith was universal and could not be contained within national boundaries, but 
(2) nationality was a matter of geography and Muslims were bound to the nation of 
their birth by obligations of loyalty along with their non-Muslim fellow-citizens. 54 
This allowed the Deobandis to liberate themselves from the politics of confronta- 
tion as implicit in the dichotomy of dar al Islam and dar al Harb. It became politi- 
cally acceptable to live as a minority in a non-Muslim environment if that nation 
could be defined as dar al Amn, a place of tolerance where Muslims could be 
guaranteed the freedom to practice their faith. 55 Secondly, the Deobandi ulema were 
engaged in an attempt to rationalise the faith. There was the beginning of a move 
away from rote learning towards a new emphasis on understanding. 56 Thirdly, the 
Deobandis continued the work of the earlier reformers in making classical Islam more 
accessible to the people by preaching, printing and teaching in the vernacular Urdu. 
They were able to reach both secular educated elites and educated women, and to 
move outwards to the populace as a whole. Fourthly, the Deobandis were concerned 
to include women in their vision of Islam. 
These four areas of change should enable the Deobandis to establish themselves in 
Britain as a group capable of leading the community forward, but as Daniele Joly 
notes, the Deobandis appear to be `the least open to British society'. 57 It has to be 
remembered that the Deobandis are a nineteenth century movement of reform. The 
strategies developed for the reformation and protection of Islam are now routinised 
and institutionalised into Deobandi practice and ideology. Despite the claims of Mus- 
lim leaders in Britain that Islam is flexible and able to accommodate modern tech- 
nological society, the Deobandis are still utilising the strategy of withdrawal that they 
used so successfully in British India in order to protect Islam from the threat of 
secularisation in modern Britain. The ulema are not sufficiently educated to take the 
move towards the self-understanding of Islam a step further. They, hold to the idea 
that the door of iftihad is closed, which means that all the knowledge required to im- 
plement Islam is contained within the interpretations of the classical jurists. All new 
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rulings must not contradict these original pronouncements. The work of the ulema is 
to interpret modern problems in the light of these ancient legal ordinances. They 
have little knowledge of the criteria of the British educational system and, unless the 
dar al Ulums can radically transform their approach from the traditional religious 
education of the subcontinent, it would appear that their graduates are going to be at a 
disadvantage in relation to Muslim youth who attend state schools and universities. 
Even the newly-trained British ulema may find it difficult to reach those of their own 
generation who have been educated in western institutions. Most of the texts which 
they have studied reflect the problems of pre-industrial rural India. Even though the 
majority of the pupils will not become members of the ulema, the demand for places 
in the Deobandi dar al Ulums reflects the traditional Deobandi fear of contamination 
by British society. 
The Deobandis were able to bring their version of Islam to the people of the sub- 
continent through their use of the vernacular. They established Urdu as the foremost 
language of South Asian Islam. In Britain, they now cling to the language as an ex- 
pression of religious elitism. Their children are more fluent in English, and care 
must be taken to ensure that Urdu does not become a religious language that is used 
exclusively in worship and the study of revered sacred texts. In Britain the majority of 
the Deobandi ulema fail to see that the original spirit of Deoband was to communicate 
in the language of the people which is rapidly becoming English. 
The Deobandis have provided religious education for girls by opening a boarding 
school in 1987 in Kidderminster, the Madina ul Uloom Al Islamiyya, which moved to 
Bradford in 1992. The school is under the supervision of Bury dar al Ulum and 
provides the same curriculum. The girls are educated to the level of alima and thus 
become qualified to teach Islam to other women and girls. 58 The Bihishti Zewar is 
still the most influential text for women, in spite of the fact that it is more concerned 
with eliminating customs and superstitions commonplace in rural India considered to 
be un-Islamic. Examples of these practices are: trying to cure illnesses by feeding 
meat to kites or purchasing an animal and setting it free, and placing food at 
crossroads to appease ghosts. 59 Very few Deobandi mosques in Britain have any fa- 
cilities for women, and they are discouraged from praying there. The Deobandis 
traditionally believe that women should pray at home and not join the congregational 
prayers at the mosque. It is unlikely that this approach will satisfy future generations 
of British Muslim women. 
The reforms begun by the Deobandis have now been continued and surpassed by 
the radical programmes of the twentieth century lay Islamic movements with their 
political agenda to revolutionise Islam (see Chapters X& XI). The generally insular 
and conservative Deobandis are still trying to preserve the way of life they established 
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in the subcontinent. This approach ensures that they continue to expend more energy 
fighting battles imported from the subcontinent concerning the true practice of the 
faith than in meeting the demands of Islam in Britain. This can be seen both in their 
vehement criticism of Shi'as and Ahmadiyyas, and in the contents of the Friday 
sermons where their imams still focus on eliminating those customs of subcontinent 
Muslims which are considered bida. 
Deoband and Tabligh-i Jamaat 
The Tablighi missionary groups first visited Britain in 1956, and continued to 
come on a regular basis throughout the 1960s. 60 The leaders of the world-wide 
Tablighi organisation in Nizamuddin, Delhi, were intensely aware of the situation of 
Muslims in Britain and sent the groups to stay and preach in sympathetic mosques. 61 
They were concerned that as the prosperity of the Muslim migrants increased in the 
materialist environment of the West, their worldly ambitions would lead them away 
from Islam. 62 As the Muslim presence in Britain increased, permission was sought 
from India to establish a purpose-built centre which could function as the head- 
quarters of Tabligh-i activity in Britain and Europe. 63 John King states that they 
were told to find a place where there was already an established Muslim population 
which would be familiar with the work of Tabligh-i Jamaat. 64 Dewsbury was 
chosen. Land was purchased in 1972. Construction of the Markazi Mosque began in 
1977 and was completed in 1980. In 1982 the dar al Ulum was opened. 65 
The mosque and dar al Ulum are situated in South Street in the district of Saville 
Town, whose population is almost exclusively Muslim. The mosque is very large and 
impressive, and its green dome and tall minaret dominate the skyline at the end of 
South Street. Inside, in addition to the two spacious prayer halls there are numerous 
offices and meeting rooms. These are used by the imam, by visitors, and by Tabligh- 
i members in transit. As in Nizamuddin, the mosque functions as the centre of 
Tabligh-i missionary activity. The gush (missionary tours) begin and end at 
Dewsbury. This coming and going is constant. There are missions to be organised 
throughout Britain, and visitors arrive from India, Pakistan and other centres in 
Europe and Africa where Tabligh-i is active. The centre is used for work, rest and 
retreat. 66 The dar al Ulum reflects the international structure of Tabligh-i Jamaat 
and has students from Canada, Norway, Denmark, Belgium and France. They all 
study the Deobandi curriculum in Urdu. The presence of the Tabligh-i students is 
noticeable in Dewsbury. They traditionally dress in a white cap, a long kurta well 
below the knees, and pyjamas shortened to be above the ankles. They are bearded 
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and often wear sneakers. 
The spokesman for the Tabligh-i Jarnaat in Dewsbury is Muhammad Ishaq Patel, 
who has been active in Britain since 1956. Ishaq Patel, a Gujarati, denies the title of 
leader on the grounds that the Tablighis are run by a shura which meets every 
Thursday night to discuss strategy. Thursday night is also an open night for Muslims 
where they can listen to guest Tabligh-i preachers. The missionary groups are also 
briefed and de-briefed. 67 
The Tabligh-i Jamaat operates entirely within the Muslim community and is rela- 
tively invisible to outsiders. The Tabligh-i activists are concerned only with dawah 
amongst Muslims. There is no qualification to join but neither is there any doubt 
concerning the piety and enthusiasm of Tabligh-i volunteers. Their experience of 
Islam is through internal conversion and conviction since they were all brought back 
to their faith by the preaching and exemplary lives of the Tabligh-i members with 
whom they came into contact. Their success internationally indicates that they are 
flexible, and that they adapt well to the diversity of Muslim cultures around the 
world. They would appear to be capable of transcending both cultural and linguistic 
differences and the internal divisions amongst the various traditions of Islam as prac- 
tised by Muslims. Tabligh-i Jamaat manages to succeed in this by focussing its ef- 
forts strictly upon the essentials of Islam. Kandhalvi states that the Tablighis spread 
the message of reform through a missionary spirit which encourages people to acquire 
a knowledge of Islam and to work together in brotherly love. 68 It is through the mis- 
sionary tours that they communicate this message of a return to the true elements of 
the faith. Volunteers under the leadership of experienced Tabligh-i preachers go 
from house to house, inviting Muslims to attend the mosque and to learn how to pray. 
They avoid religious controversy and political issues, and focus only on personal reli- 
gious observation. 
The aim of Tabligh-i Jamaat is very simple. It urges the members of the Muslim 
community to remember their faith and return to it. Sher Azam describes them as, 
`an Islamic movement that do not want to have anything to do with any sect, politics, 
or political view... they want to work for self-purification. 69 The Tabligh-i Jamaat 
may indeed welcome Muslims from any background, but their ideological orientation 
is definitely towards the simple and puritanical ideas of Deoband. Muhammad Ilyas, 
the founder of Tabligh-i Jamaat had been a student of Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (see 
Appendix E), the founder of Deoband, and was a qualified Deobandi alim. The key 
difference between Muhammad Ilyas and the Deobandi ulema was Ilyas's strong mis- 
sionary impulse. 
Sher Azam admits that `they say that they are not connected with any tradition, but 
it is fair to say that in Britain most of the work which they do is mainly in Degbandi 
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mosques'. 70 The relationship between Tabligh-i Jamaat and Deoband has been de- 
scribed in various ways. 71 Muhammad Raza claims that `all Tablighis are Deobandis 
but not all Deobandis are Tablighis'. 72 This is certainly true only in terms of the 
inter-relationship in Britain. In other parts of the world where Tabligh-i are active, 
Deoband has no relevance to local Muslims. In the subcontinent, despite the his- 
torical and ideological links, Tabligh-i preachers are not dependent on the Deobandi 
mosque network as they are in Britain. In this country their preachers are reliant on 
the mosques both for accommodation and meeting places and in order to know the 
whereabouts of local Muslims. They have been banned from Barelwi mosques, so 
the old affiliation with Deoband takes on a new and crucial significance. 
Felice Dassetto argues that Tabligh-i Jainaat has four major ways of disseminat- 
ing its message: pilgrimage to Mecca; the network of Gujarati merchants in Asia, 
Africa and Britain; the immigration of workers to European and North American 
countries; and the Deoband connection. 73 The last three all relate to the Deoband 
connection. Philip Lewis, Ahmad Andrews and John King all find evidence of 
Deobandi mosques being used by Tabligh-i Jamaat when on tour. 74 Andrews does a 
network analysis of Deobandi mosques in Scotland using a computer programme 
which conclusively demonstrates the role of both the Deobandi dar al Ulums at Bury 
and Dewsbury, and the activities of Tabligh-i Jamaat in maintaining links between 
the Deobandi mosques in Scotland. 75 Once the lines of communication caused by 
contacts with the dar al Ulums and Tabligh-i Jamaat are removed there is little com- 
munication at all. This reinforces Nielsen's suggestion that Tabligh-i Jamaat and the 
dar al Ulums are forging and maintaining the Deobandi network in Britain. 76 
Philip Lewis notes the relationship between Tabligh-i Jamaat and the two 
Deobandi dar al Ulums in Dewsbury and Bury. 77 The Bury dar al Ulum lacks the 
very close relationship with Tabligh-i Jamaat that exists in Dewsbury but it was es- 
tablished by Yusef Motala, a graduate of Deoband's second most important dar al 
Uluin in India, the Mazahir-i Ulum in Saharanpur. The Saharanpur school has main- 
tained a special link with Tabligh-i Jainaat as Muhammad Ilyas was a teacher there. 78 
Yusef Mutala was directed by his teacher Maulana Zakariya (d. 1982) to establish a 
dar al Ulum in Britain. Maulana Zakariya was an important figure in Tabligh-i 
Jamaat and the writer of their standard text, Tabligh-i Nisab (the Preaching course). 
In Dewsbury, the first aim of the dar al Ulum is to train Tabligh-i Jainaat preachers. 
The students in Dewsbury are expected to spend a weekend every month, some of 
their holidays, and then a whole year at the end of their studies in missionary ac- 
tivity. 79 Lewis claims that the main method of recruitment for both colleges is the in- 
ternational informal Tabligh-i networks. 80 
Lewis's most important discovery concerning the closeness of the relationship be- 
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tween Deobandi mosques and Tabligh-i Jamaat in Britain is the way in which the 
Tabligh-i Nisab is used by Deobandi congregations in Bradford. This book, a com- 
pilation of Qur'anic and Hadith verses, contains stories of the Prophet's companions. 
Lewis notes that `it is a merit/blessing literature rather than application or interpreta- 
tion of the law to society'. 81 Lewis's research in Bradford demonstrated that sections 
of the Tabligh-i Nisab are daily recited in Deobandi mosques for around fifteen 
minutes after asr prayers. 82 Maulana Tassawar ul Haq in Birmingham confirmed that 
this was Deobandi practice throughout the country. 83 These particular passages from 
the book have become a part of institutionalised Deobandi practice that is as unique to 
their mosques as is the na't sung after communal prayers in Barelwi mosques. 
This connection between British Deobandis and Tablighi Jamaat is significant for 
both groups. Tabligh-i Jamaat's appeal outside Britain lies in its universal message, 
but in this country it is limited largely to the Deobandi section of the community be- 
cause of the way in which it spreads and operates. The effect of the Tabligh-i 
Jamaat on the already introverted Deobandis is to isolate them even further from the 
receiving community as Tabligh-i Jamaat's activities are contained exclusively within 
the Muslim community. Dassetto states that `the relationship with the outside is 
entrusted in a relatively exclusive way to particular persons'. 84 Tabligh-i Jmnaat dis- 
courages interfaith contacts, and ecumenical approaches by Christian religious leaders 
have been rebuffed. 85 Members believe that the truth of Islam excludes any kind of 
attempt to find common ground with other religions. They condemn reading news- 
papers, watching television, and listening to the radio, fearing the contaminating con- 
tact that such practices would bring with the secular culture of Britain. They also 
condemn videos, music and dance. Lewis argues that the Deobandi tradition, heavily 
influenced by the ethos of Tabligh-i Jamaat, is consequently not sympathetic to youth 
work unless that youth work is a part of revivalist activity. 86 
This stance of isolation from the wider British society was confirmed by my own 
attempts to gain entry to Dewsbury and Bury. After several telephone calls to Bury I 
gave up any attempt to visit. On my first few calls I was told that it was not possible 
to visit or to interview because the principal, Mufti Shabbir, was away. Finally I was 
told that there was no possibility of visiting the dar al Ulumn as no contact was wanted 
with the non-Muslim world, and that they were not interested in the type of Islamic 
study pursued by Western academics. I also felt that there was an atmosphere of per- 
haps justifiable paranoia concerning British media enquiry. This attitude was con- 
firmed by my attempts to visit Dewsbury. An initial telephone inquiry asking for 
Muhammad Ishaq Patel was met by an invitation to the `open' Thursday night meet- 
ing. On arrival at the mosque I was greeted by a cordon of students surrounding the 
building and young Tabligh-i activists who were acting as security. This was surpris- 
ing as I had never before been stopped from entering a mosque in this way. On 
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mentioning my appointment, I was escorted to an office where the shura was meet- 
ing. Muhammad Ishaq Patel apologetically informed me that a mistake had been 
made; I should never have been invited to the mosque at all. The `open' night was 
for Muslims only. Since an error had been made he allowed me to attend the meeting 
in the mosque, but informed me that I was not allowed to return. When I mentioned 
that I was personally interested in Islam, he told me to visit my local mosque. He 
furthermore informed me that the Tabligh-i Jamaat were not interested in non- 
Muslims that were attracted to Islam, only after conversion could they attend Tabligh- 
i meetings. 
Inside the mosque I joined several hundred mainly younger Muslims who were 
having the preaching translated to them in English by a Tabligh-i member. The 
preaching was of an anecdotal style consisting of stories about the Prophet and his 
companions. Generally these stories emphasised the faith and conviction that existed 
amongst the first Muslims. The overwhelming message was one of faith. Muham- 
mad Ilyas preferred to call Tabligh-i Jamaat `the faith movement' or Tahrik-i 
Iman. 87 There were a few English converts to Islam in the congregation, but they 
were all dressed as Pakistanis in shalwar kamis. Even their beards were cut to the 
style of subcontinent Muslims. All the South Asian Muslims were dressed in the 
same style. Only a few Africans wore their own style of clothes. At the end of the 
preaching, a Tabligh-i member began to call on the congregation to come forward to 
the front to offer themselves for preaching tours. He stressed that they could 
volunteer as much time as they had available. I was told that the family system in the 
West was not strong enough to allow breadwinners to leave on a full preaching tour. 
Other students, however, were dismissive of this, claiming that faith in Allah should 
be the Muslim's first priority. Everything else would be taken care of. The invita- 
tion to missionary work was made in a fervent manner. 
When Muhammad Ishaq Patel noticed that I was still in the mosque and seeing 
the call to missionary activity and speaking to members of the congregation, he came 
and took me outside. The atmosphere was one of intense secrecy and a defensive fear 
of attracting attention from the wider British society. The connection between 
Deoband and Tabligh-i Jamaat was played down. Muhammad Ishaq Patel admitted 
that there was sympathy for the Deoband school of thought but insisted that the 
Tabligh-i Jainaat were a simple movement existing only in order to strengthen faith 
and to bring Muslims back to prayer as the basis of their religion. His last words to 
me told me politely but firmly never to return. 
The Tabligh-i priority is with dawah. The Deobandi mosques form a relatively 
static network, fixed in a geographical location. The mosques serve as a focal point 
for Muslim communities sympathetic to Deobandi traditions. Tabligh-i Jamaat, 
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however, is dynamic and mobile, with its teams of preachers moving from mosque to 
mosque. The itinerant missionaries serve to reinforce the values of introversion al- 
ready prevalent amongst the Deobandis. 
Conclusion 
In spite of the fact that individual Deobandi mosque congregations are often found 
to be more ethnically diverse in Britain, 88 the Deobandis in this country are not free 
from that tendency of South Asian Muslims to bring the rallying cry of Islam to the 
defence of particular class structures or ethnic groupings, as in the case of the 
muhajirs in Pakistan. The symbols of doctrine have been called up to defend ethnic, 
class and/or kinship networks within the South Asian Muslim community. They have 
also been used by the Deobandis, as they were in nineteenth century India, against the 
external forces of British culture. The policy of the Deobandis is still one of isolation 
and retreat from the old colonial enemy, even though they themselves are now British 
citizens. They are the products of colonial experience, affected by the social and 
political changes engendered by that experience. Their relationship with modern 
Britain is still determined by the strategies that they developed in order to deal with 
the British presence in India, and the resultant loss of Muslim power. Their attitude 
to the receiving culture of Britain is consequently fearful and defensive. The first 
generation of migrants is more likely to respond to the orthodox conservatism of the 
tradition because, while its members seek a new alternative from the apparently out- 
moded folk-religion of rural Islam, they do not want to compromise their identity as a 
people firmly rooted in South Asia. The Deobandi tradition is familiar and author- 
itative. 
John King's informants in Birmingham told him that the younger members of the 
community are statistically under-represented in mosque attendance. 89 One of the 
problems is that the Deobandis are reluctant to enter into social activities outside the 
sphere of worship. The influence of Tabligh-i Jainaat has reinforced this tendency 
considerably. Members' refusal to participate in Western entertainment and media 
will alienate many younger British-born and British-educated Muslims. My overall 
impression confirms that of John King's: the network of mosques representing 
Deoband and Tabligh-i Jamaat has its emphasis firmly placed upon an introspective 
concern with a particular stance towards the practice of Islam amongst Muslims90. 
Most of the activity with which Tabligh-i Jamaat is involved in Britain is designed to 
reinforce the internal cohesion of a particular ideological section within the British 
Muslim community. Since this group is still not free from the historical confines of 
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either South Asian politics or South Asian ethnic divisions, the ethos of Tabligh-i 
Jamaat that it is universal is severely compromised by its connection with Deobandis 
in Britain. The Deobandi association with Tabligh-i Jamaat will further reinforce 
their insularity. On the other hand, the Deobandis will benefit from the Tabligh-i 
Jaºnaat's use of their mosque network for their missionary activities as those attracted 
to the message will continue to frequent the mosques. The close contact will also con- 
nect the insular Deobandis to the activities of Tabligh-i Jamaat worldwide and thus 
help to provide a wider frame of reference than the subcontinent. 
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Chapter X 
JAMAAT-I ISLAMI - PAKISTAN AND INDIA 
Introduction 
Chapter VII and VIII demonstrate the responses of the subcontinent reform move- 
ments in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to the loss of Muslim power. Their 
policy of isolating themselves and focusing on reform amongst Muslims was initially 
successful in safeguarding the community from the impact of invading non-Muslim 
culture and ideas. In the twentieth century, however, many Muslims felt that the 
ulema had become hidebound, conservative, and totally out of touch with the prob- 
lems of the modern world. The new political situation demanded confrontation with 
the Western colonial powers. As the Muslim nations struggled for independence, the 
question arose of how the newly-emerging nation states should be governed. The 
ulema's conservative attitudes to the modern world placed in a weak position to in- 
fluence this debate. In particular, their attitude to ijtihad made it particularly difficult 
for them to adapt to the rapid changes brought about science and technology. 
In the twentieth century, throughout the Muslim world, groups arose that chal- 
lenged the secular and nationalist ideas of the ruling classes on the grounds that they 
were tainted by western imperialism and were not Islamic. They also criticised the 
ulema. The twentieth century revivalists were not prepared to be apologists for 
Islam; they condemned the west and its values and asserted the self-sufficiency and 
superiority of Islam. They attacked both the ethos of personal piety and the rise of 
ethnic or national consciousness. 1 Islam, they urged, had to be a comprehensive 
ideology for personal and public life. It had to be the only foundation upon which 
Muslim society and state could be built. They combined their religious ideas with so- 
cial and political activism; true believers were distinguished from their fellow Mus- 
lims and were to be totally committed to the struggle to transform society along Is- 
lamic lines. These groups mobilised opposition against what they saw as corrupt 
westernised elites. This situation was exacerbated by the contradiction between the 
poverty of the masses and the affluence of the privileged classes. 
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Pakistan 
The creation of the independent state of Pakistan was inspired by the Muslim 
League's claim that the Muslims of India formed a separate nation. This communal 
definition of nationhood was reinforced by arguments emphasising a distinct Islamic 
way of life. This campaign for the creation of an independent Muslim state was rein- 
forced by the idea at the heart of Islam of an independent political community as the 
best arena for religious activity. It has been demonstrated in Chapter VI that in the 
subcontinent this impulse for Muslim separatism had stemmed from the 19th century 
revivalists inspired by Shah Wali-allah. 
The important point here is that to the Muslims of the subcontinent, the attainment 
of a state of their own was a religious as well as a political event. One of the new 
state's main aims was to enable Muslims once more to be able to implement their 
faith in the political realm. This aspiration is explicit in both the 1949 Objective 
Resolution presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan, and the 
1956 Constitution of Pakistan. The Objective Resolution categorically states that 
Islam is the raison d'etre for the creation of the nation in that it should serve as the 
main source of inspiration for `the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, 
tolerance, and social justice as enunciated by Islam', and that these ideals should be 
fully observed in Pakistan. 2 The Constitution itself begins with the declaration that 
Sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone and the authority 
which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people, after being ex- 
ercised within the limits prescribed by Him, is a sacred trust. 
3 
Ironically one of the new state's first problems arose out of this Islamic ethos 
that was inbuilt into the logic of Muslim nationalism. There were those who took the 
ideal of an Islamic state far more literally and much more seriously. There were those 
who believed that the new nation had been created for the sole purpose of showing 
the world a model Islamic state that was based on the sovereignty of Allah rather than 
on the secular idea of the sovereignty of the people. These groups emphatically 
declared that Islam was a better alternative to both capitalism and communism. They 
argued that in Islam there is no distinction between the spiritual and the temporal 
realm: the matter of worldly life is not left to the discretion of human beings; there is 
a clearly defined path based on revelation; and God has commissioned the state to en- 
force these commands. The Medinan state under the Prophet and the first four 
Caliphs was used as the standard reference for this ideal. 
The new state of Pakistan needed to establish an industrial base. This required 
the expansion and dissemination of modern skills through an education system that 
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was secular and not dependent on received religious wisdom. This transformation of 
Pakistani society was a challenge to traditional views. The uleina had failed to come 
to terms with the modernisation process; increasingly the urban educated sectors of 
the population saw them as superstitious and clinging on to outmoded traditional ideas 
which were irrelevant in the modern technological world. The secularisation of cul- 
ture, however, which accompanied the processes of urbanisation and the development 
of modern science and technology, was seen by many as the heritage of the West and 
as a legacy of the colonial period. Independence had not freed the Muslim nations 
from the colonial influence of the Western powers; it had merely changed the form of 
the oppression. The modernist trend in Islam was suspected of compromising with the 
exploiters. The old reform message that Islam needed to be cleansed of any kind of 
cultural influence, whether it originated in the West or in the historical heritage of 
Hindu India appeared in a new form. The message of the new revivalists was that a 
purified Islam practised within the context of an Islamic state would provide the 
proper ideological framework for the nation to address itself to modernisation. This 
wl-Iký' 
new Islamic Movement was to appear in the Arab world in groups like at mSl; ý;,,, In 
the subcontinent it was spearheaded by Jamaat-i Islami, led by its founder Maulana 
Mawdudi (1903-1979). 
Maulana Mawdudi -a brief biography 
Maulana Mawdudi was born in Aurangabad, Hyderabad, India to a family with a 
long tradition of spiritual leadership within the Chishti Sufi order-4 His father 
(Ahmad Hasan), a lawyer and a highly religious man, a early companion of Sir 
Sayyid Ahmad Khan, 5 sent his son to be educated at Madrasa Fawqaniyah, which 
combined modern Western and traditional Islamic education. 6 Mawdudi went on to be 
an undergraduate at the dar al Ulum in Hyderabad, but had to abandon his studies 
when his father fell ill and died.? From this point onwards, he was essentially self- 
educated. During the 1920's he learnt Arabic, Persian and English. 
During this period his interest in politics began and he turned to journalism in 
order to make a living. He moved to Delhi to become the editor of Muslim (1921- 
1923) and, later, Al-Jam'iyat (1925-1928). Both of these newspapers were organs of 
the orthodox Deobandi Jmn'iat i Ulema i Hind. 8 His principle interests during this 
period were journalistic and academic. In 1928 he resigned from Al-Jam'iyat and 
returned to Hyderabad, where he concentrated on research and writing. In 1930 he 
published his first major book, Al Jihad Fi al Islam, a scholarly treatise on the Is- 
lamic laws of war and peace. 9 
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In 1932 Mawdudi started his own journal, Tarjuman al Qur'an. This he used as 
the main means of propagating his ideas on Islamic revival, a movement which he de- 
scribed as `Islamic renaissance'. In Tarjuman al Qur'an he focussed upon issues aris- 
ing out of the conflict between the Islamic and the Western world view. His meth- 
odology was to study everything concerning both, passing judgement according to 
their conformity with the teachings of the Qur'an and SunnalO. On Islamic grounds 
he condemned the ideologies of democracy, nationalism, and secularism which were 
growing a pace amongst Indians of all religious affiliations in the Independence 
Movement. It Mawdudi was particularly hostile to nationalism, which he saw as to- 
tally incompatible with Islam and the concept of ummah. 
Between 1937 and 1947 he opposed the Indian nationalist position of Madani and 
the Deoband ulema because of their alliance with the Congress Party. In 1939, 
however, Mawdudi began to attack Jinnah and the Muslim League, denouncing its 
secular leadership and arguing that the League was only a Westernised elite that 
desired Muslim nationalism, declaring that it wanted this solely to further its own in- 
terests. Mawdudi declared himself to be interested not in self-determination or the 
political freedom of the Indian Muslims, but in the rule of Islam; he sought to estab- 
lish a purely Islamic theocracy. He argued that Jinnah's concept of Pakistan would 
lead to the formation of a pagan state and he criticised the League's leadership as fol- 
lows: 
Not a single leader of the Muslim League from Jinnah himself to the rank and file has 
an Islamic mentality or Islamic habits of thought, or looks at political and social prob- 
lems from the Islamic viewpoint... their ignoble role is to safeguard merely the 
material interests of Indian Muslims by every possible political manoeuvre or trick- 
ery. 
12 
He moved to Pathankot, in the eastern part of the Punjab, where in collaboration 
with Iqbal, he established an academic research centre called Dar al Islam. Their vi- 
sion was to train scholars who would produce works of outstanding quality on Islam 
and carry out the reconstruction of Islamic 
Law in the post-colonial era. 13 
This move began to give actuality to Mawdudi's belief that the capabilities of the 
best minds at a given moment 
in history should be mobilised into a Jihad movement 
to bring about Islamic revolution. In 
1941 he was to make a much more ambitious 
and comprehensive step in this 
direction. He established Jamaat-i Islami, appointing 
himself amir, a position which 
he held until his retirement on the grounds of ill-health 
in 1972.14 In 1947, despite his opposition to the formation of Pakistan, he migrated 
to the newly-formed nation. 
In 1948 he modified his attitude to the existence of the 
state of Pakistan. He decided to support 
Pakistan under the principle of `gradualism'. 
The resources of Jamaat-i Islami were utilised 
in the political arena to work towards 
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the Islamicisation of the law and constitution of the state. Throughout the 1950s until 
his death, Mawdudi and the Jamaat were particularly active in any issue which re- 
lated to the Islamic identity of Pakistan. 
The ideas of Maulana Mawdudi 
Ishtiaq Ahmed states that `Mawdudi is considered one of the ablest theoreticians of 
the Islamic state in the Muslim world'15. Mawdudi consistantly argued the first step 
in bringing about a genuine Islamic renaissance was to convert the state to Islam. The 
Shari'ah had to be fully restored, and all laws from other sources repealed. Secular- 
minded officials had to be replaced, and all the media of education and mass com- 
munication had to be utilised towards the creation of an Islamic consciousness in the 
populaces. 16 This is because Islam is more than just a personal faith; it is a complete 
way of life (Din). He stresses that the Shari'ah does not recognise any division be- 
tween religion and other aspects of life, especially between religion and the state. He 
sees the division between religion and state as a Western invention. 
Mawdudi argued that the need for an Islamic state arose from the nature of 
universal order. God's law governs all creation, but man suffers from the delusion of 
independence. Nature is under the sway of Islam because it obeys God's natural law, 
but human beings have the capacity to choose to obey or disobey. In order that they 
may make the correct choice there is revelation. Human behaviour is governed, 
therefore, by revealed law just as the universe, is ruled by natural law. The law which 
governs human behaviour is fully revealed in the Qur'an and Sunna of the Prophet. 
17 
The key to understanding Mawdudi's ideas on the necessity of the Islamic state is his 
interpretation of the Kalima. He saw the major problem of history not as mankind's 
denial of the existence of one God but as mankind's unwillingness or refusal to recog- 
nise the sovereignty of God. 18 Mawdudi interpreted the Kalima as a statement which 
not only proclaims the uniqueness of God as the Creator or sole object of worship, 
but also expresses the uniqueness of God as the Master, Sovereign, Lord and law- 
giver. God alone has the right to command. 19 
It is this revolutionary interpretation of the Kalima which provided Mawdudi with 
his main critique of the intrusion of Western ideas and philosophy into Muslim 
society. Secularism, nationalism and Western models for democracy are all based on 
the idea of the sovereignty of the people. Mawdudi argued that the acceptance of any 
other authority as sovereign is a form of shirk, and as such raises that authority to the 
status of being a partner with Allah. 20 The moral evil of the age, which all true Mus- 
lims should actively oppose, consists of accepting other sovereigns such as `the will of 
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the people' or the laws of worldly rulers and setting them over and above God. True 
Islamic faith must strive for the creation of an Islamic society as well as individual 
righteousness. Islam leads individuals to develop a community of faith which pro- 
motes social change by creating a society fully obedient to God's law. Mawdudi 
called this state `the Caliphate based on the Prophetic pattern'. 21 It is a human 
caliphate under the sovereignty of God with no power to make new laws, but it will 
work within the limits prescribed by Allah by fully implementing the Shari'ah. 
Ideally, the state would be ruled by an amir in consultation with a council (shura). 
Mawdudi called this a `theo-democracy' as it was based on the equality of all Muslims 
under the sovereignty of Allah. Again and again, Mawdudi returns to the period of 
the Prophet and the `four rightly guided Caliphs' as his blueprint regarding everything 
he says about the Islamic state and its constitution. 22 Mawdudi, however, is not 
against the discoveries of science and technology, which he believes should be used to 
further the progress of the Islamic state. In order to achieve the goal of the Islamic 
state and the total change in consciousness that this would require, it is necessary that 
an organised movement should be launched that would culminate in in the estab- 
lishment of a state committed to Islam. This organised movement would strive to 
achieve the revolutionary direction that Mawdudi's vision gives to Islam. 
This movement is given organisational form in the Jamaat-i Islami. It would help 
to create a revolution to overthrow the new but sinful leaders of the Muslim world, 
and replace them with the faithful who would follow God as the legal sovereign. 23 A 
Muslim society that either creates its own constitution or borrows legal or constitu- 
tional elements from outside Islam breaks its covenant with God and therefore loses 
its right to be considered Islamic. 24 The Shari`ah alone is the codification of the con- 
tract laid down in the Qur'an. 
Mawdudi, like Shah Wali-allah, emphasised the importance of the Shari'ah but 
also advocated tolerance and flexibility in interpretation. 25 He believed, like Shah 
Wali-allah, that the doors of ijtihad are never closed. In an Islamic state the Legisla- 
ture can interpret laws but it cannot make them. 26 Mawdudi suggests that Qiyas 
(analogy) can be used. Legislators and scholars can also delve into the spirit of the 
Shari'ah and the intention of the Prophet in order to formulate specific rules accor- 
dingly. 
He also attacked the conservative ulema for adding too many rules of their own 
invention to the fundamental commands of the Qur'an and Sunna. He criticised the 
ulema for being unable to distinguish between the complex structure of the mediaeval 
legal schools and the basics of Islam. He argued that a Muslim may use his or her 
own reasoning powers against the ulema, or even use personal taffaqa (legal deduc- 
tion) to determine exactly what the Qur'anic commands mean to mankind. Mawdudi 
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argued that most of the ulema deny the right of interpretation, because they consider 
it to have been completed by the great legalists of the past, 27 which meant that the 
gate of i jtihad was closed. Mawdudi's emphasis on the use of reason required a high 
level of understanding of their religion from individual Muslims. Certainly, he said, 
all should be able to read and understand the Qur'an for themselves; rote learning was 
not sufficient. Consequently, Mawdudi's Jamaat-i Islami placed great emphasis on 
education and training for laymen. Charles Adams suggests that Mawdudi's emphasis 
on reason links him to the modernists, influenced by Western ideas, who argue that 
Islam must be rational. 28 In fact, Mawdudi's ideas concerning the use of reason need 
not in fact be derived from Western sources, since they link him directly to the tradi- 
tion of reformers following in the influential footsteps of Shah Wali-allah. 
Maulana Mawdudi's direct legacy from Shah Wali-allah is also seen in his urgent 
plea for Muslims to return to the essence of an Islam firmly based on the Qur'an and 
Sunna. Although there can be no deviation from the fundamentals of Islam, Maw- 
dudi did not enforce such outward forms as wearing special dress, certain kinds of ap- 
pearance, extra prayers, or the adoption of an ascetic lifestyle. He is also tolerant on 
fiqh, recognising all the major legal schools of Islam. This is because Mawdudi be- 
lieved that Muslims should go direct to the Qur'an and Sunna, and only then consult 
fiqh, if necessary. Despite this flexibility, however, Mawdudi was himself deeply 
conservative. His own tofsir of the Qur'an, Tafhim al Qur'an, is so literal that it 
barely leaves any scope for interpretation at all. In Gilani's observations of Maulana 
Mawdudi he notes that Mawdudi's beard was cut to `one and half fist long' and that 
his hair was `straight, combing backwards, sloping on to an evenly cut straight base at 
the back of the neck'. 29 Gilani comments that this is according to the Sunna. Despite 
Mawdudi teaching that there is no such thing as Islamic dress except insofar as people 
should be modest according to the Qur'an's command, Gilani states that `In the matter 
of dress he (Mawdudi) is quite a nationalist. He accepts that certain dresses of other 
cultures are `permissible' according to the Shari'ah, but he would not prefer those, 
lest it might express inferiority complex'. 30 This conservatism is demonstrated by 
Mawdudi's grave, which is simply an unmarked mound of earth on the lawn of his 
house in Lahore. 
The most important example of Mawdudi's conservatism is his attitude towards 
Muslim women. Zakaria Bashier claims that although Mawdudi was not a 
traditionalist in many of his views, he certainly was on the question of women. He 
notes that Mawdudi analysed and defended the traditionalist position in regard to 
women in his book al-Hijab, in which he argued that covering the face is part of the 
Muslim woman's veil. 31 Mawdudi believed that Islam has different areas of activity 
for men and women and that women should remain in the confines of the home, 
while men devote themselves to activities in the socio-economic sphere. If women 
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should have to go out of their homes for any reason, they should be fully veiled and 
covered. 32 
Above all, Mawdudi believed that the transformation of society required political 
power. To this end he deeply involved himself in the politics of Pakistan and India, 
although his stance is thoroughly religious in character. Mawdudi's political 
campaign is the inevitable conclusion of his belief in the sovereignty of God. He em- 
phasised that he was not expounding a new interpretation of Islam or creating sec- 
tarian differences, but only attempting to return to the original faith stripped of 
cultural impurity. His deep involvement in the politics of Pakistan may have un- 
dermined this somewhat, but his stance based on a return to the principles of Qur'an 
and Sunna echoes the position of Islamic revivalists throughout the Muslim world. 
Jamaat-i Islami -a vehicle for Mawdudi's ideas 
Maulana Mawdudi created the organisation of Jamaat-i Islam in 1941 with the 
idea of training committed members who would work tirelessly towards the founda- 
tion of an Islamic state in the subcontinent. The organisation was a change from the 
earlier reform movements in that these had been primarily concerned with how to be 
Muslim under colonial rule. Jamaat-i Islami tackled the wider question of how to be 
Muslim when faced with the overall domination of Western civilisation. The solution 
was to create a state which would simultaneously embody the teachings of Islam and 
exemplify these to both the West and other Muslim nations. On Partition in 1947, 
Mawdudi divided the organisation into two separate and independent parts: one for 
India and the other for Pakistan. The organisation in Pakistan was given the task of 
implementing Maulana Mawdudi's four-point programme: the first aim was in- 
tellectual, in that there should be a campaign to educate Muslims in the teachings of 
Islam, purged of all foreign accretions and false ideas; the second aim was to carry 
the message of Islam to all people in Pakistan who were inclined to work for the es- 
tablishment of righteousness in human society, and then to mould them into an effi- 
cient organisation; the third part of the programme was to persuade committed Mus- 
lims to dedicate themselves to bringing about a complete change in society based on 
the teachings of Islam; and finally, fourthly, they should work for a complete change 
of leadership, both intellectual and political. 
Thus the state could become truly Is- 
lamic once its affairs were directed by people of clear 
Islamic vision and commit- 
ment. 33 
To succeed in these goals, trained cells of 
Islamic activists were formed to work 
towards achieving social and political 
leadership. Jamaat-i Islami remained com- 
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mitted to the idea of the Islamic state in which there would be Islamic government, 
economic institutions, banking, and the implementation of the Shari'ah in both public 
and private life. The organisation functioned as an efficient opposition to the go- 
vernment, and played a major role in the overthrow of Bhutto in 1977. This resulted 
in some of their leaders becoming ministers under Zia al Haq, and in several of their 
policies being implemented. There were major reforms of the penal code, which 
reintroduced traditional Islamic punishments for certain offences. A Shari'ah judici- 
ary was established, but it had to operate in tandem with qualified common law 
judges. There were also fiscal and economic reforms involving payment of zakat and 
experimental forms of free banking. Finally, the government introduced a national 
Islamic curriculum into schools; separate universities were opened for women; and 
Urdu replaced English as the language of higher education. 
The major problem for the further progress of Jainaat-i Islami was its inability to 
capture the support of either the masses or the ruling classes. Its numbers have al- 
ways remained relatively small. Even in 1974, during the regime of Zia, there were 
only 2,500 members, although there were several hundred thousand sympathisers who 
to varying degrees had participated in its training programmes. 34 The masses, al- 
though emotive in their loyalty to Islam, were uneducated. Their religion was not the 
ideological faith of Jainaat-i Islami member but the folk Islam of the village. Their 
loyalty was to the local imam or pir. Maulana Mawdudi's appeal was to the lower 
middle-classes, urban discontents, and idealistic youth. The members of Jamaat-i Is- 
lami tended to be drawn from the products of Western modernisation: engineers, 
teachers and lawyers. These were the new young rising middle-classes who were op- 
posed to the ruling class with whom they competed for control. They were opposed 
to the ulema and pirs on the grounds that they found them ignorant and superstitious, 
and opposed to the West on the grounds of post-colonial exploitation. Mawdudi's ra- 
tional but vehement attack on both Western ideology and the Islam of the clerics ap- 
pealed to them. It gave them an ideology and an identity with which to fight for their 
place in their society. 
The organisational structure of Jacnaat-i Islami 
Jamaat-i Islami is a lay organisation with a qualitative hierarchical pyramid struc- 
ture. At the top of the pyramid is the Amir, who is elected by the members every 
five years. The Amir is assisted in running the organisation by a Shura, or consulta- 
tive council. This council is comprised of one hundred and forty members, seventy 
of whom are directly elected by the wider membership and another seventy of whom 
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are appointed. The Shura consists of scholars of Islam and `persons of piety and ac- 
tivity'35 who formulate its decisions on major issues and who also decide on the day- 
to-day policy decisions of the Jamaat. Sometimes the Shura nominates a committee 
of ulema to review certain issues relating to fiqh. Under this central Shura come the 
provincial organisations which are run by an elected General Secretary and com- 
mittee. Again, this central organisation for each province in Pakistan supervises the 
activities of the branches in its area. 36 In October 1992 there were 75 district bran- 
ches in Pakistan. Each branch elects its own organising committee. The branches are 
composed of members, associate members, workers, and sympathisers. This division 
is a qualitative one. The workers attend training programmes and become involved in 
Jamaat-i Islami activities. After this they progress according to their development in 
the training programmes, their involvement in the organisation, and the quality of the 
Islamic life they are seen to be leading. The training is rigorous, and the standard ex- 
pected of members very high. In 1992 there were 7,000 full members. There are no 
figures for the other categories, but it is estimated that there are roughly a million ac- 
tive supporters of the Jamaat in Pakistan. 37 Jamaat-i Islami leadership is aware of 
its inability to attract a wide cross-section of the Pakistan population and has special- 
ised sections which work with specific groups. In order to attract the rural population 
there is a separate organisation to improve the lives of peasant farmers. The objective 
of this group is to introduce the religious message whilst working with the people on 
a variety of agricultural and socio-environmental projects. The Jamaat has also 
organised its own trade unions for the workers in urban industries. Through these 
two operations the Jamaat hopes to increase its popularity amongst the common 
people. 38 This kind of activity has resulted in the establishment of a social work 
programme (Paasban). According to Maulana Shahid Raza this programme is 
criticised by many in the leadership of Jamaat-i Islami because they fear that an ex- 
pansion of this kind of social activity will engulf the rigid selectiveness of the 
Jamaat's structure. 39 There are also separate professional organisations for teachers 
and doctors, and the very successful students' organisation. 
The nerve centre of these well-organised and tightly disciplined groups is the na- 
tional headquarters in Lahore. The Mansurah complex is situated in the suburbs of 
the city, and forms a self-contained township in its own right. Altogether about one 
hundred families are housed on the complex. About 25 people are employed full- 
time in running the central offices, while the remainder work outside the organisation 
in their chosen professions. 
Many of the various buildings are concerned with education. The Islamic 
Research Academy engages fifteen scholars in translating books, editing papers, and 
producing some original works. There is also the Centre for Islamic Education 
situated in the large and recently constructed mosque complex. Some of the students 
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live on campus and some live nearby. Besides teaching the Qur'an, Hadith, Arabic 
and Urdu, the school also has English Language, Economics and Political Science on 
the curriculum. The students are presented as private candidates to the examinations 
of the Punjab University or the Board of Secondary Education. The final level of 
achievement is accepted as an M. A. degree in Islamic Studies awarded by the Punjab 
University. There are also several other schools: a small primary school for girls and 
two high schools, one for boys and one for girls. These schools take in children from 
the surrounding area as well as the children of the families living in the complex. 
There is also a small school which specialises in memorising the complete Qur'an, 
and another Islamic college which takes in students from countries where Islam is 
weak and Muslims a minority. This college is primarily for students from China and 
the former Soviet Union. The predominance of schools and colleges in Mansurah in- 
dicates the importance which the Jainaat gives to education in its dawah activities. 
Besides these institutions there is a small out-patient clinic for local people, and, 
very interestingly, an advanced surgical hospital set up for severely wounded Afghan 
mujahiddin. Jamaat-i Islami also had two hospitals nearer the Afghanistan border in 
Quetta and Peshawar. The hospitals and the college for educating Muslim minority 
students from Central Asia demonstrates that the activities of the Pakistan Jamaat-i 
Islami extend beyond the confines of the country, linking the organisation to the Is- 
lamic Movement worldwide. 
Islami Jami'at-i Talaba 
Islami Jami'at-i Talaba was founded on December 3rd 1947 to propagate the 
message to the campuses and schools of Pakistan. The Talaba is organised on the 
same hierarchical principle as Jamaat-i Islami, but the elections for office in the 
organisation are held annually. This is a practical arrangement since membership of 
the Talaba ends when the student completes full-time education. 40 There are six hun- 
dred full members, in addition to which the Talaba has widespread support in the 
campuses and schools of Pakistan. Membership of the Talaba does not constitute 
membership of Jamaat-i Islami in spite of the equally rigorous training 
programmes. 41 It says something for the quality of Jamaat-i Islami membership that 
the outgoing Secretary-General of the Talaba, who had also been President of the 
Students' Union at the Punjab University, was accepted only as an Associate Member 
of Jamaat-i Islami. 42 The Talaba operates independently of the Jamaat, and has its 
own headquarters in the city next door to the house where Maulana Mawdudi resided 
until his death in 1979. Every afternoon from their schools and colleges the students 
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come to their Talaba headquarters. Here they engage in training programmes, run 
the various departments (Mass media, Publications, and Finance), and go out on vari- 
ous organised dawah activities. There is an atmosphere of intense activity. 
The Talaba has a variety of programmes. There is literature aimed particularly at 
schoolchildren which includes stories from Islam's past. The Talaba organises pic- 
nics for schoolchildren in which Islam is taught through stories and games. 43 The 
main work, however, goes on in the universities. Typical of student organisations, 
the Talaba produces literature, holds debates, sells newspapers, and proselytises on 
campus, visits door-to-door in the student quarters, and holds large rallies and meet- 
ings. 44 The Talaba are also involved in student politics and social activities at a more 
general level. They have fought many campaigns to better the conditions of students 
and, on an individual level, they try to assist poor students with funds or even with 
clothes and food where necessary. To these activities they bring with them the level 
of organisation and discipline which is considered the normal standard in Jamaat-i Is- 
lami, but which is generally unusual in the subcontinent. As a result of this success 
the Talaba is popular amongst students, and its members are voted into student union 
positions right across the country. 
The involvement of the Talaba in student union activities is particularly noticeable 
in the Punjab University, Lahore, which has been transformed by Talaba activity. 
For the last twenty years the Talaba have won every election on the university 
campus, despite attempts by other political groups to defeat them by forming al- 
liances. A visit to the campus revealed the dominant influence the Talaba has over 
the students' activities and behaviour. Although the majority are not actually follow- 
ing Talaba principles, there is immense respect for those who do. Professor Zafarul- 
lah Sheikh, the Dean of the Faculty of Engineering and Technology, stressed the high 
moral standards of the Talaba youth, and observed that these days the campus is used 
for youth rallies which preach the standards and morality of Islam. He pointed out 
that the mosque, which had fallen into disuse, is now packed every Friday afternoon. 
After the prayers, the preaching is done by Talaba members. Dr. Sheikh claims that 
this transformation has come about because of the high standard of personal morality 
and behaviour amongst the Talaba, and their overwhelming success in holding all the 
higher offices in the Student Union for the last twenty years. Dr. Sheikh also com- 
mented that the students were now working harder and obtaining better degrees. He 
stated that this made the Talaba very popular amongst the staff of the University, 
regardless of their own religious or political affiliation. 45 
There is no doubt that the members emphasise academic performance as well as 
religious activity. The Talaba insists that its members get the best results possible in 
all their fields of endeavour. This echoes Mawdudi's belief that revolution had to 
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begin at the top of society by replacing the traditional rulers with new leaders whose 
priority was Islam. The Talaba has established an organisation in conjunction with 
Jamaat-i Islami whose objective is to select the brightest students of the Jamaat as 
early as the intermediate high school level and bring them under special observation 
and training. The aim of this operation is to guide the careers of society's most gifted 
members into the armed forces, the bureaucracy, government, economy, technology 
and medicine. 46 In this way the Jamaat has long-term plans to bring about Maw- 
dudi's hopes for a transformation of Pakistani society. 
Jamaat-i Islami Hind 
Jamaat-i Islami in India is a completely separate organisation with its own Amir 
and Shura. The organisational structure is the same as in Pakistan. The organisation 
is active in nearly all of India's states, but in keeping with the Jamaat's philosophy of 
a qualitative hierarchy, the membership is small. There are around 4,000 members, 
15,000 associate members, 100,000 workers and a large number of sympathisers. 47 
The organisation publishes magazines, newspapers, journals and books in almost all 
of India's major languages, and puts a lot of energy into translating into these lan- 
guages many major Islamic works, including the Qur'an and Hadith. The organisa- 
tion also has a student's wing called the Students' Islamic Organisation (SIO). 48 In 
the major states the Jamaat has organised women's branches of the student wing and, 
like its Pakistan counterpart, provides equal training in Islam to both sexes. The GIO 
or Girl's Islamic Organisation is particularly strong in Kerala and Andhya Pradesh. 49 
There is an essential difference between the work of the Jatnaat in Pakistan and 
the work of the Jamaat in India. Muslims in India comprise only 12% of the popula- 
tion, so consequently there is no overt ideology to make India an Islamic state. 
Jamaat-i Islami Hind is engaged in an active and well-organised programme of 
dawah. The thrust of this work is two-pronged. Firstly, there is an active outreach 
programme to non-Muslims. 50 There is a considerable literature devoted to explain- 
ing Islam to non-Muslims, and in Madras Jamaat-i Islami runs a successful campaign 
for converting harijans to Islam. 51 Whenever there is any natural disaster the 
Jamaat utilises its resources in humanitarian relief work. In the North the situation 
is complicated by the activities of the BJP (Bharata Janata Party) and the militant 
wing VHP (Vishwa Hindu Parishad). These extreme Hindu organisations have made 
it difficult openly to propagate Islam. Jamaat-i Islami members feel that Islam, 
Muslim culture, and the personal security of individual Muslims is threatened. 52 
Thus it is engaged in protecting all of these from attack. The second major prong of 
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the Jamaat's activities is directed at the Muslim community itself. It is acknowledged 
that India's Muslims are socially and economically backward. The Jamaat's main ac- 
tivity amongst the Muslim community is therefore in the field of education. 53 This, 
however, does not hinder their first priority: to teach a pure Islam which is in accord 
with the Qur'an and Sunna. Ejaz Ahmed Aslam sums up the work of the Jamaat in 
India as: 
Preservation of the Islamic identity, and provision of true Islamic norms in the 
society, and spreading the knowledge of Islam among the non-Muslims, these three 
are our basic works. 54 
Without the prime aim to achieve an Islamic state which involves the Pakistan and 
Bangladesh organisations so heavily in the political arena, Jamaat-i Islami Hind is 
committed to dawah. This commitment is the essential link between the independent 
Jamaat-i Islami organisations wherever they are established. 
Jamaat-i Islami in Pakistan today 
There is no doubt that the Jamaat-i Islami's central aim is still the same as that 
originally inspired by Maulana Mawdudi. The organisation is still committed to the 
ideal of an Islamic state in Pakistan, and its political work is always directed towards 
that aim. This central aim is formalised in the Constitution of both Jamaat-i Islami 
and Jami'at-i Talaba. 55 
According to Dr. Israr Ahmad, who formed a conservative breakaway organisation 
from Jamaat-i Islami called Tanzim-e Islam, Mawdudi retreated from his position of 
complete opposition to the secular state of Pakistan after his release from prison in 
1956. Dr. Israr Ahmad contends that after this date Mawdudi sought alliances with 
other religious groups and even with avowedly secular political parties in order to fur- 
ther his aims. He argues that once Mawdudi began to work within the political 
system to achieve gradual reforms, he tacitly cooperated with the government which 
he had pledged to overthrow. 56 Today, Jamaat-i Islami has continued with this 
programme of gradual reform by working within the system. They are against 
violent revolution to achieve their aims57 and they are currently a part of the Islamic 
Democratic Alliance (IJI), an Islamic Front which in 1991 had eight members in the 
National Assembly. Maulana Mawdudi's own shift in attitude towards the government 
of Pakistan and his flexibility on fiqh, dress and other non-essentials of Islam has 
provided Jamaat-i Islami with the opportunity to shift their position as Pakistan 
society undergoes various political and sociological changes. In general, these 
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changes indicate a move towards a moderate stance on various issues. The influx of 
young, university educated, urban youth into their ranks has maintained the radical 
zeal but brought up fresh important issues. These include the role of women, style of 
dress, social and economic exploitation and Muslim sectarianism. The educated 
young of the new middle-class are the grassroots of Jamaat-i Islami support and ac- 
tivism. Muhammad Aslam Saleemi suggests that they give their support because 
Mawdudi was not apologetic in defending Islam against the values of European 
civilisation, and because his ideal of Islam was stripped of both Western and Indian 
adulterations. 58 Though his Islam did not compromise with the West, his tolerance 
on the above issues made his views seem more acceptable to Western-educated young 
people than those of the custom-bound ulema. Ishtiaq Gondal, however, stresses the 
ideological component of Mawdudi's message. He is concerned with social justice: 
The people of the middle classes they have minimum chances and they want to pro- 
mote themselves. To get free from this miserable and unjust, you can say, polarised 
society. The programme with us provides them with such chances ... 
Islam says there 
is always a share for poor people in the wealth of rich people. 
59 
Universal education has created a new young middle-class in Pakistan but eco- 
nomic development has not kept pace with this development. The nation has not been 
able to create sufficient jobs for the many qualified accountants, lawyers, engineers, 
teachers, doctors and other such young professionals and graduates coming out of the 
colleges and universities. These people are naturally disillusioned, jealous of the 
power that is still retained in the hands of the dynastic families, and aware of ex- 
ploitation from the West. They blame their own governments for selling out to 
Western capitalism, and turn increasingly to Islam for an ideology of revolution and 
social justice. The truth is probably a combination of the above factors. The interest 
shown in the Jarnaat by this section of the community, however, has focussed atten- 
tion on Mawdudi's tolerance rather than on his conservatism. His belief that the 
doors of i jtihad were always open and that Muslims should use their own powers of 
reasoning would naturally appeal to the educated young. 
The Jamaat has shifted ground in regard to Mawdudi's conservatism on the sub- 
ject of women. Universal education has resulted in more equal opportunities for 
women. In addition to the usual mixed education there are also universities which are 
only for women. Jamaat-i Islami has an active women's section, and the accountant 
for the national organisation is a woman who ran her own company before becoming 
a full-time member. There is a separate mosque for women in Mansurah and they are 
conspicuous by their presence on the complex involved in all kinds of activities. 
There are teachers and female doctors in the hospital. The women wear hijab but do 
not usually cover their faces; a headscarf is considered sufficient. Women are edu- 
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cated to the same standard of Islamic knowledge as the men, although this is con- 
troversial in Pakistan and India as theoretically it allows women to achieve the status 
of muj: -W, &'),. These changes indicate a shift from the `traditional' position towards 
the `moderate Trend'). 
Mawdudi's tolerance towards the different schools of fiqh has allowed Jamaat-i 
Islami to adapt its position in regard to other Islamic groups. Many of the young 
people I interviewed in Pakistan were intolerant of their parent's sectarianism. They 
felt that Muslim groups should cooperate with each other. These feelings were 
echoed by the organisation's leadership. I was surprised to find that there were mem- 
bers of the Jamaat who had allegiances to other schools of Islamic thought. This was 
explained by the Secretary-General of the North-West Frontier Province: 
The basics of Islam if someone believes in those it is sufficient for us. In Jamaat-i 
Islatni we require that person not to preach his specific sect in Jamaat-i Islami. To 
preach or make dawah of those principles in which the whole Muslim nation believes. 
The universal principles. 
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Ishtiaq Gondal also confirmed this trend: 
There are different schools of thought, Barelwi, Deoband, AN Hadith but we have 
collections of all their fiqh. We do not attract them on the basis of Deoband, 
Barel%vi. We attract them on the basis of being Muslim. We insist to minimise these 
conflicts and these differences and become united. 62 
This attitude has allowed Jamaat-i Islami to work with other groups in Pakistan 
through political alliances and combined religious conferences. There is now closer 
association with the Deobandi ulema and Tabligh-i Jamaat. This has resulted in a 
more united Islamic front. 
Mawdudi's death, and the system of voting in a new leader every five years, has 
taken the emphasis away from one charismatic leader. Although Jamaat-i Islaini is 
still dominated by the ideas of Maulana Mawdudi, he is now more of an inspiration 
for them than a source of strict ideology. The organisation is prepared to question his 
ideas if necessary when responding to new political, social or economic develop- 
ments. The criterion for change is whether such a change is permissible in Islam. 
Today it is the Constitution (see Appendix G) that controls the members of the 
Jamaat, rather than a charismatic leader. Ishtiaq Gondal expresses this succinctly: 
Our Constitution which is very comprehensive - we carry on our activities, our ses- 
sions, our programmes according to that Constitution. That is strictly implemented 
and violations against that Constitution are minimal, and whenever we find it we 
check it strictly'. 63 
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Chapter XI 
JAMAAT-1 ISLAMI IN BRITAIN 
Introduction 
Maulana Mawdudi saw the foundation of an Islamic state as essential in the 
achievement of a pure Islam which would encompass every area of life. This ideal 
was so dominant it would seem unlikely that any Jamaat-i Islami organisation could 
be successful where Muslims are in a minority. When Jamaat-i Islami activists find 
themselves in a situation where the chances of an Islamic state developing are slight, 
as in India, they change their approach. Instead they concentrate their efforts on 
dawah. Predominantly this consists of educating their fellow-Muslims to live an Is- 
lamic life individually which will encompass all their activities. 
Like India, Britain is a nation with a Muslim minority and the same change of em- 
phasis is evident here too. As with the other organisations and movements looked at 
in this thesis, Jamaat-i Islami entered Britain with the migrants from the sub- 
continent. Jorgen Nielsen identifies four separate organisations which he claims to 
have been developed by Jmnaat-i Islami for specific purposes. I These organisations 
he identifies as The UK Islamic Mission, Young Muslims UK, The Islamic Founda- 
tion, and The Muslim Educational Trust. However, all four organisations claim to be 
fully independent of each other and from Jamaat-i Islam in the subcontinent, al- 
though all of them, with the exception of The Islamic Foundation, were once part of 
The UK Islamic Mission. This in itself does not necessarily disprove Nielsen's obser- 
vation as Jamaat-i Islmni tends to establish various specialised organisations which 
are officially independent, even in the subcontinent. There are, however, changes 
taking place in these organisations which suggest that the ideas of Maulana Mawdudi 
and the influence of Jamaat-i Islami in the subcontinent is becoming less central. 
This is particularly noticeable in the Young Muslims UK and The Islamic Foundation. 
These changes are caused by the unique situation in which Muslims find themselves in 
Britain, particularly the younger British-born generations, and by events in the wider 
Muslim world. In a later book Nielsen describes these organisations in Britain as 
`Jamaat related'. 2 This description tallies with my own findings. At a formal, offi- 
cial level Jamaat-i Islami, as established in Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh, does not 
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exist in Britain. There are, however, organisations in Britain which are inspired by 
the teaching of Maulana Mawdudi and the work of Jamaat-i Islaini. These organisa- 
tions have close informal links with Jamaat-i Islaini in the subcontinent but their al- 
legiance is increasingly given to the Islamic Movement worldwide. Jainaat-i Islami 
is acknowledged as that part of the Movement working in the subcontinent, as Ikhwan 
is acknowledged for its work in the Arab world. The organisation with the closest 
similarities to Jamaat-i Islami in the subcontinent is the UK Islamic Mission. Per- 
haps this is not surprising as it is the oldest dawah organisation in Britain and was es- 
tablished by first-generation migrants whose concerns were still located in their 
countries of origin. 
The UK Islamic Mission 
The UK Islamic Mission was founded in December 1962 by a small group of 
Muslim migrants who met at the East London Mosque to discuss the need for such an 
organisation in Britain. 3 Some of them had been already actively involved in estab- 
lishing the London Islamic Circle, which started in the Saudi Arabian-influenced Is- 
lamic Cultural Centre. 
The UK Islamic Mission's structure is definitely influenced by Maulana Maw- 
dudi's idea that, in order to restore the ummah to its original purity of faith and politi- 
cal greatness, an organisation is required whose membership is selected on the basis 
of quality rather than quantity. As in Jamaat-i Islami, the membership is a small 
elite of well-trained and committed activists. 4 In 1992 they numbered 475, although 
the number of sympathisers was calculated as exceeding 50,000.5 The UK Islamic 
Mission has modified the hierarchical structure from that prevalent in Jamaat-i Islam. 
There are only three categories of involvement: members, associate members, and 
sympathisers. These are distinguished by level of commitment to the organisation and 
by the quality of Islamic life lived. The level required for members and associate 
members is outlined in the Constitution (see Appendix H). An example of the kind of 
requirement expected of members is that they cannot be involved with riba. They 
cannot own a property that is mortgaged or have any kind of financial investment that 
earns interest, or insurance, unless it is illegal not to have it as in the case of car in- 
surance. Great emphasis is placed on training programmes (tarbiyah) for members 
and associate members. As in the Jamaat-i Islaini, this programme has been specifi- 
cally designed by the organisation to train individuals mentally and spiritually to carry 
out the work of the movement. Every branch and circle holds weekly meetings which 
consist of studying the Qur'an, Hadith, and other Islamic literature sympathetic to the 
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organisation's aims. They also discuss effective methods of communication. There 
are monthly sessions which cover specific ideological, spiritual and moral topics. It 
is interesting to note that the Constitution Committee is discussing the possibility of 
changing the three-tier model of involvement to a one-tier system. 6 If this is accepted 
by the majority of the membership, this will be another move away from the sub- 
continent Jamaat-i Islami-style structure. 
The organisational structure of the UK Islamic Mission is also derived from the 
Jamaat-i Islami model. The organisation is run by a President in consultation with a 
shura made up of ten members. The President and the shura are elected by the mem- 
bership every two years. Britain has been divided into three zones: North, South and 
Midlands. Each of these zones is run by a Nazim and an executive, who are also 
elected by the members and associate members of their respective zone. The zones 
consist of branches and circles.? There are thirty-nine branches and thirteen circles 
throughout Britain and the Mission has also established twenty-eight mosques 
throughout the country, usually in places where there are already branches. Once 
there is a mosque established the organisation has more influence over the local com- 
munity, because Muslims tend to focus their activities around their local mosque. 8 
The Mission has recently begun to give attention to women. There is now a 
women's section which they hope will develop into an independent organisation. This 
effort is still relatively small. In 1992 there were only six members and thirty associ- 
ate members, and assistance was required from the female members of the Young 
Muslims UK. 9 The training for women, as in Jamaat-i Islami, is identical to that of 
the men. The relative lack of progress with women is explained by the fact that when 
the Mission was formed, the subcontinent Muslim migrants were predominantly male. 
Once the families began to arrive the first generation wives remained generally in 
their homes raising their children. Many of them did not learn English or participate 
in the wider culture. This is not true of second and third generation Muslim women 
who may have the same educational opportunities as their brothers. Their first lan- 
guage is English and they are very often seeking employment in the wider society. 
The relatively young age of these women has meant that they are more likely to be in- 
volved with Young Muslims UK. The 
Mission is trying to redress this by working 
amongst the older generation women. 
Now that many of the mosques are larger than 
the earlier converted terraced 
houses there is space for facilities to be provided for 
women, and in the Mission mosques women are encouraged to attend. 
10 For the last 
eight years the Mission has run a marriage 
bureau to assist Muslims to find suitable 
partners. 11 Tanzeem Wasti 
feels that this kind of involvement has encouraged 
women to participate as they are concerned with anything to 
do with the family, par- 
ticularly the subject of marriage partners 
for their children. He believes that although 
the different ethnic communities are very strong, the younger generation will in- 
-239- 
creasingly marry across religious lines. Already they want to marry partners from 
Britain rather than the subcontinent, but he argues that the young activists in the 
organisation are more concerned with the quality of Islam in their prospective partners 
than in their ethnic origin. 12 
The Introduction to the UK Islamic Mission states that 
the task that we, Muslims in the West, face is not merely to safeguard our spiritual 
heritage and cultural identity and passively resist the onslaughts of foreign 
ideologies, but to participate fruitfully and contribute positively to the moral and 
spiritual betterment of the society we happen to live in. This, however, presupposes 
a spiritually and culturally strong Muslim community established through sustained 
process of self-educational and moral training. 13 
This is much closer to the aims of Jamaat-i Islami Hind, which is not surprising 
in that the overt political aims to transform the state which dominate in Pakistan can- 
not be paramount in Britain. Neither is it surprising, then, that the UK Islamic Mis- 
sion has concentrated its efforts in education. The central aim of Maulana Mawdudi, 
the establishment of an Islam practised in its entirety and of a pristine purity, is still 
the central plank of the UK Islamic Mission's aims. 14 To this end they are involved 
in dawah work amongst the Muslim community, in distributing literature and in ar- 
ranging seminars and public meetings. The Mission, however, has responded 
primarily to the concern of the Muslim population in Britain that their children should 
not lose their identity in the face of the host nation's predominantly secular culture. 
Very early on the organisation formed teaching cells in which the children were 
taught Qur'an classes by Muslim students doing degrees in British universities. Now, 
these classes are mainly held in the mosques belonging to the UK Islamic Mission. 
Currently they are teaching over four thousand students, and employing over one hun- 
dred teachers. 15 Like many Mosque schools, they take place for two hours in the 
evening after the child returns from regular education. There are some key dif- 
ferences, however; the children are taught by the Mission's members who are 
qualified teachers rather than by the imam. They have studied the Punjab University 
Matriculation and Intermediate courses of Islamic studies. The quality of the teaching 
is supervised by the Central Education Committee, who advise and maintain 
standards. At the moment they are recommending that the mosques must provide 
desks and chairs for the children rather than allowing them to be taught on the 
floor. 16 
The Mission, like Jamaat-i Islami in the subcontinent, is also involved with social 
welfare activities. These take a different form specific to the needs of the community 
in Britain. The services provided are the following: visiting Muslim patients in hospi- 
tals and assisting in the provision of halal food and the performance of religious 
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obligations; visiting Muslim prisoners in gaol; and visiting Muslims in old people's 
homes. 17 The organisation also has connections with various other Islamic organisa- 
tions around the world. Generally, these have a similar ideological viewpoint and 
link the organisation to that phenomenon known as the Islamic Movement. 18 Part of 
the Mission's funds has gone towards supporting various Muslim causes throughout 
the world. 19 This aspect of the Mission's work demonstrates the trend towards 
identifying with the Islamic causes internationally rather than solely with the activities 
of Jamaat-i Islami in the Subcontinent. This is more marked in Britain than in 
Pakistan, where Jamaat-i Islami concentrates its efforts regionally in Afghanistan and 
Kashmir. 
There can be no doubt that the UK Islamic Mission is very closely modelled on 
the subcontinent Jamaat-i Islami. Tanzeem Wasti acknowledges that the majority of 
the membership is still highly influenced by Maulana Mawdudi's ideas, but suggests 
that there should now be a rethinking of everything in order to acknowledge the con- 
temporary situation. He says: 
His work is now fifty years old. He is not alive... Maulana Mawdudi's time was 
basically when it was the colonial era... I think that his early work is more strong 
which gives the inspiration, and I think from that point of view there is a need for 
rethinking and reprogramming the Muslim ummah... I think that now on his thoughts 
you have many institutions, you have many organisations working but the times have 
changed, the factors are changing very fast, and maybe his programmes will not be so 
relevant for the future. 
20 
He sees that the future of the Muslim community in Britain requires a move away 
from ethnic identities and sectarian loyalties, and that this is beginning to happen. 21 
He suggests that since the Rushdie affair there has been much more liaison between 
the different groups, and that the international situation of Muslims is forcing them to 
cooperate. 22 Tanzeem Wasii suggests that an important distinction must be made. 
This is, he argues, that `the concentration should be on Islam, not on the cultural 
aspect of Islam. '23 There is a strong awareness that the common language of the ma- 
jority of young Muslims is English regardless of place of origin 
In this ambition there is no shift from the aims of Maulana Mawdudi and the work 
of the Jamaat-i Islami, but on the issue of an Islamic state, so central to Mawdudi's 
thinking, there has been an interesting change. It is acknowledged that this is too 
away far from actual circumstances to 
be a practical goal in Britain. The Constitution 
of the Islami Jami'at-e Talaba 
in Pakistan states that one reason for establishing an 
Islamic state is so that it should be an example for the Western and Muslim worlds. 24 
Tanzeem Wasti sees that role as being taken over by a righteous and united minority 
community in the West. 
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The West can create its own creative minority -a Muslim community. Then they can 
play a very important role in the future development of the Islamic ummah. Because 
the umnah concept is not based on territory and nationalism. 25 
He suggests that this is possible not only because of education, but also because 
Muslims in Britain are from different ethnic backgrounds; they therefore have the 
possibility of breaking free from cultural diversity and establishing the ideal of the 
ummah consisting of all nationalities and backgrounds united in Islam. He believes 
that the UK Islamic Mission has an important role to play in this process. 26 
These hopes and ideals expressed by the present secretary of the UK Islamic Mis- 
sion will probably not be fulfilled by the organisation at this time without substantial 
changes. Although there is evidence of change taking place, the organisation is 
remains very close to the Jamaat-i Islami model and the teachings of its founder 
Maulana Mawdudi. Its membership is mainly comprised of first generation migrants 
who are still too influenced by their connections to the subcontinent. There are, 
however, two organisations, the Islamic Foundation and Young Muslims UK, who 
have moved considerably further towards the ideals expressed by Tanzeem Wasti. 
The Islamic Foundation 
The Islamic Foundation was founded in 1973 through the inspiration of a group of 
Muslims led by Khurshid Ahmad and Ahmed Nasiruddin. Khurshid Ahmad is still 
the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, as well as being Deputy Amir of Jamaat-i Is- 
lami in Pakistan. 27 Khurram Murad, the former Director, has now returned to 
Pakistan and is very active in Jamaat-i Islami there. The Foundation's links to the 
ideology of Maulana Mawdudi and Jamaat-i Islami can also be inferred by the num- 
ber of books which they publish which are translations of Mawdudi's writings into 
English. The Foundation is still involved in the major project of translating and pub- 
lishing Mawdudi's Tafsir to the Qur'an. Dr. Ahsan acknowledges that several people 
working for the Foundation are influenced by the thoughts of Maulana Mawdudi and 
Jamaat-i Islami, and that because of this, these employees align themselves with the 
work being done by Young Muslims UK, the UK Islamic Mission, and the Islamic 
Society of Britain. He is adamant, however, that the Foundation is completely inde- 
pendent: 
It is an independent Islamic organisation in which we do, of course, acknowledge the 
role played by the Ikhwan Muslimin in the Arab world and Jamaat-i Islami in 
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Pakistan, Bangladesh, the subcontinent, and also similar movements in Turkey and 
Malaysia 28 
In 1990, The Islamic Foundation moved to the current nine acre site, formerly a 
conference centre, in Markfield, about nine miles outside Leicester. The Markfield 
Dawah Centre now employs about thirty full-time staff who originate from various 
parts of the Muslim world. Although the majority are of Pakistani background there 
are also Algerians, Egyptians, Indonesians, Bangladeshis and Indians. This is itself 
unusual in the context of British Muslim organisations which tend to be identified 
with one particular ethnic or language grouping. According to a publicity video, the 
Foundation is first and foremost a training and educational institution. Secondly, it is 
a research organisation. Thirdly, it serves as a nucleus for the community. Fourthly, 
it is a publishing house. 29 
The modern and spacious facilities at Markfield provide a unique centre for 
dawah activities directed towards both the Muslim community and the wider British 
society. Besides the administration of The Islamic Foundation, Young Muslims UK, 
and Islamic Society of Britain (ISB), and the offices of the specialised units, there 
are four libraries consisting of a collection of over 20,000 Islamic texts in English, 
Urdu and Arabic; an international Islamic journals collection; a press cuttings collec- 
tion of all the articles published in British newspapers concerning Muslims and Islam; 
and finally a specialised library of works on Islamic Economics. The conference fa- 
cilities provide accommodation in single rooms for fifty participants, with recrea- 
tional and relaxation lounges and several meeting and seminar rooms. There is a 
prayer room, a communal kitchen, and a large dining hall. 
The Foundation consists of several specialised units. Education and training is 
definitely high on the Foundation's priorities. All the staff participate in training 
courses and programmes, but the Education and Training Unit is specifically charged 
with designing, organising, and conducting the courses. Some of these courses are 
used by the UK Islamic Mission and the Young Muslims UK in their training 
programmes. Training Muslim youth is paramount, but there are training courses for 
all age groups and on different aspects of Islam. One day courses for large groups of 
students from schools and colleges are held at the centre, and the Foundation's staff 
regularly lecture to both Muslims and non-Muslims in universities, colleges and com- 
munity centres around the country. Seminars on various academic and topical issues 
are regularly held to which Islamic scholars of international repute are invited to 
deliver papers. 
There is also a `cultural awareness' programme which is held once a month for 
groups of up to fifty people. This programme is designed for such non-Muslim 
professionals as the police, social workers, teachers, prison officers and health service 
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employees who have day-to-day contact with Muslims, its aim being to enable them 
to work with more understanding and effectiveness. The participants eat and sleep on 
campus, the idea being to provide an authentic impression of Islam. 
The Education and Training Unit is also very concerned to assist Muslim converts. 
It offers a series of courses to give them a deeper knowledge of Islam, to perfect their 
worship rites and to teach them Islamic morals and manners. Dr. Ahsan is concerned 
that these Muslims, whom he estimates as numbering about ten thousand, are either 
isolated or find it difficult to adapt to the various ethnic and linguistic divisions in the 
mosque. He feels that the facilities of the Foundation should be at their disposal to 
deepen their knowledge of the faith and avoid the errors of `cultural' Islam. 30 
The conference facilities are available for use by Muslim groups; they have been 
used by a wide variety of organisations ranging across the full ethnic diversity which 
constitutes the British Islamic community. 31 Despite the ethnic range, however, there 
is no doubt that the organisations which predominantly use the facilities share the 
ideology of the international Islamic Movement. 
The remaining units are for specialised areas of research: they consist of the Is- 
lamic Economics Unit, the Interfaith Unit, the Central Asian Unit, the Islamic 
Resurgence Unit, and the Islam in Europe Unit. Besides the specialised library, 
which is probably the best in Europe, the Islamic Economics Unit receives data from 
all around the Muslim world, this is used to conduct research and to produce papers 
and books about contemporary Islamic economics and banking. The Unit's material 
is used by postgraduate students working in this field who come from universities 
throughout Britain. Close links have been established with the Economics Depart- 
ment of Loughborough University, which is about to offer its undergraduates an op- 
tion on Islamic Economics which utilises the Foundation's material. The Unit pub- 
lishes a quarterly review in English and Arabic entitled The Review of Islamic Eco- 
nomics. 
The Interfaith Unit researches various aspects of Christian/Muslim relations from 
the Christian sources. The central project involves monitoring Christian missionary 
activity in the Muslim world and making Muslims aware of what is occurring. To 
this effect, the Unit has produced a series of research papers covering developments 
in Africa, Asia, and the Middle-East. In addition to this work, the Unit is also in- 
volved in Christian/Muslim dialogue at local, national and international levels. For 
example, it is involved at a local level with the Leicester Council of Faiths, and the 
Foundation was instrumental in beginning interfaith dialogue in this area. At an inter- 
national level it has represented British Muslims at the World Council of Churches in 
Geneva. The Unit publishes a monthly review called `Focus' which covers both 
aspects its activities. Ataullah Siddiqi of the Interfaith Unit sees two problem areas 
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where the Foundation can contribute. The first necessity is to contextualise Islamic 
theology within the arena of debate with Western culture so that misconceptions of 
Islam can be removed. The second necessity is the provision of a voice which 
represents an Islam that is untainted by cultural accretion. 32 He explains that the 
ulema are not up to this task because `mentally and spiritually they belong in the vil- 
lage from where they came'. 33 He further argues that the ulema have little interest in 
other faiths, and that even amongst those few that have, there are only a minority that 
are fluent in English. 34 Ataullah Siddiqi believes that dialogue between religions is 
not sufficient and that Muslims in Britain must open up a dialogue with the secular 
humanist strand of western culture. He believes that the Foundation is in a position to 
begin to spearhead these two crucial areas of dialogue with the receiving culture. 35 
The Central Asian Unit monitors and produces papers on the situation of Muslims 
in what was once the Soviet Union. The Unit was established in 1981 to obtain in- 
formation on the circumstances of Muslims under the Soviet regime. Since the col- 
lapse of the Soviet Union the Unit has concentrated its efforts on reporting the situa- 
tion of Muslims in the Central Asian republics, focusing particularly on the political 
structure which these new Muslim nations will shape. The Unit produces a bi- 
monthly journal entitled Central Asian Brief . 
In addition to these Units the Foundation has recently formed the Islamic 
Resurgency Unit whose role is to examine the Islamic Movement and changes taking 
place in the Muslim world. It will concentrate on Western images of Islam in gen- 
eral, and on the Islamic revival in particular. The Islam in Europe Unit is also newly 
established. All of these activities of the Foundation are assisted by a Computer unit 
and an Audio-Visual Unit which produces and co-ordinates the vast quantity of slides, 
video-tapes, audio-cassettes and video-programmes utilised by the Foundation. 
The Islamic Foundation is also a publisher. Educational, devotional, inspirational 
and academic books covering such topics as the Qur'an, Hadith, Seerah, Shari'ah and 
Tasawuf and contemporary Muslim issues are produced and distributed throughout 
the Muslim world. The Foundation concentrates its publishing activities on the 
English-speaking parts of the Muslim world, and its catalogue now lists over 160 
titles of works written in English. It also publishes many books for children which 
teach the values of Islam through stories and pictures. In addition to books it offers 
audio-cassettes, board games, maps and posters and a video-game, all specifically de- 
signed to help children to understand the message of Islam. Finally, the Foundation 
compiles and publishes The Muslim World Book Review. This quarterly journal 
reviews current publications about Islam and the Muslim world. The Review is ac- 
companied by The Index of Islamic Literature. 
The Islamic Foundation is the think-tank of the Islamic Movement in Britain. The 
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major concern here is to create an Islam which is suited to the environment of the 
West without losing the fundamentals of the faith. Dr. Ahsan sums this up: 
Of course, there is no British Islam but if we can call it British Islam then it will have 
independent characteristics and features of its own. The Muslims attending 
universities and those who are born here and believe in religion, they will have a very 
level view of Islam... for example, the role of women. The girls have been 
marginalised in most of the Islamic organisations and Muslim countries. In the same 
room they cannot sit together (with men)... that type of Islam will not be acceptable 
here. 36 
Jamaat-i Islami is too firmly rooted in the subcontinent milieu to create an Islam 
suitable for British Muslims whatever their ethnic origin, and is itself regarded as sec- 
tarian. The Foundation, however, has taken steps to establish itself as independent of 
any sectarian organisation. Its multi-national staff ensure that the perspective of the 
Foundation is not dominated by the concerns of subcontinent Muslims. The interna- 
tional focus of the Foundation is not solely on events taking place in the subcontinent. 
It is primarily concerned with that struggle of Islamic activists throughout the Muslim 
and non-Muslim world to fight against oppression and to establish a social system 
based on the central tenets of Islam. 
The new conference facilities provide an excellent forum for debate and dialogue 
concerning the issues facing British Muslims. The Foundation's pioneering work in 
making English the language for communicating the message of Islam is very impor- 
tant in this context. The Foundation is now involved with ISB (Islamic Society of 
Britain), founded in June 1990 37 as an umbrella organisation for all Islamic groups 
which are working through the medium of English. 38 The various languages of the 
original place of origin are divisive in the context of Britain, and they will become 
decreasingly important for the community here. The Foundation will also be able to 
take a leading role in these developments for the following reasons: the prestige and 
status it has earned for the quality of its published material, and the respect which its 
members have in the community as scholars and academics. 
The staff of the Foundation are also highly aware of the needs of young British- 
born Muslims; they are actively addressing the issues with which the young Muslims 
are concerned. The magazines and pamphlets produced by various Muslim youth 
groups indicate their concern with social and political problems, not only in the Mus- 
lim world but in the world at large. There are many articles on problems confronting 
Muslims throughout the world, for example, in Palestine, Bosnia, Central Asia, Iraq, 
Egypt and Iran; but there are also articles seeking an Islamic perspective on nuclear 
weapons, disarmament, artificial insemination, genetic engineering, and environmen- 
tal issues. Farouq Murad, an early leader of Young Muslims UK, who now manages 
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the Conference facilities of the Foundation expresses this emphasis on social justice 
amongst his generation. 39 He argues that Islam will have to tackle these issues if it is 
going to have any relevance to their lives practically. He insists it will have to look 
at these wider issues and put an Islamic perspective on them. 40 
This emphasis on the ideological aspects of Islam is as central here as it is to 
Jamaat-i Islami youth in Pakistan. Their struggle for justice, however, focuses on 
their situation in the social structure of Pakistan. The young activists in Britain seek 
justice for Muslims throughout the world. Farouq Murad equates justice with Islam 
itself. 'It is Islam that we want, but Islam itself is not an end in itself. Islam responds 
to something else which is justice'. 41 
Many young educated British Muslims are led into support for the Islamic Move- 
ment orientated groups by this concern for an Islam which involves itself with the 
kind of social justice/revolutionary approach that is appropriate to the issues which 
they regard as essential. The Islamic Foundation has placed itself in a unique position 
to co-ordinate and influence the activities of these groups regardless of whether they 
originated in the ideas of Maulana Mawdudi or elsewhere in the Muslim world. The 
ideological position of the Foundation is, however, clear. This can be gathered from 
the names they have given to the prayer room and the two conference halls on the 
Markfield complex. The prayer room is Shah Wali-allah Hall; the conference rooms 
are, respectively, Maulana Mawdudi Hall and Hasan al Banna Hall. Thus the 
Foundation acknowledges its inspiration and influences from the subcontinent, but in- 
dicates clearly its loyalty to the international Islamic Movement. Dr. Ahsan openly 
acknowledged the latter when directly asked if the Foundation's connections are to the 
international Islamic Movement rather than to Pakistan and India. 42 
Young Muslims UK 
Young Muslims UK is a relatively recent organisation. It was formed in Decem- 
ber 1984 on the initiative of twenty-seven young Muslims representing various local 
youth groups who met together in Spencer Place, Leeds, to form a national organisa- 
tion. 43 One of the guiding influences from the first generation leadership was Khur- 
ram Murad, who was then Director of the Islamic Foundation. He provided the lead- 
ership of the new organisation with training programmes both for themselves and 
their membership, and a meeting-place in the old premises of the Foundation in 
Leicester. Today, the national administration of the Young Muslims UK is run from 
a portacabin situated on the Markfield complex. In spite of these connections Manozir 
Ahsan insists that the Young Muslims UK are independent from the Foundation. 44 
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In the beginning Young Muslims UK searched for a group with which to affiliate 
itself and chose the YMO (Young Muslims Organisation), the equivalent organisation 
of young Bengalis inspired by Jamaat-i Islami in Bangladesh. Wasim Yaqub says 
that although they shared the same vision and ideals, the Bengalis were not very 
fluent in English, as the process of emigration was not then complete. 45 He explains 
that the Young Muslims UK members were nearly all born in Britain. `That was one 
of the unique emphases of the time that we started. We were the only youth group 
that spoke English. This made it very easy for young people to come to Young Mus- 
lims UK'. 46 
Many of the founding members were influenced by the UK Islamic Mission. 
Some of the local groups that formed the national organisation were already attached 
to the Mission, so it was natural to affiliate the organisation with them. The Mission 
even helped them to write their Constitution, but the Young Muslims UK eventually 
became formally independent of them. There was, however, still a clause in the Con- 
stitution stating that should the leadership of Young Muslims UK do something 
seriously against Islam, then the Mission can insist upon calling the membership to- 
gether and disbanding the leadership. They could also dissolve their centres and deny 
them access to the Mission madrasas. 47 This has enabled the more conservative UK 
Islamic Mission to maintain control over the speed and the type of changes which the 
more adventurous members of the youth movement may want to introduce. Recently 
(April 1994) Young Muslims UK has become the youth organisation of ISB (Islamic 
Society of Britain). 48 
With reference to the Young Muslims UK's connection to the ideas of Maulana 
Mawdudi or the activities of Jamaat-i Islami, Wasim Yaqub acknowledges that he 
personally believes that Maulana Mawdudi was `one of the most visionary exponents 
of Islam, of a pure Islam there has been this century'. 49 He admits, however, that he 
is one of the most pro-Jamaat-i Islami members of the Young Muslim UK leadership. 
He insists that even in the UK Islamic Mission they were taught that Mawdudi be- 
lieved that `we should give the idea and let the people of any locality pick it up, and 
develop their own workers for they know best what to do'. 50 
He argues that one of the major changes from the Islami Jami'at-i Talaba in 
Pakistan is in terms of organisation; the Young Muslims UK is a much looser struc- 
ture. The membership, currently around two thousand, is not hierarchical, even 
though the training schemes are progressively more difficult. The programmes and 
activities vary considerably from branch to branch. At the present time the Young 
Muslims UK does not even require participants to complete a membership form. This 
looser organisational structure is intentional. Wasim Yaqub argues that they have 
been more successful because they adopted a more relaxed approach. 51 
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The membership of the Young Muslims UK is predominantly of Pakistani origin. 
This probably represents the statistical make-up of the Muslim community in Britain 
rather than a specific orientation towards that part of the world. They do, however, 
have a minority of members from-Somalia, the Yemen, and the current leadership is 
one-third Bengali. There is also a small but significant group of English converts to 
Islam. The organisation currently stresses dawah activity over and above training; 
consequently, it has always been incidental in bringing `reverts' from the Muslim 
community back to Islam. Wasim Yaqub says that this is especially true of the strong 
female section which is led by `reverts' to Islam. 52 
The majority of Young Muslims UK are university undergraduates and graduates. 
Wasim Yaqub and Rukhsar Shafiq, the latter a member of the Sheffield branch both 
spoke of the impact of going to university in Britain. Rukhsar Shafiq comments 
`their were ten Muslims in my house from different cultures, and all of them said the 
same thing, you know, our life has radically changed'. 53 It is this multi-cultural 
aspect of Britain which excites the members of Young Muslims UK. There are Mus- 
lims from everywhere in the world in Britain, and this has helped young British Mus- 
lims to realise that Islam is not the property of any one particular culture. Wasim 
Yaqub describes growing up in Britain as a child of migrant parents: 
They had lived all their livesin their villages, where Islam was a cultural thing. They 
would have gone to the elders of the tribe, of the village, and be told this is the way 
we do it this time. When they came over here, that communal education was cut off, 
so all they had was the images of cultural life without knowing the reasons for it. So 
naturally when their children were growing up they wanted to protect them from what 
they saw in Western society. They said, `you have to do this because it is religion. ' 
`Why is it religion? T 'Don't ask questions. ' With that approach we would easily leave 
Islam because it would be of no interest to us, to myself. 54 
The members of Young Muslims UK express sentiments which are understood by 
the Muslim youth of Britain as they seek their identity in a new environment. They 
are forming close links with others who are trying also to find the direction that Islam 
should take in the West. Although Young Muslims UK was once closely connected to 
the UK Islamic Mission as its youth wing, it is now making alliances with other youth 
organisations in Britain who, share the same ideology. This process will be accelerated 
by their new connection with ISB (Islamic Society of Britain). They are not 
defensive concerning Western culture or threatened by it, feeling rather that their 
presence is meant. Wasim Yaqub says 'we think that our existence in the West is a 
sign for Islam'55 whilst Rukhsar Shafiq believes `The West as far as I am concerned 
is where the purest form of Islam will rise because it is the dirtiest environment'. 56 
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The Muslim Educational Trust 
The UK Islamic Mission's emphasis on education resulted in the establishment of 
the Muslim Educational Trust to oversee the requirements of Muslim children in the 
British school system. Tanzeem Wasti claims that this organisation was given inde- 
pendence because the issue of education was far too important to be in the hands of 
any one ideological group; it was felt to be a matter of urgent concern to the whole 
Muslim community. 57 
The Muslim Educational Trust was established in 1966. It is the oldest national 
Muslim educational organisation in Britain dealing with the concerns of Muslims in 
regard to the education of their children. 58 The organisation arranges for teachers to 
give Islamic Studies lessons in English to Muslim children in state schools wherever 
there are large Muslim communities. It publishes books and posters on Islam for use 
by teachers and these are used throughout the world. The Trust has also produced the 
syllabus in Islamic Studies for the GCSE examination of the London East Anglian 
Group examining board. These efforts in the field of education have resulted in the 
Trust being regularly consulted by the Department of Education, the National Cur- 
riculum council and several Local Education Authorities. 59 The Trust's work has also 
placed it in the forefront of the campaign to ensure that the religious needs of Muslim 
children are met by British schools. They have issued guidelines to that effect on 
such matters as sex education, diet, dress restrictions, and participation in sports. The 
Trust actively supports the establishment of full-time and supplementary Muslim 
schools in Britain. 6 
Conclusion 
There is no doubt that there are changes taking place in the development of 
Jamaat-i Islami-influenced groups in Britain which echo wider changes taking place 
in the community as a whole. These particular groups seem to be equipped to adapt 
themselves to the new situation, and they even provide the leadership and direction 
for the changes involved. Despite their relatively small numbers, their influence on 
Islamic youth is profound. The Islamic Foundation and the UK Islamic Mission pro- 
vided the leadership and the direction during the Rushdie affair. They were in- 
strumental in setting up the UK Action Committee for Islamic Affairs which brought 
together Muslims of all denominations to provide a common voice against the pub- 
lishing of The Satanic Verses. This was an important step on the way to learning to 
work with each other, it gave status in the community to the Jamaat-i Islami in- 
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fluenced groups. This process is likely to continue and intensify through the work 
and the facilities of the Islamic Foundation. 
The flexibility of these groups can be traced to Maulana Mawdudi's view that the 
gates of ijtihad cannot be closed. Dr. Chachi of the Islamic Economics Unit ex- 
presses this viewpoint: `It is open from the time of creation to the Day of Judgement. 
The only requirement is that the person who does the ijtihad should, whatever ijtihad 
he comes up with, not contradict the Qur'an and Sunna'. 61 This flexibility provides 
the ability to respond to the new situation in the West, and is attractive to young Mus- 
lims born and educated here in Britain who have been taught to think for themselves 
and to accept nothing as given. 
It is almost certainly not accurate to call these groups Jamaat-i Islami. Although 
there is still strong affection for, and some links with Jamaat-i Islami in the sub- 
continent, together with inspiration from the ideas of Maulana Mawdudi, the `Jamaat 
related' organisations in Britain are beginning to identify themselves not so much with 
their subcontinent origins, but with their role as representatives of the Islamic Move- 
ment in Britain. This enables them to identify with the struggles of various groups 
throughout the world who are engaged in a struggle to implement radical change in 
their societies utilising Islam as their ideology. In this way, these organisations in 
Britain can provide an identity for their members which extends outwards to the wider 
Muslim world. They consciously promote an Islamic identity over and above ethnic or 
national identity, and their programmes actively seek to move away from South Asian 
customs and traditions. This is more evident amongst the younger generation in the 
organisations, especially in Young Muslims UK. The newly-formed link between 
them and the Islamic Society of Britain demonstrates an awareness to promote Islam 
within the context of wider British society. 62 This aim is also strongly expressed 
amongst the academics of The Islamic Foundation. All the groups openly identify 
with the ideology and politics of the Islamic Movement throughout the world rather 
than solely with Jamaat-i Islami in the subcontinent. It is this identification 
worldwide, combined with an emphasis on promoting Islam for British Muslims, 
which is attractive to some young Muslims attempting to define their identity in 
Britain. 
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Chapter XII 
CONCLUSION 
In order to ascertain the possible direction which could be taken by Islam in 
Britain and the impact that this will have upon the Muslim communities, this thesis 
has investigated the key factors likely to be involved. In Chapter II the origins and de- 
velopment of the Muslim concept of ummah have been explored. Because minority 
migrant groups form communities which cannot be explained solely in the light of the 
Muslim understanding of ummah, Chapter III has looked at some sociological 
analyses of community. This needed to be done before focusing in Chapter IV on the 
various dilemmas facing Muslims in Britain as they attempt to define themselves as a 
community in a non-Muslim environment. The remaining chapters explore the various 
religious organisations and schools of thought most likely to influence the direction of 
Islam in Britain as they contribute their own attitudes to the dilemmas discussed in 
Chapter IV. My awareness of the dual influence of the migrants' place of origin and 
place of present habitation has necessitated the provision of independent chapters in 
order to examine each religious grouping in both these contexts. 
The central concern of the majority of Muslims whom I interviewed was with the 
transmission of Islam to the younger generation. In this context they felt that it was 
crucial to establish a community both firmly rooted in Islamic principles and capable 
of full participation in the resources of the receiving culture. The essential differences 
of opinion concerning how this could be achieved are often between first-generation 
migrants and subsequent generations. Both generations affirm the values of religion. 
The first-generation migrants are more likely to cling onto traditional ideas and 
customs brought with them from the subcontinental place of origin, and to find their 
identity within their ethnic community. Their practice of Islam is frequently used to 
reinforce the lifestyles which they brought with them to Britain. Old customs and 
traditions are reinforced by sanctifying them as prescribed by religion. A number of 
British-born Muslims argue that it is necessary to create a community that is in- 
tegrated into British society but whose locus of identity is Islam. Increasingly, more 
of them believe that this can be achieved by Muslims separating out the universals of 
Islam from the accretions added by culture, custom and history. It is already ex- 
tremely difficult to transfer the values and traditions of the villages of origin to Mus- 
lims who were born and educated in Britain and identify themselves as such. This at- 
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tempt to find an Islamic identity based on the universals of the faith often insists that 
it is not sufficient to be born a Muslim. Religion has to be more than an accident of 
birth subservient to culture, it needs to be founded on knowledge and experience. 
Values which are deeply held by many first-generation migrants as part of their reli- 
gion and culture are beginning to be criticised by their offspring who are in the 
process of determining what is intrinsically Islamic. This inter-generational clash of 
values is central to the various dichotomies (see Chapter IV) that Muslims in Britain 
need to resolve in order to form a communal self-identity. 
I agree with Werner Schiffauer that the process of migration to the advanced in- 
dustrial and technological societies of the west involves the same changes in religious 
behaviour that he found often occurred in the movement of rural populations to the 
cities within Muslim societies. 1 He argues that illiterate villagers are generally de- 
pendent upon the ceremonial aspects of religion and daily rites for their apprehension 
of Islam. The move of the family from the village to the city, whether in the sub- 
continent or to Britain, usually offers better education for the children and more 
lucrative employment for the parents. Literacy results in the family having access to 
the Qur'an and Hadith for themselves, and urban imams are often better trained in the 
principles of Islam. Village practices and traditions may well be criticised by 
`sophisticated' urban dwellers. All of these factors link the change in class status in- 
volved in the move from village to city to a change in religious identity. Gellner 
argues that rural Muslims who have migrated to an urban environment often become 
more orthodox and join revivalist and `fundamentalist' groups not only for enhanced 
status but in order to replace these close-knit relations of village or tribe which are 
lost in the more impersonal life of city-dwellers. 2 
Certainly my research indicated that religious identity amongst Muslims is becom- 
ing the sharpest focus for establishing a sense of selfhood in an alien environment. In 
what is often perceived to be a hostile and godless culture, the symbols of Islam take 
on a new importance when established in Britain. For many they evoke very power- 
fully the feeling of never-forgotten places of origin, but for numerous British-born 
Muslims they can enhance a sense of purpose provided by feeling a part of an 
ideological movement to establish Islam as an alternative to the secular capitalism of 
the west. 
Regardless of these divisions and conflicts, there can be no doubt that belonging to 
the ummah is an integral part of Muslim self-awareness. It has always provided an 
ideology of unity which should override the variety of ethnic, linguistic and national 
groupings from which it draws its membership. The ideal of the ummah, a com- 
munity bound together by its belief in Allah and the Prophethood of Muhammad, still 
supplies striking examples of common unity and fellowship as found within a vast 
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range of ethnic and national groupings. The salat, Ramadan, the Ha j j, the respect 
and status given to the Qur'an, and the principle of tawhid bind Muslims together in a 
common faith which can be drawn upon as a basis for unity and can provide a power- 
ful sense of communal identity. The combination of this basic core of shared religious 
practices and observation of the Shari'ah is central to Muslim life, and creates the 
bonds that tie together the ummah. Because of this unity of Islam's essential ritual and 
cultic practices, millions of Muslims can look to the wider Islamic community and 
feel part of it in spite of the fact that it is divided into competing groups. Thus for 
many Muslims in Britain, the concept of uninah becomes of central importance to 
their religious ideology. In spite of the fact that they live in a non-Muslim state, their 
membership of the ummah is not nullified and may even be strengthened by their 
isolation. For many first-generation migrants their membership of the ummah can be 
a source of solace and strength, and can be used to legitimise and sanctify time- 
honoured customs from far-away but intensely remembered places. British-born Mus- 
lims can draw upon their membership of the ummah in a different way. It links them 
to an identity which transcends their allegiance to both nationality and the ethnic cul- 
tures of their parents. The concept of ummah can also be drawn upon to provide an 
alternative world-view and confront the overriding secular viewpoint that is dominant 
in the indigenous culture. The need to provide an alternative worldview is reinforced 
by negativity to the migrants' presence. 
This ideal of the ummah as a united, indivisible transnational community has been 
put forward by some modern Islamic thinkers to counteract the pervasive influence of 
the western ideologies of nationalism and secularism in Muslim societies. In spite of 
this attempt to claim unity of the ummah in Islam's history, in reality it has not ex- 
isted since the Prophet's death except as a symbol of cohesion in the minds and hearts 
of the devout Muslims. McWilliams argues that, if successful, such a close-knit com- 
munity based on belief contains the seeds of its own destruction. This is because its 
very success leads to a vast state in which the members can only know each other as 
abstractions. 3 Furthermore, in a world of constant change and social upheaval, new 
ideologies and belief system constantly arise to challenge the old ones. This leads to a 
collapse of intellectual unity4 which in turn challenges the inherited unity based on 
Islam. Toynbee suggests that civilisations break down when they are no longer able to 
respond creatively to new situations. He argues that they rest on their past achieve- 
ments, idolising their society either at the moment of past success or in terms of some 
special institution which was instrumental to success. 5 
All of the above analyses of society could be fruitfully applied to counteract the 
Muslim ideal of the integrity of the ummah. The Muslim civilisation has often been 
guilty of idolising a vision of community which it has not been able historically to 
maintain. Throughout Islam's history various devout Muslims have tried to restore 
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the unity of the ummah by calling for a return to the perceived pristine faith of the 
Prophet, his companions, and the four rashidun. This echoes Toynbee's idea that if 
the community is a religious one it need not necessarily fall into permanent decline, 
as breakdown can be followed by renewal. 6 These attempts to restore the ummah can 
be observed in Islam from the Kharijites to the organisations which make up the Is- 
lamic Movement of the twentieth century. 
Impetus has been given to these revivalist movements by the ever-increasing per- 
vasiveness of European ideas and lifestyle throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, and the failure of Muslim societies to respond to the west's technological 
and military dominance. They raised the ideal of the ummah as the banner to fight the 
European ideologies of secularism and nationalism. These groups declared that a 
Muslims' real choice was between Islam and jahiliyya. There is, however, a paradox 
in their call for the revival of Muslims' fortunes by restoring the unity of faith im- 
plicit in the concept of ummah. The revivalist groups' attempts to restore the ummah 
require a more exclusive definition of the concept than that generally held by most 
Muslims, for whom birth is sufficient qualification. The revivalists have drawn upon 
the verse of the Qur'an which defines the ummah as a righteous group of believers 
selected from the wider community and charged with the duty to call all Muslims to 
obedience.? It is this narrower definition of ummah which has stimulated the develop- 
ment of sectarianism within Islam. The revivalists form organisations and groups 
which contain the qualities of Poplin's moral communities and Shenkar's intentional 
communities (see Chapter III). 8 The community becomes relatively self-contained and 
its members can live most of their lives within it. They have a deep sense of belong- 
ing to a morally significant group within the wider Muslim population. A tremendous 
sense of individual and group identity is achieved by identifying with the first Mus- 
lims and the transformation of the Meccan jahiliyya into the first city of Islam. Thus 
it is that self-defined righteous groups within the wider community can claim to be 
the true `ummah'. This inflation of group consciousness results in a strong awareness 
of distinctiveness, resulting in separation from other Islamic organisations. This 
makes it very difficult for these religious organisations to resolve their differences 
and recreate the united ummah to which they all aspire. 
These historical divisions in the ummah have been transported to Britain, but the 
process of migration further complicates the problem of unity based on faith. Minor- 
ity communities tend to organise themselves on an ethnic basis which maintains their 
original languages. They usually stay together in close-knit inner-city enclaves and 
form different types of community based around kin networks and formed of people 
from the same regions or even villages of origin. This creates a much smaller locus of 
group identity than that of common religion or nationality. This urban village which 
retains its own linguistic, social and ethnic frontiers, interacting on a selective basis 
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with the wider non-Muslim society, can conflict with the Islamic vision of a 
universal, egalitarian society as based upon the revelation of the Qur'an. Religion is 
used to reinforce the customs of the smaller ethnic community. This provides a fur- 
ther stimulus to those Islamic revivalist groups which insist that the universal Islamic 
identity is primary and criticise as unlslamic many traditional customs arising out of 
the place of origin. Various Islamic groups operating in Britain utilise a revivalist 
ideology brought with them from the subcontinent in order to oppose ethnic-based 
urban village communities, whilst other groups are prepared to defend the latter. 
Rex suggests that structured interaction begins to take place amongst the migrants 
in the form of associations whose concern with religion will be based upon main- 
taining culture in the new environment. 9 These associations tend to be local in 
organisation, but Joly points out that national religious organisations concerned with 
the preservation of Islam and the promotion of Islamic identity particularly in regard 
to British-born generations are increasingly more influential. 10 These groups were 
formed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in response to the decline of 
Muslim power and the successful spread of European culture in the subcontinent. 
Prior to the creation of Pakistan, Muslims had always been a minority in the region 
and had a long history of regarding themselves as separate and distinct from other so- 
cial groups and religions. They had developed strategies to deal with living alongside 
a Hindu majority and later used these to cope with the loss of power to the British. 
Essential to these strategies was the message of return to the basics of Islam in order 
to renew the community. This resulted in the Muslims of India becoming inward- 
looking as some focussed their energies on reform amongst themselves and others de- 
fended traditional practices influenced by Hinduism or folk-Sufism criticised by the 
reformers. 
This thesis has focused upon the influence of these groups, namely Deobandis, 
Tabligh-i Jamaat, Barelwis and Jamaat-i Islami, on the development of the Muslim 
community in Britain. Each has an ideological programme and a specific Islamic out- 
look which echoes conflicts in the wider Muslim world, but which they specifically 
inherit from their history in the subcontinent. Each challenges the dominant secular 
ideology in Britain and promotes Islam as the rallying flag around which the various 
ethnic and national groups amongst the migrants can unite. It is important to establish 
whether their ideological programmes can succeed in establishing Islam in Britain to 
the satisfaction of those later generations for whom the historical controversies of the 
subcontinent carry far less significance. There is a strong possibility that they are 
communicating divisions developed in the history of subcontinent Islam which could 
seriously endanger any efforts towards creating a truly indigenous Islam in Britain. 
Their history of conflict, if continued in their chosen country of migration, would 
still further fragment the community. 
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In order to survive, all religious movements need to satisfy two criteria: they must 
be sufficiently flexible to adapt to changing circumstances, and at the same time they 
must be seen as maintaining those essential truths of the faith without which they 
could not continue to exist as viable carriers of the divine message. The tension 
created through the process of determining what can be changed, how far it can be 
changed, to what it can be changed, and finally what is inviolate, will be heightened 
by the process of migration. The struggle generated by these tensions will create 
inter-generational stress. It will be particularly acute at the stage of migration, which 
exists in Britain at present, where the first-generation migrants' belief systems are still 
dominant but in which the second and third generations are increasingly demanding 
that their requirements too should be acknowledged. 
There are indications that all the Islamic religious movements transported with the 
migrants from the subcontinent are undergoing change as they adapt to the demands 
of the new environment. It will be their capacity to change rapidly enough to provide 
for the new requirements of Muslims born and bred in Britain which will ensure their 
survival. The majority of the first-generation Muslim migrants were from rural areas 
of the subcontinent; their religion is the traditional version of Islam practised in their 
villages of origin. It is this majority and their offspring that have become the targets 
of dawah activity from both the reform groups and Barelwi organisations. The rela- 
tive success of all these groups will depend on their ability to capture the hearts and 
minds of the young. The Barelwi groups need to make the most profound changes. 
This is because historically they have defended the kind of Islam which incorporates a 
wide range of local customs, traditional practices and is usually confined to a particu- 
lar locale through being focussed around a Sufi shrine. Obviously it will be difficult 
to replicate this in Britain. The Barelwi mosques often function more strongly as a 
means of reinforcing kinship and ethnic ties than as a means of promoting the aware- 
ness of belonging to the wider ummah. The Barelwis usually focus their activities 
around personalities, rather than institutions and this can cause problems with unity of 
purpose. In Britain there has been a history of rivalry between various pirs, Barelwi 
ulema and their respective followers. There are indications, however, that the 
Barelwis in Britain are developing a common consciousness and a degree of unity. 
Various practices and customs have become institutionalised within Barelwi worship 
throughout all their mosques in Britain, these help to provide a common Barelwi 
group identity. Some Barelwis are aware of the need to promote a sense of belonging 
to the wider Muslim ummah and thus to bestow legitimacy on themselves. Following 
in the path of Ahmad Riza Khan, who did much to establish the Barelwi beliefs and 
practices as a coherent and distinct maslak in the subcontinent, many Barelwis assert 
that their brand of Islam is AN Sunnat wa-jamaat, or the true Sunni path as prac- 
tised by millions of Muslims throughout the Islamic world. Finally, it is the some- 
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times vehement critique of popular expressions of Sufism by the better organised, 
tightly-knit reform groups which has pushed the Barelwis towards developing a 
clearly defined self-identity. 
The arrival of Sufi pirs in Britain has done much to consolidate Barelwi identity 
and increase their activity. It has enabled Barehvi migrants to focus their religious re- 
quirements in their new location rather than looking back to the hallowed places in 
their country of birth. The charisma and message of pirs who live in Britain is able 
to reach out and attract the young who are unfamiliar with the shrines and uneasy 
with the customs of rural subcontinent. However, many changes need to occur before 
the Barehvi tradition can fulfil the needs of young British Muslims. Although some 
Barehvi leaders are aware of the need for a wider unity which must include all Mus- 
lims in Britain, particularly the young of both sexes, in practice little is being 
achieved in this direction. In spite of the new-found awareness of the needs of the 
younger generation, an awareness instigated at least in part by the fear that the better 
organised reform groups will lure their children away, I saw no indications in the 
Barelwi mosques of English being used or of the problems of British-born Muslims 
being addressed. The conservatism of the first-generation migrants who control the 
Barelwi mosques and institutions makes them suspicious of any kind of change in the 
religion which they have inherited from their forebears and successfully transferred to 
Britain. The great majority of the British pirs are themselves first-generation migrants 
whose teachings reinforce the beliefs and practices of their own generation. Visiting 
pirs from the subcontinent reinforce the values of these first-generation migrants by 
reminding them of the traditions still prevalent in the country of origin. In time, 
however, the mantle of the pirs will fall onto their successors born and bred in 
Britain; they will be more aware of the needs of their own generation and of what is 
required to establish Islam in Britain. Pir Noor ul-Aqtab Siddiqi in Coventry is the 
first British-born Muslim to succeed his recently deceased father, Pir Abdul Wahhab 
Siddiqi. University educated and a qualified barrister, he has inherited an international 
organisation and personifies his father's belief that the next generation of leaders must 
be chosen from amongst the educated in the community. 
The success of the nineteenth century reform groups in Britain to some extent con- 
forms with Schiffauer's analysis of what takes place when rural Muslims migrate to 
the cities. They have developed a religion which is generally more systematic, self- 
conscious and based on abstract principles. Consequently it travels well, since it has 
escaped the rites and rituals that bind the believer to particular localities in the sub- 
continent. There are, however, other reasons for the reform groups' success in the 
new environment. They gain added legitimacy by their strong claim to be perpetuating 
the teachings of Shah Wali-allah, considered by many to be the foremost Muslim 
from the subcontinent. Shah Wali-allah had accused the Muslims of India of becom- 
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ing Indian rather than of identifying with the worldwide ummah. He struggled to 
create an integrated Muslim brotherhood which could call all others Muslims into a 
united religious social grouping. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
the reform movements continued and developed his ideas into a successful strategy to 
cope with the arrival of British colonial power and the subsequent loss of Muslim au- 
thority over India. In their efforts to keep Muslim society distinct from both the cul- 
ture and religion of the invaders and the indigenous Hindu majority, they constructed 
a wall of isolation maintained by the issue of thousands of fatwas concerned with 
minutiae of daily Muslim life as based on their interpretation of the Hadith. The 
reformers' main strategy was to turn their attentions inwards to the Muslim com- 
munity and to promote a renewal of Islam that was to be brought about by returning 
to the universals of the faith. Practically, this involved a propaganda war against 
rituals and customs regarded by the reformers as bida. Their ulema intensely disliked 
anything to do with British culture, language and education. In all these areas they en- 
couraged Muslims to assert their own identity and to perceive the culture of the in- 
vaders as jahiliyya. The reformers succeeded in making religion a badge of pride 
which provided a sense of community in the present reinforced by a sense of con- 
tinuity with the past. 
The most successful of these reform groups was the Deobandis. They made the 
madrasa or dar al-Ulum the centre of their institutional activities in order to create 
well-educated ulema who could preach the reform message effectively. They decided 
that the teaching within the dar al-Ulums would consist only of the traditional reli- 
gious curriculum taught through the medium of Arabic and Urdu. The Deobandi em- 
phasis on observance of correct custom and application of the Shari'ah in all areas of 
life made them deeply conservative. This they held in common with all the nineteenth 
century reform organisations. They made great use of fatwas, but this both estab- 
lished the boundaries of the reform message and also created the boundaries which 
differentiated those diverse Muslim points of view, from which grew the various 
reform movements. The Deobandi conservatism is combined with a sense of having a 
special understanding of the reality of God. This gave them a strong sense of unique- 
ness, of being special. Like the Barelwis, they saw themselves as the true Sunni Mus- 
lims, but the Deobandis condemned others as deluded or confused by adding customs 
derived from local culture to their practice of Islam. This conservatism extended to 
their attitude towards ijtihad. Threaded through these issues is the underlying concept 
of community. The Deobandis felt the need to define the limits of a group of Mus- 
lims where unity was secured by maintaining a shared correct perspective on all issues 
which affected the practice of Islam. 
The Barelwi fear that their children will be attracted by the reform message is not 
without foundation. It is not really surprising that the Deobandis have achieved a 
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degree of success in establishing themselves in Britain. Their sense of pride resulted 
in part from their rejection of local Sufi-based customs in favour of regulations drawn 
from authentic text. The Deobandis teach that believers have to be responsible for 
their own practice rather than relying on the intervention of saints and pirs. This shift 
places more weight on individual initiative and self-understanding. This change of 
emphasis should ideally be suited to young Muslims born and educated in British 
cities, and certainly the Deobandis appeared to be better placed to provide the reli- 
gious needs of the migrants within the context of their radically changed situation in 
Britain. They had already established an esteemed tradition which was able to provide 
Muslims with self-pride and identity by defining their morality and beliefs favourably 
against the materialistic culture of the British. To many of the middle-class Muslims 
who dominate the mosque committees of Britain, the Deobandi tradition of scholar- 
ship and religious orthodoxy seemed to provide the qualities required to establish and 
continue Islam amongst the migrants. The central concern of the Deobandis, to 
remove superstitions and folk-belief and to rediscover the pristine faith of Islam 
through direct study of the Hadith and the Qur'an, was ideally suited to the new 
status of the migrants. 
Many Muslims living in Britain feel themselves to be part of a community under 
threat. The subcontinent Muslim presence in Britain is a direct product of the colonial 
relationship, and British Muslims still find that they are a relatively powerless minor- 
ity in the midst of a non-Muslim majority. It is not surprising that Muslims turn to the 
reform movements for guidance. They have over two hundred years of experience in 
safeguarding an authentic religious expression and disseminating detailed information 
in religious matters to a community lacking the security of a Muslim state. 
There are, however, problems. Although the Deobandis claim to represent an 
Islam which is universal, in practice they are often closely linked with various class 
and ethnic groups in the subcontinent. The rivalry between the various reform 
organisations and the conflict which usually expresses itself as Deobandi/Barelwi 
hostility has little sympathy from the young British-born generations.. Many of the lat- 
ter regard it as part of subcontinent history, having no relevance to their own needs in 
Britain. As with the Barelwis, the concern which the Deobandi elders feel for the 
younger generation is more to do with perpetuating their own traditions than un- 
derstanding the new requirements of British-born Muslims. Although the Dar al- 
Ulums established in Britain have modified the traditional Deoband curriculum, it will 
still disadvantage young Muslims who wish to develop skills and careers requiring 
secular further education. The religious knowledge gained in the Deobandi dar al- 
Mums will help to preserve the tradition in Britain by providing ulema whose frame- 
work and life experience is here rather than based in the subcontinent. It will also 
supply ulema who are fluent in English, such ulema are, at present, in very short 
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supply. It is reasonable to assume, however, that the present demand for dar al-Ulum 
places is more to do with the Deobandi policy of isolation that originates in their fear 
of the influence of British culture. 
This fearful and defensive attitude has been considerably reinforced by the 
Deobandis' close liaison with Tabligh-i Jamaat. It must be acknowledged, however, 
that Tabligh-i Jamaat's worldwide activities help the Deobandis to widen their frame 
of reference outwards from the subcontinent to the larger Muslim world. The success- 
ful missionary activity of Tabligh-i Jamaat revitalises the nineteenth century reform 
message and carries it forward into the twentieth century. In Britain, Muslims in- 
spired by the Tabligh-i missionaries to return to the practice of their faith will do so 
in the Deobandi mosque network. In this way many British-born reverts to their faith 
may well find themselves joining Deobandi congregations without any knowledge of 
Deoband's history or significance to their parents. In the main, the first-generation 
migrants are more likely to respond to the orthodox conservatism of the Deobandi 
tradition, because although it frees them from the apparently outmoded folk beliefs of 
the subcontinent and links them to the wider ummah through the teachings of classical 
Islam, it still does not compromise their identity as a people rooted in the place of 
origin. For the first-generation migrants, the Deobandi reform tradition is familiar 
and authoritative. 
It is the twentieth century revivalist movements based on Jamaat-i Islami which 
seem to have the ability to adapt themselves most readily to the needs of British Mus- 
lims. Like the earlier reform movements discussed above they promote Islamic 
identity over and above ethnic or national identity, and their programmes seek to un- 
dermine South Asian customs and traditions which are not essential to the universals 
of Islam. There are, however, key differences. In the subcontinent they have already 
proved themselves more adaptable to political and social changes. This can be partly 
attributed to Maududi's insistence that the doors of i jtihad were always open and his 
subsequent critique of the conservative tradition-bound ulema. His belief in the use of 
individual reason to interpret the Qur'an and Sunna combined with his acceptance of 
scientific and technological development won over many middle-class educated young 
Muslims; they were also attracted by his critique of certain outward forms such as 
special dress and certain kinds of appearance. In spite of this tolerance, Mawdudi was 
not prepared to compromise his Islam or be apologetic. He attacked the Western 
ideologies of nationalism and secularism with intellectual vigour which pleased the 
newly rising middle-class professionals, who opposed the ulema and pirs on the 
ground that they were superstitious but also criticised the west because of colonial and 
post-colonial exploitation. Maududi's Islamic programme was ideological and political 
and called for a radical overhaul of Muslim society. 
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The flexibility which Jamaat-i Islaini has demonstrated in the subcontinent 
without giving way on fundamentals has intensified on its transposition to Britain. 
The insistence on the need for a Muslim state has been modified in this country and 
the focus is on dawah. Of greater significance is the fact that the organisations have 
become less dependent on Maududi's ideas and are prepared to question them when 
responding to new political, social or economic developments. He is now regarded 
more as a source of inspiration and it is the Constitutions of the various organisations 
which dictate purpose and functions. The activists of these organisations are con- 
sciously aware of the special needs of British-born Muslims. They are challenging the 
traditional ideas on the role of women, the use of regional languages to promote 
Islam, and the identification of ethnicity with religion. In this respect they are be- 
ginning to promote the use of English and some of the younger members are chal- 
lenging marriages on ethnic lines, insisting on the right to choose partners based on 
their practice of Islam regardless of place of origin. The magazines and pamphlets 
produced by the various organisations (i. e. Trends) address issues with with young 
British Muslims are concerned, especially in the area of social and political problems, 
and relate to both Britain and the world at large. In this respect, the Jamaat-i Islaini 
influenced organisations are encouraging young British Muslims to identify with the 
struggle of the Islamic Movement throughout the world rather than with the narrower 
awareness of issues originating in the subcontinent. 
In spite of this awareness of the issues facing young Muslims in Britain, and the 
need to develop an indigenous Islam without compromising fundamentals, there are 
still problems to be overcome. The twentieth century revivalist organisations develop 
into close-knit organisational structures in which members are carefully selected, and 
trained to ensure ideological conformity and the required level of religious knowl- 
edge. A high level of commitment is required. Although recognising a common al- 
legiance with other groups of similiar ideology which they refer to as the Islamic 
Movement, they distinguish true believers from their fellow Muslims. All too often 
the distinction is based upon allegiance to their own activities, which invariably opens 
them to criticism of being sectarian. The Jamaat-i Islaini organisations in Britain are 
still too closely connected with the subcontinent organisations to fulfil, as they claim, 
the needs of all British Muslims regardless of ethnic origin. In Birmingham, for ex- 
ample, a well-established Yemini community lives alongside the Pakistani migrants, 
but the Jamaat-i Islami organisations' activities are virtually non-existent outside the 
subcontinent communities. The high degree of qualitative selection for membership 
limits the numbers able to join as it does in Pakistan and India. Essentially the 
organisations attract the educated middle-classes, and in Britain the youth organisa- 
tions' members are almost exclusively university and college graduates. The emphasis 
on social justice and political issues attracts many young educated Muslims who feel 
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socially downtrodden both in Britain and the subcontinent. There are, however, 
dangers that the Islamic ideology of the recruits will merely be reactive. 
It is difficult to foresee the possible direction which Islam will take in Britain: to 
some degree this will depend on the attitudes of the receiving culture and events in the 
wider world. Certainly the demands of British-born Muslims will eventually be met 
by themselves as they succeed the first-generation migrants. At present the various re- 
ligious groups are still caught up in conflicts and divisions imported from the sub- 
continent, and their various activities tend to divide the communities along sectarian 
and ethnic lines rather than uniting them under the banner of Islam. Several of my in- 
formants from both Barelwi and Deobandi camps were aware of the need to trans- 
cend their differences, and recognised that their children would not be concerned with 
these issues. The Deobandi tradition which insists upon a chauvinistic attitude and is 
isolationist, stressing correct Muslim dress as based on subcontinent styles, length 
and styles of beards, correct Islamic manners and customs derived from nineteenth 
century Muslim behaviour, and which is in danger of making Urdu a sacred language 
used exclusively for worship and the study of sacred texts will need to adapt. Some 
informants felt that the Deobandi tradition was in danger, along with traditional 
Barelwis, of becoming increasingly sectarian and out of touch with modern society 
along the lines of orthodox Jewish groups, for example the Hassidim. Maulana 
Ahmad Shaheed Raza suggested that the main difference between the Bareiwis and 
the reform groups lay in their respective attitudes towards Muslim integration with 
non-Muslim cultures throughout the history of Islam's spread across the globe. He 
stated that the Barelwi attitude was that Islam had always been tolerant of indigenous 
culture as long as the principles of Islam were observed. Consequently, it had always 
adapted well. On the other hand, the reform groups attempted to separate out the 
principles of Islam and to discover the pristine universal faith which can be practised 
anywhere. If both these courses are pursued in Britain then many young Muslims of 
Barelwi and Deobandi parentage may find themselves arriving at a common ground 
in which they establish a truly British Muslim community for those who wish to con- 
tinue practising their faith. The danger will be that they will continue to maintain his- 
torical conflicts through familial loyalty even though no longer relevant. In this 
process of moving towards common ground there is no doubt of the crucial ideologi- 
cal role that will be taken by the activists of the youth movements influenced by 
Jmnaat-i Islami and by the Islamic Movement. Their membership may always remain 
small and elite, but their intellectual vigour and successful publications will pinpoint 
the issues that the present and future generations of British Muslims will need to 
tackle. This will be further reinforced by summer camps, conferences and rallies. 
They can supply the intellectual leadership required providing they can further 
develop flexibility and moderation. The foundation of the umbrella organisation, Is- 
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lamic Society of Britain, is of key interest in this context. Despite their assertion, 
however, to be independent of any sectarian influences, a comparison of their Con- 
stitution with those of the Jamaat-i Islami organisations in the subcontinent and 
Britain demonstrates the influence of the latter (see Appendices G-I). The claim of 
these groups to be moderate will be substantiated as the more reactive elements 
amongst the Muslim youth are attracted to more extreme organisations such as Hizb 
ut Tahrir. Their focus, however, on the ideological aspect of Islam rather than per- 
sonal piety may deny them popular support. The richness and variety of the sub- 
continent Sufi tradition may always be attractive to those seeking a more spiritual per- 
sonal experience. In this respect, Tabligh-i Jamaat, which combines the teachings of 
the reform movements with the personal piety of the Suf is may prove to be more pop- 
ular with the less educated as it is in the subcontinent. 
There are some interesting lines of research which can be pursued in order to 
throw more light on this area of study. It would be interesting to know how many 
young Muslims endorse the ideas put forward by groups such as Young Muslims UK 
without actually becoming members. More work also needs to be done on the direc- 
tion some Barelwis are likely to take under the influence of British pins. In this 
respect, the views of Pir Noor ul-Aqtab Siddiqi and the direction in which he is in- 
tending to take his father's organisation would be revealing. Very soon the first grad- 
uates of the Deobandi dar al-Ulums in Britain will be taking up their positions as 
imams. Again it would be interesting to discover how their attitudes compared with 
those of their elders. A substantial piece of work on the ways that `ummah' is used as 
a symbol to promote common Islamic awareness or group identity could be un- 
dertaken by someone with the linguistic ability to translate sermons delivered in the 
mosque by the imams. Finally I have not explored the impact of Islamic modernism in 
Britain on the development of the community because I did not feel that it came 
under the category of `sectarian', nonetheless its influence needs to be assessed. 
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Appendix A 
THE OCCURRENCE OF 'UMMAH' IN THE QUR'AN1 
Usage of 
Untmah 
M2 M3 
a) oneness of 
Ummah 
b) Messengers 
and agents of 
God connected 
with Ummah 
c) Ummah as 
appointed term 
d) Ummahs which 
have perished 
(judgement) 
e) Ummah as 
religion, connected 
with a rite 
f) Ummah as 
other godly people 
43: 33; 23: 52; 
21: 92 
43: 22,23; 23: 44; 
27: 83 
15: 5; 23: 43; 27: 83 
23: 44; 27: 83 
43: 22,23; 23: 52; 
21: 92 
23: 52; 21: 92 
16: 92,93; 11: 118; 
42: 8; 10: 19 
41: 25; 16: 36,63; 
16: 84,89; 11: 48; 40: S; 
28: 75; 29: 18; 10: 48; 
35: 24,42; 7: 168; 46: 18; 
6: 42,108 
41: 25; 16: 36,63; 16: 89; 
40: 5; 29: 18; 35: 24; 7: 38; 
7: 164; 46: 18; 6: 42; 13: 30 
41: 25; 16: 36,63,89; 
40: 5; 29: 18; 35: 24; 7: 38; 
7: 164; 46: 18; 6: 42; 13: 30 
10: 19 
16: 92; 29: 18; 11: 48; 7: 168 
35: 42 
g) Abraham as 
Ummah 
h) Muslims as 
an Ummali 
23: 52; 21: 92 45: 28; 16: 89; 16: 92; 29: 18 
7: 181; 13: 30 
g) Ummali as any 
belief system 
h) Urnmah as 
tribe 
i) Ummah as 
genus 
J) Ummah as 
set time 
43: 22,23 
28: 23; 7: 164 
6: 38 
11: 8; 12: 45 
Medinan 
2: 213; 16: 120; 5: 48 
2: 134,141,143,213, 
4: 41; 7: 159,160; 16: 120 
22: 34; 5: 48 
2: 134,141 
2: 134,141; 7: 160 
2: 128; 3: 113; 16: 120; 22: 34 
22: 67 
2: 134,141; 16: 120,121; 
3: 113; 7: 159,160; 5: 66 
2: 134,141; 16: 120 
2: 128,134,141,143; 3: 104 
3: 110,113; 16: 120; 22: 34; 
5: 66 
7: 160 
1. Table information taken from Denny, Frederick, Mathewson, 1975, `The Mean- 
ing of Ummah in the Qur'an', History of Religions Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 43,46- 
47, and the Holy Qur'an. The chronology follows Noldeke-Schwally. Where 
Richard Bell (1936, The Qur'an: Translated with a Critical Re-arrangement of 
the Surahs, T. Clark, Edinburgh) disagrees and places some Meccan verses in 
the Medinan period, the references are italicised. The Holy Qur'an chronology 
essentially agrees with Noldeke-Schwally concerning Meccan and Medinan 
surahs. There is only a difference concerning the period of the Meccan surahs. 
Appendix B 
THE CONSTITUTION OF MEDINA 
The Text of the Document 
Ibn Ishaq said: The Messenger of God (God bless and preserve him) wrote a writ- 
ing (kitab) between the Emigrants and the Ansar, in which he made a treaty and 
covenant with the Jews, confirmed them in their religion and possessions, and gave 
them certain duties and rights: 
In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate! 
This is the writing of Muhammad the prophet between the believers and Muslims 
of Quraysh and Yathrib and those who follow them and are attached to them and who 
crusade (jihadu) along with them. 
1. They are a single community (uminah) distinct from (other) people. 
2. The Emigrants of Quraysh, according to their former condition, pay jointly the 
blood-money between them, and they (as a group) ransom their captive(s), (doing so) 
with uprightness and justice between the believers. 
3. Banu `Awf, according to their former condition, pay jointly the previous 
blood-wits, and each sub-clan (ta'i f ah) ransoms its captive(s), (doing so) with 
uprightness and justice between the believers. 
4. Banu 'l-Harith, according to their former condition, pay jointly... (as 3). 
5. Banu Sa`idah... (as 3). 
6. Banu Jusham... (as 3). 
7. Banu 'n-Najjar... (as 3). 
8. Banu `Ainr b. `Awf... (as 3). 
9. Banu 'n-Nabit... (as 3). 
10. Banu '1-Aws... (as 3). 
11. The believers do not forsake a debtor among them, but give him (help), ac- 
cording to what is fair, for ransom or blood-wit. 
12. A believer does not take as confederate (halif) the client (mawla) of a be- 
liever without his (the latter's) consent. 
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13. The God-fearing believers are against whoever of them acts wrongfully or 
seeks (? plans) an act that is unjust or treacherous or hostile or corrupt among the be- 
lievers; their hands are all against him, even if he is one of them. 
14. A believer does not kill a believer because of an unbeliever, and does not help 
an unbeliever against a believer. 
15. The security (dhimmah) of God is one; the granting of `neighbourly pro- 
tection' (yujir) by the least of them (the believers) is binding on them; the believers 
are patrons (or clients-mawali) of one another to the exclusion of (other) people. 
16. Whoever of the Jews follows us has the (same) help and support (nasr, iswah) 
(as the believers), so long as they are not wronged (by him) and he does not help 
(others) against them. 
17. The peace (silm) of the believers is one; no believer makes peace apart from 
another believer, where there is fighting in the way of God, except in so far as equal- 
ity and justice between them (is maintained). 
18. In every expedition made with us the parties take turns with one another. 
19. The believers exact vengeance for one another where a man gives his blood in 
the way of God. The God-fearing believers are under the best and most correct guid- 
ance. 
20. No idolater (mushrik) gives `neighbourly protection' (yujir) for goods or per- 
son to Quraysh, nor intervenes in his (a Qurashi's) favour against a believer. 
21. When anyone wrongfully kills a believer, the evidence being clear, then he is 
liable to be killed in retaliation for him, unless the representative of the murdered 
man is satisfied (with a payment). The believers are against him (the murderer) 
entirely; nothing is permissable to them except to oppose him. 
22. It is not permissable for a believer who has agreed to what is in this document 
(sahifah) and believed in God and the last day to help a wrong-doer or give him 
lodging. If anyone helps him or gives him lodging, then upon this man is the curse of 
God and His wrath on the day of resurrection, and from him nothing will be accepted 
to make up for it or take its place. 
23. Wherever there is anything about which you differ, it is to be referred to God 
and to Muhammad (peace be upon him). 
24. The Jews bear expenses along with the believers so long as they continue at 
war. 
25. The Jews of Banu `Awf are a community (ummah) along with the believers. 
To the Jews their religion (din) and to the Muslims their religion. (This applies) both 
to their clients and to themselves, with the exception of anyone who has done wrong 
or acted treacherously; he brings evil only on himself and on his household 
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26. For the Jews of Banu 'Najjar the like of what is for the Jews of Banu `Awf. 
27. For the Jews of Banu 'Harith the like... 
28. For the Jews of Banu Sa'idah the like... 
29. For the Jews of Banu Jusham the like... 
30. For the Jews of Banu 'l-Aws the like... 
31. For the Jews of Banu Tha'labah the like of what is for the Jews of Banu 
`Awf with the exception of anyone who has done wrong or acted treacherously; he 
brings evil only on himself and his household. 
32. Jafnah, a subdivision (barn) of Tha'labah, are like them. 
33. For Banu'sh-Sutaybah the like of what is for the Jews of Banu `Awf; 
honourable dealing (comes) before treachery. 
34. The clients of Tha`labah are like them 
35. The bitanah (obscure) of (particular) Jews are as themselves. 
36. Not one of them (? those belonging to the urnmah) may go out (to war) 
without the permission of Muhammad (peace be upon him), but he is not restrained 
from taking vengeance for wounds. Whoever acts rashly (fataka), it (involves) only 
himself and his household, except where a man has been wronged. God is the truest 
(fulfiller) of this (document). 
37. It is for the Jews to bear their expenses and for the Muslims to bear their ex- 
penses. Between them (that is, to one another) there is help (nasr) against whoever 
wars against the people of this document. Between them is sincere friendship (nas'h 
wa-nasihah), and honourable dealing, not treachery. A man is not guilty of treachery 
through (the act of) his confederate. There is help for (or, help is to be given to) the 
person wronged. 
38. The Jews bear expenses along with the believers so long as they continue at 
war. 
39. The valley of Yathrib is sacred for the people of this document. 
40. The `protected neighbour' (jar) is as the man himself so long as he does no 
harm and does not act treacherously. 
41. No woman is given `neighbourly protection' (tujar) without the consent of her 
people. 
42. Whenever among the people of this document there occurs an incident (dis- 
turbance) or quarrel from which disaster for it (the people) is to be feared, it is to be 
referred to God and to Muhammad, the Messenger of God (God bless and preserve 
him) God is the most scrupulous and truest (fulfiller) of what is in this document. 
43. No `neighbourly protection' is given (1a tujar) to Quraysh and those who help 
them. 
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44. Between them (? the people of this document) is help against whoever sud- 
denly attacks Yathrib. 
45. Whenever they are summoned to conclude and accept a treaty, they conclude 
and accept it; when they in turn summon to the like of that, it is for them upon the 
believers, except whoever wars about religion; for (? =incumbent on) each man is his 
share from their side which is towards them. 
46. The Jews of al-Aws, both their clients and themselves, are in the same posi- 
tion as belongs to the people of this document while they are thoroughly honourable 
in their dealings with the people of this document. Honourable dealing (comes) before 
treachery. 
47. A person acquring (? guilt) acquires it only against himself. God is the most 
upright and truest (fulfiller) of what is in this document. This writing does not inter- 
vene to protect a wrong-doer or traitor. He who goes out is safe, and he who sits still 
is safe in Medina, except whoever does wrong and acts treacherously. God is `protect- 
ing neighbour' (jar) of him who acts honourably and fears God, and Muhammad is 
the Messenger of God (God bless and preserve him). 
(Taken from Watt, Montgomery W., 1972, Muhammad at Medina, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, pp. 221-225. 
Appendix C 
SALAAM 
(Translation of Na't written by Ahmed Riza Khan Barelwi which is sung by 
Barelwis after Friday Prayers and on special occasions) 
One hundred thousand blessings be on Mustafa, 
the chosen one, 
the essence of Allah's Mercy. 
One hundred thousand blessings 
be on the lamp of the prophets' company. 
Allah's Peace and benedictions 
be on the Sun in the Sky of Prophethood 
One hundred thousand blessings 
be on the Rose in the garden of Messagership. 
Eternal peace be on the Bridegroom in the Night of Ascension 
who was taken into the presence of God 
One hundred thousand blessings 
be on the Bridegroom in the company of Paradise. 
Countless benedictions be on the Lord of the poor 
One hundred thousand blessings 
be on our real wealth. 
By the light of whose face, dark hearts began to shine 
One hundred thousand blessings 
be on his radiant complexion. 
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His lips are the thin petals of the celestial rose 
One hundred thousand blessings 
be on their tenderness. 
His mouth utters the revelation of God 
One hundred thousand blessings 
be on this fountain of wisdom. 
His tongue is the key to the Divine Command, `Be! ' 
One hundred thousand blessings 
be on his mighty rule. 
Countless benedictions be on his honeyed speech 
One hundred thousand blessings 
be on his alluring eloquence. 
By whose consolation, the suffering laugh 
One hundred thousand blessings 
be on his manner of smiling. 
Given the universe as his possession, 
but he eats only barley bread 
One hundred thousand blessings 
be on the contentment of his heart. 
The hour the Moon of Arabia rose and shone 
One hundred thousand blessings 
be on that brightest hour. 
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Oh God! Oh God! 
the loveliness of his childhood 
One hundred thousand blessings 
be on his God-loved form. 
Ask Moses who he saw 
One hundred thousand blessings 
be on the boldness of the Prophet's eye. ' 
In short, 
One hundred thousand blessings 
be on every hair 
One hundred thousand blessings 
be on all his traits. 
Countless benedictions from his Lord be on him 
One hundred thousand blessings 
be on his companions and family. 
I This is a reference to the belief that Moses was not able to see God but that Muham- 
mad glimpsed Allah during the Mi'raj. 
Appendix D 
THE SPIRITUAL GENEALOGY OF THE NAQSHBANDI SUFI ORDER OF 
GHAMKOL SHARIF, KOHAT, PAKISTAN 
Oh Allah 
Bless me, for the sake of Your Greatness, 
For the sake of Your Chosen Prophet. 
Give me most perfect truth and sincerity 
For the sake of Hazrat Abu Bakr, 
The Truthful and Righteous, Commander of the Faithful. 
Give me divine love 
For the sake of the sincerity of Hazrat Salman Farsi, 
Companion of the Prophet. 
Give me steadfastness 
For the sake of Imam Qasim, grandson of Imam Jaafar, 
The Truthful and Most Pure. 
For the sake of the Guides, 
The Great Helper (Ghaus), the Axis of the world (Qutb), 
The most elevated of Sufi Masters, Bayazid. 
Make my heart beat with God's remembrance (zikr) 
For the sake of the modesty 
Of Abu'1 Hasan of Kharqan. 
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Free me from sin 
For the sake of Khajah Abu Qasim of Gargan, 
Who is filled with light. 
Grant me good deeds 
For the sake of Khaja Hazrat 'Bu-Ali of Farmid, 
Saint of the World. 
Grant me perfection 
For the sake of the most wondrous saint, the Leader, 
Khaja Abdul Khaliq of Ghadjdawani. 
For my faith, 
Let the holiness of Hazrat Hoja Muhammad Arif of Regawar 
Prevail upon me. 
Teach me the lesson of mercy 
For the sake of the limitless pearl, the man of truth, 
Hazrat Mahmood Al-Khair of Faghna. 
May your name be dear 
For the sake of the most honest 
Hazrat Khaja Azizana Ali of Ramteen. 
Fill my heart with love 
For the sake of that lover, 
Baba Samasee, Lover of God. 
Grant me perfect righteousness 
For the sake of the Pious Sayyid 
Hazrat Shah Kalal Mir, who is filled with generosity. 
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Imprint Thy Name upon my heart 
For the sake of the Saint of Saints, the exalted self, 
The King, Naqshband. 
Perfume my heart 
For the sake of the joyous face of 
Hazrat Khaja Ala-Udin of Atar. 
Turn me from idleness and neglectfulness 
For the sake of Memu Hama, 
And of Hazrat Yaqoob Charkhi, 
Helper of the destitute. 
Make me Your absolute lover 
For the sake of Khajah Ubaidullah, 
The Noble, the Free, the Beloved. 
Grant me abstinence too 
For the sake of the wondrous ascetic, 
Hazrat Khaja Muhammad Zahid. 
Make me special before the saintly ascetics (darwesh) 
For the sake of the saintly ascetic, Man of Cloak (aba), 
Khaja Darwesh Muhammad. 
Make me a fellow disciple 
For the sake of the confidant of God, 
King of Saints, Khaja Muhammad Baqi Billah. 
Grant me greatness in this world and the hereafter 
For the sake of the incomparable Guide of the Truth, 
Hazrat Mujaddid-i-Alif Thani. 
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Give me divine guidance to worship You 
And turn me away from evil 
For the sake of Muhammad Shah Husain, God's Trusted. 
Grant me Your Love, and the love of Mustafa (PBUH), 
For the sake of Sayyid Abdul Basit, 
Of the auspicious face. 
Oh Sustainer 
At my death may I die a believer 
For the sake of Muhammad Abdul Qadr, 
The Leader, may God have mercy on him. 
Protect me from the enemies of religion and the world 
For the sake of Sayyid Mehmood, 
One of the Blessers. 
Make my self (hal) in accordance with Thy commands 
For the sake of Khaja Abdullah, 
Leader of God's Friends. 
Fill me with light from head to toe 
For the sake of Shah Inayatullah 
The Sincere. 
Shlter me, Oh God, for I am destitute, 
For the sake of Hafiz Ahmed, 
The Gracious. 
I am no ascetic, no worshipper, only a man of God, 
For the sake of Abdul Sabur Sahib, 
The Faithful. 
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I am never separate from you, Oh God, 
For the sake of Raja Gul Muhammad, 
He who is filled with light. 
Cast an eye on my miseries, Oh God, 
For the sake of Hazrat Abdul Majid Sahib, 
One of the Sufis. 
My sins exceed all limits, have mercy, 
For the sake of Muhammad Shah Maluk, 
One of God's people. 
To my friends too, for the sake of Mustafa (PBUH), 
For the sake of Shah Nizam Udin, 
God's Beloved. 
Accept the intercession of these saints in my favour: 
Hazrat Muhammad Qasim Mori, 
The Great Helper of the World (ghaus), 
The most noble of Saints, 
The Beloved of God. 
Have mercy on me, give me blessings 
For the sake of Khaja Hazrat Shah of Ghamkol, 
God's Beloved, God's Great Helper, 
The King of Sufis. 
Give me burning love to overcome my selfish self (nafs) 
For the sake of Khaja Sufi Muhammad Abdullah, 
Slave of Mustafa (PBUH). 
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Appendix F 
THE CURRICULUM OF THE DAR AL-ULUM DEOBAND1 
The Eight-Year Course of the Arabic Classes 
FIRST YEAR 
Subject 
Conjugation - Grammar 
(Sarf) 
Syntax (Nahv) 
Arabic Literature 
Logic 
Chirography 
(Khush-navisi) 
Cantillation 
(Tajvid) 
Books 
Arabic Primer, Mizan al-Sarf and Munsha'ab (complete), 
Pan j Gan j (complete). 
Memorizing of Nahv-e Mir (complete); Sharh-e Mi'ata 
A'mil (complete). 
Rauzat al-Adab (omitting Bab al-Makateeb); 
Insha-e Arabi (Prose); Arabi ka Mu'allim (Parts I& II). 
Taiseer al-Mantiq. 
Correct writing and dictation. 
Exercise in cantillation in the first quarter of the 
Para-e Amm and traditional invocations. 
SECOND YEAR 
Subject 
Jurisprudence 
(1 iqh) 
Syntax 
Conjugation 
Arabic Literature 
Logic 
Cantillation 
Books 
Nur al-Ezah (complete); Qaduri (up to Kitab al-Hajj). 
Hedayat al-Nahv (complete); Al-Nahv al-Wazeh 
(Elementary Part I). 
'Ilm al-Sigha (up to Khasiyat); Fusool-e Akbari 
(from Khasiyat). 
Nafahat al-Adab (complete); Taturin-e Arabi. 
Mirqat and Tehzib. 
Exercise in the last one-third of the Para-e Amn with 
memorising. Jamal al-Quran (complete). 
Chirography Correct writing and dictation. 
THIRD YEAR 
Subject 
Quranic Exegesis 
(ta f sir) 
Jurisprudence 
Syntax 
Arabic Literature 
Logic 
Hadith 
Books 
Tarjumat al-Quran (Sura-e Baqrah) 
Qaduri (from Kitab al-Buyu till the end) 
Ibn 'Aqeel (up to 300 pages); Sharh-e Jami (verb and 
particle). 
Nafahat al-Arab (Prose). 
Sharh-e-Tehzib (up to Zabita); Qutbi (Tasdiqaat). 
Mishkat al-Athaar. 
FOURTH YEAR 
Subject 
Quranic Exegesis 
Jurisprudence 
Principles of 
Jurisprudence 
Rhetorics 
Logic 
Philosophy 
Hadith 
Books 
Tarjumat al-Quran (from Sura-e Aal-e ! Sian up to 
Sura-e Mariam. 
Kanz al-Daqa'iq (up to Kitab al-Nikah); 
Shah-e Waqaya, vol ii (up to Kitab a! 'Iraq). 
Usool al-Shashi (complete). 
Mukhtasar al-Ma'ani (up to the end of the second subject); 
Talkhis al-Miftah (only the third subject). 
Sallam al-Ulum (up to the end of Tasawwurat). 
Hadya-e Sa'eed (first halt). 
Alfiyat al-Hadith. 
FL TH YEAR 
Subject 
Jurisprudence 
Arabic Literature 
Logic 
Principles of 
Jurisprudence 
Beliefs ('Aqa'id) 
Rhetorics 
Books 
Hedaya: First Quarter; Second Quarter. 
Magamat-e Hariri (10 Magalas). 
Mulla Hasan (up to Jins). 
Nur al-Anwar (up to Qiyas). 
'Agidat al-Tahavi (complete). 
Al-Balaghat al-Wazeha. 
SIXTH YEAR 
Subject 
Ta f sir 
Usool-e Ta f sir 
Usool-e Fiqh 
Philosophy 
Arabic Literature 
Subject 
Fiqh 
'Aqa'id wa Kalam 
Ta f sir 
Books 
Jalalayn Sharif (complete): Two hours daily. 
AI-Fawn al-Kabir (complete). 
Husami (complete). 
Mebazi (complete). 
Divan-e Mutanabbi (up to the end of the rhyme Dal) 
Taturin-e Arabi (Arabic exercises). Insha-e Muhadatha 
(colloquial prose); Cantillation or Chirography. 
SEVENTH YEAR 
Books 
Hedaya (last portion): two hours daily. 
Sharh-e 'Aga'id-e Nasa fi (complete). 
Baizazi (one and a quarter portion of Sura-e Baqrah). 
Hadith 
Usool-e Hadith 
Fara'iz 
Optional Subjects 
Usool-e Ta f sir 
Usool-e Hadith 
Kalam 
Logic 
Literature 
Subject 
Hadith 
Mishkat Sharif (complete). 
Sharh-e Nakhbat al-Fikr (complete): two hours daily. 
Siraji (complete). 
Talkhis al-Itgan. 
Mugaddama-e Ibn Salah. 
Masamarah. 
Hamd Allah. 
Divan-e Himasa (Bab al-Adab wal-Himasa); Al-Nathr 
al-Jadid. 
EIGHTH YEAR 
DAURA-E HADITH 
Books 
Bukhari Sharif (complete). 
Muslim Sharif (complete). 
Tirmizi Sharif (complete). 
Abu Da'ud Sharif (complete). 
Nasa'i Sharif. 
Ibn Maja Sharif. 
Tahavi Sharif . 
Shama'il-e Tirmizi Sharif . Mut'attaayn (The Two Mu'attas). 
PRIMARY CLASSES 
According to the rules of the Dar al-Uluin, the completion of the following pri- 
mary course is necessary for reaching the above `Arabic Course': - 
The Quran Class: (1) First of all it is necessary to be able to read 
at least the Holy Quran. Before the reading of the Quran generally the primer which 
is known as Qa'ida-e Baghdadi is taught. The acquiring of the ability to read Quran 
takes more or less two years. 
The estimate of this period is for those small children who may have been started to 
read at the age of five years and may have average intelligence; otherwise intelligent 
children can complete the reading of the Quran in even less time. 
The period of committing the Holy Quran to memory is more or less three years. 
(2) After completing the Quran the learning of Urdu and Persian is also necessary, 
but the Department of Cantillation is also there for those children who wish to be 
trained in Cantillation and Orthoepy after having memorised the Quran. 
The Cantillation Class: 
In the course of this class, along with the practice of cantillation and orthoepy, the 
following books are also taught: - 
Jamal al Quran, Ma'rifat al-Wagoof, Fawa'id-e Makkia, Shatibia, Rai'yya, 
Tayyiba. 
This is a 2-year course. It has been made compulsory for every student of the 
Arabic class that, along with other lessons, he should take admission for one period in 
this department and should practice to read at least the Para-e Amm with cantillation. 
Urdu Diniyaat (Theology in Urdu): - 
(3) Next to the Holy Quran class is the Department of Urdu Diniyaat in which, be- 
sides the teaching of Theology in Urdu language, Arithmetic and other subjects are 
also taught. The course of this Department is spread over four years. 
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The Persian Class: - 
(4) Next to the Urdu Diniyaat Department is the Department of Persian in which 
primary books of Persian prose and poetry, Arithmetic, Geography, Hindi, and 
Arabic Grammar are included in the course. 
Endnotes 
1 All the information contained in this Appendix is taken from Rizvi, S. M., 1981, 
The History of the Dar Al-Ulum, Deoband, Vol II, Maulana Abdul Haq, Idara-e 
Ihtemam, Dar al-Ulum, Deoband, pp. 202-211. I have not included the Post-Graduate 
classes or the work of Departments which deal in Fatwa writing, Unani medecine, or 
Arabic Calligraphy. 
Appendix G 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMI JAMIAT-E-TALABA PAKISTAN 
Preamble 
Whereas we firmly believe 
That the creation, continued existence, sustenance and evolution of the universe 
owes itself to Allah, Alone, Who governs the cosmic order with absolute wisdom, 
and Who with His Sovereign Will reigns supreme over every atom of the heavens and 
the earth, Who holds the key to all the resources of sustenance, controls the reigns of 
life and death and is the fountainhead of all power and strength; 
That human life is not confined to this world, rather through the gateway of death 
man will enter the realm of eternal life wherein he will be required to render an ac- 
count of every moment and every act of his earthly existence to his Lord Who is 
aware of the innermost secrets of his heart; 
That true success does not lie in securing the ephemeral advantages and transient 
pleasures of worldly life; it rather lies in achieving success and salvation in the 
Hereafter and this can be attained only if one orients oneself to living a life in full 
conformity with the will of the Creator; 
That Allah has been raising His prophets (peace be upon them) and revealing His 
Books for the guidance alone as embodied in His revealed Books and in the life- 
example of His prophets (peace be upon them) can provide the norms upon which a 
sound system of human life can be founded; and that the Holy Prophet Muhammad 
(peace be upon him) is the Last Prophet and Messenger of Allah and that the Qur'an; 
the Book revealed to him and his inspired life-example shall continue to radiate guid- 
ance to all mankind until the end of time; 
That the only true course of life for man is to live in total submission to Allah and 
to follow the directives of the prophets (peace be upon them). In our view the wefare 
and salvation of man depends upon accepting the principles enshrined in the teachings 
of the prophets and human history testifies that whenever human life was founded on 
any other than those principles, man courted his doom. The root cause of all the rest- 
lessness found in the present day would also be the large-scale indifference to Divine 
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Guidance, and the only remedy is that man live in obedience to that Guidance; 
In view of the above, we, the Islam loving students of Pakistan bring ourselves to- 
gether under an organisation and hereby resolve: 
That our motto shall be to obey Allah and follow in the footsteps of His Mes- 
senger (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him). We shall renounce all forms of 
obedience, worship, and service to false gods and shall devote ourselves exclusively 
to obeying, worshipping and serving Allah. We shall look to nothing except the life- 
example of the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) as the 
main source of our guidance and inspiration, and shall do our best to follow the Mes- 
senger's life-example in all walks of our life. 
That by precept we shall call human beings to obey Allah and worship Him alone 
and to follow the life-example of His Messenger (peace and blessings of Allah be 
upon him) and that by our deeds we shall try to bear witness to the fact that obedience 
to Allah alone is the best course that all men ought to adopt; that the example pro- 
vided by the prophets (peace be upon them) lead to the true guidance for the entire 
human race and that the order of life based on obedience to Allah and observance of 
the life-example of His Messenger (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) is the 
best order of life for man; 
That all our striving shall be centred around one objective, namely, that the order 
of life which rests on obedience of Allah and observing the life-example of His 
Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) be established in the world; that 
the word of Allah be made to prevail; that the way of life prescribed by Allah should 
govern human life and that mankind abandon every form of servitude except ser- 
vitude of Allah and follow only the way of His Messenger (peace be upon him); 
That as a prelude to the global ISLAMIC REVOLUTION envisioned by us, a full- 
fledged Islamic system of life should be established in Pakistan. The objective for 
which Pakistan was established is to build a model Islamic Society and an ideal Is- 
lamic State in this part of the world in order that the principles of Islam be presented 
to the world in an authentic form. We do hereby resolve to bend all our energies so as 
to bring about a truly ISLAMIC REVOLUTION in Pakistan within the shortest pos- 
sible time. 
WE are committed to all this with the aim that our Lord be pleased with us, that 
we be able to obtain His gracious approbation, and that when we ultimately stand be- 
fore Him for His final judgement, we might be reckoned as worthy of Success and 
Salvation. 
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PART ONE 
Chapter 1: NAME, IDEAL AND PROGRAMME 
Name: 
Article 1. 
This organisation of the students of Pakistan shall be called the ISLAMI JAMIAT-E- 
TALABA PAKISTAN (hereinafter referred to as the `Jamiat'). 
Ideal: 
Article 2. 
The ideal of the Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba Pakistan shall be to seek the pleasure of Allah 
by ordering human life in accordance with the principles laid down by Allah and His 
Messenger Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him). 
Programme: 
Article 3. 
The programme of the Jamiat shall be as follows: - 
(1) To convey the message of Islam to the students, to induce them to acquire its 
knowledge, and to awaken them to the task of fulfilling its requirements in practical 
life. 
(2) To organise under the Jamiat those students who are prepared to strive for the es- 
tablishment of Islamic way of life. 
(3) To make effective arrangements for the study of Islam and modem thoughts, the 
building of Islamic character and the development of mental and physical qualities for 
those students who join the Jamiat. 
(4) To strive for the implementation of Islamic education system in Pakistan which is 
the most scientific, comprehensive and easy to establish; to make efforts to solve the 
problems faced by the students, to get their genuine demands fulfilled and to lead 
them in their collective problems. 
(5) To struggle for the establishment of an Islamic society in Pakistan which ensures 
-294- 
human welfare and is free from economic, social and political exploitation. 
PART TWO 
Chapter 1: MEMBERSHIP 
Article 4. 
Any Pakistani student who is enrolled in any educational institution or is a private stu- 
dent and who; 
(1) affirms the ideals of Jamiat as his own ideal of life, after fully understanding it; 
(2) fully agrees with the programme and the methodology of the Jamiat; 
(3) pledges to adhere to the discipline of the Jamiat in accordance with its Constitu- 
tion; 
(4) has such minimum knowledge of Islam as to enable him to distinguish between 
what is Islamic and un-Islamic and is aware of the limits prescribed by Allah; 
(5) performs the obligations enjoined upon by Islam in accordance with the Shariah 
and refrains from major sins; and 
(6) is not associated with any organisation whose principles and methods are in con- 
flict with those of the Jamiat; 
may be enrolled as a Member of the Jamiat. 
Article 5. 
The procedure to acquire the membership of the Jamiat, in accordance with the above 
Article, shall be as follows: - 
(1) Every candidate for membership shall submit the duly filled in membership appli- 
cation form, as per Annexure 1, to the Local President concerned, who shall forward 
the same, through the Provincial President and along with his own opinion, to the 
President; 
(2) The President shall have power to approve the membership application but, in 
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case of refusal, he shall consult the Central Executive Council; 
(3) After approval by the President, the candidate shall make, in a meeting of the 
members of the Jamiat, the oath of membership as provided in Annexure 4; 
(4) A candidate shall be entitled to the rights of membership, only from the date of 
his making the oath of membership. 
(note: in places where there is no local unit of the Jamiat, the above membership 
form shall be sent to the Provincial President who shall, along with his recommenda- 
tion, send it to the President. In such cases, the oath of membership will be made in a 
manner prescribed by the Provincial President. 
Article 6. 
Every member shall be required to bring gradually the following changes in his life: - 
(1) To mould his thoughts, attitudes and behaviour in accordance with the teachings 
of the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah; to adopt only the pleasure of Allah as the aim of his 
life, the criterion of his liking and disliking and the centre of his loyalties and become 
obedient to the commands of Allah by breeding out obstinacy and selfishness; 
(2) To give up friendship with those who are disobedient to and forgetful of Allah 
and establish relations with the righteous; 
(3) To develop his academic, mental and physical qualities for the purpose of estab- 
lishing Islam; 
(4) To present the message of the Jamiat to the maximum number of students and to 
invite those who accept it to make a collective struggle by joining the Jamiat; 
Article 7. 
(1) A member may be expelled from the Jamiat if: - 
(a) he violates (breaks) his oath of membership by deeds or words; 
(b) he acts in a manner prejudicial and harmful to the policy, the discipline and the 
religious or moral position of the Jamiat; 
(c) his words and deeds show that he has no interest left in the Jamiat; 
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(2) In case the local President finds that any member in that place has committed acts 
under Clause 1 of this Article to the extent that he ought to be expelled from the 
membership, he shall report the matter to the Provincial President who shall forward 
it, along with his opinion, to the President; 
(3) In case of a solitary member in any place, the Provincial President shall be com- 
petant to make recommendation for expulsion; 
(4) The final decision to expel a member shall rest with the President, but he must 
consult the central Executive Council in this respect. 
Article 8. 
(1) A member may submit his resignation to the Local President who shall inform the 
President through the Provincial President; 
(2) Deleted) 
(3) The membership shall become suspended upon receipt of the above information 
by the President. 
(4) The membership shall cease after the acceptance of the resignation by the Presi- 
dent. 
Article 9. 
(1) A member shall automatically cease to be a member upon the expiry of a period 
of six months from the termination of his studentship. This period shall be reckoned 
from the date of declaration of his examination results; 
(2) The membership of those members of the Jamiat, who go abroad for education 
shall be no more to exist. 
Chapter 2: ASSOCIATESHIP 
Article 10. 
Any student may become an Associate of the Jamiat who: 
(1) agrees consciously with the ideal and programme of the Jamiat; 
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(2) is endeavouring to fulfil the preliminary requirements of Islam in practice and; 
(3) promises to co-operate in the struggle for the fulfilment of Jamiat's programme. 
Article It. 
(1) Any student desiring to join as an Associate shall submit the Associateship Form 
as provided in Annexure 2; 
(2) The Local President shall have power to approve Associateship Form within his 
unit; 
(3) In places where there is no Local Unit of the Jamiat, power to approve associ- 
ateship shall vest in the Provincial President. 
Article 12. 
The Local President and the Provincial President in both the above mentioned cases 
under Article 11, (2) and (3), shall respectively have the power to expel any associate 
who does not fulfil the prescribed conditions for Associateship. 
Chapter 3: DELETED 
Chapter 4: ALUMNI CIRCLE OF THE JAMIAT 
Article 14. 
(1) This circle shall comprise of those individuals who have been affiliated with the 
Jamiat during their studentship or those who have developed interest in the activities 
of the Jamiat, after their studentship and submit their membership form to the Presi- 
dent of the Circle. 
(2) (a) The organisation of such individuals shall exist on an all Pakistan basis; 
(b) The Central Executive Council shall appoint any member of this Circle to be its 
President; 
(c) The President of the Circle shall, in consultation with the members of the Circle 
and the President, determine the structure of the Circle. 
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(3) (a) Two members of the central Executive Council of the Jamiat may be from 
among such members of the Circle who have been members of the Jamiat; 
(b) Deleted. 
(c) The President shall, in consultation with the Central Executive Council, determine 
the procedure for the inclusion of these members in the Central Executive Council. 
PART THREE 
Chapter 1: QUALIFICATIONS OF THE OFFICE BEARERS 
Article 15. 
(1) The following qualifications shall be kept in view while electing a President: 
(a) that he is neither a candidate for the office nor is making efforts to secure it. 
(b) that the members of the Jamiat consider him the best among them in respect of 
'taqwa', knowledge, prudence, decision-making, honesty, trustworthiness, and per- 
severence in the way of Allah; 
(c) that he is the best among the members with respect to administrative capability. 
(2) While electing members of the Executive Council, the qulaifications mentioned in 
sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above shall be kept in view. 
Article 15. A. 
(1) No canvassing shall be permissable in any elections; 
(2) No person shall propagate in his own favour nor shall he make others propagate 
for him, directly or indirectly; 
(3) Group formation and group activity shall not be permissable in support of or 
against a person; 
(4) To seek advice or to give advice in respect of an election shall not be deemed to 
fall under the definition of canvassing; 
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(5) The elections shall be decided by a simple majority of the votes cast 
Chapter 2: THE CENTRAL ORGANISATION 
Article 16. 
(1) Deleted; 
(2) The Centre shall consist of a President, Islami Jamiat-e Talaba Pakistan, a 
Secretary-General and a Central Executive Council. 
Article 17. 
(1) The members of the Jamiat shall elect the President through direct voting. 
(2) If an annual conference is going to be held, the ballot papers shall be issued to all 
members at least fifteen days before its commencement. The same shall be received 
back till an appointment hour on the last day of the annual conference and the name 
of the President as elected by a majority of the votes cast, shall be announced 
hereforth; 
(3) If no annual conference is going to be held, the procedure for the election shall be 
determined by the President, in consultation with the Central Executive Council; 
(4) The President shall hold office for a term of one year; 
(5) The members of the Jamiat may elect the same person as the President for more 
than one term. 
Article 18. 
(1) If at any time, for any reason, the office of the President falls vacant, the mem- 
bers of the Central Executive Council shall elect the new President with a majority of 
votes cast, but the same shall have to be ratified by the members of the Jamiat within 
a period of two months; 
(2) If the members of the Jamiat do not ratify the decision of the Central Executive 
Council by a majority of votes, then the President so elected by the Central Executive 
Council shall be deemed to have been removed from office and it shall he necessary 
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to elect a new President within a period of one month. 
Article 19. 
(1) If at any time it becomes necessary for the President, relinquish temporarily the 
functions of his office, he may, in consultation with the Central Executive Office, ap- 
point an Acting President; 
(2) Such appointment shall not be extended for more than three months. 
Article 20. 
(1) Before he enters upon his office, the President shall make the oath in the meeting 
of the members of the Jamiat or in a meeting of the Central Executice Council as 
provided in Annexure 5; 
(2) An Acting President (Article 19) shall make the oath before the President or in a 
meeting of the Central Executive Council. 
Article 21. 
The duties of the President shall be as follows: - 
(1) To consider as his first and foremost duty to attain the ideal of the Jamiat and to 
fulfil its programme; 
(2) To make his best efforts to run, maintain and protect the organisation of the 
Jamiat in the best manner in accordance with the constitution; 
(3) To always work in consultation with the Central Executive Council, except in day 
to day affairs or in discharging general functions of Presidentship or in matters re- 
quiring immediate action, unless otherwise provident for in the constitution. 
Article 22. 
The President shall have the following powers which he shall exercise directly or 
through persons under him: 
(1) All powers as are specified in the constitution vide Articles 5 (2), 7 (4), 14 (3) 
(c), 19 (1), 22 (1) (a), 24 (1) (a), (b), 24 (1) (d), 24 (2), 25,26 (2), 27 (1), 28,31 (2), 
35,36 (2), 36 (3), 37,38 (3), 40 (1) (a), 43 (2), 44,48 (3), 55 (2), 56 (5), 56 note 
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(d), 57,59 (3), 61,62 (3), 62 (5), 63,64,66; 
(2) All other powers that he feels necessary to exercise in performing duties to attain 
the ideal of the Jamiat, to fulfil its programme and to maintain its discipline in ac- 
cordance with the constitution, unless any such power is explicitly restricted or made 
conditional by the constitution or by the Jamiat. 
Article 22. (A). 
(1) There shall be a Secretary in the Centre of the Jamiat, to be called as Secretary- 
General, who shall be appointed by the President, in consultation with the Central Ex- 
ecutive Council, and who shall hold office till the President is satisfied with his work; 
(2) The Secretary-General shall be appointed from among the members of the Jamiat; 
(3) The Secretary-General shall be an ex-officio member of the Central Executive 
Council; 
(4) The Secretary-General shall be responsible to satisfactorily run the central depart- 
ments. His duties shall also include to maintain the discipline of the Jamiat, to su- 
perintend subordinate Jamiats and members and to keep the President fully informed 
of all affairs. 
(5) The Secretary-General shall be responsible to the President in the performance of 
his duties; 
(6) He may be removed from office only in consultation with Central Executive 
Council. 
Article 23. 
There shall he a Central Executive Council to assist and advise the President in the 
performance of his duties. 
Article 24. 
(1) The Central Executive Council shall consist of members elected both on all 
Pakistan and electoral units basis and nominated members. 
(a) On all Pakistan basis, the members of the Jamiat shall directly elect three mem- 
bers to the Council; 
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(b) On Electoral Unit Basis: The member of each Electoral Unit (Area) shall directly 
elect from among themselves one member to the Council for every fifty or less than 
fifty members; 
(b-1) The Electoral Units (Areas) shall be delimited by the President, in consultation 
with the Central Executive Council. 
(c) Deleted. 
(d) The President may, at his discretion, nominate members to the Council, but their 
number shall not exceed one half of the members elected under paragraphs (a) and (b) 
above; 
(e) In accordance with Article 14 (3), there shall be two members as representative of 
the alumni Circle of Jamiat; 
(f) Deleted. 
(2) The President shall be the ex-officio Chairman of the Central Executive Council. 
(3) If any seat in the Central Executive Council becomes vacant, it shall be filled 
within a period of two months; 
Article 25. 
After being elected, the members of the Central Executive Council shall make the 
oath as provided in Annexure 6, in a manner to be prescribed by the President; 
Article 26. 
(1) The Central Executive Council shall hold office for a period of one year; 
(2) If the election of a new Central Executive Council is not possible on the expiry of 
the term of office, the President shall have power to extend its tenure after consulta- 
tion with the Provincial Presidents; 
(3) In case a new President is elected during the term of an Central Executive Coun- 
cil, the existing Council, including the nominated members, shall continue to hold of- 
fice. 
Article 27. 
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A meeting of the Central Executive Council shall be called whenever: 
(1) The President deems it necessary; 
(2) One fifth of the members of the Jamiat make a written requisition to the Presi- 
dent; 
(3) One tenth of the members of the Jamiat make a written requisition to the Presi- 
dent; 
(4) in case of written requisition from the members of the Council or those of the 
Jamiat, the meeting of Council shall be held within one month from the date of 
receipt of such requisition. 
Article 28. 
The President may, if he deems it necessary, invite persons other than the members 
of the Council to the meeting of the Council but such invitees shall not have the right 
to vote. 
Article 29. 
The Central Executive Council shall frame the rules and regulations for its pro- 
ceedings; 
(1) At least two general sessions of the Council shall be held during a period of one 
year; 
(2) The announcement to hold a general session of the Council shall be made three 
weeks before the date of the meeting and the agenda shall be sent two weeks before; 
(3) If any member of the Council dissents with any decision of the Council and insists 
upon his opinion, he shall have the right, with the permission of the Council, to raise 
the issue again in a meeting of the members of the Jamiat. 
Article 30. 
The quorum for any meeting of the Council shall comprise of one-fourth of its mem- 
bers, provided there shall be no quorum for a meeting held after adjournment due to 
lack of quorum. 
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Article 31. 
(1) The decisions in the Council shall be made by a majority of votes. 
(2) The President shall usually accept the decisions of the Council, but he shall have 
the right to reject them. 
Article 32. 
If a conflict on any matter arises between the President and the Central Executive 
Council and none is prepared to accept the opinion of the other, the final decision 
shall be made by the members of the Jamiat. 
Article 33. 
The duties of the Central Executive Council, acting collectively, and those of its 
members, as individuals, shall be as follows: 
(1) To keep a watch on the President, the Jamiat and themselves and ensure that: 
(a) the affairs are being conducted in accordance with the correct principles of Islam; 
(b) as far as possible, suitable measures are being taken to attain the ideal of the 
Jamiat and to fulfil its programme; 
(c) the Constitution of the Jamiat is being followed. 
(2) To make every effort to rectify any defect they find anywhere in the Jamiat; 
(3) To consider as their foremost duty to render their advice wherever necessary for 
the benefit of the Jamiat; 
(4) To express their opinion without fear or favour; 
(5) To attend the meetings of the Council regularly or to send their opinions. 
Article 34. 
(1) The Central Executive Council shall have all powers as are specified in the Con- 
stitution vide Articles: 5 (2), 7 (4), 18 (1), 19 (1), 22a (1), 22a (6), 24 (1), (a & b), 
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29,35,42,57 (2), 57 (3), 58 (2), 63,64 (2), 66,67 (2), 68; 
(2) In addition, every member of the Council, in the discharge of his duties under Ar- 
ticle 33, shall have the right to raise questions, to discuss, to criticise, to call to ac- 
count and to freely express his opinion in any meeting of the Council. 
Chapter 3: PROVINCIAL ORGANISATION 
Article 35. 
The President shall, after consultation with the Central Executive Council, determine 
the organisational limits of the provinces and shall have power to alter these limits 
after consultation with the Council. 
Article 36. 
(1) There shall be a President, to be called as "Provincial President" after consulta- 
tion with the members of the Jamiat and while making such an appointment, shall 
take into consideration the qualifications provided in Article 15(1); 
(2) The President shall appoint the Provincial President, after consultation with the 
members of the Jamiat and while making such an appointment, shall take into con- 
sideration the qualifications provided in Article 15(1); 
(3) The President shall specify the procedure and manner in which the opinion of the 
members of the Jamiat shall be determined; 
(4) The appointment of the Provincial President shall be for a period of one year. 
Article 37. 
Before he enters upon his office, the Provincial President shall make the oath as pro- 
vided in Annexure 5, in a manner to be prescribed by the President. 
Article 38. 
(1) The duties of the Provincial President within his province shall be the same as 
provided in Article 21, for the Central Organisation; 
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(2) The Provincial President shall have the following powers within his province 
which he shall exercise directly or through persons under him; 
(a) All powers are as specified in the constitution vide Articles 7 (3), 11 (3), 12,26 
(2), 40,41,48 (3), 50,52,53,56, Note (b), (d), 57 (1), 57 (2), 62 (3), 62 (5), 65; 
(b) All powers required for performing functions required to attain the ideal of the 
Jamiat, to fulfil its programme and to maintain its discipline in accordance with the 
constitution, unless any such power is explicitly restricted or made conditional by the 
constitution or the Jamiat; 
(c) The Provincial President, if he deems necessary, may, in consultation with his Ex- 
ecutive Council, appoint a Provincial Secretary who shall have the same status as that 
of the Secretary-General in the Centre; 
(d) The Provincial Secretary shall have such functions and powers as may be 
entrusted to him by the Provincial President. 
Article 39. 
The Provincial President if he deems necessary, may, in consultation with the Presi- 
dent, constitute a Provincial Executive Council. 
Article 40. 
(1) The Provincial Executive Council shall consist of. 
(a) Elected members whose number shall be determined by the Provincial President 
after consultation with the President; 
(b) Members nominated by the Provincial President whose number shall not exceed 
one-half of that of members under paragraph (a) above; 
(2) The Provincial President shall be the ex-officio Chairman Provincial Executive 
Council. 
Article 41. 
The members of the Provincial Executive Council shall make the oath as provided in 
Annexure 6, in a suitable manner to be prescribed by the Provincial President. 
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Article 42. 
The Provincial Executive Council shall have the same duties and powers within the 
Province as provided for the Central Executive Council under the Central organisa- 
tion. 
Article 43. 
(1) The relation between the Provincial President and the Provincial Executive Coun- 
cil shall be governed by the Provisions of Article 31; 
(2) If a conflict on any matter arises between the Provincial President and the Provin- 
cial Executive Council, the matter shall be referred to the President. 
Article 44. 
In all disputes which cannot be resolved within the Province, reference shall be made 
to the President. 
Chapter 4: LOCAL ORGANISATION 
Article 45. 
(1) A local Unit of Jamiat shall be constituted in any place where there are more than 
two members of the Jamiat; 
(2) Where there are solitary members, they shall be directly responsible to the Provin- 
cial President. 
Article 46. 
(1) There shall be a President in every `Local Unit' responsible for its affairs, who 
shall be called as `Local President'; 
(2) The Local President shall be elected directly by the members of the Local Unit, 
who shall, while electing him, take into consideration the qualification as provided in 
Article 15 (1); 
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(3) The election shall be held in the month of October every year and shall be for a 
period of one year; 
(4) Same person can be re-elected more than once; 
(5) The members shall have the right to hold an election at any other time during the 
year if circumstances so warrant. 
Article 47. 
Before he enters upon his office, the Local President, shall make the oath as provided 
in Annexure 5, in a meeting of the members of the Jamiat. 
Article 48. 
(1) The Local President shall have the same duties within his Unit as are laid down in 
Article 21; 
(2) The Local President shall have the following powers within his Unit: - 
(a) All powers as are specified in the continuation vide Articles 11 (2), 12,49 (1), 
51,62 (3), 62 (5); 
(b) All other powers necessary for performing functions required to attain the ideal of 
the Jamiat, to fulfil its programme and to maintain its discipline in accordance with 
the constitution, unless any such power is explicitly restricted or made conditional by 
the Constitution of the Jamiat; 
(3) In addition he shall have such duties and powers which the President or the 
Provincial President may entrust to him. 
Article 49. 
(1) The Local President may, in consultation with the local members constitute a 
Local Executive Council and determine its composition. 
(2) The relation between the Local President and the Local Executive Council shall be 
governed by the Provisions of Article 31 and 32. 
Article 50. 
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Any disputes which cannot be resolved locally shall be referred to the Provincial Pres- 
ident. 
Article 51. 
The Local President shall have power to determine the details of the internal structure 
of the Local Unit. 
Chapter 5: ASSOCIATES' CIRCLE 
Article 52. 
In any place where there are more than one Associate and there is no Local Unit, and 
Associates' Circle may be constituted with the prior permission of the Provincial 
President. 
Article 53. 
The Associates shall elect a person most capable among them as President of the Cir- 
cle but ratification by the Provincial President shall be required after such an election. 
Article 54. 
Deleted. 
Chapter 6 FINANCE (BAITUL MAL) 
Article 55. 
(1) There shall be a `Local Baitul Mal' in every province and a `Central Baitul Mal' 
at the Centre; 
(2) All powers pertaining to the administration of the `Baitul Mal' shall vest in the 
President. 
Article 56. 
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The income in the `Baitul Mal' shall be under the following heads; 
(1) Donations from the members of the Jainiat and from other persons who have in- 
terest in its work; 
(2) Publications and bookstall; 
(3) `Zakat' and 'Sadaqat'; 
(4) Contribution from lower `Baitul Mals'; 
(5) Such other heads for which permission has been obtained from the President. 
Note- 
(a) (a) The members shall be required to undertake to give regular subscriptions as dona- 
tion every month. 
(b) Donations from outside the Jamiat shall be accepted only from such persons who 
are not expected to use their donations to influence or exploit the Jamiat. The Associ- 
ates' Circle will obtain permission from the Provincial President before accepting 
such donations. 
(c) Accounts of income from Zakat and Sadaqat shall be maintained separately. 
(d) The `lower Baitul Mals' shall pay such amount into the Provincial and `Central 
Baitul Mal' as are fixed by the respective Presidents. 
Article 57. 
(1) Every President from the `Baitul Mal' concerned shall have the power to incur ex- 
penditures on matters relating to the attainment of the Jamiat's ideal, the achievement 
of its programme and the running of its organisational affairs; 
(2) Local Presidents and Provincial Presidents shall be responsible, with respect to 
their respective Executive Councils and, in cases where no Executive Council exists, 
to the members, and also to the Presidents above them; 
(3) The President shall be responsible to the Central Executive Council in respect to 
the income and expenditure in the `Central Baitul Mal'. 
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Chapter 7 REMOVAL FROM OFFICE 
Article 58. 
(1) The Jamiat shall have power to remove the President from his office in the fol- 
lowing cases: 
(a) When he insists upon violating any clear injunction of the Qur'an and the Sunnah; 
(b) When his conduct is likely to cause serious harm to the Jamiat. 
(2) The Procedure for the removal shall be as follows: 
(a) The Central Executive Council may pass a resolution of no confidence against the 
President by a simple majority of its members, in which case the entire matter shall 
be placed before the members of the Jamiat with a period of one month. If a simple 
majority of the members of the Jamiat ratify the resolution of no confidence, the 
President shall forthwith cease to hold office. If more than one half of the total num- 
ber of members vote in support of the President, the Central Executive Council shall 
be deemed to have been dissolved and fresh elections shall be held; 
(b) The members of the Jamiat may move a resolution of no confidence against the 
President provided it is submitted to the Central Executive Council in a written form 
specifying the grounds and reasons thereof and signed by not less than one-tenth of 
the total number of members. This resolution shall be placed before the Central Ex- 
ecutive Council within a period of one month and shall then be dealt with in accord- 
ance with the procedure as contained in sub-clause (a) above. 
Article 59. 
(1) Deleted. 
(2) Deleted. 
(3) The President shall have power to remove the Provincial President from his of- 
f ice; 
(4) One-fifth of the total number of members of the Provincial Jainiat may make a 
request to the President for the removal of the Provincial President from his office. 
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Article 60. 
If a majority of the total number of members of a Unit pass a resolution of no con- 
fidence against a Local President, he shall forthwith cease to hold the office. 
Article 61. 
If the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which necessitate a change in the 
Central Executive Council or in its elected members, he shall place the issue before 
the members of the Jamiat. If a majority of the total number of members expresses 
agreement with the President on this issue, the Central Executive Council shall be 
deemed to stand dissolved. However, if the majority of the total number of members 
does not express its agreement with the President, it shall be incumbent upon the 
President to convene a meeting of the Central Executive Council within a period of 
one month and place his resignation before it. 
Article 62. 
A member of the Executive Council shall be liable to be removed from the member- 
ship of the Council if: 
(1) He ceases to be a member of the Jamiat; 
(2) He violates Article 33(5) of the Constitution twice in succession without any valid 
reasons 
(3) He resigns from the membership of the Council and his resignation is accepted by 
the President; 
(4) A resolution of no confidence is passed against him by a majority of the members 
who have elected him; 
(5) In case of being a nominated member, he loses the confidence of his President. 
Article 63. 
The President shall have power to dissolve or suspend a Local Unit after consulting 
the Central Executive Council. 
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Chapter 8 MISCELLANEOUS 
Article 64. 
(1) If in a province, no provincial organisation has been established, it shall be under 
the direct control of the Centre; 
(2) In such province, the President shall, after consultation with the Central Executive 
Council, establish a suitable organisation for conducting the affairs of the Jamiat; 
(3) In such province, the President shall exercise all powers of a Provincial Presi- 
dent as provided under the provincial organisation. 
Article 65. 
The Local units and the Circles of Associates shall obtain permission from the Provin- 
cial President for all important publications except ordinary publications, invitations 
and posters. 
Article 66. 
To achieve the objectives of this Constitution, President; Islami Jamiat-e Talaba 
Pakistan, shall be the sole authority to frame rules and regulations after consultation 
with the Central Executive Council. 
Article 67. 
An Amendment to this Constitution may be: 
(1) Passed in a meeting of the members of the Jamiat by majority vote, provided that 
the Notice for the Amendment is received by the President within a period of two 
weeks from the date of declaration of the meeting; 
(2) Passed by the majority of the total number of members of the Central Executive 
Council, provided that it is ratified by the majority of the total number of members of 
the Jamiat within a period of two months after its approval. 
Article 68. 
If a dispute arises with respect to the interpretation of any provision of this Constitu- 
tion, the matter shall be referred to the Central Executive Council. 
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Article 69. 
This Constitution shall come into force with effect from Ist November, 1952. 
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ANNEXUREI 
Membership Application Form of Islami Jamiat-e Talaba Pakistan 
1. Name ................................................................... 
2. Fathet Name ........................................................... 
3. Age ..................................................................... 
4. Class/Name of Educational Institute ...................................... 
............................................................................. 
5. Present Address 
........................................................... 
6. Permanent Address 
......................................................... 
7. Educational Resume. 
Examination Year Marks/Div. No. of attempts 
1 
............... ................ ................. ................ 
2 ............... ................ ................. ................ 
3 ............... ................ ................. ................. 
8. Future Career Planning? or 
Your Career Ambitions? 
9. Any Hobby? (Past or Present) 
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10. Your affiliation with the Jamaat. 
(a) Worker: 
(b) Associate (Unit)? 
11. Present Office .............................................................. 
12. Your Family Links With The Movement? 
13. Your Study of Islam? (Name of Books etc. ) 
14. Your study of other ideologies? 
(eg Democracy, Communism, Socialism, Fascism etc. ) 
15. Briefly describe your concept of Islam........... 
16. How has your study of Islam influenced your practical life? 
17. What is your understanding of the purpose of the Jamiat? ...................... 
What inspires you to become a member? .............................................. 
18. Have you fully understood what you shall have to adopt and to give up in your 
life after becoming a member of the Jamiat? ......................................... 
Signature ...................... 
Applicant ..................... 
Date ........................... 
I1 
ANNEXURE2 
Islami Jamiat-e Talaba Pakistan 
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FORM OF THE ASSOCIATESHIP 
I do solemnly affirm that I fully agree with the ideal and programme of Islami 
Jamiat-e Talaba Pakistan, and, promise my full co-operation in the endeavours being 
made by Islami Jamiat-e Talaba Pakistan to fulfil its programme. I offer myself for 
the Associateship. 
May Allah help me to fulfil these requirements of Islam. Ameen! 
Signature ................... Date......................... 
Signature of President ............... Date................ 
1. Name ................................................... 
2. Age .................................................... 
3. Name of Institution and Class ............................ 
4. Home and Postal Address .................................... 
Signature of President ..................................... 
Date ....................................................... 
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I ANNEXURE3 
(Deleted) 
`ANNEXURE4 
OATH FOR THE MEMBERSHIP 
(I bear witness that there is no God but Allah and that Muhammad (peace be 
upon him) is His servant and His Messenger 
I ........................... while taking up the membership of Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba 
Pakistan do solemnly affirm, making the Lord of the Universe as my witness that: 
(1) The aim of my life shall be to seek the pleasure of Allah by ordering my life in 
accordance with the principles laid down by Allah by His messenger (peace and bless- 
ings of Allah be upon him) and I am joining Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba Pakistan purely 
for the sake of Allah, in order to strive to achieve this aim. 
(2) I fully agree with the methodology and programmes of the Jamiat in accordance 
with this Constitution. 
(3) I will observe the discipline of the Jamiat in accordance with this Constitution. 
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I further affirm that to the best of my ability: 
(4) I will always be making efforts to mould my thoughts, attitudes, and behaviour in 
accordance with the teachings of the Holy Quran and the Sunnah and to adopt the 
pleasure of Allah as the aim of my life, the criterion of my liking and disliking and 
the centre of my loyalties. 
(5) I will always be endeavouring to gain knowledge of Islam and to develop my 
mental and physical qualities. 
(6) I will always be striving to convey the message of the Jamiat to other students and 
to organise them. 
(0 Allah! My Salat, and my sacrifice, and my living and my dying are all for the 
Lord of the Universe). 
May Allah help me to keep this pledge. 
A meen! 
Signature .................................. 
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ýANNEXURE5 
OATH FOR THE PRESIDENT 
I .......................................... 
having been appointed as 
President of Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba ................................. 
making the Lord of the Universe as my witness, do hereby solemnly affirm that: 
(1) I will consider as my first and foremost duty to attain the ideal and to fulfil 
the programme of the Jamiat. 
(2) I will follow the Constitution of the Jamiat and will endeavour to run, main- 
tain and protect the organisation of Jamiat in accordance with the Constitution. 
May Allah help me to keep my pledge. 
Ameen! 
Signature .................................... 
Appendix H 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UK ISLAMIC MISSION 
PART I 
CREED-OBJECTIVE-METHOD OF WORK-PROGRAMME 
Name 
Article 1: The name of this organisation shall be "The United Kingdom Islamic 
Mission", hereinafter called "The Mission". 
Creed 
Article 2: The belief in La haha Ill-Allahu Muhammad-ur-Rasool-ullah shall he 
the fundamental creed of the Mission i. e ILAH is Allah alone and none else: and 
Muhammad-ur-Rasoollah (peace be upon him) is Allalt Messenger. 
Clarification 
a) The first part of this creed ie there is no ILAH except Allah shall be understood 
to mean that Allah alone is the Creator, the Sustainer and Master of everything in 
heavens and earth. He alone is the Fountainhead of all laws - physical and temporal. 
None else shares with Him in anything and in anyway. 
b) The second part of this creed i. e. the prophethood of Muhammad (pbuh) means 
that, as the last Prophet, he was appointed to set the perfect example for the mankind 
in accordance with the authentic guidance and code of law which Allah, the Creator 
of the Universe, revealed through him. 
Objective 
Article 3: The objective of the Mission shall be to establish the Islamic Order of 
Life with a view to seeking the blessings of Allah in this life and the life hereafter. 
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The Method of Work 
Article 4: The Quran and the Sunnah shall form the basis of the Mission method 
of work. The Mission shall adopt only peaceful and constructive means to achieve its 
objective. 
Programme 
Article 5: The Mission, within its means, will try to carry out the following 
programme: 
a) The establishment of mosques and Islamic centres; provision of facilities for 
congregational prayers, study of Quran and Hadith and religious meetings. 
b) The making of arrangements for the education and training of Muslim children 
and youth. 
c) The setting up of reading rooms and libraries. 
d) The spreading of Islam through literature, lectures, and seminars. 
e) The providing of social and welfare services. 
f) The providing of help and guidance for students. 
PART II 
The structure of the mission will consist of Members, Associate Members and 
sympathisers. 
Article 6: Every Muslim irrespective of race and caste may become a member of 
the Mission provided that he: - 
i) affirms and declares his complete agreement with the objectives of the Mission; 
ii) pledges, after understanding the Constitution, that he shall abide by it and in 
conformity therewith, shall abide by the discipline of the Mission; 
iii) adheres to shariah obligations, i. e. regular performance of prayers, fasting, 
Zakat, abstinence from Kabair (major sins). 
iv) should not have such means of livelihood that may be defined as grossly sinful 
involving interest, alcohol, adultery, music, dance, perjury, bribery, misappropiation, 
gambling, etc. 
v) should not be a member of any party or organisation whose principles and 
policies are against the Mission creed, objective and method of work 
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Admission 
Article 7: Application for membership shall be submitted through a local Branch 
or Circle to the Central Office. The President, in consultation with the Central 
Shoora, is empowered to accept or reject such applications. 
Membership Responsibilities 
Article 8: It is expected of every member of the Mission that he will endeavour 
to: 
i) acquire sufficient knowledge of Islam so that he may be able to differentiate be- 
tween Islam and Jahiliyyah (ignorance of Islam) and become aware of HUDOODUL- 
LAH i. e. limits imposed by Allah to guide man in his daily life; 
ii) recast his thoughts and actions in accordance with the teachings of the Quran 
and Sunnah, change the object of his life, his preferences, his criteria of values and 
the focus of his loyalties and free himself of the idols of arrogance and egoism so that 
he is in complete obedience to the Will of his Sustainer. 
iii) Purge his life of such customs and traditions which are inconsistant with the 
Quran and Sunnah, so that his words and actions correspond with the Shariah. 
iv) purify his heart of those prejudices, interests, pursuits, disputes, and polemics 
which are based on selfishness and worldliness and which have no importance in 
Islam; 
v) order in, his dealings on the basis of righteousness, justice, and fear of Allah 
and uphold the truth without fear or favour. 
vi) except for the genuine needs of life, concentrate all his efforts on the objective 
of Igamat-e-Deen and he should disassociate himself from all those activities which 
may not lead towards this goal. 
vii) introduce the Mission, its objectives and programmes to his acquaintances and 
others wherever and whenever possible according to his ability. 
Conditions For Associate Membership 
Article 9: Any person who is not prepared to accept the responsibilities of mem- 
bership, can join as an associate member, provided he fulfils the following minimum 
conditions: - 
i) regular participation in meetings; 
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ii) regular payment of monthly donations; 
iii) sincere efforts in the performance of religious obligations and avoidance of 
major sins; 
iv) sincere efforts to fulfil the aims and objects of the Mission according to his 
ability. 
Admission 
Article 10: Application for associate membership shall be submitted through local 
branch or circle to the Central Office. The President in consultation with the Central 
Shoora is empowered to accept or reject such applications. 
Responsibilities 
Article 11: Every associate member is expected to try to fulfil the responsibilties 
as laid down in Article 8. 
Sympathisers 
Article 12: Anyone can become a sympathiser if he/she agrees with the objectives 
of the Mission and cooperates to achieve the same in any way. An appropiate form 
must be completed for this purpose. 
PART III 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE MISSION 
The Organisation 
Article 13: The organisation of the Mission shall be Shurd and for the purposes 
of administration it shall comprise the Central Office, Zones Branches and Circles. 
The Central Office 
Article 14: The Central Office shall consist of the following constituent parts: 
i) The President 
ii) Senior Vice President 
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iii) The Vice President 
iv) The Secretary-General 
v) The Joint Secretary 
vi) The Finance Secretary 
vii) Heads of Departments 
viii) The Central Shoora 
ix) The Administrative Committee 
Explanation 
The Secretary General, the Joint Secretary and the Finance Secretary can be appointed 
from amongst the members but the Vice-President shall have to be appointed from the 
members of the Central Shoora. 
The Congregation of Members 
Article 15: 
i) The ultimate authority in the Mission rests with the Congregation of Members. 
ii) The Congregation of Members shall be convened at least once every year in 
which membergreports shall be presented and the affairs of the Mission shall be 
critically assessed and the programme for the next year shall be finalised and ap- 
proved. 
iii) The Quorum for the Congregation shall be 33 % of total membership. 
The President 
Article 16: There shall be a President of the Mission. Members of the Mission 
shall be bound to obey him in what is Maaroof (legitimate). 
Requisite Qualifications for the Office of the President 
Article 17: The following qualities shall be kept in view in the election of the 
President: - 
i) He should have enough knowledge of Quran and Sunnah and be God-fearing, 
far-sighted, honest and sincere. He should possess the highest possible qualities of 
-326- 
leadership and be equipped to discharge his duties most ably. 
ii) He should neither desire nor seek office any office in the Mission. 
Duties and Offices of the President 
Article 18: The duties and power of the President shall be as follows: - 
i) The ultimate responsibility with regard to the running of the affairs of the Mis- 
sion shall be that of the President. The President, in the discharge of his duties, shall 
be accountable to the Central Shoora. 
ii) The President shall consult the central Shoora in formulating policy before 
taking important decisions about the Mission. 
iii) The President shall nominate an Administrative Committee from amongst the 
members of the Central Shoora. 
iv) The President, in the discharge of his duties and in the interest of the Mission, 
shall, within limitations imposed by the central Shoora, use assets of the Mission. 
v) The President shall take all decisions with regard to the following: - 
a. to accept membership applications; 
b. to suspend or expel members; 
c. to suspend or remove a President of a Branch or Circle; 
d. to appoint or dismiss the central secretaries or other staff; 
e. to operate Central Fund for various projects of the Mission; 
f. to extend the term of office of the Central Shoora. 
g. to convene the Congregations of Members. 
Election 
Article 19: 
i) Members shall elect the President of the Mission directly through secret ballot. 
The election shall be held in two stages. 
The first stage will be calledPrimary Electiodwhile the second stage will be 
calledFinal Electiod 
In the event of any member receiving more than fifty percent of votes in the Pri- 
mary Election he shall be declared elected as President. Failing this, the three mem- 
bers securing most of the votes shall contest the Final Election. The candidate receiv- 
ing the highest number of votes shall then be declared elected. 
ii) The term of Office of the President shall be two years. The same person may 
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be re-elected repeatedly for the office of the President 
iii) The Central Shoora shall appoint an Election Commission two months before 
the expiry of the term of office of the President and shall also frame electoral rules. 
iv) In the event of death, resignation, removal or for any other reason when the 
office of the President falls vacant, a by-election will be held within sixty days. The 
by-election shall be conducted in the Congregation of Members or through a postal 
ballot. 
v) In the interim period the Senior Vice-President shall be Acting President. 
Before assuming the office of President (whether Permanent or Acting) the in- 
cumbent shall have to take the oath of office. 
Senior Vice-President 
Article 21: There shall be a senior Vice-President of the Mission. He shall in the 
absence of the President exercise the same powers as laid down in Article 18 for the 
President. 
The Central Shoora 
Article 22: 
i) There shall he a Central Shoora to advise the President in formulating the party 
decisions. 
ii) The Shoora will consist of ten members elected by direct election on a regional 
basis by members of the region. In addition all Zonal Naxzimin will be ex-office 
members of the Shoora. 
iii) The President, in consultation with the Central Shoora may co-opt up to three 
additional members. 
iv) The President shall summon a meeting of the Shoora within thirty days of its 
election, when each member of the Shoora will be required to take his oath of office. 
v) The term of office for members of the Shoora shall be two years. 
vi) The President will convene at least three meetings of the Shoora during a year 
and preside over these sessions. Decisions will be made by a simple majority. The 
quorum for the Shoora meetings shall be fifty percent of the total membership of the 
Shoora. 
vii) In the event of disagreement between the President and the Council, the Con- 
gregation of Members shall have the final decisive vote. The losing party shall have 
to vacate office. 
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Duties and Powers of the Central Shoora 
Article 23: The duties and powers of the Shoora are as follows: - 
i) to formulate the policy of the Mission; 
ii) to appoint auditors for the accounts of the Mission; 
iii) to suspend the President of the Mission if two thirds of the Central Shoora ap- 
prove such a move. 
iv) to make neccessary changes in the administrative organisation of the Mission; 
v) to approve the Central Budget; 
vi) to review and critically evaluate the performance of the President and the 
heads of central departments. 
vii) to appoint Boards and Committees and frame their terms of reference for vari- 
ous activities of departments in the Mission, and for the management of its proper- 
ties. 
viii) to interpret the Constitution of the Misssion and this interpretation shall be 
final. 
The Administrative Committee 
Article 24: 
i) For the day to day administration, the President shall appoint a five-member 
Administrative Committee. It will consist of the President, Senior Vice President, 
Vice President, the Secretary-General, the Joint-Secretary and the Finance Secretary. 
ii) Meetings of the Committee will be convened by the President and when neces- 
sary. 
iii) Membership of the Committee will cease with the cessation of membership of 
the Central Shoora. 
iv) A quorum for meetings of the Committee shall be three. 
v) Decisions taken at the Administrative Committee meeting shall be relayed to the 
members of the Central Shoora every month, and later approved by it. 
The Secretary-General 
Article 25: 
i) The President, in consultation with the Central Shoora, shall appoint a 
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Secretary-General. 
ii) The Secretary-General will hold office till such time as the President is 
satisfied with his work. His removal from the office, however, shall be carried out 
inconsultation with the Shoora. 
iii) The Secretary-General will assist and represent the President in all matters as- 
signed to him. He will hold all powers delegated to him from time to time by the 
President. 
iv) The Secretary-General or the Acting Secretary-General shall take the oaths of 
office before taking up his responsibilities. 
The Joint Secretary 
Article 26: 
i) The President, in consultation with the Central Shoora shall appoint a Joint Sec- 
retary. 
ii) The Joint Secretary shall undertake such duties as are assigned to him by the 
Secretary-General. 
iii) During the absence of the Secretary-General, the Joint Secretary will he the 
Acting Secretary-General and shall have the same status. 
Heads of Central Departments 
Article 27: 
i) There shall be a head of every Central Department whose appointment will be 
made by the President in consultation with the Central Shoora. 
ii) He will hold this office till such time as the President and the Central Shoora 
are satisfied with his work 
iii) The Central Shoora shall define the powers and duties of the heads of the Cen- 
tral Departments and they shall be accountable to the Shoora. 
Branches and Circles 
Article 28: 
i) The President may designate any place in the United Kingdom as a Branch of 
the Mission where there are at least two members of the Mission. Where there is only 
one member, he may be assigned to the nearest branch or circle. 
ii) Each local branch shall comprise a President, a Secretary and a Treasurer. 
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Local members and associate members shall elect the President. Other office bearers 
will be appointed by the local President in consultation with members and associate 
members. The Central Shoora may, if and when needed, create other posts or appoint 
a local executive committee. 
iii) The President may designate any place in the United Kingdom as the Circle of 
the Mission where there is more than one associate member. 
iv) In places where there is only one member and several associate members the 
person eligible for the local Presidency shall be the member. However, other offices 
may be allocated to associate members. 
v) Local Presidents and Secretaries shall exercise the same powers and duties as 
the President and the Secretary-General at the centre, except those which are exclu- 
sively reserved for the Centre. 
PART IV 
WOMEN'S UNIT 
Article 29: 
There shall be a separate unit for women members and associate members. The 
President of the Mission, in consultation with the Central Shoora, shall have the 
power to provide an appropriate structure for this Unit and make changes therein as 
necessary. 
Duties of Women's Members and Associate Members 
Article 30: All women joining the Mission shall be subject to the same conditions 
as laid down in Article 6. In addition, their duties will be as follows: - 
i) to present the message of the Mission to their family members and ac- 
quaintances as far as possible; . 
ii) to propagate teachings of Islam among their close relations i. e. husbands, 
parents, brothers and sisters, and other family members; 
iii) to kindle the light of faith in the hearts of their children; 
iv) to encourage and assist their husbands, sons, fathers, and brothers if they are 
associated with the Mission; 
v) to try to reform with patience and understanding their husbands or guardians if 
they deviate from Islam. 
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PART V 
DISCIPLINE OF THE MISSION 
Removal from the Central Shoora 
Article 31: 
i) A member of the Central Shoora who resigns from the Shoora and whose resig- 
nation is accepted by the President, will cease to be a member of the Shoora. 
ii) A member of the Shoora who ceases to remain a member of the Mission shall 
cease to be a member of the Shoora 
iii) A member of the Shoora who remains absent for two consecutive meetings of 
the Shoora without reasonable excuse may be asked to resign. 
iv) A member of the Shoora will cease to be so when expelled from it 
Expulsion from the Membership 
Article 32: A member of the Mission may he expelled for the following reasons: - 
i) deviation, in words or deeds, from his oath of membership; 
ii) violation of the discipline of the Mission; 
iii) defiance of the declared policy of the Mission; 
iv) lack of sincere association with the Mission as may be manifested by his be- 
haviour; 
v) lack of interest in the activities of the Mission; 
vi) On discovering himself, or after receiving a report from a local President 
about a member being in contravention of Clause 1 above, the President, having con- 
sulted the Central Shoora, may expel a member. 
Expulsion from the Associate Membership of the Mission 
Article 33: An associate member may be expelled for the following reasons: - 
i) violation of the discipline of the Mission; 
ii) defiance of the declared policy of the Mission; 
iii) lack of interest in the activities of the Mission; 
vi) On discovering himself, or after receiving a report from a local President 
about a member being in contravention of Clause 1 above, the President, having con- 
sulted the Central Shoora, may expel him. 
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Suspension /Dissolution of Branches and Circles 
Article 34: 
For the purpose of proper discipline and administration the President may suspend 
or dissolve any Branch or Circle after consulting the Central Shoora. 
Limits of Difference of Opinion 
Article 35: 
A member adhering to the constitution may disagree with the decisions of the 
Central Shoora or the Congregation of Members regarding practical steps for the 
achievement of the objectives of the Mission - in such cases, he is required to keep 
himself within the following limits: - 
i) he will have a full right to express his views in membet meetings, but he may 
not use the mass media or any public platform nor will he have recourse to the legal 
machinery for this purpose. Furthermore, he shall not have the right to canvass indi- 
vidually among members; 
ii) he shall have to accept all majority decisions of the Mission as binding. 
However, he will have the right to disagree with them and try to have them reversed 
in the appropriate forums, while remaining within the prescribed limits. 
iii) a member or associate member who disagrees with a policy decision of the 
Mission shall not hold any office which is responsible for implementing that policy 
decision or act as any spokesman for it. 
PART VI 
FINANCE 
Article 36: 
There shall be a local baitulmal for every branch /circle and a central baitulmal for 
the headquarters of the Mission. The central Shoora may determine a separate baitul- 
mal to be unnecessary for a branch/circle or create a single one for more than one 
branch /circle. 
Sources of Income 
Article 37: The sources of income for the baitulmal are as follows: - 
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i) Donations 
ii) Zakat 
iii) Alms, welfare money 
iv) Contributions from local treasurers 
v) Income from the property of the Mission 
vi) Income from properties endowed to the Mission 
Powers of Expenditure 
Article 38: 
Baitulmals at the Centre, branchs or circles shall be under their respective presi- 
dents, who shall have the power to authorise expenditure on the projects of the Mis- 
sion. The President of the Mission and local presidents are accountable to the Central 
Shoora and local Shoora (or members and associate members collectively). 
Auditors 
Article 39: 
i) The Central Shoora shall appoint an auditor to audit the central baitulmal Ac- 
counts and for local branches and circles their local executive committees shall ap- 
point auditors. 
ii) Every year accounts of the Mission shall be audited and reports of the auditors 
shall be presented to their respective appointing bodies. Copies of audit reports of all 
Branches and Circles shall be sent to the Central Office. 
PART VII 
ASSESSMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY (TANQEEDIQMUHASIBAH) 
Right of Assessment 
Article 40: 
i) Every member of the Mission shall have the right to criticise the Central Ad- 
ministration in the Congregation of Members, provided: 
a) he does not exceed the limits laid down in the Shariah for such criticism: 
b) he does not exceed the limits of decency: 
c) he does not any other means harmful to the cause of the Mission. 
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ii) The above rules will also be applicable at the membergmeetings at local level. 
iii) Every member shall have the right to question the decision of the President or 
the central Shoora. Such questions should be raised at the central Shoora meetings 
through its members or in person at the Congregation of Members. 
PART VII 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Powers of Framing By-Laws 
Article 41: To fulfil the intent of this Constitution, the Central Shoora shall frame 
by-laws as necessary. 
Amendments to the Constitution 
Article 42: 
i) Except Article 2, which shall never be subject to alterations or amendments, this 
Constitution may be amended by a two thirds majority of members present 
ii) Proposed amendments should reach the Secretary General at least thirty days 
before any Congregation of Members. 
iii) Proposed amendments will be circulated to the members before the meeting. 
Exemption from Legal Proceedings 
Article 43: Except for financial matters, all actions taken in pursuance of the Con- 
stitution shall be outside the perview of any judicial adjudication. 
Property of the Mission 
Article 44: 
i) The right of ownership of all properties movable or immovable will be vested in 
the Mission. 
ii) The Central Shoora shall have full power to appoint trustees for the properties 
of the Mission or remove such trustees. 
iii) Trustees or administrators of the properties of the Mission shall have no rights 
of ownership of such properties. 
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iv) Deeds and other ownership documents of all such properties will remain in the 
Mission Headquarters. 
Article 45: The Mission shall be a member of the Federation of Islamic Da'awa 
Organisations. 
Date of Enforcement 
Article 46: This Constitution shall come into force on the 3rd Day of February 
1980, in place of the previous Constitution which is hearby replaced. 
Appendix I 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC SOCIETY OF BRITAIN 
1. Name 
The name of the organisation shall be "The Islamic Society of Britain" (ISB), 
hereinafter called "The Society". 
2. Aim 
To strive to make the individual and society live in submission to Allah, the 
Creator, in order to achieve peace and harmony on this earth and salvation in the 
Hereafter. 
3. Objectives 
(a) To invite all human beings to the message of the Creator. 
(b) To organise those who respond to this invitation into a community (ummah) 
which is disciplined and committed to God-consciousness. 
(c) To enjoin good for the benefit of humanity and to campaign against all forms 
of injustice and oppression in order to create a caring, just and God-conscious society. 
4. Programme Guidelines 
(a) To invite British Muslims to adhere to the principles of Islam and to promote 
unity among them. 
(b) To convey the message of Islam, and to establish cordial relations with non- 
Muslims in general and with the people of the Book in particular in order to promote 
better understanding of Islam in the multi-cultural society. 
(c) To provide social welfare services in accordance with the Islamic guidance. 
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5. Ultimate Sources of Guidance 
The Glorious Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon 
him) shall constitute the ultimate source of reference in all affairs of the society. 
6. Membership 
Any person residing in Great Britain may apply to become a member of the 
society provided he/she: 
(i) affirms his/her faith in Allah as his/her only Lord and in the Prophet Muham- 
mad (peace and blessings be upon him) as His last Messenger. 
(ii) makes sincere efforts to mould his/her life according to the teachings of the 
Glorious Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him). 
(iii) agrees to strive with his/her abilities and resources as much as possible to 
achieve the aim and to implement the programmes of the Society. 
(iv) agrees to abide by the Constitution and decisions of the Society. 
(v) refrains from joining or taking part in any anti-Islamic activity or supporting 
any such groups. 
The membership application will be approved subject to the satisfying of the pres- 
cribed regulations as laid down by the Shura Council from time to time. 
7. The Structure 
The structure of the Society shall consist of: 
A. A central organisation which will be comprised of: 
(i) The Shura Council. 
(ii) The Executive Committee. 
(iii) The Conciliation and Arbitration Committee. 
B. Local organisations. 
8. The Shura Council 
(i) Composition: The Shura Council shall be comprised of: 
(a) Ten nationally elected representatives. 
(b) Fifteen local representatives. 
(c) The consecutive Ex-Presidents as Ex-Officio members. 
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(ii) Powers 
(a) The Shura will be the supreme policy making body of the Society. 
(b) The Shura will be responsible for initiating and approving major programmes 
and plans and for approving the budget of the Society. 
(c) The Shura may delegate some of its powers to the Executive Committee. 
(d) The Shura may co-opt five members into the Council. 
(iii) Duties 
(a) The Shura will elect a Chairman from amongst itself, who will organise and 
conduct Shura meetings, which will be held at least twice every year or at such times 
as the President may deem necessary or upon requisition by one-fourth of the Council 
members or one-fifth of the members: The Chairman will ensure that agenda and the 
minutes of the meetings are circulated to all members of the Shura. The quorum for 
Shura meetings will be two-thirds of its members. The Council shall take decision by 
a majority vote. 
(b) The Shura after deliberation will elect the most suitable person for the office 
of the President amongst the ten nationally elected representatives. 
(c) The Shura will oversee the overall running of the Society. 
9. The Executive Committee 
(a) The Executive Committee shall be comprised of the President, the Vice- 
President, the General-Secretary, Bait-ul-Mal secretary, the other office bearers and 
up to three nominated members. The President will dominate the rest of the members 
of the Executive Committee in consultation with and approval of the Shura Council 
for one year. 
(b) The Committee will assist the President in the execution and implementation of 
the work plan approved by the Shura Council. 
(c) The Committee shall meet regularly and also as and when the President 
deemed necessary. The Quorum for its meeting shall be two-thirds of its members. It 
shall take decisions by a majority vote. 
10. Power of the President 
(a) The President shall: 
(i) have power to appoint ad hoc committees. 
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(ii) have power to remove any member from the Executive Committee. 
(b) Duties of the President: 
The President shall: 
(i) be responsible for overall conduct and direction of the policies and programmes 
and all affairs of the Society in accordance with the Constitution and shall be account- 
able to the Shura Council. 
(ii) present to the Shura Council policies and programmes of the Society for ap- 
proval. 
(iii) be responsible for the good conduct of the members of the Executive Com- 
mittee. 
11. Duties of the Vice-President 
The Vice President: 
(i) will be responsible to the President and will assist him in the performance of 
his duties. 
(ii) will exercise such powers as delegated by the President in the event of his ab- 
sence. 
(iii) shall be Acting President until a new President is elected in the event of the 
President being incapacitated to perform his duties or suspended or is removed from 
his office. In these circumstances he will exercise all powers and perform all duties as 
laid down in Article 10 of the Constitution. 
12. Duties of the General Secretary 
The General Secretary shall: 
(i) be responsible for the co-ordination of the work of the Central Office. 
(ii) be responsible for ensuring the taking of minutes of the Executive Committee, 
and its circulation. 
(iii) be responsible for all internal and external communications. 
(iv) be responsible to the President for the discharge of his duties. 
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13. Duties of the Bait-ul-Mal Secretary 
The Bait-ul-Mal Secretary shall: 
(1) formulate financial policies and plans of the Society. 
(ii) be in charge of the Bait-ul-Mal and maintain its acounts. 
(iii) present the annual accounts and the budget. 
(iv) monitor and supervise expenditure. 
(v) ensure proper collection of contributions and donations 
(vi) supervise and provide support towards local Bait-ul-Mals. 
14. Conciliation and Arbitration Committee 
(i) The Shura Council shall establish a Committee of three members for concilia- 
tion and arbitration for two years. The Committee will resolve differences and ar- 
bitrate in conflicts which may arise within the Society and which could not be 
resolved by the executive Committee or the Shura Council. The Committee will have 
jurisdiction to arbitrate in disputes in which the Executive Committee, the Shura 
Council or any of the office bearers of the Society may be a party. 
(ii) The Committee will be the competant body to interpret the Constitution of the 
Society and its interpretation will be binding. 
(iii) The members of the Committee will be ineligible to be members of the Shura 
Council or the Executive Committee. 
(iv) The Committee shall elect a convenor to whom all complaints in writing with 
all relevant documents will be presented. 
(v) The Committee will act independently and act as an impartial body and its 
decisions shall be binding on all members and Constituent bodies of the Society. 
(vi) The Shura Council will frame the rules of procedure for the Committee. 
15. Branches/Circles 
The work of the Society will be organised through branches or circles at local 
level. 
(i) The President with the consultation of the Executive Committee may desgnate 
any place in Great Britain as a Branch where there are at least ten members of the 
Society and which fulfils such other requirements as laid down by the Shura Council 
from time to time. A place where a branch cannot be established may be designated a 
Circle. 
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(ii) Each branch shall have a local President who will be elected in accordance 
with the provisions laid down in Art. 16. 
(iii) A branch will have a local working committee to plan, organise, assign 
responsibilities and review the work. 
(iv) The President with the consultation of the Executive Committee may suspend 
a branch or circle for gross violation of the Constitution. The Branch or Circle could 
be dissolved on the recommendation of the Executive and with the approval of the 
Shura Council. 
(v) The President of the Branch or In-charge of the Circle will regularly report on 
the activities of their localities and send its accounts to the Executive Committee. 
16. Elections 
(i) Elections to all offices shall be held every two years, according to the proce- 
dure laid down by the Shura Council. However, due to unavoidable circumstances, if 
the elections cannot be held, the President may extend the tenure to a maximum of 
three months. The tenure of the President can only be extended by the Shura Council. 
(ii) No canvassing in any form shall be carried out in any election nor shall 
anyone present himself/herself as a candidate for any post. 
(iii) The election of local president will be supervised by the Executive Com- 
mittee. 
17. Members' Convention 
(i) An Annual Members' Convention shall be held unless prevented by some un- 
avoidable circumstances. 
(ii) The quorum for the Convention shall be one-third of the total membership. 
(iii) The annual report of work of the Society shall be presented to the Conven- 
tion. Every member shall have the right, subject to Islamic principles and such rules 
as may be prescribed by the Shura Council, to raise issues, discuss, question, criticise 
and freely express his/her views in the meeting about the affairs of the Society. 
18. Discipline of the Members 
Any member shall cease to be a member if he/she 
(i) resigns and his/her resignation is accepted by the Executive Committee. 
(ii) in the opinion of the Executive Committee fails to fulfil any of the require- 
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ments as laid down in Article 6. 
(iii) indulges in gross misconduct, disobedience of the Constitution or persistent 
disregard of the discipine of the Society and his/her expulsion is approved by the Ex- 
ecutive Committee. 
(iv) before any action is taken under Sub-section (ii) and (v) the member con- 
cerned will be given an opportunity to clarify his/her position. 
(v) the regulations for suspension and expulsion shall be laid down by the Shura. 
19. Termination and Removal of Office Bearers 
(i) The President or any office bearer shall cease to remain as such if he resigns 
and his resignation is accepted by the Shura Council. 
(ii) The President or any other office bearer shall be liable to be removed by a 
motion of no confidence if: 
(a) he consistently fails to fulfil the requirements of discharging the duties and 
responsibilities laid down for such office in the Constitution. 
(b) he deliberately or consistently violates any major explicit injunction of the 
Qur'an and Sunnah. 
(iii) A motion of no confidence stating the reason thereof and signed by at least 
one-third of the members shall be given: 
(a) to the General-Secretary in case of a motion against the President. 
(b) to the President in case the motion is against a member of the Executive Com- 
mittee, member of the Shura Council or a local President. 
(iv) (a) A meeting of the Shura Council shall be convened assoon as possible to 
discuss and decide about the motion of no confidence. The motion against the Presi- 
dent will be carried if passed by two-thirds of the Shura Council. For others the mo- 
tion will be passed if carried by a simple majority. 
(b) In case of a motion against the. local President, the President shall convene a 
meeting of the local members to discuss the issue and the Executive Committee shall 
decide about the motion. 
(c) The President shall have the power to suspend or remove from office any local 
President with prior conciliation of the Executive Committee, if he becomes liable for 
such action. 
-343- 
20. Finance 
(i) The President shall be accountable to the Shura Council for all incomes and ex- 
penditures. The bank account will be operated by such persons as laid down by the 
Shura Council from time to time. 
(ii) The funds shall be acquired from the following sources: 
(a) regular contributions from members and donations from well-wishers of the 
Society. 
(b) other sources as approved by the Shura Council. 
(iii) The Shura Council shall appoint an auditor to audit the Central Bait-ul-Mal 
accounts. For local branches and circles their local working committees shall appoint 
auditors. 
(iv) Audited accounts for Bait-ul-Mal shall be presented to their respective ap- 
pointing bodies. Copies of all audited accounts of all branches and circles shall be 
sent to the Executive Committee. 
21. Amendments to the Constitution 
Except Articles 2,3,5, and 21 which shall never be subject to amendments, this 
Constitution may be amended by a two-thirds majority of the Shura Council mem- 
bers, provided the motion of the amendment is circulated at least two weeks in ad- 
vance of the Shura Council meeting. 
GLOSSARY 
Abbasid Dynasty of caliphs that ruled from Baghdad (750-1258CE) 
Adab 
Adhan/Azan 
Ahl al-Kitab 
Ahmadiyas 
Ideal behaviour, habit, used by Suf is to describe the 
practice of murids modelling themselves on the behaviour 
of the Shaikh. Also used to describe practices unique to the 
tariga. 
Call to prayer. 
People of the Rook; Jews and Christians. 
Movement founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908) 
whose members believe him to be the promised messiah. 
Declared non-Muslims by several Muslim states including 
Pakistan. 
Alim Singular of ulema, a learned man, usually used for a 
religious scholar or graduate of madrasa 
Alima a learned woman, feminine of alim 
Amir 
Ashraf 
Title given to a military commander, governor or prince. 
Used by Jamaat-i island for its leader. 
Claiming ancestry to the Prophet or his companions. Used 
in the subcontinent by well-born Muslims to claim ancestry 
to the original Arab/Central Asian invaders. Of high 
culture. 
Ayat Verse of the Qur'an. 
Azad Free 
Azraqites Sect of Khari jites. 
Baba father, old man, term of respect used for both sadhus and 
faqirs 
Bai`a(t) oath of allegiance taken to a shaikh on becoming a disciple. 
Bait al-Mallul Mal lit. 'house of wealth'; the public treasury in Muslim lands; 
used by some Muslim organisations for the post of 
treasurer. 
Baraka(t) `Blessing'; the power to bless inherent in a saint, his tomb, 
and his relics. Usually received through physical contact. 
Be-pir (Urdu) 'Without pir', cruel, heartless 
Bhuta (Hindi/Urdu) a wandering evil spirit, ghost of a murdered 
person; used by both Muslims and Hindus in rural parts of 
the subcontinent. 
Bida 
Biradari 
Caliph 
Chela 
Chishti/Chishtiyya 
Chutti 
Darban 
Darga(h) 
Dar al-Amn 
Dar al-Narb 
Dar al-Islam 
Dar al-ulum/Dar ul-uloom 
Dars i Nizami 
Dawa(h) 
Dhikr/Zikr 
Dhimmi/Zimmi 
Diwali 
Du'a 
Dussehra 
Faqir 
Fatiha(h) 
An illegal innovation in religion. 
(Urdu) `brotherhood'; extended kinship networks defined 
through male lineage. 
see Khalifa. 
(Sanskrit) A Hindu disciple of a yogi or guru. 
Sufi order, which in the subcontinent, traces its spiritual 
ancestry back to Mu'inuddin Chishti of Ajmer (d. 1236). 
(Bengali) Destructive Hindu godling. 
(Urdu) Doorkeeper 
(Urdu) Shrine to a saint and a centre for pilgrimage 
Abode of peace; territory not under Islamic law but where 
Muslims can live peacefully as a minority. 
Abode of war; territory not under Islamic law. 
Abode of Islam; territory under Islamic law. 
'Abode of Sciences'; higher institution for Islamic 
religious education. 
Curriculum devised by Farangi Mahal, Lucknow, in the 
eighteenth century 
The proselytising of Islam to Muslims and non-Muslims. 
The constant remembrance of God; used by Sufis to 
describe the continuous and rhythmic repetition of God's 
names which varies from order to order. 
Protected status given to the followers of revealed 
religions. 
Hindu festival of lights held in October/November. 
Prayer of supplication. Sometimes made through the 
Prophet 
Hindu Festival in September/October; known as Durga 
Puja in Bengal. 
A mendicant who lives only for God with a vow of 
poverty. 
The first chapter of the Qur'an. 
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Fatwa Opinion concerning Islamic law issued by an expert on the 
Shari'ah 
Fiqh Jurisprudence; the science of interpreting Shari'ah 
Fitna(h) Disorder. 
Giarvin Sharif Celebration of Sufi teachings often in praise of Abdul 
Qadir Gilani 
Hadhrat/Havrat Dignity; nearness; title for Sufi or Companion of the 
Prophet. 
Nadith Report of the sayings or deeds of the Prophet passed on by 
the Companions. The Hadith collections are second only in 
authority to the Qur'an. 
Hafiz Muslim who has memorised the Qur'an. 
Hajj Annual pilgrimage to Mecca which every Muslim should 
undergo at least once in his/her life. One of the five pillars 
of [slam. 
Halal Permitted 
Hanafi 
Hanbali 
School of Islamic jurisprudence founded by Abu Hanafi 
(d. 767) 
School of jurisprudence founded by Ahmad ibn Hanbal 
(d. 855). 
Haram Forbidden 
Hidayah Legal textbook brought to India by Maulana Buhari-uddin 
from Central Asia in the thirteenth century. It has remained 
the basis for Muslim law in the subcontinent. 
Hifz Traditional method of learning to recite the Qur'an in 
Arabic. 
Hi jab Headcovering used to maintain modesty by women. 
Hijra(h) The migration from Mecca to Medina in 622CE. 
Hookah Water-pipe or hubble-bubble used for smoking. 
Id/Eid Muslim holy days/festival. 
1 jma Consensus of the Muslim community as a source of law. 
1 jtihad Individual inquiry which goes back to the roots of Islamic 
jurisprudence in the Qur'an and Sunna and thereby 
circumvents taglid. 
Imam 
Imam Khatib 
Imam Rhatib 
Iman 
Islah 
Istafta 
Itikaf, <<t; k_, \ 
Izzat 
Jahiliyya 
Jamaat/Jami'at Uami yat 
Jawaz 
Jihad 
Jinn/d jinn 
Jizya 
Juba 
Julus 
Juma 
Junta Namaz 
Kafir 
Kalam 
Kalima 
Karama(t) 
Leader of the community; title given to founders of the 
four law schools; a leader of the ritual prayers; an 
honorific for a religious scholar; used by the Shia as a title 
for the spiritual descendents of the Prophet through Ali. 
Imam who leads the prayers. 
Qualified Imam able to preach and instruct. 
Faith 
Reform; the effort to maintain the original purity of the 
faith. 
Legal queries 
Retv,. k maintained in the mosque during the last ten days 
of Ramadan; S SQJ wLrV. 
Honour; family pride 
The time of ignorance first used to describe pre-Islamic 
Arabia. 
Party of God; Islamic group committed to Dawah 
(Urdu) Legitimacy 
Religious obligation to defend Islam if necessary by means 
of a righteous war; religious effort or striving. 
Beings mentioned in the Qur'an made of fire and air, 
thought to be able to interfere in human affairs. 
Tax paid by dhinunis. 
Cloak given by a pir to his successor or khalifa. 
(Urdu) Sufi procession usually held on Prophet's birthday. 
Friday; day of assembly in the mosque. 
Friday prayers. 
An unbeliever 
Theology 
The article of faith: `There is no god but God; Muhammad 
is His Prophet'. 
Supernatural power that enables a saint to perform 
miracles. 
Khali fa(h)lKhili fa(t) 
Khanqah 
Kharaj 
Khari fites 
Khojah 
Khutbah/Qutbah 
Kitab 
Kurta 
Langar 
Madrasa(h)/Madrassa(h) 
Majlis 
Maktab/Maktub 
Manqulat 
Ma'qulat 
Masjid 
Maslak 
Maulana/Mawlana 
Maulvi 
Mawali 
Milad an (e) Nabi 
Minbar 
Mi'raj 
Arabic term denoting the notion of deputy or successor. 
Formerly used by the rulers of the Islamic commnunity. 
During the rapid growth of the community into an empire, 
the term came to mean imperial sovereignty combining 
both political and religious authority. Also used as the title 
for a representative of a Sufi. 
Muslim hospice usually established by Sufi. 
Land tax. 
Early Islamic sectarian movements. 
Trading community or caste of Muslim converts found 
mainly in Sind or Bombay, most of whom are Ishmailis. 
Address or sermon given during Friday prayers. 
Book. 
Long tunic worn by Hindus and Muslims. 
Public kitchen in a khanqah or dargah. 
School for religious study usually attached to a mosque. 
The graduates are known as 'ulema'. 
gathering or assembly 
School for children to study the Qur'an usually attached to 
a mosque. 
Traditional sciences of Qur'an and Hadith. 
Rational sciences of logic, philosophy, etc. 
mosque 
School of Islamic thought. 
Title given to religious scholars. 
As above 
Client or freedman; applied to non-Arab Muslims when 
Islam first spread from the Arabian peninsula. 
Bithday of the Prophet. 
High seat or chair in the mosque from which the sermon is 
delivered. 
'ascension'; The Prophet's journey to heaven where he is 
supposed to have entered the presence of God. 
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Moharram/Muharram 
Mufti 
Mughal 
Muha jir 
Mujaddid 
Mujahiddin 
Mu jawar/Mu jawir 
Mulk 
Murid 
Murji'ite 
Mushriq 
Mutakullum 
Nabi 
Nadhir 
Nafs 
Najdites 
Namaz 
Naqshbandi 
Na't 
Nawwab 
Nizam 
Nur/Noor 
Noor e Muhammadi 
Paasban 
Festival to mark the tragedy at Kerbala. 
Specialist in Islamic law able to issue Fatwas. 
Muslim dynasty in India established in 1526CE. 
Indian Muslims who migrated to Pakistan on Partition in 
1947. 
Person believed to renew the Muslim faith at the beginning . 
of each century. 
Those engaged in Jihad. 
Attendants at a shrine. 
Form of ownership in Islamic law corresponding 
approximately to modem freehold. 
Follower of a Pir or Shaikh. 
Early group who believed in `postponement' - leaving the 
punishment of sins to God. 
Idolater. 
(Urdu) Speaker 
Prophet. 
A warner. 
Self 
Sect of Kharijites. 
(Urdu) Prayers. 
Sufi order introduced to India by Khwaja Baqi Billah 
(b. 1563). 
(Urdu) Song which praises the Prophet. 
Originally used for for the viceroy or governor of a 
province in the Mughal empire, but later used simply as a 
title. 
Governor, particularly the Viveroy of the Deccan. 
Light; light of God. 
(Urdu) Sufi doctrine which regards Muhammad as an 
emanation of God's Light 
(Urdu) Social work programme. 
Pir 
Pirbhai 
Pirzada 
Purdah 
Qadi 
Qadiani 
Qadiriyya 
Qawwali 
Qibla 
Qiyas 
Quraysh 
Qush 
Qutb 
Rafiq 
Rahbar 
Ramadan 
Rashidun 
Rasul 
Riba 
Risala(h) 
Sadhu 
Sahib 
Sajjada nashin 
Sala fi 
Salat 
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(Urdu) Saint, Sufi teacher. 
(Urdu) fellow-follower of a pir. 
(Urdu) Pl. pirzade; descendents of a saint in charge of the 
shrine. 
Veiling and seclusion of women. 
Muslim judge who administers Islamic law. 
Another name for the Ahmadiyya. 
Sufi order founded by Abdul Qadir Gilani. 
Devotional singing. 
The direction of Mecca faced during prayer. 
The Process of applying Hadith and Qur'an to new 
situations by the use of analogy. 
The tribe the Prophet was born into. 
Missionary tours undertaken by Tabligh-i Jamaat. 
The head of an invisible hierarchy of saints upon whom the 
order of the universe depends. 
Jamaat-i Islami worker 
(Urdu) Guide 
Ninth month; the month of fasting; one of the five pillars. 
The first four rightly-guided Caliphs. 
Prophet who comes with a Book of revelation. 
Interest, forbidden in Islam. 
Those who accepted the message. 
(Hindi) Hindu wandering holy man. 
(Urdu) Honorific applied to titles and names. 
'He who sits on the mat'; the ancestral successor to a pir. 
Movement founded by Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905). 
Influenced Islah and nationalist groups in North Africa. 
Prayer. 
Sama 
Sanussiyyah 
Sasthi 
Saiyid/Sayyid 
Sha fi `i 
Shahadah 
Shahid 
Shaikh al Hadith 
Shalwar Kamis 
Shari'ah 
Sheikh/Shaikh 
Shi'a 
Shirk 
Shura 
Silsilah 
Sirah/Seerah 
Sufi 
Sunna 
Sunni 
Sura 
Taffaqa 
Tafsir 
Tajdid 
Listening to music in Sufi circle. 
Reform Sufi tariqa popular in North Africa. Founded by 
al-Sanusi (1486). 
(Hindi) Hindu deity of children. 
Descendant of the Prophet. 
School of jurisprudence named after founder al-Shafi'i 
(d. 820CE). 
Witnessing the kalima to become a Muslim. 
Witness; martyr. 
Senior teacher of Hadith in dar al Ulum 
Tunic and baggy trousers worn by Muslims in the 
subcontinent, especially Punjab. 
Islamic law codified into different schools in the middle 
ages. 
Old man, Sufi teacher, saint. 
The Party of All. Minority tradition which believes the 
succession came to Ali not Abu Bakr. 
Associating another with God. The most serious sin in 
Islam. 
Council. 
Sequence of Sufi masters reaching back to the Prophet. 
Corpus of tradition concerning the Prophet. 
Muslim mystic 
Custom or tradition associated with Muhammad. 
`One who follows the beaten path'; the largest group of 
Muslims. 
Chapter of the Qur'an. 
Legal deduction. 
Explanation; commentary on the Qur'an and science of its 
interpretation. 
Renewal 
Tajwid (Urdu) Study of the correct pronunciation of Urdu. 
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Taqlid 
Tarbiyah 
Tariqa 
Tasawuf 
Tawhid 
Ta'widh/Ta'wiz 
Ta'wil 
Tobarrak 
Ulema 
Umam 
Umayyad 
Umnah 
Ummah Wusta 
Umrah 
Unani 
Urs 
Wahhabi 
Wali 
Watan 
Wataniyyah 
Wazir 
Yathrib 
The principle of following the established doctrines of the 
schools of Islamic law. 
Islamic training programmes. 
The Sufi path; the way; a school of guidance along that 
path 
Spiritual disciplines of the Sufis 
The Divine Unity; the assertion of oneness. 
Amulets or bracelets containing verses of the Qur'an given 
to cure diseases or bring good fortune. 
Allegorical exegesis of the Qur'an. 
(Urdu) Blessed 
Plural of Alim. 
Plural of Ummah 
First Arab Muslim dynasty founded in 661CE. 
The universal Muslim community. 
The ideal or model Muslim community. 
Lesser pilgrimage to Mecca which can be performed at any 
time. 
Traditional medicine practiced by Muslims in subcontinent. 
Anniverary of a saint's death which is regarded as 
celebrating their union with God. 
Follower of the movement founded by Abdul Wahhab 
(1703-1787). 
Friend of God; a saint. 
Fatherland. 
Patriotism. 
Chief Minister of the Delhi Sultanates; sometimes used to 
describe an official in charge of finances. 
Medina 
Zakat Alms-giving, one of the five pillars of Islam. 
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